HARVARD^ 
HISTORICAL    STUDIES 


PUBLISHED   UNDER  THE  DIRECTION  OF  THE    DEPARTMENT  OF 
HISTORY  AND  GOVERNMENT  FROM  THE  INCOME  OF 


1benr\>  Warren  {Torre\>  jfunb 


VOLUME  XI 


THE  -CIVIL  SERVICE 


AND 


PATRONAGE' 


BY 


CARL    RUSSELL   FISH,    PH.D. 

ASSISTANT  PROFESSOR   OF  AMERICAN    HISTORY  IN  THE 

UNIVERSITY  OF  WISCONSIN 
SOMETIME  AUSTIN  TEACHING  FELLOW  IN   HARVARD  UNIVERSITY 


NEW  YORK 
LONGMANS,  GREEN,  AND  CO. 

LONDON  AND  BOMBAY 


REESE 


Copyright,  1904, 
BY  THE  PRESIDENT  AND  FELLOWS  OF  HARVARD  COLLEGE. 


Nortoooto 

J.  S.  Gushing  &  Co.  —Berwick  &  Smith  Co. 
Norwood,  Mass.,  U.S.A. 


PREFACE. 

THIS  work  is  the  outgrowth  of  a  statistical  study  of 
removals  from  office  begun  in  the  Seminary  of  American 
History  and  Institutions  at  Harvard  University.  The 
results  of  this  preliminary  study  were  published  in  the 
Annual  Report  of  the  American  Historical  Association 
for  1899.  The  interest  thus  aroused  led  to  a  broader 
investigation,  which  has  been  continued  for  about  five 
years.  From  materials  accumulated  not  strictly  perti- 
nent to  the  subject  of  this  volume,  an  article  on  "  Lincoln 
and  the  Patronage  "  was  contributed  to  the  American 
Historical  Review  for  October,  1902. 

The  subject  which  this  book  attempts  to  treat  defies 
concise  definition ;  and  as  the  boundaries  have  perhaps 
not  been  drawn  so  as  to  satisfy  all  who  will  be  led  by  its 
title  to  refer  to  it,  a  few  words  are  necessary  to  guide 
those  who  use  it.  The  leading  words  of  the  title  limit 
each  other ;  it  is  a  history  of  the  civil  service  from  the 
standpoint  of  the  patronage,  and  of  the  patronage  with 
regard  solely  to  the  public  offices.  The  aim  has  been  to 
give  fully  the  development  of  policy  and  practice  as  to 
the  relation  of  these  two  elements  of  our  public  life,  from 
the  foundation  of  the  government  to  the  present  day. 
In  addition,  it  has  been  thought  wise  to  outline  the  dis- 


vi  PREFACE. 

tinguishing  policy  of  each  successive  administration, 
though  in  some  instances  this  has  been  done  very 
briefly;  in  the  case  of  a  few  very  important  administra- 
tions the  subject  has  been  treated  still  more  broadly,  so 
as  to  include  practice  as  well  as  policy.  The  work  of 
Miss  Salmon  on  the  Appointing  Power  of  the  President 
has  left  me  free  to  leave  out  constitutional  questions, 
except  when  they  become  questions  of  politics ;  and  the 
problem  of  civil  service  reform  has  been  treated  histori- 
cally, and  not  from  the  standpoint  of  expediency. 

I  have  had  access  to  the  collections  of  the  Harvard 
College  Library  and  the  libraries  of  Boston,  of  Brown 
University,  the  American  Antiquarian  Society  at  Wor- 
cester, the  Rhode  Island  Historical  Society,  the  Wis- 
consin Historical  Society,  the  Library  of  Congress,  and 
the  departmental  libraries  at  Washington ;  and  I  desire 
to  express  my  thanks  to  the  officials  of  these  institutions 
for  their  uniform  interest  and  assistance.  Thanks  are 
particularly  due  to  the  owners  of  private  collections  of 
manuscripts  and  newspapers,  whose  courtesy  in  opening 
them  for  research  evinces  the  general  interest  felt  in 
historical  studies.  Most  of  all,  I  wish  to  record  my 
appreciation  of  the  kindness  of  Professor  Albert  Bush- 
nell  Hart  and  Professor  Edward  Channing,  to  whose 
inspiration  and  guidance  the  inception  and  development 
of  this  monograph  are  chiefly  to  be  attributed. 


CARL   RUSSELL  FISH. 


MADISON,  WISCONSIN, 
May  30,  1904. 


CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  I. 

ESTABLISHMENT  OF  THE  NATIONAL  CIVIL  SERVICE, 
1789-1801. 

PAGE 

CONSTITUTIONAL  PROVISIONS i 

POPULAR  DISCUSSION 3 

PATRONAGE  AND  THE  ADOPTION  OF  THE  CONSTITUTION    ...  4 

WASHINGTON  AND  QUALIFICATIONS  FOR  OFFICE        ....  6 

FITNESS 7 

GEOGRAPHY 8 

LOCAL  STANDING 9 

POLITICAL  OPINION 14 

EXTENT  OF  WASHINGTON'S  CONTROL 15 

SUCCESS 16 

ADAMS  AND  THE  PATRONAGE 16 

PARTY  LINES 17 

REMOVALS .        .  18 

MACHINERY  OF  APPOINTMENT 21 

THE  SENATE 22 

AN  ILLUSTRATION 24 

CONCLUSION 26 

EFFICIENCY 27 

POLITICS 28 

CHAPTER   II. 
JEFFERSON'S  POLICY  AS  TO  PUBLIC  OFFICE,  1801-1809. 

THE  SITUATION 29 

FEELING  FOR  PUBLIC  OPINION •   .        .31 

REMOVAL  OF  THE  ILLEGALLY  APPOINTED  .        .        .        .        .        .31 

A  TEST  CASE 33 

PUBLIC  OPINION  APPROVES  REMOVALS 38 

vii 


viii  CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

THE  PROSCRIPTION 40 

IN  THE  SOUTH 42 

EXTENT 42 

RETRENCHMENT 45 

MACHINERY  OF  APPOINTMENT 46 

QUALIFICATIONS  FOR  APPOINTMENT 49 


CHAPTER  III. 

THE  PATRONAGE  QUESTION  UNDER  DISCUSSION, 
1809-1829. 

MADISON'S  POLICY  AND  CONDUCT 52 

PROPOSED  REFORMS 56 

THE  CAUCUS  AND  THE  PATRONAGE 58 

JACKSON  CORRESPONDENCE  WITH  MONROE 60 

MONROE'S  CABINET 62 

CONGRESS  AND  THE  CIVIL  SERVICE 63 

CRAWFORD  AND  THE  FOUR  YEARS'  LAW 65 

ATTITUDE  OF  THE  FEDERALISTS 70 

POLICY  AND  CONDUCT  OF  JOHN  QUINCY  ADAMS         ....  72 

REFORMS 73 

CONDITION  OF  THE  CIVIL  SERVICE  IN  1829 75 


CHAPTER  IV. 
AGENESIS  OF  THE  SPOILS  SYSTEM,   17^1828. 

ROTATION  IN  OFFICE  AS  AN  EDUCATION 79 

ROTATION  AS  A  PROTECTION 81 

ROTATION  APPLIED  TO  ADMINISTRATIVE  OFFICES       ....      83 

A  POLITICIAN'S  CATCHWORD 86 

THE  SPOILS  SYSTEM  IN  NEW  YORK 86 

THE  SPOILS  SYSTEM  IN  PENNSYLVANIA 92 

THE  SPOILS  SYSTEM  IN  MASSACHUSETTS    ....  -95 

THE  SPOILS  SYSTEM  IN  THE  SOUTH .98 

THE  SPOILS  SYSTEM  IN  THE  WEST 99 

ROTATION  AND  REFORM  IN  1828 103 


CONTENTS.  ix 

y  CHAPTER  V. 

ESTABLISHMENT  OF  THE  SPOILS  SYSTEM  UNDER  JACKSON, 

1829-1837. 

PAGE 

DEMAND  FOR  REMOVALS  IN  1829 105 

ANNOUNCEMENT  OF  POLICY in 

MACHINERY  FOR  DISTRIBUTION  OF  OFFICE 113 

INFLUENCE  OF  JACKSON 117 

CONDUCT  OF  THE  SENATE 118 

PRINCIPLES  OF  DISTRIBUTION  OF  OFFICES 121 

NUMBER  OF  PRESIDENTIAL  OFFICES  AFFECTED 125 

SECONDARY  OFFICES  AFFECTED 126 

STATUS  OF  BANK  OFFICERS 127 

REFORMS  IN  THE  SERVICE 128 

'  PUBLIC  OPINION  IN  THE  CRISES 130 

CHAPTER  VI. 
IMMEDIATE  EFFECTS  OF  THE  NEW  POLICY,   1837-1845. 

VAN  BUREN 134 

CONDITIONS  IN  1837 135 

THE  LAND  OFFICE 136 

THE  CUSTOMS  SERVICE 139 

THE  WHIGS  ATTACK  THE  SPOILS  SYSTEM 140 

THE  WHIGS  ADOPT  THE  SPOILS  SYSTEM 143 

A  PERSONAL  PROSCRIPTION 151 

V/SlGNIFICANCE  OF  THE   SPOILS   SYSTEM 155 

CHAPTER  VII. 
^THE  SPOILS   SYSTEM  TRIUMPHANT,   1845-1865. 

CHARACTERISTICS  OF  THE  PERIOD 158 

POLK 159 

TAYLOR 161 

FILLMORE 164 

PIERCE 164 

BUCHANAN  AND  ROTATION 166 

LINCOLN 169 


x  CONTENTS. 

y    CHAPTER  VIII. 
MACHINERY  OF  THE  SPOILS  SYSTEM. 

PAGE 

INFLUENCE  OF  MEMBERS  OF  CONGRESS 173 

LOCAL  INFLUENCE 175 

INFLUENCE  OF  MEMBERS  OF  THE  CABINET 176 

INFLUENCE  OF  THE  PRESIDENT 177 

CHARACTER  OF  THE  MEN  APPOINTED 177 

OFFICIALS  IN  POLITICS 179 

CHARACTER  OF  THE  SERVICE       .  181 


J  CHAPTER  IX. 
A  STRUGGLE  FOR  THE  PATRONAGE,   1865-1887. 

ATTITUDE  OF  CONGRESS 186 

ANDREW  JOHNSON'S  USE  OF  THE  PATRONAGE 189 

THE  POINT  AT  ISSUE 191 

DEBATE  ON  THE  TENURE  OF  OFFICE  ACT 193 

STALEMATE 201 

SENATORIAL  COURTESY 202 

REPEAL  OF  THE  TENURE  OF  OFFICE  ACT  .  .  206 


7  CHAPTER 


, 


PERIOD  OF  CIVIL  SERVICE  REFORM,   1865-1901. 

GENESIS  OF  REFORM 209 

GRANT 212 

HAYES .215 

AGITATION .217 

SUCCESS 218 

CLEVELAND 222 

HARRISON .223 

CLEVELAND 225 

MCKINLEY    ,  226 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  XI. 

PRESENT  STATUS  OF  THE  CIVIL  SERVICE  REFORM 
MOVEMENT. 

PAGE 

SUMMARY  OF  PROGRESS 229 

PROPOSED  EXTENSION  TO  FOURTH  CLASS  POSTMASTERS    .        .        .  230 

REFORM  OF  THE  CONSULAR  SERVICE 231 

MISCELLANEOUS  EXTENSIONS 232 

EFFICIENCY  OF  THE   MERIT  SYSTEM    .        .        .        .        .        .        .233 

THE  MERIT  SYSTEM  AND  POLITICS 234 

INTERNAL  DANGERS  TO  THE  MERIT  SYSTEM 237 

EXTERNAL  DANGERS  TO  THE  MERIT  SYSTEM 239      / 

AN  ALTERNATIVE  PLAN 242 

STRENGTH  OF  THE  PRESENT  SYSTEM 243 


APPENDICES. 

A.  OFFICERS  OF  THE  CONFEDERATION  AND  THE  STATES  APPOINTED 

TO  POSITIONS  UNDER  THE  CONSTITUTION  OF  1789  .        .        .247 

B.  TABLES  OF  HOLD-OVER  OFFICIALS 248 

C.  REMOVALS  UNDER  TYLER  AFTER  WEBSTER'S  RESIGNATION         .    252 

D.  LIST  OF  AUTHORITIES .252 

INDEX 267 


THE    CIVIL  SERVICE   AND   THE 
PATRONAGE. 


CHAPTER  I. 

ESTABLISHMENT  OF  THE  NATIONAL  CIVIL  SERVICE. 
1789-1801. 

THE  makers  of  the  constitution  fully  realized  that  the  adjust- 
ment of  the  power  of  appointment  to  office  required  careful 
consideration.  From  their  youth  up  they  had  seen  the  rivalry 
for  office,  they  had  felt  the  influence  of  the  patronage,  in  the 
politics  of  colony  and  state.  John  Adams  complained  that 
Governor  Hutchinson  of  Massachusetts  passed  over  proper 
candidates  in  order  to  advance  members  of  his  own  family ; 
and,  while  this  particular  charge  may  be  unjust,  it  is  certainly 
true  that  in  most  cases  colonial  governors  owed  their  positions 
wholly  to  favoritism,  and  that  one  of  their  chief  duties  was  to 
use  the  offices  within  their  gift  for  the  upbuilding  of  a  British 
party.1  All  Americans  were  familiar,  moreover,  with  the  power 
wielded  in  England  by  the  "  King's  Friends,"  the  most  mighty 
faction  ever  based  almost  solely  on  the  distribution  of  offices,  and 
the  source  to  which  the  colonies  attributed  much  of  the  evil 
treatment  which  had  estranged  them  from  the  mother  country.2 
While  they  knew,  however,  the  evil  possibilities  of  the  patronage, 
they  regarded  the  disease  as  peculiarly  characteristic  of  mon- 
archy, and  were  unacquainted  with  the  new  conditions  presented 
by  a  democratic  form  of  government. 

A  mechanical  system  for  the  choice  of  public  servants  existed 
at  that  time  in  no  considerable  country  except  China,  to  whose 
example  the  convention  at  Philadelphia  was  not  likely  to  turn ; 

1  Greene,  Provincial  Governor,  ch.  3.  2  Elliot,  Debates,  iii.  371. 

B  I 


2  FEDERALIST  POLICY. 

nor  in  the  ancient  civilizations  could  any  precedent  for  such  a 
scheme  be  found.  The  responsibility  for  appointments  must 
be  personal,  and  the  question  to  be  decided  was,  in  what  person 
or  persons  it  should  reside.  The  national  civil  service  under 
the  Confederation  was  so  small,  and  the  conditions  were  so  ex- 
ceptional, that  the  experience  to  be  drawn  from  its  history  was 
^slight*.  /IK  sfris:  practically  certain,  moreover,  even  before  the 
^cbnventio'ri  of  i7S7».met,  that  the  old  system  must  be  changed. 
,  ,  -  /jThe 'Callvfor^; constitution  was  largely  the  result  of  a  reaction 
*\\  '*  against  the  extreme  democracy  and  decentralization  of  the 
Revolution ;  and  it  is  not  strange,  therefore,  to  find  in  the  earli- 
est plans  for  "  a  more  perfect  union  "  the  proposal  to  transfer 
the  appointing  power  from  Congress  to  the  executive.1  In  other 
words,  the  question  of  the  civil  service  was  part  and  parcel  of 
the  more  general  problem  of  the  extent  of  the  executive  power, 
and  was  itself  scarcely  drawn  into  debate. 

While  it  was  thus  tacitly  admitted  that  the  power  of  appoint- 
ment should  be  taken  from  the  legislature,  the  feeling  was  by 
no  means  universal  that  the  executive  could  be  safely  intrusted 
with  it.  The  idea  of  a  council,  one  of  whose  duties  should  be 
to  aid  and  limit  the  president  in  making  appointments,  was 
pertinaciously  pressed.  Its  chief  supporter  was  George  Mason, 
who  could  point  for  authority  to  the  constitutions  of  several 
states,  and  particularly  to  that  of  New  York,  which  provided 
for  a  special  council  of  appointment.2  It  was  urged,  however, 
that  the  Senate  could  perform  these  functions ;  and  it  was  said 
by  Davie  of  North  Carolina  that  this  proposition  was  strongly 
supported  by  the  smaller  states  because  of  their  equal  represen- 
tation in  that  body.3  Opposition  arose  from  those  who  feared 
the  power,  not  of  the  executive  alone,  but  of  the  whole  central 
government ;  and  Dickinson,  supported  by  Randolph,  suggested 
that  officers  be  selected  by  the  president  with  the  advice  and 
consent  of  the  Senate,  "  except  where  by  law  the  appointment 

1  Pelatiah  Webster,  Dissertation  on  the  Political  Union,  art.  ii.  §  6.   In  his  Political 
Essays,  221. 

2  Madison  Papers,  ii.  1130,  iii.  1522  ;  Ford,  Pamphlets  on  the  Constitution,  341  j 
Federalist  (Ford  ed.),  513. 

8  Elliot,  Debates,  iv.  122. 


CONSTITUTIONAL  PROVISIONS.  3 

shall  be  vested  in  the  Legislatures  or  Executives  of  the  several 
States."  1  This  plan,  so  foreign  to  the  spirit  of  the  convention, 
was  dropped  by  unanimous  consent ;  and  the  two  following 
clauses  were  finally  framed,  and  have  stood  unchanged  to  the 
present  time. 

The  president  "  shall  nominate,  and,  by  and  with  the  advice 
and  consent  of  the  Senate,  shall  appoint  ambassadors,  other 
public  ministers  and  consuls,  judges  of  the  Supreme  Court,  and 
all  other  officers  of  the  United  States,  whose  appointments  are 
not  herein  otherwise  provided  for,  and  which  shall  be  established 
by  law ;  but  the  Congress  may  by  law  vest  the  appointment  of 
such  inferior  officers  as  they  think  proper  in  the  president  alone, 
in  the  courts  of  law,  or  in  the  heads  of  departments. 

"  The  President  shall  have  power  to  fill  up  all  vacancies  that 
may  happen  during  the  recess  of  the  Senate,  by  granting  com- 
missions which  shall  expire  at  the  end  of  their  next  session." 

In  the  debates  on  the  adoption  of  the  constitution,  these 
clauses  received  a  fair  share  of  attention,  though  in  all  proba- 
bility no  single  vote  was  changed  because  of  them.  In  Pennsyl- 
vania the  power  of  the  Senate  was  most  feared.  "  Centinel," 
the  strongest  Antifederalist  writer,  predicted  that  the  Senate 
would  control  appointments ;  and  it  was  argued  that,  since  that 
body  was  to  judge  officials  when  they  were  impeached,  it  should 
not  share  in  their  election.  Thomas  McKean  replied  that  in 
practice  the  president  would  name  the  successful  candidate  in 
nominating  him ;  and  James  Wilson  relied  upon  the  president's 
power  to  fill  vacancies  during  the  recess  of  Congress,  to  secure 
him  his  proper  share  of  influence.2  In  New  York  the  Anti- 
federalists  occupied  different  ground  from  those  of  the  neighbor- 
ing state ;  and  George  Clinton,  who  was  perhaps  of  all  Americans 
the  man  best  fitted  by  experience  to  judge,  feared  lest  the  presi- 
dent, by  choosing  subordinates  from  his  own  circle,  should  build 
up  "  an  imperfect  aristocracy,  bordering  on  monarchy."  3  Similar 
differences  of  opinion  existed  among  Federalists,  and  John  Adams 

1  Madison  Papers,  Hi.  1423,  1434. 

2  McMaster  and  Stone,  Pennsylvania  and  the  Federal  Constitution,  366,  375, 
401,  673. 

8  Ford,  Essays  on  the  Constitution,  264. 


4  FEDERALIST  POLICY. 

and  Roger  Sherman  carried  on  an  interesting  correspondence 
with  regard  to  the  subject  in  1789.  Adams  graphically  depicted 
the  chances  for  combination  and  corruption  opened  by  the  par- 
ticipation of  the  Senate ;  and,  while  he  perhaps  underrated  the 
danger  of  according  the  full  power  to  the  executive,  he  certainly 
grasped  the  nature  of  the  problem  better  than  his  correspondent, 
who  argued  that  the  senators  would  in  general  be  the  most 
respectable  citizens  of  their  respective  states,  and  deduced  there- 
from that  they  would  be  diffident  about  recommending  even 
friends  and  kindred  of  other  members,  "  lest  they  should  be 
thought  unduly  to  favor  a  person  who  is  related  to  a  member 
of  their  body." 1 

On  one  point  there  was  widespread  criticism :  it  was  claimed 
that  the  president  would  be  able  to  control  the  action  of  Con- 
gress by  appointing  its  members  to  offices,  and  that  congressmen 
should  therefore  be  made  ineligible  during  their  terms.  Roger 
Sherman  answered  this  objection  boldly  by  declaring  that  for 
many  places  they  would  be  best  fitted,  and  that  all  danger  was 
prevented  by  the  provision  that  they  could  accept  no  positions 
which  had  been  created,  or  the  emoluments  of  which  had  been 
increased,  during  their  terms.2  Such  arguments  did  not  fully 
meet  the  issue ;  and  three  state  conventions,  those  of  New  York, 
Virginia,  and  North  Carolina,  included  a  clause  providing  for 
such  a  restriction  in  their  suggested  amendments  to  the  consti- 
tution.3 It  will  be  found  that  at  a  later  period  this  question 
assumed  a  peculiar  importance. 

While  these  discussions  were  progressing,  it  was  claimed  that 
in  the  very  struggle  then  being  waged  instances  of  the  evils 
dreaded  were  present.  The  Antifederalists,  particularly  in  Penn- 
sylvania, asserted  that  the  Federalist  mail  authorities  curtailed 
the  circulation  of  newspapers  hostile  to  the  proposed  constitu- 
tion. These  charges  are  made  with  great  particularity,  and 
may  contain  a  kernel  of  truth ;  for  the  carriage  of  newspapers 
was  not  a  part  of  the  regular  mail  service,  but  was  arranged 

1  John  Adams,  Works,  vi.  433-442. 

2  Ford,  Essays  on  the  Constitution,  234. 

8  Federalist  (Ford  ed.),  637,  644,  648.  Virginia  debate  in  Elliot,  Debates,  iii.  369- 
375- 


UNEASINESS  IN  1789.  5 

for  by  special  bargain  with  the  riders,  a  system  which  afforded 
opportunity  for  favoritism.  A  change  in  postal  regulations  made 
about  this  time  may,  however,  explain  the  facts  presented.1 

More  extensive  and  more  telling  were  the  charges  made  by 
the  Federalists.  James  Wilson  of  Pennsylvania  pointed  out 
that  the  transfer  of  the  customs  from  the  states  to  the  national 
government,  and  the  establishment  of  many  new  judicial  and 
administrative  offices,  would  turn  the  stream  of  patronage  into 
a  new  channel,  and  that  the  constitution  would  therefore 
be  opposed  by  all  those  who  profited  by  existing  conditions. 
Francis  Hopkinson,  in  his  famous  satire,  The  New  Roof, 
depicted  the  old  woman  who  led  the  opposition  to  the  improve- 
ment as  using  the  cornice  of  the  old  roof  for  a  cupboard,  and 
as  boiling  her  pot  with  the  shingles  that  blew  off.  Specific 
charges  were  also  made.  The  fact  that  Elbridge  Gerry  held  no 
office  in  Massachusetts  did  not  prevent  the  Federalists  from 
attributing  his  opposition  to  a  desire  to  retain  one ;  and  Luther 
Martin  was  accused  of  refusing  to  sign  the  draft  of  the  consti- 
tution because  he  despaired  of  receiving  under  it  an  office  that 
he  desired.2 

The  charges  of  interested  opposition  seemed  most  reasonable 
in  New  York.  There  the  patronage  was  particularly  valuable, 
owing  to  the  commercial  importance  of  New  York  City,  where 
goods  destined  for  a  large  part  of  New  Jersey  and  of  Connecti- 
cut paid  duty.3  It  will  be  remembered  that  New  York  had 
been  willing  that  the  Congress  of  the  Confederation  should  lay 
certain  customs  dues,  if  the  state  government  might  retain  the 
appointment  of  the  collecting  officers.  In  the  state  convention 
of  1788  the  charge  was  definitely  made  that  Governor  Clinton 
was  using  this  patronage  to  defeat  the  constitution.  A  prompt 
denial  was  made ;  it  was  pointed  out  that  some  of  the  state 
officials  supported  the  new  plan,  and  the  charge  was  partly 

1  McMaster  and  Stone,  Pennsylvania  and  the  Federal  Constitution,  530,  637,  650- 
654,  666-668;   Harding,  Federal  Constitution  in  Massachusetts,  18. 

2  Ford,  Pamphlets  on  the  Constitution,  161;   McMaster  and  Stone,  Pennsylvania 
and  the  Federal  Constitution,  440,  511  ;   Ford,  Essays  on  the  Constitution,  129,  187, 
1 88. 

8  Massachusetts  Centinel,  January  5,  1788  ;  Federalist  (Ford  ed.),  37,  note. 


6  FEDERALIST  POLICY. 

withdrawn.  Undoubtedly  the  state  machine  formed  the  chief 
prop  of  the  opposition ;  but  Clinton,  as  will  be  shown  later, 
was  moderate  in  his  use  of  the  appointing  power,  and  it 
is  extremely  improbable  that  he  made  any  direct  threats  of 
removal  or  promises  of  reward.1  The  more  serious  accusa- 
tion made  by  the  Federalists,  that  the  governor  was  chiefly  influ- 
enced in  his  opposition  by  fear  of  loss  of  prestige,  must  be 
dismissed  as  entirely  unfounded.  It  was  perfectly  natural  that 
the  men  in  office  should  oppose  the  constitution :  they  repre- 
sented the  ideas  of  the  Revolution ;  they  had  been  the  active 
agents  in  destroying  the  governmental  control  of  Great  Britain 
over  the  colonies ;  and  by  their  type  of  mind  they  were  opposed 
to  centralized  government  and  vigorous  administration.  The 
adoption  of  the  constitution  marked  a  change  of  party  domi- 
nance; and  many  of  the  men  prominent  in  1787  by  1790  had 
retired,  some  to  be  restored  by  the  Democratic  wave  of  1800. 

When  the  new  government  was  installed,  almost  the  first  task 
with  which  it  had  to  deal  was  that  of  filling  the  offices,  in  order 
that  the  constitution,  and  the  laws  as  they  were  passed,  might 
be  executed.  The  question  of  qualification  was  left  entirely  to 
the  discretion  of  President  Washington,  who  formed  his  plans 
with  the  punctilious  exactness  which  was  characteristic  of  him. 
Early  in  May,  after  his  inauguration,  he  wrote  to  Edward  Rut- 
ledge,  "  I  anticipate  that  one  of  the  most  difficult  and  delicate 
parts  of  the  duty  of  my  office  will  be  that  which  relates  to  nomi- 
nations for  appointments;  "  and  in  the  same  letter  he  remarked 
that  he  had  made  it  a  rule  to  say  nothing  definite  on  particular 
appointments  until  his  mind  was  made  up.  In  1796  he  said 
that  his  plan  was  "to  lay  the  recommendations  .  .  .  by,  until 
the  hour  comes  when  nominations  are  to  be  made,  and  then 
after  reference  to  them  and  an  attention  to  other  circumstances 
(which  is  often  essential)  prefer  those  who  seem  to  have  the 
greatest  fitness  for  the  office."2 

There  can  be  no  doubt  that  Washington  considered  fitness 
for  the  post  to  be  filled  a  sine  qua  non  for  appointment.  His 

1  Elliot,  Debates,  ii.  220  ;   Hammond,  Political  Parties  in  New  York,  i.  85. 

2  May  5,  1789,   Washington,   Writings  (Sparks  ed.),  x.  i;     Rowland,  Charles 
Carroll,  ii.  204. 


WASHINGTON^  PRINCIPLES.  j 

letters  constantly  repeat  this,  and  he  was  a  man  honest  even 
with  himself.  An  excellent  example  is  a  letter  of  May  21,  1789, 
to  Mary  Wooster :  "  MADAM,  I  have  duly  received  your  affect- 
ing letter,  dated  the  8th  day  of  this  month.  Sympathizing  with 
you  as  I  do  in  the  great  misfortunes,  which  have  befallen  your 
family  in  consequence  of  the  war,  my  feelings  as  an  individual 
would  forcibly  prompt  me  to  do  everything  in  my  power  to 
repair  those  misfortunes.  But  as  a  public  man,  acting  only 
with  reference  to  the  public  good,  I  must  be  allowed  to  decide 
upon  all  points  of  my  duty,  without  consulting  my  private  incli- 
nations and  wishes.  I  must  be  permitted,  with  the  best  lights  I 
can  obtain,  and  upon  a  general  view  of  characters  and  circum- 
stances, to  nominate  such  persons  alone  to  offices,  as  in  my 
judgment  shall  be  the  best  qualified  to  discharge  the  func- 
tions of  the  departments  to  which  they  shall  be  appointed." 1 
This  absolute  requirement  of  capacity  seems  to  have  been 
generally  understood,  and  nearly  every  existing  application  for 
office  under  Washington  dwells  on  the  applicant's  ability. 

There  is  a  broad  difference  between  appointing  only  fit  men  to 
office,  and  appointing  those  who  are  most  fit ;  and  Washington 
pursued  this  second  aim  also.  It  was  a  difficult  task.  There 
were  many  applicants  who  appealed  to  his  benevolence ; 2  and 
it  must  have  been  particularly  hard  to  turn  away  soldiers  of  the 
Revolution,  great  numbers  of  whom  urged  their  sufferings  upon 
him  as  just  ground  for  reward.  Yet  he  always  answered  that 
these  considerations  could  not  offset  superior  efficiency.  He 
refused  to  make  public  office  a  bounty,  though  in  some  cases  he 
did  assist  such  applicants  with  his  private  means.  One  class 
of  seekers  he  cut  off  from  all  hope  of  office  by  writing  to  his 
nephew,  Bushrod  Washington,  that  relationship  must  be  an 
absolute  bar  to  preferment.  So  clear  did  he  make  the  honesty 
of  his  attempt  to  fulfil  his  difficult  task  impartially,  that  some- 
times even  disappointed  candidates  acknowledged  the  justice  or 
the  necessity  of  his  selections.3 

1  Washington,  Writings  (Sparks  ed.),  x.  6. 

2  American  Historical  Review,  i.  275,  278. 

8  Ibid.  i.  276,  278 ;  Boutell,  Roger  Sherman,  223-224  ;  Washington,  Writings 
(Sparks  ed.),  x.  23,  24;  Webb,  Correspondence,  iii.  141. 


8  FEDERALIST  POLICY. 

Into  Washington's  idea  of  fitness,  however,  several  elements 
entered.  The  ability  to  perform  the  functions  of  the  post  was, 
of  course,  essential ;  but  that  alone  was  not  a  sufficient  qualifi- 
cation. A  large  and  loose-jointed  federation,  such  as  the  United 
States  was  in  1789,  made  geographical  considerations  of  spe- 
cial importance.  From  tne  very  beginning  of  the  attempts  at 
union,  honors  had  been  distributed  with  anxious  care  among 
the  several  states  and  sections,  the  nice  balance  maintained 
between  Virginia  and  Massachusetts  being  particularly  notice- 
able. Washington  himself  was  indebted  to  such  considerations 
for  a  part  of  his  prestige,  as  it  is  scarcely  possible  that  he  could 
have  been  chosen  commander-in-chief  in  1775  had  he  lived  in 
Delaware.  As  president,  he  prudently  consulted  geography 
in  making  his  general  appointments : 1  his  cabinet  at  first  con- 
tained two  men  from  Virginia,  one  from  New  York,  and  one 
from  Massachusetts.  When  party  lines  came  to  be  drawn  more 
closely,  the  task  became  more  arduous.  John  Adams  wrote  to 
his  wife,  January  7,  1796,  "There  seems  to  be  a  necessity  of 
distributing  the  offices  about  the  States  in  some  proportion 
to  their  numbers ;  but  in  the  southern  part  of  the  Union,  false 
politics  have  struck  their  roots  so  deep,  that  it  is  very  difficult 
to  find  gentlemen  who  are  willing  to  accept  of  public  trusts, 
and  at  the  same  time  capable  of  discharging  them."  2  Still,  a 
certain  balance  of  sections  was  always  preserved  in  the  cabinet. 
After  the  retirement  of  Jefferson  and  Hamilton,  it  consisted  of 
one  member  from  Virginia,  one  from  Pennsylvania,  and  two 
from  New  England ;  afterward  Maryland  was  substituted  for 
Pennsylvania.  The  balance  would  appear  more  nearly  perfect 
if  Timothy  Pickering  were  counted  as  from  the  West,  where  he 
lived  when  appointed,  and  not  as  from  New  England,  where 
he  was  born  and  died. 

In  addition  to  this  attempt  to  prevent  jealousies  between  the 
several  sections  was  the  desire  to  make  each  choice  acceptable 
to  the  section  especially  concerned.  The  constitution  was  as 
yet  but  an  experiment ;  and  Washington,  who  was  responsible  for 

1  Washington,  Writings  (Sparks  ed.),  x.  26  ;  Jefferson,  Anas,  August  6,  1793,  in 
his  Writings  (Ford  ed.),  i.  256-258. 

2  John  Adams,  Works,  i.  483. 


QUESTION  OF  FITNESS.  9 

its  success,  wished  it  to  be  put  in  force,  not  only  by  competent 
men,  but  by  men  known  and  respected  in  the  localities  in  which 
they  were  to  serve :  he  preferred  to  have  the  federal  authority 
represented  by  men  who  had  been  esteemed  and  honored  by 
their  neighbors.  He  therefore  considered  the  previous  career 
of  the  various  men  whose  names  were  presented,  and  allowed 
any  marks  of  the  confidence  of  their  fellow-citizens  to  count  in 
their  favor.1  To  have  previously  held  an  elective  office  was 
considered  the  best  recommendation.  Some  administrative 
officers  were  transferred  from  the  State  to  the  national  service, 
—  as  Oliver  Wolcott,  comptroller  of  public  accounts  for  Con- 
necticut, who  was  made  an  auditor. 

This  qualification  was  particularly  insisted  upon  for  judicial 
appointments.  The  new  judiciary  had  much  to  contend 
against.  Legal  changes  are  always  looked  upon  with  dis- 
favor ;  and  Washington  wished  to  draw  into  the  national  ser- 
vice, so  far  as  possible,  judges  from  the  benches  of  the  states. 
This  plan  would  serve  to  create  a  judiciary  tried  and  therefore 
trustworthy,  would  indicate  that  the  line  of  promotion  lay  from 
the  State  to  the  nation,  and  would  tend  to  lessen  the  rancor  of 
the  disappointed.  His  letters  to  Madison  show  the  solicitude 
with  which  he  applied  himself  to  the  filling  of  the  judicial  list; 
and  it  is  largely  owing  to  this  care  that  the  national  courts  so 
soon  acquired  the  confidence  of  the  public.2 

To  Washington's  anxiety  that  the  officers  of  the  general 
government  should  be  men  of  established  reputation,  was 
added  a  desire  that  they  should  be  sound  supporters  of  the 
new  system ;  that  is,  political  orthodoxy  was  considered  as  one 
of  the  elements  of  fitness  for  office.  The  supreme  importance 
of  this  qualification  in  later  periods  lends  special  interest  to  the 

1  Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers,  i.  58-59. 

2  He  wrote  to  Madison,  August  10  (?),  1789:  "My  solicitude  for  drawing  the 
first  characters  of  the  Union  into  the  judiciary  is  such,  that  my  cogitations  on  this 
subject  last  night,  after  I  parted  with  you,  have  almost  determined  me,  as  well  for 
the  reason  just  mentioned,  as  to  silence  the  clamors,  or  more  properly,  soften  the 
disappointment  of  smaller  characters,  to  nominate  Mr.  Blair  and  Colonel  Pendleton 
as  associate  and  district  judges,  and  Mr.  Edmund  Randolph  for  the  attorney-general, 
trusting  to  their  acceptance."     Washington,  Writings  (Sparks  ed.),  x.  26  ;    Gibbs, 
Memoirs  of  the  Administration  of  Washington  and  Adams,  i.  165,  22-27. 


10  FEDERALIST  POLICY. 

attitude  of  the  first  president  in  regard  to  it.  It  is,  however,  a 
subject  so  elusive  that  his  policy  can  be  made  clear  only  by 
a  somewhat  detailed  account  of  the  conditions  existing,  and  a 
study  of  some  characteristic  instances  of  his  practice. 

In  one  sense,  Washington  had  a  clear  field  before  him  in  the 
creation  of  a  civil  service  :  there  were  absolutely  no  hold-over 
officers ;  the  servants  of  the  Confederation  became  private 
citizens  the  moment  the  new  government  was  established. 
Justice  demanded,  however,  that  the  men  thus  legislated  out 
of  office  should  be  considered  as  having  a  special  claim  to  the 
new  offices  that  involved  similar  functions,  and  Washington 
recognized  these  claims  whenever  he  was  convinced  that  the 
old  occupant  possessed  the  requisite  qualifications.  John  Jay, 
who  had  been  president  of  the  old  Congress  and  was  in  1789 
secretary  of  foreign  affairs,  was  given  his  choice  among  the 
new  offices,1  partly  because  of  the  new  president's  esteem  for 
him,  but  partly,  doubtless,  because  of  his  official  position. 
Jefferson,  who  held  the  ministry  to  France,  the  most  impor- 
tant post  in  the  diplomatic  service  after  that  to  England,  which 
Adams  had  vacated  to  become  vice-president,  was  made  sec- 
retary of  state.  Samuel  Osgood,  who  had  been  commissioner 
of  the  board  of  the  treasury,  was  appointed  postmaster-gen- 
eral; Charles  Thomson,  the  secretary  of  the  old  Congress, 
might  have  been  secretary  of  the  Senate,  but  declined,  as  he 
expected  a  higher  office ;  and  Washington  broke  his  rule  of 
not  interfering  with  departmental  appointments,  to  recommend 
Thomson's  assistant  secretary,  Roger  Alden,  to  Jefferson  for  a 
place  in  the  state  department.  In  addition,  the  governor  and 
judges  elected  by  Congress  for  the  Northwest  Territory  were 
reappointed,  with  the  exception  of  General  Varnum,  who  had 
died  in  the  interregnum.2 

A  similar  policy  was  pursued  with  regard  to  the  state  offices. 
Richard  Henry  Lee,  writing  early  in  June,  1789,  says:  "  Con- 
versing on  the  subject  of  these  appointments  [those  in  the 

1  Pellew,  Jay,  262  ;  he  cites  no  contemporary  evidence. 

2  Harley,  Thomson,  128-134  ;  Washington,  Writings  (Sparks  ed.),  x.  40;  Jour- 
nals of  Congress,  xii.  174  (October  5,  1787);   Executive  Journal,  i.  18  (August  1 8, 
1789);  Appletorfs  Encyclopaedia  of  American  Biography,  Varnum. 


TRANSFERS  FROM  STATE  SERVICE.  II 

revenue  service]  lately  with  the  P.,  I  mentioned  two  principles 
which  I  had  the  pleasure  to  hear  him  approve  of.  The  first 
that  State  officers  in  similar  lines  who  had  behaved  well, 
deserved  preference  in  the  service  of  the  United  States ;  and 
that  having  discharged  these  duties  undivided,  now  that  they 
become  divided,  the  same  officers  were  entitled  to  the  best." 
Many  applications  for  office  were  grounded  on  these  principles, 
and  such  statistics  as  can  be  obtained  tend  to  show  that  the 
rule  was  adhered  to.  There  were  136  offices  in  the  customs 
service  as  at  first  established  under  the  new  government :  in 
42  cases  the  old  occupants  were  reappointed ;  in  4  cases  they 
received  some  office  in  the  service ;  in  1 5  cases  they  were  not 
appointed;  and  in  75  cases  either  there  is  no  record  or  the 
office  was  a  new  one.1 

The  fact  that  such  was  the  general  policy  gives  peculiar 
importance  to  one  case  in  which  it  was  not  carried  out,  —  that 
is,  in  Rhode  Island.  The  struggle  for  the  adoption  of  the  con- 
stitution was  particularly  bitter  in  that  state,  and  even  before 
it  was  finally  decided  Washington  began  to  receive  applications 
for  office.  John  Brown  and  John  Francis,  great  merchants  who 
favored  the  new  establishment,  sent  him  a  letter  of  advice :  they 
describe  the  iniquities  of  the  opposition,  and  "  sincearly  Hope 
that  none  of  these  carrectors  may  be  promoted  to  Aney  office," 
and  "  take  the  Libberty  of  Recommending  a  core  of  Honest 
Faithfull  and  Vigilent  Custom  House  Officers  for  this  Depart- 
ment Such  as  will  cause  Every  Copper  of  the  Revenew  ...  to 
be  punctually  paid  to  the  Treasury  of  the  United  States."2 
While  the  Antifederalists  were  yet  in  control  of  the  state,  they 
had  elected  a  board  of  customs  officers  with  but  one  of  their 
opponents  upon  it.  When  the  constitution  was  at  last  adopted, 
it  was  fully  expected  that  a  change  would  be  made ;  and  one  of 
the  Rhode  Island  senators  was  asked  to  advise  the  president  to 
divide  the  offices  between  the  several  parties.3  The  subject 
excited  much  local  interest,  and  was  most  carefully  considered 

1  Washington,  Writings  (Ford  ed.),  xi.  394  note  ;   American  Historical  Review, 
i.  277;  Appendix  A,  table  ii. 

2  June  n,  1790,  American  Historical  Review t  i.  280. 

8  Massachusetts  Centinel,  September  30,  1789  ;  Foster  Manuscripts,  i.  22,  23. 


12  FEDERALIST  POLICY. 

by  the  administration.  The  very  pressure  put  upon  it  by  the 
one  side  and  the  other  showed  how  bitter  the  previous  contest 
had  been,  and  how  important  it  was  that  the  new  officers  should 
be  such  as  would  not  only  perform  their  duties  well,  but  would 
strengthen  the  hold  of  the  constitution  on  the  people.  Each 
case  was  minutely  considered. 

The  list  of  customs  officers  finally  made  out  contained  ten 
new  names,  only  two  of  those  who  had  served  under  the  state 
being  appointed.  One  of  those  retained  was  Theodore  Foster, 
naval  officer  at  Providence,  who  has  just  been  referred  to  as  the 
single  Federalist  in  office.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  Foster,  though 
generally  rated  as  a  Federalist,  had  friends  and  enemies  in  both 
parties,  and  seems  to  have  been  reported  to  Washington  as  an 
Antifederalist.  Immediately  after  his  second  appointment  he 
was  elected  senator,  and  his  successor  as  naval  officer  was 
Ebenezer  Thompson,  who  had  been  collector  under  the  state 
government  and  was  avowedly  opposed  to  the  adoption  of  the 
constitution.  Job  Comstock,  the  other  representative  of  the  old 
corps  of  officials,  declined  to  serve  the  new  government ;  but  on 
the  declination  of  Aborn,  the  newly  selected  surveyor  at  Paw- 
tuxet,  Zachariah  Rhodes,  the  old  incumbent  there,  who  had 
been  passed  over  when  the  list  was  first  made  out,  was  chosen.1 

The  fact  that  two  representatives  of  the  state  board  of  cus- 
toms officials  were  thus  persistently  retained  may  indicate  that 
Washington  judged  it  proper  to  recognize  to  that  extent  the 
Antifederalist  element.  The  remaining  officers,  both  in  the 
customs  and  in  the  judicial  service,  seem  to  have  been  all  strong 
Federalists ; 2  and  at  least  three  of  them  had  previously  held 
state  offices,  but  had  lost  them  during  the  "  Know  Ye  "  troubles. 
If  the  general  government  hoped  to  allay  political  rancor  in 
Rhode  Island  by  recognizing  both  factions,  it  was  unsuccessful. 
Three  years  later,  on  occasion  of  a  vacancy  in  Rhode  Island, 
Henry  Marchant  wrote  a  letter  to  Hamilton  carefully  estimating 

1  Massachusetts  Centinel,  September  30, 1789;  Jameson,  in  Rhode  Island  Historical 
Society,  Publications,  viii.  109,  131,  135. 

2  Ibid.  131,  133;   Arnold,  Rhode  Island,  ii.  525,  544.     One  of  them,  Jeremiah 
Olney,  had  been  commissioner  of  the  town  of  Providence  at  the  time  it  proposed  to 
secede  from  Rhode  Island  and  join  the  Union  (Greene,  Providence  Plantations,  64). 


FRIENDS  OF  THE  CONSTITUTION.  13 

the  several  candidates,  and  adding,  "  It  is  indeed  to  be  regretted 
that  this  affair  should  assume  a  Party  Complection."  l 

A  similar  care  was  observed  in  making  the  North  Carolina  ap- 
pointments, for  the  conditions  were  similar.  So  far  as  can  now 
be  discovered,  there  were  no  reappointments  in  the  state.  There 
exists  in  Jefferson's  handwriting,  under  date  of  June  7,  1790,  an 
annotated  list  of  candidates  for  the  judicial  positions  there, 
such  as  it  has  always  been  customary  to  prepare  for  the  presi- 
dent's use  in  important  cases  ;  in  it  one  man  is  definitely  rec- 
ommended as  being  a  "  federalist."  2  The  fact  that  Jefferson 
made  this  note  shows  that  the  term  "  federalist  "  was  not  used 
in  its  later  party  signification,  but  referred  to  those  who  had 
supported  the  adoption  of  the  constitution.  If  ever  political 
discrimination  was  justifiable,  it  was  at  this  time;  and  fair-minded 
Republicans  of  a  later  date  recognized  that  the  conditions  had 
been  unusual,  and  that  it  was  especially  important  that/the 
constitution  should  be  in  the  hands  of  its  friends  while  receiving 
its  trial.  Nor  should  the  sharpness  of  the  distinction  drawn  be 
exaggerated.  Washington  wrote  with  regard  to  the  district 
judgeship  of  Maryland :  "  Mr.  Paca  has  been  mentioned  for 
that  appointment,  and,  although  his  sentiments  have  not  been 
altogether  in  favor  of  the  general  government,  and  a  little 
adverse  on  the  score  of  paper  emission,  I  do  not  know  but  his 
appointment  on  some  other  accounts  might  be  a  proper  thing." 
The  important  post  of  collector  of  New  York  was  given  to 
General  John  Lamb,  a  vigorous  Antifederalist.3 

When  political  strife  grew  hotter  and  the  Republican  and 
Federalist  parties  began  to  emerge,  and  when,  too,  the  irasci- 
bility of  old  age  came  upon  him,  Washington  became  more  of  a 
party  man.  He  made  only  seventeen  removals,4  and  these  strictly 
for  the  efficiency  of  the  service ;  but  in  1795  he  wrote  to  Picker- 
ing, "  I  shall  not,  whilst  I  have  the  honor  of  administrating  the 

*  American  Historical  Review,  i.  281. 

2  Ibid.  i.  273-274. 

8  Amory,  James  Stillivan,  ii.  94;  Washington,  Writings  (Sparks  ed.),  x.  56; 
Leake,  Lamb,  337.  John  Lowell  (in  his  New- England  Patriot,  21)  says  that  Major 
Melville,  appointed  inspector  at  Boston,  had  also  been  an  Antifederalist. 

4  C.  R.  Fish,  Removal  of  Officials  by  the  Presidents,  in  American  Historical  Asso- 
ciation Reports,  1899,  i.  69. 


I4  FEDERALIST  POLICY. 

government,  bring  men  into  any  office  of  consequence  knowingly 
whose  political  tenets  are  adverse  to  the  measures  the  general 
government  is  pursuing;  for  this,  in  my  opinion,  would  be  a 
sort  of  political  suicide."  1  It  was  the  popular  charge  of  the 
Republicans  that,  in  his  second  term,  after  the  dismissal  of 
Randolph,  he  confined  his  appointments  to  members  of  the 
Federalist  party;  and  certainly  in  1798  he  advised  McHenry 
to  be  cautious  about  enlisting  Jacobins  in  the  new  army.2 

Such  seem  to  have  been  the  ideals  which  Washington  set 
before  himself,  and  which  he  attempted,  with  his  usual  con- 
scientiousness, to  realize.  Like  all  his  policies,  they  were  proper 
and  practical ;  but  he  was  not  omnipresent,  he  could  not  control 
his  subordinates  in  all  their  actions,  and  his  practice  did  not, 
therefore,  accord  wholly  with  his  theory.  The  members  of  the 
cabinet  were  given  power  to  appoint  their  clerks,  and  how  unre- 
stricted that  power  was,  the  long  employment  of  Freneau  in  the 
state  department  shows.3 

By  many  avenues,  intrigue  and  faction  crept  in.  The  following 
extract  from  a  letter  exhibiting  the  political  situation  in  Savannah 
shows  what  a  part  local  politics  played  in  the  establishment  of 
the  civil  service :  "  Col?  Few  will  nominate  me  with  the  others. 
Our  other  Senator  [James  Gunn]  I  expect  no  Friendship  from. 
.  .  .  His  Man  will  be  a  Wretch  who  now  fills  the  Office  of 
Collectorship  at  this  place  —  his  Name  is  Ruben  Wilkinson  — 
he  is  from  our  back  Woods  low  and  illiterate  as  possible,  but 
served  our  Honorable  Senator  Gunn  in  geting  him  Votes."  4 
In  a  similar  way  the  other  possible  candidates  were  discussed. 
Theodore  Foster,  senator  from  Rhode  Island,  wrote  February 
17,  1791,  of  the  difficulties  of  steering  between  the  Scylla  of 
favoritism  and  the  Charybdis  of  ingratitude  in  making  sugges- 

1  September  27,  1795,  Washington,  Writings  (Ford  ed.),  xii.  107. 

2  Oracle  of  Dauphin  and  Harrisburgh  Advertiser,  August  10,   1801;    alluded 
to  in  Coleman,  Examination  of  the  President's  Reply,  24 ;   Washington,  Writings 
(Ford  ed.),  xiv.  104 ;   see  also  Appendix  B  below. 

3  Washington,    Writings   (Sparks  ed.),   x.   40.     See   account   of    the   Goddard 
papers,  in  Facts,  July  12,  1902.     Miss  Mary  K.  Goddard  was  removed  from  the  post- 
office  of  Baltimore  in  1 789.     Washington's  influence  was  sought,  but  he  declined  to 
interfere.     She  was  reinstated  by  Osgood  on  petition  of  patrons  of  the  office. 

*  Letter  of  Seagrave,  February  22,  1789,  in  Webb,  Correspondence,  iii.  123. 


FACTIONS.  15 

tions  to  the  president,  and  spoke  of  charges  made  against  the 
former  Rhode  Island  delegate  of  improperly  using  his  influence.1 
It  is  said  that  in  New  York,  where  Hamilton's  advice  was  nat- 
urally potent,  the  appointments  were  such  as  tended  to  aid  the 
Schuyler  faction  and  weaken  Clinton,  but  the  force  of  this  charge 
is  weakened  by  the  appointment  of  Lamb.  The  Livingston 
family,  so  great  an  influence  in  that  state,  felt  slighted  ;  and 
perhaps  their  turning  to  Jefferson  is  to  be  thus  accounted  for.2 
It  lies  not  in  man  to  give  universal  satisfaction ;  and  small  as 
was  the  part  which  politics  played  in  the  selections  of  the  first 
administration,  the  government  did  not  escape  the  charge  of 
intolerance.  John  Tyler,  Sr.,  was  one  of  the  judges  of  the 
admiralty  court  of  Virginia,  the  functions  of  which,  under  the 
constitution,  fell  to  the  United  States  district  court.  Tyler  was 
not  the  only  admiralty  judge  ;  and  Cyrus  Griffin  as  judge  of  the 
federal  Court  of  Appeals  in  Cases  of  Capture  had  as  high,  if 
not  higher,  claim,  and  was  appointed.  Yet  Tyler  was  displeased 
and  wrote,  long  after  the  event,  "  This  kind  of  conduct  began 
the  strong  distinction  which  has  embittered  the  cup  of  life,  and, 
in  a  great  measure,  produced  a  spirit  of  retaliation."  3 

The  constitution  of  the  consular  service,  moreover,  was  un- 
satisfactory. The  law  provided  that  a  consul  be  appointed  for  the 
Barbary  coast  at  a  salary  of  not  more  than  two  thousand  dollars. 
This  post  involved  semi-diplomatic  functions,  and  for  that  reason, 
and  because  there  was  little  legitimate  trade  in  the  region,  was 
made  an  exception  to  the  general  rule  that  the  service  support 
itself  by  fees.  The  system  of  paying  consuls  by  fees  is  a  very 
wasteful  one:  the  agents  at  a  few  great  posts  are  overpaid, 
while  in  many  places  where  the  trade  may  be  important,  though 
small,  the  fees  do  not  afford  a  living.  Washington  found  it 
impossible  to  secure  proper  candidates  for  many  minor  posts,4 
and  was  thus  forced  to  appoint  natives  of  the  country,  or  at 

1  Foster  Manuscripts,  i.  36. 

2  Hammond,  Political  Parties  in  New  York,  i.  30;   H.  Livingston,  March  29, 
1791,  complains  of  Washington's  appointments  from  the  South,  and  adds,  "I  wish 
to  see  a  change."     Webb,  Correspondence,  iii.  172,   176. 

8  Tyler,  The  Tylers,  ii.  171,  246. 

4  Even  for  Lisbon  proper  candidates  did  not  apply.  Jefferson,  Writings  (Ford 
ed.),  v.  344 ;  Statutes  at  Large,  i.  254-257. 


1 6  FEDERALIST  POLICY. 

least  Americans  residing  abroad  for  business  purposes,  whose 
administration  of  their  duties  might  be  affected  by  their  private 
interests.  This  expedient  was,  however,  the  result  of  condi- 
tions rather  than  of  policy ;  and  the  evils  resulting  from  it 
have  only  recently  been  eradicated  from  the  service. 

Such  facts  should  not  obscure  the  wisdom  of  Washington  in 
laying  down  the  proper  general  qualifications  for  office,  and  his 
unusual  skill  in  applying  them.  His  success  in  quietly  and 
satisfactorily  organizing  the  new  government  is  indicated  by 
the  fact  that  the  press  of  the  day  contains  so  few  references 
to  the  change  in  administration.  One  of  the  few  allusions  to 
it,  aside  from  the  mention  of  local  appointments,  is  the  simple 
change  under  "  Ship  News,"  of  the  heading,  "  Naval  Office " 
to  "  Custom  House,"  and  a  notice  in  the  Massachusetts  Centi- 
nely  in  fancy  type,  of  the  location  and  office  hours  of  the  new 
board  of  officers.1  The  constitution  was  quietly  launched  and 
was  manned  with  a  good  crew.  Washington  was  perhaps  the 
only  president  who  could  write,  after  passing  through  the 
ordeal  of  appointing  a  new  staff  of  officers,  "  I  have  the  hap- 
piness to  find,  so  far  as  my  information  extends,  that  they  are 
highly  acceptable  to  the  good  people  of  this  country."  2 

John  Adams  became  president  in  1797  under  circumstances 
quite  different  from  those  of  1789.  The  constitution  was  now 
fully  accepted,  at  least  as  a  basis  for  development;  but  while 
this  question  was  out  of  politics,  the  country  was  more  dis- 
tinctly divided  into  two  parties  than  before,  and  Adams  had 
been  definitely  elected  as  the  representative  of  one  of  them. 
Further,  he  found  a  well-established  civil  service,  and  had  to 
deal  with  the  question  of  appointments  only  as  vacancies  oc- 
curred from  time  to  time.  As  the  total  number  of  public  offi- 
cers was  then  small,  he  had  comparative  freedom  from  the 
irritating  task  of  selection,  a  freedom  which  he  increased  by 

1  August  19  there  appeared  the  following  notice  :    "  The  COLLECTOR,  NAVAL- 
OFFICER,  and  SURVEYOR,  of  this  district,  have  opened  their  respective  offices,  at  the 
house  next  door  to  Mr.  Paine's  Insurance- Office  in  State- Street — Constant  attend- 
ance will  be  there  given  by  the  several  officers,  each  day  in  the  week,  from  Nine  o'clock 
in  the  morning,  iintil  One,  and  from  Three  in  the  afternoon  until  sunset  —  Sundays, 
Saturdays  in  the  afternoon,  and Publick  Days  of  Thanksgiving  and  Fasting  excepted?' 

2  Washington,  Writings  (Sparks  ed.),  x.  51. 


ADAMS'S  PRINCIPLES.  17 

leaving  most  minor  appointments  to  the  members  of  his  cabi- 
net.1 No  president  has  enjoyed  such  immunity  from  this  vexa- 
tious task  as  did  he ;  still  he  found  opportunity  to  develop  a 
policy  which  is  significant  as  marking  a  transition  from  the 
principles  of  Washington  to  those  of  Jefferson. 

The  war  with  France  rendered  the  military  appointments 
the  most  important  of  the  administration.  The  pressure 
brought  to  bear  upon  Adams  to  make  Hamilton  second  in 
command  is  too  well  known  to  need  description ;  but  there  was 
then,  as  there  has  been  ever  since,  a  conviction  that  the  army 
should  stand  on  a  different  footing  from  the  civil  service,  and 
that  the  two  parties  should  unite  to  defend  the  country.  In 
response  to  this  sentiment,  Burr  and  Muhlenberg  were  placed 
on  the  list  of  generals.2  Although  the  Republicans  received 
representation,  the  control  remained  in  the  hands  of  the 
Federalists  :  probably  Washington's  caution  to  McHenry 
against  enlisting  Jacobins  indicates  the  general  attitude  of 
the  war  department.  The  same  policy  was  advocated  with 
regard  to  critical  diplomatic  missions.  Hamilton,  in  1797, 
advised  that  either  Jefferson  or  Madison  be  sent  to  France  to 
conciliate  the  republic,  but  that  Federalist  colleagues  be  joined 
with  them  to  control  their  action ; 3  he  did  not  wish  a  repetition 
of  the  Monroe  episode.  The  plan  was  carried  out,  but  Elbridge 
Gerry,  who  was  not  fully  identified  with  any  party,  was  substi- 
tuted for  the  Republican  leaders  suggested. 

Turning  to  the  ordinary  appointments,  we  miss  the  careful 
statements  of  policy  which  are  found  in  Washington's  letters. 
Adams  wrote  to  Wolcott,  in  October,  1800,  strenuously  denying 
that  he  had  told  any  one  that  "  political  creed  would  be  an  in- 
superable bar  to  promotion."  He  added,  however:  "Washing- 
ton appointed  a  multitude  of  democrats  and  jacobins  of  the 
deepest  die.  I  have  been  more  cautious  in  this  respect ;  but  there 
is  danger  of  proscribing,  under  imputations  of  democracy,  some 
of  the  ablest,  most  influential,  and  best  characters  in  the  Union."  * 

1  American  Historical  Review,  ii.  242. 

2  C.  F.  Adams,  John  Adams,  529  ;   Muhlenberg,  Muhlenberg,  324. 
8  Hamilton,  Works  (Lodge  ed.),  viii.  445,  449,  450. 

4  John  Adams,  Works,  ix.  87. 
c 


1 8  FEDERALIST  POLICY. 

This  letter  is  rather  an  omen  of  the  coming  break  between  Adams 
and  the  more  extreme  Federalists  than  an  indication  of  political 
tolerance.  With  one  wing  of  the  Republicans,  —  with  men  like 
Elbridge  Gerry,  —  Adams  had  more  in  common  than  with  the 
Essex  junto,  but  the  active  and  dominant  members  of  that  party 
he  would  include  under  the  name  "  Jacobin  "  ;  and  while  there 
are  repeated  requests  for  office  from  his  political  opponents,  no 
instance  has  been  noticed  in  which  a  "Jacobin  "  was  appointed. 

Not  only  was  a  bar  placed  against  Jacobins,  but  there  is  a  sus- 
picion of  the  influence  of  personal  prejudice  on  appointments. 
The  collectorship  of  New  York  fell  vacant  in  the  first  year 
of  the  administration.  Hamilton  wrote  a  letter  (apparently  to 
Wolcott)  suggesting  and  carefully  characterizing  seven  men, 
and  recommending  four  of  them.  If  one  may  judge  by  what  is 
known  of  the  relations  between  the  three  men,  these  recom- 
mendations were  pressed  upon  the  president  by  Wolcott,  secre- 
tary of  the  treasury ;  yet  no  one  of  the  men  recommended  was 
appointed.1  This  can  hardly  be  construed  otherwise  than  as  a 
slight  to  Hamilton ;  but  it  should  be  attributed  rather  to  per- 
sonal dislike  than  to  the  ulterior  purpose  of  undermining  the 
latter's  influence  in  New  York.  Adams  had  too  few  supporters 
there  to  form  even  the  nucleus  of  a  personal  faction. 

Adams  was  also  charged  with  nepotism.  Washington  had 
explained  to  General  Webb,  in  1 789,  that  it  was  necessary  for 
him  to  find  a  post  for  Colonel  Smith,  the  vice-president's  son-in- 
law;  but  it  is  not  known  whether  Adams  urged  the  suit  by 
personal  solicitation.  In  1798  Colonel  Smith  was  again  a  can- 
didate.2 Washington,  as  commander-in-chief,  suggested  that  he 
be  made  a  brigadier-general,  and  also  mentioned  him  as  third 
choice  for  adjutant-general.  The  president  promptly  nomi- 
nated him  for  the  latter  more  lucrative  position.  When  Timo- 
thy Pickering,  the  secretary  of  state,  heard  of  this  action,  he 
hastened  to  the  Senate  and  secured  a  rejection  of  the  nomination, 
claiming  afterward  that  his  step  was  an  act  of  kindness  toward 

1  American  Historical  Review,  ii.  245,  247;  Executive  Journal,  i.  240. 

2  Webb,  Correspondence,  iii.  141;  Washington  to  Hamilton,  July  14,  1798,  Wash- 
ington, Writings  (Sparks  ed.),  xi.  265;  Executive  Journal,  i.  292,  293;   Pickering, 
Pickering,  iii.  465. 


PARTY  LINES.  19 

Adams.  The  kindness  is  open  to  doubt;  but  certainly  few 
things  tend  more  to  hurt  a  man  politically  than  a  reputation  for 
feathering  the  family  nest  with  the  salaries  of  public  offices. 
Even  the  transfer,  by  his  father,  of  John  Quincy  Adams  from 
the  post  of  minister  to  Portugal  to  that  of  minister  to  Prussia,  so 
amply  justified  by  the  event,  furnished  material  for  detractors.1 


Jn  Adams's  letter  to  Wolcott,  quoted  above,  mention  is  made 
of  the  fact  that  Washington  appointed  many  violent  Republicans 
to  office.  The  break  between  the  Federalists  and  the  Republi- 
cans did  not  follow  quite  the  same  lines  as  that  between  the 
Federalists  and  the  Antifederalists ;  hence,  in  spite  of  Wash- 
ington's policy  of  excluding  most  of  the  latter  from  the  service, 
many  vigorous  supporters  of  Jefferson  were  in  office.  It  would 
have  been  indeed  surprising,  considering  the  bitterness  of  party 
spirit  at  the  time,  if  they  had  remained  unmolested.  One  of 
the  most  obnoxious  was  Tench  Coxe,  commissioner  of  revenue, 
an  intense  partisan  and  very  useful  to  the  opposition.  In  1797 
he  received  his  dismissal  from  Wolcott,  who  based  it  upon  the 
ground  of  deliberate  misconduct  in  office.  This  misconduct  was 
the  giving  of  aid  to  the  opposition,  and  it  may  be  that  Coxe  used 
his  official  position  to  make  this  aid  more  effective ;  but  that 
does  not  alter  the  fact  that  the  removal  was  made  for  party 
purposes,  and  that  a  precedent  was  set  which  might  prove 
dangerous.  The  Federalists  were  exceedingly  gratified,  and 
warmly  congratulated  Wolcott  on  having  finally  expelled  the 
traitor  from  the  treasury.2 

This  may  be  considered  the  first  case  of  removal  for  party 
reasons.  It  was  not  the  only  one  under  Adams.  In  June, 
1798,  Jeremiah  Smith  wrote  to  Wolcott  complaining  of  Joshua 
Whipple  and  William  Gardner,  the  collector  at  Portsmouth 
and  the  commissioner  of  loans  for  New  Hampshire.  He  said  : 
"  They  have  been  it  is  generally  said  faithful  and  punctual  in 
the  discharge  of  the  duties  of  their  offices.  They  have  some 
property  and  I  believe  are  pretty  free  from  debts  and  specula- 
tions. Their  political  conduct  has  been  disrespectful  to  the 
Government  and  offensive  to  good  men  in  the  extreme."  He 

1  Callender,  Sedgwick  &>  Co.,  or  a  Key  to  the  Six  Per  Cent  Cabinet. 

2  American  Historical  Review,  ii.  261. 


20  FEDERALIST  POLICY. 

described  at  length  their  methods  of  instilling  Jacobinical  ideas 
into  the  minds  of  their  fellow-citizens,  and  concluded :  "  I  have 
no  hesitation  in  saying  that  I  think  Justice  to  the  public  re- 
quires the  removal  of  these  men.  They  surely  cannot  complain 
if  that  Government  which  is  the  object  of  their  execrations 
should  weaken  their  means  of  injuring  and  abusing  it."  The 
next  day  Eliphalet  Ladd  wrote,  complaining  particularly  of 
Whipple,  and  adding  charges  of  unjust  exactions.  On  June  30, 
successors  to  both  of  these  accused  men  were  nominated.1 

Here  we  have  an  indubitable  case  of  political  removal ;  for  of 
course  no  credence  can  be  placed  in  the  vague  eleventh-hour 
tales  of  injustice.  Callender  writes  that  the  removals  of  Gardner 
and  Whipple  were  made  because  they  would  not  sign  one  of  the 
eulogistic  addresses  to  the  president  that  were  so  numerous  at 
the  outbreak  of  the  French  war;2  and  the  conjunction  of  these 
first  removals  with  the  Federalists'  high  hopes  based  on  the 
war,  and  with  the  Alien  and  Sedition  Acts,  is  indeed  striking. 
The  Columbian  Centinel  had  previously  asked  :  "  Why  does  not 
the  President  tumble  headlong  from  their  places  the  collector, 
loan-office  commissioner,  and  commander  of  the  revenue  cutter 
at  Portsmouth  ?  These  ingrates  ought  not  for  a  moment  to  be 
suffered  to  eat  the  bread  of  the  public,  when  they  wait  only  for 
a  safe  occasion  to  betray  our  country  to  France."  3  Pickering, 
who  as  secretary  of  state  chose  the  newspapers  that  should 
print  the  laws  of  the  United  States,  deprived  Freneau  of  that 
privilege,  which  in  those  days  of  scanty  circulation  was  much 
prized ;  and  General  Knox  apparently  voiced  the  desires  of 
many  Federalists  when  he  urged  the  president  to  make  a 
general  sweep  of  all  the  more  pronounced  Republicans.4 

That  Adams  resisted  the  pressure  for  a  general  proscription 
is  made  evident  by  the  statistics  of  removals  during  his  adminis- 
tration. The  total  was  only  nineteen,  and  most  of  these  seem 


1  American  Historical  Review,  ii.  254-256;    Executive  Journal,  i.  283. 

2  Callender,  The  Prospect  before  Us,  31-32. 
8  Ibid,  quoting  Wood. 

4  Jefferson,  Anas,  March  14,  1800,  in  his  Writings  (Ford  ed.),  i.  286;  Lodge, 
Cabot,  230 ;  Duane,  Examination  of  the  Question  who  is  the  Writer  of  Two  Forged 
Letters,  18. 


ADAMSES  REMOVALS.  21 

to  have  been  for  some  cause  connected  with  the  efficiency  of 
the  service.1  The  dismissal  of  Pickering,  the  secretary  of  state, 
was  due  to  the  break  in  policy  between  Adams  and  the  more 
extreme  elements  in  the  Federal  party.  After  this  removal 
had  been  made,  Stephen  Higginson  accused  Adams  of  using 
his  patronage  to  help  the  Republicans  elect  Gerry  to  the  gov- 
ernorship of  Massachusetts ; 2  but  he  did  not  cite  any  specific 
instance,  and  this  was  undoubtedly  only  a  vague  charge  caused 
by  personal  spleen.  On  the  whole,  Adams  seems  to  have 
developed  no  such  systematic  policy  of  appointments  as  Wash-  " 
ington,  but  to  have  yielded  more  to  influence,  time,  and  cir- 
cumstance ;  he  was  more  moderate  than  some  of  his  advisers, 
but  more  proscriptive  than  the  first  president  ;  the  line  of 
division  that  he  drew  was  not  exactly  between  the  Federalist 
and  Republican  parties,  but  rather  between  those  with  whom 
he  agreed,  as  Gerry  and  Marshal,  and  those  with  whom  he 
differed,  as  Pickering,  Hamilton,  and  Jefferson.8 

The  constitution  assigned  to  the  president  the  duty  of  nomi- 
nating public  officers ;  but,  in  a  country  so  extended  as  the 
United  States,  even  a  man  with  the  wide  personal  acquaintance 
of  Washington  needed  assistance  in  finding  proper  men.  A  , 
machinery  for  presenting  names  to  the  executive  therefore  grew  \ 
up  outside  of  the  constitution.  This  was  based  in  part  on 
experience,  and  was  in  part  the  natural  result  of  conditions ;  it 
has  grown  in  scope  and  importance  with  every  increase  in  the 
civil  service,  but  for  almost  a  century  from  the  foundation  of 
the  government  no  essentially  new  elements  were  introduced 
into  it. 

Under  the  Confederation,  appointments  were  made  by  Con- 
gress. Often  the  delegates  from  a  single  state,  or  from  several 

1  See,  for  example,  Pickering  to  Cabot,  June  16,  1800,  e.g.  the  consul  at  Cape 
St.  P'rancis  had  attacked  Pickering's  honesty,  and  had  interfered  with  the  consul- 
general  at  San  Domingo.     If  the  facts  are  as  stated,  the  reason  was  good.     Lodge, 
Cabot,  275. 

2  Fish,  in  Tables  of  Removal,  in  American  Historical  Association,  Reports,  1899, 
i.  70,  table  ii.;   Report,  1896,  i.  836. 

8  The  relations  between  Adams  and  Hamilton  are  not  discussed  here,  because  to 
bring  anything  new  to  light  would  demand  a  long  chapter  devoted  to  that  subject 
alone. 


22  FEDERALIST  POLICY. 

states,  would  agree  upon  a  candidate,  and  would  press  his 
appointment  with  their  combined  votes.1  This  precedent,  and 
the  fact  that  under  the  new  constitution  the  Senate  shared  the 
appointing  power,  led  to  a  belief  in  many  sections  that  officers 
would  actually  be  elected  by  that  body.  James  Seagrove  of 
Georgia  wrote  to  General  Webb,  January  2,  1789  :  "  As  the  new 
government  of  the  United  States  will  soon  take  place,  and  of 
course  all  appointments  be  made,  it  behoves  us  all  to  look  round 
and  try  what  we  can  get.  I  am  advised  by  all  my  friends  this 
way  to  offer  for  the  Collectorship  of  the  Import  for  Georgia  and 
have  little  doubt  of  being  Nominated  by  our  Senators  to  Con- 
gress —  But  this  alone  will  not  do.  It  will  also  be  necessary  to 
have  as  many  friends  as  possible  in  the  Senate."  On  February 
22  he  wrote,  "There  will  be  four  Candidates  for  that  office 
from  Georgia  so  that  it  must  be  determined  by  a  Vote  of  the 
Senate."2 

The  senators,  who  were  burdened  with  numberless  applica- 
tions for  the  few  offices  within  their  respective  states,  differed 
broadly  in  their  interpretation  of  their  duties.  George  Cabot 
was  apologetic  when  he  made  recommendations.  Roger  Sher- 
man understood  that  the  method  to  be  employed  by  those  desir- 
ing office  was  to  write  a  letter  to  the  president,  "  mentioning  the 
office  to  which  they  wish  to  be  appointed,  and  their  past  ser- 
vices and  sufferings  as  a  ground  of  claim,  —  and  if  the  President 
is  not  personally  acquainted  with  their  character,  their  letter  is 
accompanied  with  a  certificate  from  persons  of  distinction,  cer- 
tifying their  qualifications,  and  they  sometimes  in  their  letters 
refer  the  President  to  members  of  Congress,  or  other  persons 
residing  at  the  Seat  of  Government  for  information."3 

Republican  senators  were  more  insistent  on  their  rights. 
Monroe  boldly  protested  against  the  rumored  appointment  of 
Hamilton  as  special  envoy  to  Great  Britain  in  1794;*  and 
Davis,  in  his  life  of  Burr,  asserts  that,  after  the  recall  of  Gou- 
verneur  Morris  from  France,  it  being  conceded  that  some  promi- 

1  Austin,  Gerry,  i.  294-295.  2  Webb,  Correspondence,  iii.  121-124. 

8  McRee,  Iredell,  i.  275  ;  Foster  Manuscripts,  passim,  for  Foster's  term  as  senator; 
Lodge,  Cabot,  43,  94 ;   Boutell,  Sherman,  223-224. 
*  Monroe,  Writings,  i.  291-292. 


SENATORIAL  INFLUENCE.  23 

nent  Republican  must  be  sent  to  succeed  him,  the  Republican 
members  of  Congress  held  a  caucus,  and  decided  to  press  the 
appointment  of  Burr.  This  statement  is  confirmed  by  Monroe's 
letters  of  the  period;  for  he  positively  refused  to  accept  the 
mission  until  assured  that  Burr  would,  under  no  circumstances, 
be  appointed.1 

The  famous  debate  of  1789,  on  the  subject  of  the  removing 
power,  lies  outside  the  field  of  this  monograph ;  but  one  incident 
of  it  is  worthy  of  note  in  this  connection.  In  the  House  of 
Representatives  the  supporters  of  the  president's  power  won 
by  votes  of  thirty  to  eighteen,  and  thirty-one  to  nineteen,  on 
the  crucial  points ;  in  the  Senate  the  casting  vote  of  the  vice- 
president  was  needed,  indicating  that  the  latter  body  was 
already  alert  and  jealous  of  its  rights.2 

Washington  recognized  that  the  word  of  a  member  of  Con- 
gress should  have  special  weight  with  regard  to  local  appoint- 
ments because  of  his  local  knowledge.3  He  insisted,  however, 
in  a  communication  to  a  committee  of  the  Senate  upon  his 
right  of  nomination,  presenting  all  names  to  the  Senate  by  a 

1  Davis,  Burr,  i.  408-409  (given  on  the  authority  of  Burr,  and  of  "  a  gentleman  of 
high  standing  ").     See  also  Parton,  Burr,  196.     Monroe  wrote  to  Jefferson,  May  26, 
27,  1794,  that  Burr  is  sole  candidate  "under  auspices  very  favorable  to  his  success," 
that  "  of  course  he  goes  as  a  Republican,"  that  the  New  Jersey  members  are  in 
his  interest;  then  that  Monroe  has  accepted,  after  being  assured  that  Burr  could 
not  be  appointed,  and  after  consulting  friends.     Monroe,  Writings,  i.  298,  299- 
301. 

2  Lucy  M.  Salmon,  Appointing  Power  of  the  President  (American  Historical  Asso- 
ciation, Papers,  i.  No.  5),  ch.  ii. 

8  The  following  notes  of  the  opinions  of  the  new  congressmen  from  North  Caro- 
lina are  in  Jefferson's  handwriting,  and  were  to  guide  the  president  in  making  the 
North  Carolina  appointments  {American  Historical  Review,  i.  273-274)  :  — 
"  District  judge.     Col°  Davie  is  recommended  by  Steele. 
Hawkins  says  he  is  their  first  character. 
Brown  sais  the  same. 

Samuel  Spencer. 
Steele  sais  he  is  a  good  man,  one  of  the  present  judges,  not  remarkeable  for  his 

abilities,  but  deserves  well  of  his  country. 
Bloodworth  sais  Spencer  desires  the  appointment,  but  sais  nothing  of  him. 

John  Stokes. 

Steele  names  him  at  his  own  request,  he  is  a  Virginian,  was  a  Captn  in  the  late  war, 
lost  his  right  hand  in  Beaufort's  defeat,  practises  law  in  S.  Carolina  with  reputa- 
tion and  success;  has  been  frequently  of  the  legislature,  was  a  member  of  the 


24  FEDERALIST  POLICY. 

written  message ; l  and  he  did  not  suffer  himself  to  be  coerced. 
Monroe  received  a  rebuff  for  his  interference  in  regard  to 
Hamilton,  and  the  president  himself  selected  the  Republican 
who  should  go  to  France.  When  the  Senate  rejected  one  of 
the  nominations  presented  to  it,  Washington  sent  a  dignified 
letter  of  protest,  asking  that,  in  the  future,  the  senators  make 
sure  what  reasons  he  had  for  presenting  a  name  before  they 
rejected  it.2 

During  the  first  administration  the  influence  of  the  senators 
was  simply  that  of  men  with  special  opportunities  for  informa- 
tion. Other  prominent  men  sent  advice,  and  Washington's 
broad  acquaintance  resulted  in  his  receiving  directly  many  re- 
quests for  offices,  particularly  from  army  officers.  In  addition 
to  these  and  to  the  applications  sent  to  members  of  Congress, 
many  were  sent  to  the  heads  of  departments  and  to  other 
prominent  officials.  The  administration,  moreover,  like  any 
intelligent  employer  of  labor,  refused  to  confine  its  selection  to 
those  who  sought  employment  either  directly  or  indirectly,  but 
I  searched  out  able  men  from  all  over  the  country.3 

Methods  were  unchanged  under  Adams,  but  conditions  were 
somewhat  different;  for  the  Senate  was  less  friendly  to  him 
than  to  his  predecessor,  and  his  smaller  personal  acquaintance 
left  him  more  at  the  mercy  of  advisers.4  One  case  of  competi- 
tion for  office  can  be  closely  followed,  and  illustrates  very  well 

convention,  a  federalist,  is  now  a  Col°  of  Militia  cavalry  and  additional  judge 
of  the  Supreme  Court. 

Hawkins  has  understood  he  is  a  worthy  man. 
Ashe  names  him." 

Davie  was  appointed,  declined,  and  Stokes  was  selected  {Executive  Journal,  i.  50, 
53).  See  also  Oliver  Wolcott's  application  for  office  and  reliance  in  the  decision  of 
the  Connecticut  delegation  (Gibbs,  Memoirs,  i.  20). 

1  Washington  to  a  committee  of  the  Senate,  August  8,  1789,  Washington,  Writings 
(Ford  ed.),  xi.  417. 

2  Monroe,    Writings,  i.  292  note,  301  ;   Executive  Journal,  i.  16  ;    Richardson, 
Messages  and  Papers,  i.  58. 

8  Higginson  to  Adams,  July  4,  August  10, 1789,  American  Historical  Association, 
Report,  1896,  i.  767  ;  Washington,  Writings  (Sparks  ed.),  x.  3  ;  American  Histori- 
cal Review,  ii.  241,  271,  276;  Monroe,  Writings,  i.  227;  Washington,  Writings 
(Sparks  ed.),  x.  25-26  ;  Lodge,  Cabot,  107,  109. 

*  Note  the  rejection  of  his  son-in-law  mentioned  above,  and  Pickering's  success 
in  securing  the  rejection  of  General  George  Mathew's  nomination  as  governor  of 


APPLICATIONS  FOR   OFFICE.  2$ 

the  conditions  of  the  period.  A  certain  Colonel  Lindsay,  col- 
lector of  Norfolk,  Virginia,  early  in  Adams's  term  became  mor- 
tally ill.  Since  the  deputy  of  the  collector,  Francis  Taylor, 
was  engaged  to  Lindsay's  daughter,  it  was  felt  by  Colonel 
Lindsay's  friends  that  it  would  be  pleasant  for  Taylor  to 
succeed  to  the  collectorship,  marry  the  daughter,  and  so 
provide  for  the  family.  In  April,  1797,  a  citizen  of  Norfolk 
wrote  to  some  one  in  authority,  probably  a  member  of  the 
Virginia  delegation  in  Congress,  in  regard  to  the  case.  He 
said  that  Lindsay  had  for  some  time  been  disabled,  would  soon 
die,  and  that  Taylor  was  well  qualified  to  succeed  to  the  posi- 
tion, as  he  had  for  some  time  performed  its  duties.  This 
letter  was  supported,  within  a  few  days,  by  a  petition  of 
merchants. 

The  surveyor,  Mr.  Bedinger,  who  had  had  several  contests 
with  Lindsay  himself  for  the  post,  naturally  felt  aggrieved  at 
seeing  a  new  rival  rise  from  the  grave  of  the  old.  He  appealed 
at  once  to  the  representative  of  the  district  in  Congress,  a  Mr. 
Parker,  who  had  at  one  time  been  collector  with  Bedinger  as 
his  deputy.  "  I  cannot  say,"  he  writes,  "but  it  seems  to  me  that 
a  death-bed  resignation  looks  too  much  like  a  bequest — that  this 
kind  of  succession  in  office  has  too  greatly  the  appearance  of  the 
inheritance  of  office,  ever  to  be  countenanced  by  the  President 
of  the  United  States,  should  he  be  truly  informed  of  all  the 
circumstances  attending  this  Case."  Bedinger  secured  the  sup- 
port of  Parker,  who  warmly  recommended  him  to  Wolcott.  In 
May,  Lindsay  was  still  alive ;  but  the  news  of  his  condition 
seems  to  have  become  public,  for  two  new  candidates  appeared. 
One  of  these,  a  man  by  the  name  of  Byrd,  was  brought  forward 
by  General  William  Heth,  to  whom  Wolcott  seems  to  have 
applied  for  a  suggestion.  Byrd  was  also  supported  by  General 
Carrington,  and  was  appointed.  Parker  attributed  his  success 
over  Bedinger  to  political  reasons.  Doubtless  these  counted, 
as  they  usually  did  under  Adams ;  but  probably  General  Heth's 
charges  of  wholesale  mismanagement  in  the  Norfolk  custom- 


Mississippi  (Massachusetts  Historical   Society,  Collections,   6th   series,   viii.  322); 
American  Historical  Review,  ii.  241. 


26  FEDERALIST  POLICY. 

house  had  some  weight  in  deterring  the  administration  from 
selecting  any  of  the  incumbent  officers.1 

This  controversy  illustrates  the  machinery  for  the  distribution 
of  offices  as  it  existed  under  Adams.  One  candidate,  it  is  noted, 
presented  his  claims  through  his  congressman ;  another  sup- 
ported his  with  personal  letters  and  petitions.  These  latter  do 
not  seem  to  have  been  very  highly  regarded :  there  is  on  one 
the  marginal  note,  "I  should  not  consider  it  a  very  great  com- 
pliment to  be  highly  recommended  as  a  Collector  by  the  Mer- 
chants, owners  and  Masters  of  vessels  of  Norfolk  —  or  indeed 
any  other  District."  The  general  government  did  not,  how- 
ever, rely  on  these  suggestions  and  simply  take  what  was 
offered;  it  sought  for  the  best  men.  The  details  also  show 
how  strongly,  in  spite  of  the  removals  that  Adams  made,  the 
idea  of  property  in  office  was  held,  and  how  much  greater,  at 
this  particular  time,  seemed  the  chance  that  a  place  would  be 
held  too  long,  become  hereditary,  than  that  it  would  change 
hands  too  often.  In  fact,  the  idea  set  forth  by  John  Cotton,  in 
his  famous  election  sermon,  that  even  elected  officers  should  not 
be  changed  so  long  as  they  properly  performed  their  duties, 
seems  not  to  have  entirely  disappeared.2 

On  the  whole,  the  civil  service  under  the  Federalists  seems 
to  have  been  exceptionally  honest.  With  the  loose  business 
tone  prevailing  in  the  country,  a  certain  amount  of  loss  was 
to  be  expected ;  but  while  there  were  defalcations,  some  at- 
tributable to  dishonesty  and  some  to  bad  management,  they 
scarcely  bear  so  large  a  proportion  to  the  amount  of  money 
handled  as  they  did  in  the  succeeding  period.  The  best  proof 
of  the  general  integrity  of  the  service  is  that  Gallatin,  when 
directed  by  Jefferson  to  conduct  a  searching  investigation  of  the 
Federalist  financial  administration,  was  able  to  find  no  evidence 
to  its  discredit.3  Honesty  and  efficiency  are  not  entirely 

1  This  account  is  taken  wholly  from  the  documents  printed  by  Mr.  Gaillard  Hunt, 
in  the  American  Historical  Review,  ii.  247-254. 

2  "  It  is  the  height  of  ingratitude,  says  a  correspondent,  to  endeavor  to  remove 
the  Honorable  Mr.  Dunbar  from  the  Senate  "  {Massachusetts  Centinel,  April  4,  1789). 

8  Leake,  Lamb,  353-354 ;  Senate  Documents,  16  Cong.,  ist  sess.,  ii.  No.  89  ; 
J.  A.  Hamilton,  Reminiscences,  121-122. 


GENERAL   PRINCIPLES.  2? 

synonymous,  and  government  reports  cannot  tell  how  well  the 
various  officers  of  the  government  performed  their  duties  — 
whether  they  were  polite  and  abreast  with  the  progress  of  the 
age  or  not ;  but  the  general  impression  that  one  carries  away 
from  the  correspondence  and  press  of  the  time  is  that  the  people 
were  satisfied.  It  must  be  borne  in  mind,  however,  that  official 
duties  were  simple  as  compared  with  the  functions  of  the  mod- 
ern public  officer,  and  that,  in  the  absence  of  foreign  travel, 
standards  of  comparison  were  lacking.  The  only  branch  of  the 
public  service  that  closely  affected  the  mass  of  the  people  was 
the  post-office.  Jefferson  complained  that  he  dared  not  use  the 
office  most  convenient  for  him,  lest  his  mail  be  tampered  with ; l 
but  this  sensitiveness  was  perhaps  exaggerated  for  political 
purposes.  The  continuance  of  Mr.  Lindsay  in  office  until 
death,  in  spite  of  his  long  sickness,  shows  that  the  civil  service 
was  not  kept  constantly  pruned  ;  yet  one  of  the  very  few  cases 
in  which  an  officer  has  been  requested  to  resign  because  dis- 
abled by  permanent  ill  health  occurred  in  Washington's  adminis- 
tration.2 On  the  whole,  it  seems  probable  that  the  administration 
of  public  business  bore  a  better  relation  to  the  business  stand- 
ards of  the  country  under  the  Federalists  than  at  any  subse- 
quent period. 

In  a  summing  up  of  the  whole  policy  of  the  Federalists  toward 
the  civil  service,  this  point  should  first  of  all  be  insisted  upon, 
that  fitness  was  always  an  essential  requirement;  other  quali- 
fications were  often  looked  for,  but  these  were  ever  subsidiary 
to  the  ability  to  perform  the  duties  of  the  office^  Of  these  sub- 
sidiary qualifications,  correct  political  opinion  was  one  of  the  most 
important  both  under  Washington  and  under  Adams*  Political 
service,  however,  was  never  seriously  reckoned  by  them:  re- 
quests for  office  made  no  parade  of  services  at  caucuses  and 
polls,  and  it  cannot,  therefore,  be  said  that  the  spoils  system 
had  then  come  into  existence. 

1  Jefferson,    Writings  (Washington   ed.),  iv.  230-231,256;    Massachusetts  Spy, 
October  9,  1799. 

2  But  Pickering,  in  1796,  advised  William  Lithgow,  district  attorney  of  Maine, 
to  resign  (Massachusetts  Historical  Society,  Collections,  6th  series,  viii.  281).     Lith- 
gow resigned  {Executive  Journal,  i.  217). 


28  FEDERALIST  POLICY. 

The  Federalist  policy  of  excluding  the  opposition  from  office, 
however,  inevitably  entailed  a  policy  of  removals  upon  their 
opponents  when  the  latter  should  come  into  power ;  while  the 
few  removals  they  actually  made  furnished  their  enemies  with 
the  tu  qtwque  argument,  always  so  telling  in  political  conflicts.1 
In  the  very  last  weeks  of  their  power,  moreover,  they  laid 
themselves  distinctly  open  to  the  charge  of  using  the  patronage 
for  party  purposes.  The  hasty  creation  of  an  extensive  judici- 
ary in  the  very  death  hour  of  the  administration,  and  the  filling 
of  the  places  created  with  ardent  Federalists,  would,  if  the  act 
were  that  of  a  modern  legislature,  be  generally  considered  as  a 
job.  Gouverneur  Morris  looked  upon  it  in  that  way  at  the  time.2 

One  feature  of  this  act,  especially,  gave  opportunity  to  sus- 
pect the  good  faith  of  its  framers :  among  the  offices  created 
were  those  of  twenty-four  justices  of  the  peace  for  the  District 
of  Columbia ;  these  positions  were  not  to  be  held  during  good 
behavior,  that  practice  having  become  unpopular,  but  for  a  term 
of  years,  which,  out  of  all  analogy  with  the  other  fixed  terms 
for  national  officers,  was  to  be  five  years.3  Republicans  could 
not  refrain  from  the  reflection  that  this  provision  would  protect 
the  justices  until  another  election,  which  might  give  the  pat- 
ronage to  the  Federalists  once  more.  Politically  these  minor 
sins  of  the  Federalists  almost  offset  the  general  decorum  of 
their  administration,  and  must  be  held,  at  least  in  part,  respon- 
sible for  the  evil  times  into  which  they  were  soon  to  fall. 

1  "  Every  person  holding  office  must  either  quit  it,  or  think  and  vote  exactly  with 
Mr.  Adams."  The  hope  was  also  expressed  that  on  March  4,  1801,  Gardner  and 
other  "  expelled  public  servants "  would  be  replaced  (Callender,  The  Prospect 
before  Us,  32-33).  See  also  Coleman,  Examination,  27.  As  late  as  1 808  the 
charge  was  repeated  (Address  to  the  People  of  the  American  States  who  Choose 
Electors,  13). 

'  2  "That  the  leaders  of  the  federal  party  may  use  this  opportunity  to  provide  for 
friends  and  adherents  is,  I  think,  probable  ;  and  if  they  were  my  enemies,  I  should 
blame  them  for  it.  Whether  I  should  do  the  same  thing  myself  is  another  question. 
.  .  .  They  are  about  to  experience  a  heavy  gale  of  adverse  wind  ;  can  they  be 
blamed  for  casting  many  anchors  to  hold  their  ship  through  the  storm  ?  "  (Roose- 
velt, Gouverneur  Morris,  333). 

8  Statutes  at  Large,  ii.  107. 


CHAPTER   II. 

JEFFERSON'S  POLICY  AS   TO  PUBLIC  OFFICE. 
1801-1809. 

WHEN  Jefferson  became  president,  he  found  nearly  all  the 
offices  filled  by  his  opponents.1  Was  it  right,  when  the  people 
had  expelled  the  Federalists  from  the  elective  offices  and  put 
Republicans  in  their  places,  that  the  old  occupants  of  the 
appointive  offices  should  be  left  in  their  positions  merely  be- 
cause the  people  could  not  reach  them  ?  Should  the  govern- 
ment be  administered,  should  the  national  salaries  be  enjoyed, 
by  representatives  of  a  minority  of  the  population  ?  Most  of 
the  Republicans  agreed  that  it  was  not  right,  and  that  it  should 
not  be  tolerated.  Gideon  Granger,  Jefferson's  postmaster-general, 
wrote :  "  Upon  entering  on  the  duties  of  this  office,  my  mind 
was  impressed  with  an  unusual  anxiety  and  solicitude.  Know- 
ing as  I  did  that  most  of  the  officers  under  me,  from  their 
official  stations,  had  been  in  the  habit  of  associating  and  corre- 
sponding, as  well  on  politics  as  on  business,  with  those  lately 
in  authority,  from  whom  the  people  had  withdrawn  their  con- 
fidence ;  and  elevated  to  office  men  whose  political  principles 
they  believed  better  calculated  to  preserve  the  constitution  and 
public  prosperity,  and  having  a  general  knowledge  of  the  most 
pronounced  recent  events,  it  occurred  to  me  that  some  removals 
would  become  necessary,  as  well  to  effect  an  equal  participation 
and  enjoyment  of  office  by  the  two  great  classes  of  citizens  who 
are  designated  by  the  terms  Federalists  and  Republicans,  as  to 
maintain  and  preserve  confidence  in  the  Department."2  The 

1  February  18,  1803,  Jefferson,  Writings  (Ford  ed.),  viii.  212-213. 

2  New  York  Evening  Post,  March  4,  1802. 

29 


30  JEFFERSOWS  POLICY. 

bitterness  of  the  preceding  contest  sharpened  this  call  for  action. 
The  judiciary  act  was  viewed  in  the  worst  possible  light,  the 
few  removals  made  by  Adams  were  magnified  into  a  searching 
proscription,  charges  wholly  false  were  fabricated,  and  cries 
for  the  punishment  of  the  Federalists  mingled  with  demands 
for  a  just  recognition  of  the  Republicans.1 

The  Federalists  foresaw  the  danger,  and  a  story  was  circu- 
lated at  the  time,  that  some  of  their  leaders  attempted  to  ward 
off  the  blow  by  sowing  dissension  between  Jefferson  and  his 
followers.  Certainly  during  the  early  months  of  his  term  some 
of  the  well-known  Federalist  newspapers  praised  him  and  dis- 
paraged his  party.2  The  Columbian  Centinel,  August  12,  1801, 
told  how,  when  a  list  of  men  to  be  appointed  to  office  because 
of  their  services  in  the  campaign  of  1800  was  presented  to  the 
president,  he  remarked,  "  Yes,  yes,  I  have  read  that  Rome  was 
saved  by  geese ;  but  I  do  not  remember  that  these  geese  were 
made  Revenue  Officers  or  Marshals."  Jefferson  was  too  clever 
to  be  caught  by  such  chaff.  Three  days  after  his  inauguration 
he  wrote  to  Monroe :  "  I  have  firmly  refused  to  follow  the 
counsels  of  those  who  have  advised  the  giving  offices  to  some 
of  their  leaders,  in  order  to  reconcile  [them].  I  have  given,  and 
will  give  only  to  Republicans,  under  existing  circumstances."  3 

The  question  of  the  patronage  was  of  special  importance  to 
Jefferson  because  of  his  desire  to  win  over  the  bulk  of  the 
Federalist  party,  and  its  delicacy  was  enhanced  by  the  fact  that 
his  own  party  was  not  united ;  while  the  majority  expected  vig- 
orous action,  some  desired  that  removals  be  made  sparingly.4 
He  felt  that  efficiency  was  not  the  sole  object  to  be  kept  in 
mind  in  administering  the  civil  service ;  and  wished  so  to  con- 

1  American  Historical  Review,  iii.  276-280.     For  instance,  it  was  said  that  Con- 
gress gave  special  power  to  the  secretary  of  state  to  make  contracts  with  the  news- 
papers by  which  the  printing  was  secured  to  the  "  aristocratic  presses  "  for  "  the  term 
of  one  year"  {Columbian  Centinel,  April  n,  1801). 

2  Jefferson  to  Gerry,  March  29,  1801,  Jefferson,  Writings  (Ford  ed.),  viii.  41; 
American  Historical  Review,  iii.  274 ;    Columbian  Centinel,  May  23,  1801  ;  Massa- 
chusetts Spy,  July  15,  1801. 

3  Jefferson,  Writings  (Ford  ed.),  viii.  10. 

*  P.  Butler  to  Burr,  September  19,  1801,  "On  the  subject  of  removal  from  office, 
it  appears  to  my  finite  judgment  that  it  should  be  done  sparingly  "  (Davis,  Burr,  ii. 
153-154). 


INITIAL  PRINCIPLES.  31 

duct  it  as  to  bring  about  the  best  political  results  for  country 
and  for  party.  He  wrote  to  Monroe,  March  7,  1801,  that  he 
believed,  as  did  others,  "  that  deprivations  of  office,  if  made  on 
the  ground  of  political  principles  alone,  would  revolt  our  new 
converts,  and  give  a  body  to  leaders  who  now  stand  alone. 
Some,  I  know,  must  be  made.  They  must  be  as  few  as  pos- 
sible, done  gradually,  and  bottomed  on  some  malversation  or 
inherent  disqualification.  Where  we  shall  draw  the  line  between 
retaining  all  &  none,  is  not  yet  settled,  and  will  not  be  till 
we  get  our  administration  together ;  and  perhaps  even  then,  we 
shall  proceed  a  talons,  balancing  our  measures  according  to  the 
impression  we  perceive  them  to  make." *  On  the  next  day  he 
wrote  to  Horatio  Gates  about  the  patronage,  "If  we  can  hit 
on  the  true  line  of  conduct  which  may  conciliate  the  honest  part 
of  those  who  were  called  federalists,  &  do  justice  to  those  who 
have  so  long  been  excluded  from  it,  I  shall  hope  to  be  able 
to  obliterate,  or  rather  to  unite  the  names  of  federalists  & 
republicans."  2 

With  these  ideas  in  mind,  —  of  conciliation  for  the  opposing  \ 
party,  and  of  justice  for  his  own, — Jefferson  sought  out  classes  |tx 
of  officers  for  whose  removal  some  special  reason  might  be  as-^f 
signed.      First,  he  treated  as  null  and  void  all  appointments* 
about  the  validity  of  which  there  was  any  legal   doubt.     The 
best  known  of  these  cases  was  that  of  the  justices  of  the  peace 
for  the  newly  organized  District  of  Columbia,  —  the  "  midnight 
appointments."  3      Although  the  supreme  court  decided  against 
the  president  in  the  famous  case  of  Marbury  vs.  Madison,  it 
declined  to  issue  any  writ  ;*  and  the  men  whom  he  appointed 
to  take  the  place  of  Adams's  nominees  retained  office.     The 

1  Jefferson,  Writings  (Ford  ed.),  viii.  10;  a  letter  of  March  23,  Writings  (Wash- 
ington ed.),  iv.  380. 

2  Jefferson,  Writings  (Ford  ed.),  viii.  11-12.     He  expected  that  there  would  not 
be  more  than  twenty  removals.     Randall,  Jefferson,  ii.  656. 

3  Jefferson  seems  to  have  felt  that  the  appointment  of  these  officers  by  Adams  was 
a  personal  unkindness.     See  letter  to  Mrs.  Adams,  June  13,  1804,  Jefferson,  Writings 
(Ford  ed.),  viii.  307.     On  the  judiciary,  see  Max  Farrand  in  American  Historical 
Review,  v.  682-686. 

4  I.  Cranch,  137;  Columbian  Centinel,  May  23,  July  I,  1801;  Gazette  (Charleston), 
September  9,  1801. 


32  JEFFERSON'S  POLICY. 

eagerness  with  which  Jefferson  seized  on  every  opportunity  to 
get  an  opponent  out  of  office  without  removing  him  is  illustrated 
by  an  incident  in  Rhode  Island.  After  the  judiciary  act  of  1801 
was  passed,  Adams  had  nominated  Mr.  Bourne  for  one  of  the 
new  circuit  judgeships  and  Mr.  Ray  Greene  for  the  district  judge- 
ship  that  Mr.  Bourne  was  to  vacate.  The  latter  did  not  resign 
his  post  until  March  23,  1801  ;  and  Jefferson  held  that,  as  Mr. 
Greene  had  been  nominated  to  a  position  which  was  not  vacant, 
and  which  was  held  on  the  tenure  of  good  behavior,  his  ap- 
pointment was  not  valid,  and  he  refused  to  recognize  him. 
This  action  was  violently  attacked  by  the  Federalists  ;  and  the 
president,  in  an  apparent  attempt  to  ward  off  their  criticism, 
selected  Mr.  Barnes,  a  moderate  Federalist,  for  the  position  of 
district  judge  thus  made  vacant.1 

The  number  of  these  so-called  illegal  appointments  was  small, 
and  Jefferson  was  soon  obliged  to  look  beyond  them  for  means 
to  satisfy  those  of  his  followers  who  desired  to  serve  their 
country  in  lucrative  places.  A  class  of  officers  subject  to  re- 
moval was  soon  discovered  in  those  appointed  by  Adams  after 
the  Federalist  defeat  of  1800  became  evident,2  on  the  ground 
that  Adams  should  not  have  chosen  men  to  positions  in  which 
he  knew  they  would  serve  another  president.  The  Federalists, 
of  course,  would  not  acknowledge  that  Adams  was  under  any 
such  obligations  of  law  or  courtesy ;  they  saw  no  reason  why 
customs  officers  need  be  in  political  sympathy  with  the  presi- 
dent, and  violently  attacked  this  action,  in  which  they  foresaw 
the  prelude  to  a  promiscuous  proscription.  Jefferson  was  not 
the  man  to  be  silent  under  attack,  and  he  spun  out  those  per- 
suasive arguments  which  always  flowed  so  readily  from  his  pen, 
and  which  provoked  a  full  discussion  of  the  problems  of  the 
civil  service. 

^The  particular  case  that  called  forth  this  discussion  was  the 
removal  of  Chauncy  Goodrich  from  the  collectorship  at  New 

1  New  York  Evening  Post,  March  24,  1803. 

2  See  Jefferson   to   Giles,  March  23,  and  to   Rush,  March  24,  1801,  Jefferson, 
Writings  (Washington,  ed.),  iv.  381,  383.     However  illogical  his  position,  Jefferson 

stood  by  it.  December  27,  1808,  he  wrote  to  Dr.  Logan,  "I  shall  make  no  new 
appointments  which  can  be  deferred  till  the  fourth  of  March,  thinking  it  fair  to  leave 
to  my  successor  to  select  the  agents  for  his  own  administration." 


EARLY  REMOVALS.  33 

Haven.  Connecticut,  Jefferson  considered  as  the  fortress  of 
the  "  monarchial  party,"  the  one  state  whose  conversion  to  re- 
publicanism was  problematical.  From  the  first  the  Connecticut 
Courant  had  led  the  press  of  the  state  in  a  fierce  denunciation 
of  every  instance  of  proscription.  With  several  other  papers 
it  followed  the  ingenious  device  of  printing  conciliatory  sen- 
tences from  the  inaugural,  and  under  them,  in  fancy  type,  the 
heading  "  Practice,"  followed  by  all  the  instances  of  removals 
that  could  be  accumulated.1  Jefferson  was  probably  not  sorry 
to  have  an  opportunity  to  fight  out  the  question  in  the  home  of 
the  enemy :  there  was  little  to  lose,  and  much  might  be  learned 
of  popular  sentiment. 

The  collector  at  New  Haven  had  died  in  February,  1801, 
and  Adams,  about  a  week  before  the  inauguration  of  Jefferson, 
appointed  Goodrich,2  who  therefore  fell  under  the  ban  which 
Jefferson  had  established.  The  president  consulted  his  sup- 
porters in  the  state ; 3  and  from  them  he  received  bitterly  par- 
tisan letters  calling  for  the  removal  of  Goodrich  and  a  clean 
sweep  throughout  the  state.4  Gideon  Granger  urged  that 
"The  principle  cannot  be  controverted,  that  it  is  just,  fair  and 
honorable  that  the  friends  of  the  Government  should  have  at 
least  as  great  a  proportion  of  the  honors  and  offices  of  the  Gov- 

1  Columbian  Centinel,  March  28,  August  I,  8,  1801  ;    Connecticut  Courant,  July 
20,  1 80 1 ;  New  York  Evening  Post,  December  18,  1801. 

2  Austin  died  February  5,  and  Goodrich  was  appointed  February  19  {Columbian 
Centinel,  August  I,  1801). 

3  Jefferson  to  Gideon  Granger  and  to  Pierrepont  Edwards,  March  29,  1801,  Jeffer- 
son, Writings  (Ford  ed.),  viii.  44-45  and  note. 

4  Granger  wrote :  "  As  to  the  case  of  Mr.  Goodrich  and  the  general  questions 
affecting  removals  from  office  in  this  State,  I  have  had   a    full    consultation   with 
Messrs.  Edwards,  Thirby  and  Wolcott  and  a  few  other  tried  friends.     They  are  all 
agreed  that  the  cause  requires  the  removal  of  Mr.  Goodrich  immediately,  and  of 
various  other  principal  officers  as  soon  and  in  such  manner,  as  the  Executive  should 
deem  proper;   for  my  own  part  I  have  yielded  to  the  same  opinion  so  far  as  respects 
the  principal  officers  in   Newhaven,  Hartford,  Middletown,  and  Litchfield  though 
reluctantly  and  with  some  apprehension.  .  .  .     Premising  that  I  am  fully  sensible  of 
the  agitations  which  will  be  produced  by  removals  from  office,  that  I  have  no  con- 
nections for  whom  I  wish  office,  and  that  I  sincerely  lament  the  existence  of  a  state 
of  things  which  require  acts  calculated  to  affect  individuals,  and  to  give  pain  to  the 
feelings  of  the  executive  —  I  proceed  to  state  the  reasons  upon  which  I  have  founded 
my  opinion"  {American  Historical  Review,  iii.  272-273). 

D 


34  JEFFERSON'S  POLICY. 

ernment  as  they  are  of  the  whole  people.  .  .  .  The  general 
depression  of  the  Republicans  in  this  State,  who  have  suffered 
everything,  combatting  a  Phalanx  vastly  superior  to  what  can 
be  found  in  any  other  part  of  the  union  forms  a  strong  reason. 
Nothing  can  be  lost  here,  and  something  may  be  gained :  how 
far  this  applies  to  other  parts  of  the  union  is  not  for  me  to 
judge.  A  knowledge  that  we  had  the  real  confidence  of  the 
Executive  I  think  would  have  a  happy  effect,  for  already  it  is 
used  as  an  argument  to  affect  our  elections  that  the  President 
used  the  Democrats  to  ride  into  office,  that  now  seated  there 
he  has  evinced  his  contempt  for  them,  and  will  rely  solely  on 
the  federalists  for  support.  .  .  .  Lastly,  the  sacred  rule  that 
no  man  shall  be  persecuted  for  his  opinions  decently  and  rea- 
sonably maintained  will  not  apply  to  any  of  our  official  Char- 
acters. I  believe  without  a  single  exception  All,  and  I  know 
most  have  been  bitter  persecutors."1  Pierrepont  Edwards  re- 
iterated the  charge  that  the  Federalists  expected  Jefferson  to 
look  to  them  for  support  in  Connecticut,  and  told  stories  of  the 
violent  hatred  with  which  they  nevertheless  regarded  him  :  how 
the  "collector  at  Middletown  .  .  .  violent,  irritable,  priest- 
ridden,  implacable,  a  ferocious  federalist,  and  a  most  indecent 
enimy  to  you  and  your  administration,"  drank  the  toast  "Thomas 
Jefferson  may  he  receive  from  his  fellow  Citizens  the  reward  of 
his  merit,"  adding,  "a  halter."  He  suggested  Samuel  Bishop 
as  the  proper  man  to  receive  the  New  Haven  collectorship,2  and 
the  appointment  was  made. 

At  first  Bishop's  name  was  well  received  by  the  Federalist 
press,  though  the  removal  of  Goodrich  was  condemned.  New 
Haven  Federalists,  however,  immediately  raised  a  cry  of  indig- 
nation, the  merchants  sent  a  protest  to  Jefferson,  and  the  party 
press  rallied  to  their  support.  "  The  office,"  they  said,  "  while 
filled  by  Mr.  Goodrich,  was  conducted  with  a  promptness,  integ- 
rity and  ability  .  .  .  not  to  be  found  in  his  successor."  3  Jefferson 

1  American  Historical  Review,  iii.  274. 

2  Ibid.  276.     Jefferson  also  received  a  letter  from  twenty-four  Connecticut  Repub- 
licans asking  for  removals.     Congressional  Record,  47  Cong.  2  sess.  276. 

8  Columbian  Centinel,  June  10,  July  29  (exceptionally  fancy  type),  August  I,  8, 
1801;  Connecticut  Courant,  June  15,  1801;  Massachusetts  Spy  and  Worcester  Gazette, 
October  7,  1801;  American  Historical  Review,  ii.  277. 


NEW  HAVEN  COLLECTORSHIP.  35 

seized  this  opportunity  to  give  expression  to  his  views  on  the 
question  of  the  patronage,  embodying  them  in  a  reply  (July  12, 
1801)  to  the  petition  of  the  merchants.  "The  removal,  as  it  is 
called,  of  Mr.  Goodrich,"  he  writes,  "forms  another  subject  of 
complaint.  Declarations  by  myself  in  favor  of  political  tolerance, 
exhortations  to  harmony  and  affection  in  social  intercourse,  and 
to  respect  for  the  equal  rights  of  the  minority,  have,  on  certain 
occasions,  been  quoted  and  misconstrued  into  assurances  that 
the  tenure  of  offices  was  to  be  undisturbed.  But  could  candor 
apply  such  a  construction  ? "  He  goes  on  to  quote  the  usual 
arguments,  that  the  Federalists  had  excluded  from  office  those 
"  not  of  a  particular  sect  of  politics,"  and  that,  as  a  consequence, 
office  was  a  monopoly  in  the  hands  of  the  minority.  "  Does  it 
violate  their  equal  rights"  he  continues,  " to  assert  some  rights 
in  the  majority  also  ?  Is  it  political 'intolerance  to  claim  a  propor- 
tionate share  in  the  direction  of  the  public  affairs  ?  .  .  .  If  the 
will  of  the  nation,  manifested  by  their  various  elections,  calls  for 
an  administration  of  government  according  with  the  opinions  of 
those  elected ;  if,  for  the  fulfilment  of  that  will,  displacements 
are  necessary,  with  whom  can  they  so  justly  begin  as  with  per- 
sons appointed  in  the  last  moments  of  an  administration,  not  for 
its  own  aid,  but  to  begin  a  career  at  the  same  time  with  their 
successors  ? "  Could  the  preference  for  another  as  successor  to 
Mr.  Austin  be  justly  considered  the  removal  of  Mr.  Goodrich  ? 
"  If  a  due  participation  of  office  is  a  matter  of  right,  how  are 
vacancies  to  be  obtained  ?  Those  by  death  are  few ;  by  resig- 
nation, none.  Can  any  other  mode  than  that  of  removal  be  pro- 
posed ?  This  is  a  painful  office ;  but  it  is  made  my  duty,  and  I 
meet  it  as  such.  I  proceed  in  the  operation  with  deliberation 
and  inquiry,  that  it  may  injure  the  best  men  least,  and  effect  the 
purposes  of  justice  and  public  utility  with  the  least  private  dis- 
tress ;  that  it  may  be  thrown,  as  much  as  possible,  on  delinquency, 
on  oppression,  on  intolerance,  on  ante-revolutionary  adherence 
to  our  enemies.  It  would  have  been  to  me  a  circumstance  of 
great  relief,  had  I  found  a  moderate  participation  of  office  in 
the  hands  of  the  majority.  I  would  gladly  have  left  to  time 
and  accident  to  raise  them  to  their  just  share.  But  their  total 
exclusion  calls  for  prompter  corrections.  I  shall  correct  the 


36  JEFFERSON'S  POLICY. 

procedure ;  but  that  done,  return  with  joy  to  that  state  of  things, 
when  the  only  questions  concerning  a  candidate  shall  be,  is  he 
honest  ?  Is  he  capable  ?  Is  he  faithful  to  the  Constitution  ?  "  l 
/  With  a  zest  and  an  analytical  keenness  worthy  of  the  New 
York  Evening  Post  of  to-day,  its  first  editor,  William  Coleman, 
probably  with  the  assistance  of  Alexander  Hamilton,  dissected 
this  programme  of  proscription,  enunciated  the  Federalist  doc- 
trine, and  imagined  the  president,  "  Gazing  round  him  with 
wild  anxiety,  he  furiously  enquires,  '  How  are  vacancies  to  be 
obtained  ? ' '  He  pointed  out  the  absurdity  of  the  contention 
that  Goodrich  had  not  been  removed,  but  was  less  convincing 
when  he  endeavored  to  show  a  distinction  between  refusing  to 
appoint  opponents,  as  the  Federalists  had  done,  and  removing 
them ;  nevertheless  he  acutely  remarked  in  this  connection  that, 
if  the  first  were  proscription,  it  could  not  be  cured,  as  Jefferson 
was  trying  to  do,  by  more  proscription.  Enunciating  his  own 
principles  on  the  subject,  he  said :  "  Every  man  who  accepts  an 
office,  takes  it  under  an  implicit  contract  from  the  Government, 
that  he  shall  be  continued  in  it,  as  long  as  he  exercises  it  with 
fidelity  and  capacity.  On  this  reliance  he  relinquishes  his  regu- 
lar business,  .  .  .  and  devotes  his  time  and  talents  to  his  public 
employment."  In  marked  contrast  with  a  later  famous  utter- 
ance is  the  following  statement :  "  There  are  few  offices,  with 
the  duties  of  which  a  person  can,  till  after  a  considerable  length 
of  time,  so  far  familiarize  himself,  as  to  perform  with  accuracy 
all  the  necessary  details  ...  if  every  change  of  a  chief  magis- 
trate is  to  produce  a  similar  change  of  subordinate  officers  .  .  . 
their  places  are  to  be  supplied  by  a  new  set  of  men  who  have 
everything  to  learn  .  .  .  :  the  means  of  improvement  being 
thus  rejected,  Government  will  be  entirely  deprived  of  all  the 
benefits  of  experience,  and  the  management  of  public  offices, 
perpetually  shifting  from  one  tyro  in  office  to  another,  will  for- 
ever be  kept  in  infancy  and  weakness."  He  goes  on  to  point 
out  that  in  America  most  men  have  to  support  themselves,  that 
it  is  difficult  to  resume  a  business  once  laid  aside,  and  that  con- 
sequently the  best  men  will  not  take  office  unless  its  tenure  is 
fairly  stable.  The  latter  part  of  the  pamphlet  is  taken  up  chiefly 

1  Jefferson,  Writings  (Washington  ed.),  iv.  402-405. 


NEW  HAVEN"  COLLECTORSHIP.  37 

with  a  discussion  of  some  of  the  intricate  constitutional  questions 
of  the  civil  service,  and  with  an  exhortation  to  the  Senate  to 
review  carefully  all  removals  and  appointments  made  during  the 
recess. 

This  discussion1  has  been  treated  at  considerable  length, 
because  it  illustrates  the  contemporary  idea  of  the  civil  service. 
It  is  noticeable  that  Jefferson  did  not  put  forward  the  idea  that 
long  tenure  of  office  is  unrepublican ;  and  that  Coleman,  in 
spite  of  his  general  sanity,  fell  into  the  fallacy  of  commending 
an  appointment  made  in  order  that  the  recipient,  a  veteran, 
might  "spend  the  evening  of  his  days  in  ease  and  com- 
petence ; " 2  that  is,  he  sanctioned  the  popular  view  that  the 
civil  service  was  a  pension  fund  for  meritorious  public  servants, 
a  view  mistaken  and  baneful. 

Samuel  Bishop  was  a  man  of  repute,  and  so  much  respected 
that  he  was  at  this  very  time  holding  office  under  the  Federal- 
ist legislature ;  and  Jefferson  doubtless  hoped  that  he  would 
reflect  his  respectability  on  the  Republican  party  in  his  state. 
Yet  it  was  an  altogether  bad  appointment.  Bishop  was  deacon 
in  one  of  the  established  churches,  mayor  of  New  Haven,  jus- 
tice of  the  peace,  chief  judge  of  the  court  of  probate.  He  was 
seventy-seven  years  of  age,  and  so  far  as  the  collectorship  was 
concerned  merely  a  figurehead.  The  office  was  really  given 
to  his  son  Abraham,  an  active  Republican  leader  and  pam- 
phleteer,3 who  acted  as  his  father's  clerk  in  nearly  all  his  capaci- 

1  Coleman,  Examination,  12,  49,  et  passim.     Particularly  as  to  the  power  of  the 
president  to  commission  officers  in  the  place  of  men  removed  during  the  recess  of 
the  Senate,  a  question  which  the  Columbian  Centinel  (September  9,  1801)  wished 
to  be  fully  discussed  in  the  Senate. 

2  Coleman,  Examination,  45. 

8  Massachusetts  Spy,  July  29,  1801  ;  American  Historical  Revienv,  iii.  276;  Jeffer- 
son to  committee  of  merchants,  July  12,  1801,  Jefferson,  Writings  (Washington  ed.), 
iv.  403;  Noah  Webster  to  Jefferson,  July  18,  1801,  Good  Government,  October  15, 
1894  ;  New  York  Evening  Post,  March  13,  1804  ;  Columbian  Centinel,  June  10,  1801. 
The  following  words  show  Jefferson's  appreciation  of  the  younger  Bishop's  work : 
"  Bishop's  pamphlet  on  political  delusions  has  not  yet  reached  the  book  stores  here. 
It  is  making  wonderful  progress,  and  is  said  to  be  the  best  anti-republican  eye-water 
which  has  ever  yet  appeared.  A  great  impression  of  them  is  making  at  Philadelphia 
to  be  forwarded  here"  (Jefferson  to  T.  M.  Randolph,  November  30,  1800,  Massa- 
chusetts Historical  Society,  Collections,  yth  series,  i.  78). 


38  JEFFERSON'S  POLICY. 

ties,  and  performed  the  functions  of  the  collectorship  not 
without  causing  complaint.1  Samuel  Bishop  died  in  1803,  and 
Abraham  was  appointed  to  succeed  him.2 

Although  Jefferson,  in  his  answer  to  the  New  Haven  remon- 
strance, hinted  at  a  more  general  proscription  if  he  could  not  by 
other  means  bring  about  the  desired  equality  in  the  civil  service 
between  the  parties,  he  continued  to  seek  for  special  classes 
that  seemed  peculiarly  proper  subjects  for  removal.  Charles 
Pinckney  was  nominated  minister  plenipotentiary  at  Madrid, 
"vice  David  Humphreys,  recalled  on  account  of  long  absence 
from  the  United  States."3  William  Jarvis,  hearing  while  in 
Lisbon  that  Jefferson  had  said  that  any  well-qualified  citizen  of 
the  United  States  who  desired  a  consulate  held  by  a  foreigner 
might  have  it  for  the  asking,  wrote  to  General  Dearborn 
requesting  the  place  in  that  city,  and  obtained  it.4  The  presi- 
dent found  that,  although  in  general  "  good  men  "  of  no  undue 
political  activity  were  not  "proper  subjects  of  removal,"  the 
principle  did  not  apply  to  attorneys  and  marshals.  "The 
courts  being  so  decidedly  federal -and  irremovable,"  he  wrote 
to  Giles,  March  23,  1801,  "it  is  believed  that  republican  attor- 
neys and  marshals,  being  the  doors  of  entrance  into  the  courts, 
are  indispensably  necessary  as  a  shield  to  the  republican  part 
of  our  fellow-citizens ; "  and  he  strengthened  his  case  by  prefer- 
ring charges  of  partiality  and  jury-packing  against  the  officers 
then  holding.5 

Having  thus  proceeded  carefully  step  by  step,  observing  the 
effect  of  the  removals  made,  and  particularly  watching  the 
masses  of  the  opposition,  whom  he  wished  to  ween  from  their 
leaders,  Jefferson  felt  encouraged  by  the  end  of  the  first  year 
of  his  administration  to  go  farther.  He  wrote  to  Elbridge 
Gerry,  August  28,  1802:  "After  a  twelve  months'  trial  I  have 
at  length  been  induced  to  remove  three  or  four  more  of  those 

1  Connecticut  Courant,  June  17,  1801;    Columbian  Centinel,  September  12,  1801. 

2  Executive  Journal,  i.  453  (November  II,  1803). 

8  Ibid.  404  (January  6,  1802);  Jefferson  to  William  Short,  October  3,  1801, 
Jefferson,  Writings  (Ford  ed.),  viii.  95-99. 

4  Cutts,  Jarvis,  129. 

5  Jefferson,  Writings  (Washington  ed.),  iv.  381 ;  Jefferson  to  Rush,  March  24, 
1 80 1,  ibid.  383. 


CONTINUED  REMOVALS.  39 

most  marked  for  their  bitterness  and  active  zeal  in  slandering 
and  in  electioneering.  Whether  we  shall  proceed  any  further 
will  depend  on  themselves."  1  In  fact,  the  policy  of  removing 
his  opponents  was  a  political  success,  and  had  alienated  from 
the  Republican  administration  none  of  the  elements  upon  which 
it  counted  for  support.  The  Federalists  had,  in  the  beginning, 
hoped  that  Jefferson's  action  might  meet  with  popular  resent- 
ment. So  suicidal  did  it  seem,  that  they  imagined  that  Burr, 
while  endeavoring  to  dissociate  himself  from  the  proscription, 
was  urging  it  on  the  president  with  a  view  to  rendering  him 
unpopular.2  Yet  before  the  end  of  1801  all  were  forced  to 
acknowledge  that  their  prognostications  were  unwarranted.3 

The  Federalists,  moreover,  continued  to  give  the  administra- 
tion some  little  ground  for  countercharges.  June  13,  1801,  the 
Columbian  Centinel  noted  with  satisfaction  that  after  the  election 
in  New  Hampshire  "  all  the  vacancies  "  were  "  filled  by  federal 
men."  The  dismissal  of  the  clerk  of  the  court  of  common 
pleas  in  Massachusetts  by  Federalist  superiors  gave  the  Aurora 
an  opportunity  to  speak  of  "tyranny."4  The  Columbian 
Centinel  asserted  that  much  of  the  material  for  the  Republi- 
cans' countercharges  was  cleverly  manufactured  by  their  poli- 
ticians;5 but,  whether  these  allegations  were  genuine  or  not, 

1  Jefferson,  Writings  (Ford  ed.),  viii.  169. 

2  Columbian  Centinel,  August  5,  1851.    This  rumor  reached  London,  but  was 
there  attached  to  the  name  of  Madison.     London  Traveller,  quoted  in  Massachusetts 
Spy,  December  16,  1801. 

8  See,  for  example,  Theodore  Sedgwick  to  Rufus  King,  December  14,  1801 :  "I 

do  not  think  that  Mr.  J n  has  lost  any  influence  by  his  removals  from  office. 

There  is  nothing  more  mischievous  &  monstrous  than  the  principle,  and  it  is  avowed, 
on  which  this  conduct  rests.  It  is,  palpably,  rendering  the  aggregate  of  the 
emoluments  of  all  the  offices,  holden  at  the  pleasure  of  the  president,  a  mass  of 
electioneering  corruption.  And  yet  there  is  a  wonderful  tranquillity  prevailing  on 
the  avowal  and  practice  of  this  conduct.  There  was  a  time  when  the  resentment 
of  the  people  of  Connecticut  would  have  been  roused,  almost  to  a  frenzy,  by  remov- 
ing such  men  as  Chester,  Goodrich  and  Whittlesey,  from  important  offices,  to  fill 
them  with  such  as  Thirby,  Bishop,  and  Wolcott,  let  the  motive  have  been  whatever  it 
might  ;  but  on  this  occasion,  tho'  a  most  detestable  motive  is  declared,  no  great  degree 
of  sensibility  seems  to  be  excited  among  even  good  men"  (King,  King,  iv.  35). 

4  Columbian  Centinel,  June  13,  1801. 

6  "Certain  sly-boots,"  it  said,  June  6,  1801,  recommend  worthless  persons  to 
Governor  Strong  for  justices  of  the  peace,  and  when  he  rejects  them,  say  it  is  on 
party  grounds. 


40  JEFFERSON'S  POLICY. 

the  unthinking  reader  of  newspapers  at  that  time  must  have 
believed  that  it  was  six  of  one  party  and  half  a  dozen  of  the 
other.  At  the  same  time,  some  of  the  Republican  elements 
were  growing  restive.  The  state  committee  of  Republicans, 
appointed  to  correspond  with  the  committees  of  the  several 
counties  in  the  state  of  Pennsylvania,  signed  an  address  in 
1802  in  which  it  referred  to  "the  slow,  but  we  trust,  certain 
progress  of  the  executive,  to  restore  the  Republicans  to  that 
share  in  the  public  patronage,  of  which  they  have  been  so  long, 
and  so  unjustly  deprived."1 

These  circumstances  probably  helped  give  Jefferson  courage 
for  bolder  acts  than  any  he  had  yet  attempted.  The  repeal  of 
the  judiciary  bill  of  1801  involved  much  broader  issues  than  we 
are  concerned  with  in  this  monograph,  but  it  involved  the  ques- 
tion of  the  patronage  also.  Jefferson  at  an  early  date  expressed 
a  determination  to  cut  off  the  "excrescences  from  the  judiciary"; 
and  in  the  debate  on  the  measure  Mr.  Thompson  of  Virginia 
denounced  the  act  because  it  had  created  sinecures.2  Jefferson, 
much  to  the  amusement  of  the  Federalist  press,  divided  the 
number  of  cases  by  the  number  of  judges,  and  so  arrived  at 
the  decision  that  the  system  provided  for  was  too  expensive  for 
the  country.3  Of  course,  as  the  offices  were  abolished,  Republi- 
cans could  not  obtain  what  was  taken  from  the  Federalists ;  and 
while  the  enemy  was  punished,  friends  were  not  rewarded. 

The  debate  on  this  proposition  brought  out  some  facts  which 
neither  side  relished.  In  the  Senate,  Giles  showed  that,  while 
none  of  the  congressmen  who  had  voted  for  the  judiciary  act 
could  constitutionally  be  appointed  to  the  offices  created,  two 
senators  had  been  made  district  judges  in  the  place  of  men  pro- 
moted to  the  new  circuit  judgeships,  and  thus  the  intent  of  the 
constitutional  clause  was  violated.4  Bayard  pointed  out  that 

1  Address  of  the  State  Committee  (published  by  Duane,  1802). 

2  To  Levi  Lincoln,  August  26, 1 80 1,  Jefferson,  Writings  (Washington  ed.),iv.  401; 
Bayard,  Speech  in  Opposition  to  the  Repeal  of  the  Judiciary  Act  of  i8oiy  33. 

8  New  York  Herald,  January  2,  1802.  "Then  by  another  operation  you  will 
readily  see  whether  the  justice^  done  is  worth  the  money  "  (New  York  Evening  Post, 
December  29,  1801). 

4  Annals  of  Congress,  7  Cong.  I  sess.  598.  One  of  the  senators  whose  appoint- 
ments are  here  referred  to  was  Mr.  Ray  Greene,  who,  as  we  have  already  seen 
(above,  p.  32),  failed  to  secure  his  new  office. 


REPEAL   OF  JUDICIARY  ACT.  41 

every  man  who  "  had  any  distinguished  means  in  the  competi- 
tion for  the  presidential  office,  of  deciding  the  election,"  received 
some  valuable  appointment.1  It  is  probable  that  neither  of 
these  particular  facts  revealed  any  conscious  corruption ;  yet 
the  very  fact  that,  without  dishonest  intention,  questionable 
action  had  been  taken  by  both  parties,  forced  many  to  the  con- 
clusion that  under  the  most  honest  men  unworthy  motives 
inevitably  enter  into  the  distribution  of  the  patronage,  and  that 
the  hands  of  those  dispensing  it  are  almost  sure  to  be  soiled. 
Both  parties  had  now  held  the  reins,  and  the  purity  of  neither 
was  untouched.  There  was  about  this  time  an  appreciable 
change  of  tone  in  speaking  of  the  civil  service ;  speakers  and 
writers  while  evincing  more  comprehension  are  more  despon- 
dent; for  the  first  time  they  begin  to  doubt  the  ability  of 
their  own  party  to  deal  with  the  question  in  an  altogether  satis- 
factory manner.2 

The  repeal  of  the  judiciary  act  was  effected  March  9,  1802, 
and  just  about  this  time  began  an  active  proscription  of  post- 
masters. The  New  York  Evening  Post  of  March  4  contains 
a  letter  which  Postmaster-general  Granger,  in  accordance  with 
the  Jeffersonian  penchant  for  explaining  the  motives  of  the 
administration,  wrote  to  a  postmaster  to  be  removed.  "  From 
repeated  complaints  from  the  country,  and  from  opinions  which 
are  entertained  by  persons  who  have  been  long  in  office,  together 
with  the  reasons  upon  which  those  opinions  are  founded,  I  was 
soon  convinced  that  as  a  general  rule  the  printers  of  newspapers 
ought  not  to  be  employed  as  postmasters,  because  they  have  a 
special  interest."  This  interest  lay  in  their  opportunities  for  sup- 
pressing rival  papers,  and  in  the  possibility  of  extending  their 
won  circulation  by  abusing  the  franking  privilege,  which  enabled 
postmasters  to  send  free  of  charge  letters  and  packages  not 
exceeding  two  ounces  in  weight.3  Armed  with  such  reasons, 
Granger  began  what  seems  to  have  been  a  general  sweep  in  his 

1  Annals  of  Congress,  7  Cong.  I  sess.  641. 

2  For  example,  a  pamphlet  of  the  year  1806  (  Who  shall  be  Governor  [of  Massa- 
chusetts], 22)  praises  the  administrations  of  both  Washington  and  Jefferson,  but 
fears  that  favoritism  has  a  place  "  even  in  the  best  regulated  republic." 

8  Statutes  at  Large,  v.  362. 


42  JEFFERSON'S  POLICY. 

branch  of  the  service.  It  is  not  surprising  to  find  complaint 
that  the  Republican  editors  were  allowed  to  hold  postoffices 
in  spite  of  their  special  interests.1 

Jefferson,  in  the  course  of  his  administration,  removed  109 
out  of  a  total  of  433  officers  of  the  presidential  class.  This 
does  not  by  any  means  show  the  total  changes  in  personnel. 
In  July,  1803,  Jefferson  wrote  to  Duane  that,  of  316  officers  in 
his  appointment,  1 30  were  still  held  by  Federalists ;  probably  he 
meant  that  there  had  been  186  changes.  From  March  4,  1801, 
to  July  1 6,  1803,  there  were  59  changes  in  the  165  offices  of  the 
external  revenue  service ;  8  were  due  to  death,  4  to  resignation, 
9  to  misbehavior,2  and  the  remaining  38  were  doubtless  cases  of 
political  removal.  Except  for  the  last  item,  this  would  be  but 
a  normal  list  of  changes,  though  possibly  there  would  not  have 
been  so  many  removals  for  misbehavior  if  all  the  officers  had 
been  supporters  of  the  administration.  During  Jefferson's  first 
term  there  were,  in  all,  164  changes  in  334  offices.3 

These  figures  do  not  adequately  represent  the  severity  of  the 
proscription.  In  some  localities  the  sweep  was  much  more  com- 
plete than  in  others :  Jefferson  wrote  to  Governor  McKean  of 
Pennsylvania,  who  had  just  turned  out  his  opponents  in  that 
state,  "Some  states  require  a  different  regimen  from  others."4 
In  Massachusetts  alone  there  were  almost  as  many  removals  as 
in  the  whole  South,  and  in  general  the  proportion  of  changes 
was  greater  in  the  North.5  Jefferson  told  John  Quincy  Adams 

1  New  York  Evening  Post,  February  12,  13,  25,  March  4,  6,  24,  31,  April  6,  8,  16, 
22,  1802,  March  31,  1803  ;  New  York  Herald,  February  17,  1802. 

2  Fish,  Removal  of  Officials,  in  American  Historical  Association,  Reports,  1899, 
i.  70,  table  ii.;  August  21,  1802,  Gouverneur  Morris  wrote  to  Livingston,  "Indeed, 
some  officers  have  resigned,  because  they  felt  a  kind  of  dishonor  in  remaining  as 
exceptions  to  the  proscription"  (Sparks,  Morris,  iii.    171);   American  Historical 
Review,  iii.  281. 

8  Five  district  judges  out  of  17,  14  district  attorneys  out  of  22,  15  marshals  out  of 
22,  41  collectors  out  of  82,  4  naval  officers  out  of  n,  18  surveyors  out  of  30,  67  mis- 
cellaneous out  of  150.  American  Historical  Association,  Papers,  ii.  No.  I,  p.  51. 

4  July  24,  1801,  Jefferson,  Writings  (Ford  ed.),  viii.  78. 

6  There  were  15  removals  from  offices  local  in  the  South,  12  in  Massachusetts,  8  in 
New  Jersey,  6  in  New  York,  5  in  Pennsylvania,  4  each  in  Connecticut  and  New 
Hampshire,  3  in  Vermont,  and  2  in  Rhode  Island.  Of  the  southern  removals  the 
greater  number  were  in  Virginia  and  North  Carolina,  a  fact  somewhat  surprising,  as 


NUMBER   OF  REMOVALS.  43 

that  not  one  request  for  appointment  involving  a  removal  had 
come  from  Virginia.  This  extreme  statement  was  probably  due 
to  a  lapse  of  memory ; l  but  it  is  true  that  the  southern  states, 
particularly  those  south  of  the  Potomac  and  east  of  the  Allegha- 
nies,  did  not  take  kindly  to  the  proscriptive  system,  and  that  it 
never  really  flourished  in  that  region  until  after  the  Civil  War. 
The  small  number  of  removals  there  at  this  time  is  further 
explained  by  the  fact  that  Jefferson  found  some  supporters  in 
office,2  and  that  his  conciliatory  programme  was  so  successful 
that  the  Federalist  party  in  the  South  almost  ceased  to  exist. 

In  estimating  the  severity  of  this  first  proscription,  as  of  all 
later  epochs  of  removal,  it  must  always  be  remembered  that  if 
the  lists  of  removals  were  made  out  on  the  basis  of  salary,  or 
of  the  influence  which  the  various  offices  carried  with  them,  the 
proportion  of  changes  would  be  very  much  greater.3  Among 
the  removals  are  always  found  the  collectors  of  the  great  cities, 
the  postmasters,  the  great  territorial  and  foreign  officers,  and, 
under  Jefferson,  the  supervisors  of  the  revenue.  These  officers 
had  subordinates  under  them  and  carried  on  minor  proscriptions. 
It  is  difficult  to  secure  information  with  regard  to  local  and 
departmental  removals  at  this  period ;  there  are  no  figures,  and 
the  policy  was  vacillating.  July  25,  1801,  Gallatin  sent  Jefferson 
the  draft  of  a  proposed  circular  to  the  collectors,  particularly 
intended  for  those  of  them  who  were  Federalists.  In  it  they 
were  ordered  "  no  longer  to  shut  the  door  to  the  offices  under 
them  to  any  man  merely  on  account  of  his  political  opinions," 
and  were  told  that  an  electioneering  collector  was  necessarily  a 
bad  one.  Jefferson  expressed  qualified  approval;  he  thought 
that  the  circular  should  be  delayed  until  his  answer  to  the  New 
Haven  remonstrance  had  been  published,  and  said  that  he  had 

South  Carolina  was  the  stronghold  of  the  Federalist  party  in  the  South.  See  Execu- 
tive Journal. 

1  February,  1805,  J.  Q.  Adams,  Memoirs,  i.  344.     He  wrote  to  Pierce   Butler, 
August  26,  1801 :  "The  Southern  republicans  [have]  been  really  magnanimous.     In 
Maryland  little  has  been  asked,  in  Virginia,  North  Carolina,  Georgia,  not  one  "  (Jef- 
ferson, Writings  (Ford  ed.),  viii.  82);   American  Historical  Review,  iii.  280. 

2  Ibid. 

8  See  Jefferson  to  Duane,  July  24,  1803,  Gallatin,  Writings,  i.  130-133.  He 
figures  this  point  out  carefully. 


44  JEFFERSON^  POLICY. 

intended  to  have  the  collectors  produce  "an  equilibrium"  before 
the  non-partisan  regime  went  into  effect.  The  circular  was 
never  sent.1  At  Boston,  Dearborn,  the  new  collector,  made 
removals.  Jefferson  wrote  to  John  Burke  that  there  was  a 
" redundancy  of  applications"  for  departmental  places;  and 
Duane  prepared  lists  of  the  clerks  holding  such  positions, 
appending  to  each  name  reasons  for  removal.  As  the  presi- 
dent, however,  left  to  each  head  of  a  department  much  freedom 
of  action,2  the  treatment  of  the  patronage  differed  in  the  various 
localities  and  in  the  various  branches  of  government. 

In  the  summer  of  1803  Jefferson  apparently  decided  that  the 
desired  equilibrium  had  been  attained,  and  removals  ceased. 
At  that  time  the  balance  of  office-holding  weighed  down  consid- 
erably on  the  Republican  side ;  but  it  should  be  borne  in  mind 
that  the  Federalists  no  longer  constituted  half  the  population, 
and  were  therefore,  according  to  the  Jeffersonian  rule,  not 
entitled  to  half  the  offices.  If  Jefferson  had  lived  up  to  his 
principles,  the  attainment  of  the  equilibrium  should  have  been 
followed  by  the  adoption  of  a  non-partisan  standard  for  appoint- 
ments. There  was  an  abundant  opportunity  for  this,  as  forty- 
six  new  appointments  were  made  in  the  customs  service  alone;3 
but  the  opportunity  was  neglected,  and  by  1806  the  civil  service 
must  have  been  as  strongly  Republican  as  it  had  been  Federalist 
in  1801. 

This  proscription  is  pleasantly  distinguished  from  later  ones 
by  the  fact  that  it  was  conducted  with  a  certain  degree  of  cour- 
tesy. Reasonable  notice  was  given  to  the  victims,  who,  in 
their  turn,  often  initiated  their  successors  into  the  mysteries  of 
the  craft.  One  letter  of  removal  reads  in  part  as  follows : 
"  Accept,  Sir,  my  thanks  for  all  the  faithful  services  you  have 
rendered  while  in  office.  With  esteem  and  respect,  Gideon 
Granger."  4 

1  Gallatin,  Writings,  i.  28  ;   Adams,  Gallatin,  279. 

2  Columbian  Centinel,  August  29,  1801  ;   American  Historical  Review,  iii.  285  ; 
Adams,  Gallatin,  277-278 ;  Jefferson  to  Burke,  June  21,  1801,  Jefferson,  Writings 
(Ford  ed.),  viii.  66. 

8  American  Historical  Review,  iii.  281. 

*  Ibid.  271;  Columbian  Centinel,  August  5,  12,  1801  ;  Adams,  Gallatin,  277; 
New  York  Evening  Post,  February  13,  1802. 


REDUCTION  OF  OFFICES.  45 

Jefferson  did  not  plan  to  fill  all  the  offices  thus  vacated. 
During  a  long  period  of  our  history,  our  civil  service  has  been 
hampered  by  the  popular  prejudice  against  large  salaries.  The 
Massachusetts  Centinel  of  September  1 7,  I 789,  pointed  out  that 
to  people  accustomed  to  deal  in  pounds  a  fair  salary  in  dollars 
looked  large,  and  urged  that  cheap  rogues  and  dunces  would 
cheat  and  lose  more  than  could  be  saved  on  the  salary  account ;_ 
but  this  argument  did  not  appeal  to  the  democracy  of  the  time, 
and  the  liberal  schedule  established  for  the  federal  officers 
caused  opposition.1  Retrenchment,  therefore,  was  a  natural 
plank  in  the  Republican  platform.  Not  high  salaries  alone 
were  attacked,  but  also  the  tendency  to  strengthen  the  central 
government,  and  particularly  the  executive,  by  creating  an  ex- 
tensive patronage ;  and  it  was  urged  that  the  civil  service  must 
be  reduced  to  the  lowest  terms. 

Both  of  these  objects  had  been  in  mind  when  the  judiciary 
act  was  repealed,  and  Jefferson  struck  a  popular  chord  when  he 
lopped  off  two  missions  and  saved  about  twenty  thousand  dol- 
lars a  year  in  the  diplomatic  service.2  More  important  was  Gal- 
latin's  plan  for  the  abolition  of  the  internal  taxes.  Throughout 
the  discussion  of  this  measure,  particularly  in  the  House  of  Rep- 
resentatives, the  Republican  members  repeatedly  asserted  that 
one  of  its  main  objects  was  the  reduction  of  the  patronage.  The 
Federalists  argued  that,  if  this  was  the  end  desired,  the  taxes 
might  be  collected  by  the  customs  officers  and  the  postmasters.3 
There  were,  of  course,  other  motives  for  passing  the  bill ;  but 
there  seems  little  doubt  that  the  majority  of  the  Republicans 
were  sincerely  pleased  at  the  reduction  of  the  civil  service  thus  ... 
entailed.  The  actual  annual  saving  effected  seems  to  have  been  / 
about  one  hundred  and  fifteen  thousand  dollars.4  The  only  impor- 
tant offices  abolished  were  sixteen  supervisorships  and  twenty- 

1  NCT.O  York  Evening  Post,  September  26,  November  21,  1789. 

2  American  State  Papers,  Miscellaneous,  i.  306 ;    Gazette  and  Daily  Advertiser 
(Charleston),  September  9,  1801.     This  form  of  retrenchment  long  continued  popu- 
lar.    See  Niles's  Register,  xxiii.  225  (December  14,  1822). 

8  Annals  of  Congress,  7  Cong.  I  sess.  1032,  1053,  1061;  Jefferson  to  Dickinson, 
December  19,  1801,  Jefferson,  Writings  (Washington  ed.),  iv.  425. 

4  Statutes  at  Large,  ii.  148.  The  figures  are  calculated  from  a  list  of  officers  in 
American  State  Papers,  Miscellaneous,  i.  280-288. 


46  JEFFERSOWS  POLICY. 

four  inspectorships,  together  with  the  post  of  commissioner  of 
the  revenue.  These  officers  could  not  be  spared  at  once,  as 
there  were  taxes  already  due  that  must  be  collected ;  but  a  year 
later  provision  was  made  that  the  president  be  authorized  to 
attach  their  duties  to  those  of  any  other  officer  in  the  district.1 
It  was  proposed  also  to  discontinue  the  mint,2  but  the  measure 
was  never  adopted. 

In  addition  to  the  actual  retrenchments,  a  number  of  useful 
regulative  acts  were  passed.  One  of  these  fixed  the  maximum 
I  I  compensation  for  customs  officials ; 3  it  did  not  save  much 
money,  but  was  a  step  toward  the  correct  principle  of  fixed 
salaries  as  opposed  to  fees.  While  these  measures  tended  to 
show  the  good  faith  of  the  Republicans,  the  sum  total  of  the 
economies  was  not  very  great.  One  bill,  the  judiciary  act  of 
1802,  actually  increased  the  patronage  of  the  president  by  trans- 
ferring to  him,  from  the  district  judges,  the  appointment  of  com- 
missioners of  bankruptcy,  thus  giving  Jefferson  the  opportunity 
to  do  the  ungracious  act  of  displacing  John  Quincy  Adams.4 
What  little  reduction  was  made  in  the  patronage  of  the  presi- 
dent was  soon  offset  by  the  increases  made  necessary  by  the 
growth  of  the  country,  and  particularly  by  the  annexation  of 
Louisiana.6 

Jefferson  had,  therefore,  more  offices  to  fill  than  had  Wash- 
ington, and  he  devoted  himself  to  the  task  with  great  energy. 
The  Federalist  press  represented  him  as  overwhelmed  by 
"  strange  beings  continually  .  .  .  crying  More,  More,  Give, 
Give."  6  Some  cases  presented  little  difficulty ;  he  accepted  as 
an  axiom  that  all  officers  removed  by  Adams  for  political  rea- 
sons should  receive  appointments,  preferably  to  their  old  posi- 

1  Annals  of  Congress,  7  Cong.  2  sess.  1612  (March  3,  1803). 

2  Ibid.  7  Cong.  I  sess.  1036. 

8  Ibid.  1197,  1252,  1348.  Collectors  were  to  receive  not  more  than  $5000,  naval 
officers  $3500,  surveyors  $3000. 

4  Statutes  at  Large,  ii.  21,  164  ;  Morse,/.  Q.  Adams,  28. 

6  Seybert's  Annals  (p.  378)  gives  a  yearly  increasing  number  of  officers  from  1790 
to  1812.  These  lists  are  probably  incorrect,  though,  as  the  Blue  Book  was  not  pub- 
lished in  this  period,  I  have  been  able  to  check  them  only  here  and  there,  —  as  for 
1794,  1795,  and  1797,  for  which  years  I  have  used  a  semi-official  register  published 
in  Philadelphia. 

6  American  Historical  Review,  iii.  278;  Columbian  Centinel,  August  29,  1801. 


INFLUENCES.  47 

tions.1  Gardner  and  Whipple  went  back  to  their  posts,  and 
Tench  Coxe  became  supervisor  for  Pennsylvania.  Two  clerks 
claimed  appointments  as  martyrs  of  the  previous  regime :  one 
had  been  removed  by  Adams,  the  other  had  apparently  been 
forced  to  resign.  These  men,  in  plain  violation  of  good  faith 
and  actual  legal  regulation,  had  given  Duane  information  which 
enabled  him  to  bring  charges  of  defalcation  against  Timothy 
Pickering  and  Jonathan  Dayton.  Gallatin  wrote :  "  Whatever 
impropriety  there  might  be  in  their  conduct,  I  have  reason  to 
believe  Gardner  to  be  a  man  of  honor.  Campbell  is  very  im- 
pudent, but  as  enthusiastic  as  his  friends  (the  United  Irishmen, 
I  mean)  commonly  are."  Gardner  was  made  consul  at  Dema- 
rara ;  and  Campbell,  as  the  new  auditor  refused  to  restore  him 
to  his  old  position,  was  made  an  ensign  in  the  army.2 

Where  no  such  special  claim  existed,  the  decision  called  for 
more  consideration,  and  a  procedure  developed  much  like  the 
old  Federalist  machinery.  Members  of  Congress  continued  to 
be  the  main  purveyors  of  information.3  The  New  Yorkers, 
already  becoming  adept  at  businesslike  politics,  agreed  upon  a 
slate,  to  be  submitted  to  the  president  by  Burr  in  the  name  of 
the  whole  delegation  in  Congress.4  This  was  accepted,  but  with 
a  few  changes.  Although  this  form  was  not  always  followed, 
the  successful  candidate  seems  generally  to  have  been  the  one 
who  had  the  support  of  his  state  delegation ; 6  and  if  congress- 
men did  not  take  the  initiative,  the  president  usually  consulted 
some  of  them  in  regard  to  names  presented.6  It  was  natural, 

1  Jefferson  to  Giles,  March  23,  and  to  Rush,  March  24,  1801,  Jefferson,  Writings 
(Washington  ed.),  iv.  381,  383. 

2  Executive  Journal,  i.  403,  432  (January  6,  1802,  January  n,  1803);   American 
Historical  Review,  iii.  282-285 ;   Gallatin  to  Jefferson,  August  10  and  September  14, 
and  Campbell  to  Jefferson,  October  12,  1801,  Gallatin,  Writings,  i.  34,  and  note,  50; 
New  York  Evening  Post,  April   i,  1802.     The  New  York  Herald,  January  9,  1802, 
says  that  Campbell  was  exonerated  by  a  congressional  committee. 

3  Jefferson  to  C.  Pinckney,  March  6,  1801,  Jefferson,  Writings  (Ford  ed.),  viii.6- 
7;   to  Gallatin,  August  14,  1801,  Gallatin,  Writings,  i.  36. 

4  American  Historical  Review,  iii.  290. 

5  Ibid.  286;  Gallatin  to  his  wife,  January  29,  1801,  Adams,  Gallatin,  258;  Jefferson 
to  George  Clinton,  May  17, 1801,  Jefferson,  Writings  (Ford  ed.),  viii.  52;  to  Gallatin, 
September  18,  1801,  Gallatin,  Writings,  i.  54 ;  New  York  Evening  Post,  March  4, 
1802.  6  American  Historical  Review,  iii.  282. 


48  JEFFERSOWS  POLICY. 

considering  the  democratic  principles  of  the  party,  that  petitions 
should  be  numerous.1  The  Massachusetts  Spy,  under  Pennsyl- 
vania news,  told  how  "  A  secret  committee  of  accusation,  estab- 
lished for  the  blackest  purposes,  in  a  neighboring  commercial 
town,  lately  forwarded  a  memorial  to  President  Jefferson  against 
their  Collector,  a  worthy  citizen,  .  .  .  praying  that  he  should  be 
removed  from  office."  2  While  petitions  of  unconnected  individ- 
uals doubtless  had  full  weight,  Jefferson  refused  to  be  influenced 
even  by  those  from  organized  bodies.3  Certain  prominent  men, 
incipient  political  bosses,  exercised  much  influence.4  In  New 
York  the  Livingstons,  the  Clintons,  and  Burr,  in  Pennsylvania, 
Duane  and  Dallas,  struggled  to  gain  advantage  from  the  distribu- 
tion of  the  patronage;  5  Dearborn  seemed  to  control  that  of  Maine 
without  struggle,  and  Caesar  Rodney  that  of  Delaware.6  Burr 
fared  ill  in  the  conflict.  Davis,  his  candidate  for  naval  officer  at 
New  York,  was  not  appointed,  though  he  pressed  the  nomination 
on  Jefferson  in  a  personal  interview,  and  wrote  a  most  abject 
letter  to  Gallatin.  Perhaps  with  a  view  of  keeping  up  his  hopes 
and  so  preventing  a  break  in  the  administration  no  change  was 
made  in  the  office  for  two  years,  although  the  Federalist  incum- 
bent was  guilty  of  "  ante-revolutionary  adherence  to  enemies." 
The  post-office  was  given  to  a  friend,  but  not  the  one  selected  by 
the  vice-president ;  nor  could  the  latter  secure  the  withdrawal 
of  the  printing  from  Cheetham,  who  was  abusing  him.7  On  the 
other  hand,  he  was  highly  favored  in  the  Louisiana  appoint- 
ments.8 Jefferson  apparently  endeavored  so  to  treat  him  as  to 

1  American   Historical  Review,  iii.  288;    Jefferson  to  Rodney,  June  14,  1802, 
Jefferson,  Writings  (Ford  ed.),  viii.  154. 

2  July  15,  1801. 

8  Jefferson  to  Duane,  July  24,  1803,  Gallatin,  Writings,  i.  130. 
'4  American  Historical  Review,  iii.  276,  280,  287,  291. 

*  Ibid.  277,  283,  290  ;  Gallatin  to  Jefferson,  September  14,  1801,  Gallatin,  Writ- 
ings, i.  50-51;  New  York  Evening  Post,  January  28,  1802. 

6  New  York  Evening  Post,  April  15,  1802  ;   Jefferson  to  Rodney,  June  14,  1802, 
Jefferson,  Writings  (Ford  ed.),  viii.  154. 

7  Adams,  Gallatin,  282-289  ;  Adams,  Administrations  of  Jefferson  and  Madison, 
i.  296 ;   Jefferson,  Anas,  January  26,  1804,  in  his  Writings  (Ford  ed.),  i.  301-302. 

8  Probably  to  secure  his  aid  in  the  Chase  impeachment.     His  stepson  was  made 
secretary,  his  wife's  brother-in-law  judge.     Wilkinson   also   was  his  friend.     See 
McMaster,  United  States,  iii.  176. 


POLITICAL   CONSIDERATIONS.  49 

avoid  the  danger  of  making  him  too  powerful  on  the  one  hand, 
and  of  causing  a  premature  break  with  him  on  the  other. 
Although  these  men  and  many  more  exercised  influence,  there 
is  no  hint  in  the  correspondence  of  the  period  that  the  adminis- 
tration felt  itself  in  the  least  dependent  on  any  individual  or 
organization :  no  matter  what  its  position  or  power,  no  dictation 
was  allowed.1  To  Mr.  Larkin  Smith,  who  presumed  to  dictate 
on  the  ground  that  he  was  a  presidential  elector,  Jefferson 
replied  in  a  letter  of  admirable  dignity  and  self-restraint,  utterly 
dismissing  the  claim.2 

It  was  Jefferson,  therefore,  who  outlined  the  qualifications 
for  office,  although  he  did  not  as  rigorously  adhere  to  a  fixed 
rule  as  had  Washington.  Fitness  continued  to  be  considered 
essential ; 3  and  while  careful  character  studies  are  lacking,  such 
as  Henry  Marchant  sent  to  Hamilton  and  the  latter  to  Wolcott, 
Jefferson  and  Gallatin  sought  out  suitable  candidates,  not  con- 
fining their  choice  to  those  who  offered  their  services.4  That 
these  efforts  were  genuine  is  evinced  by  the  many  declina- 
tions they  received ;  Jefferson  wrote  to  Gouverneur  Morris  that 
he  feared  he  should  have  to  advertise  for  a  secretary  of  the 
navy.5  The  majority  of  the  appointees  came  from  the  same 
class  of  the  population  as  those  under  the  Federalists.  The 
president  wrote  to  Gallatin  in  regard  to  a  man  proposed  for  a 
New  England  position,  "  His  family  has  been  among  the  most 
respectable  on  that  shore  for  many  generations."  6  Some  selec- 
tions were  even  commented  on  by  the  Federalist  newspapers  as 
"  judicious  and  proper." 7  The  Jefferson  Democracy,  however, 

1  Gallatin  to  Jefferson,  September  14,  1801,  Gallatin,  Writings,  i.  50-51. 

2  November  26,  1804,  Jefferson,  Writings  (Ford  ed.),  viii.  337. 
8  Correspondence  between  Jefferson  and  Gallatin,  passim. 

*  Jefferson  to  George  Clinton,  May  17,  1801,  Jefferson,  Writings  (Ford  ed.), 
viii.  52  ;  Gallatin  to  Jefferson,  September  7,  1801,  Gallatin,  Writings,  i.  44. 

5  May  8,  1801,  Jefferson,  Writings  (Ford  ed.),  viii.  49  ;  Gallatin  to  Jefferson, 
September  7,  1801,  Gallatin,  Writings,  i.  45. 

6  November  12,  1801,  Gallatin,  Writings,  i.  60. 

7  The  New  York  Evening  Post,  February  12,  1802,  said:  "Mr.  Gelston  has  been 
turned  out  of  the  post  office  in  this  city,  .  .  .  Alexander  Coffin  being  appointed  in 
his  place.     Federalism  is  the  crime  for  which  Mr.  Gelston  is  removed.  ...    The 
selection  of  Mr.  Coffin  was  judicious  and  proper."     See  also  Columbian  Centinel, 
August  27,  1 80 1. 

£ 


50  JEFFERSOWS  POLICY. 

brought  new  classes  into  politics,  and,  to  the  dismay  of  the 
conservative,  these  received  some  recognition.  Especially  the 
appointment  of  the  foreign-born  —  "  wild  Irishmen"  and  French 
refugees1  —  called  out  such  voluble  criticism  as  to  drown  the 
occasional  faint  praise. 

Among  the  elements  of  selection,  geographical  distribution 
may  be  regarded  as  permanent ; 2  but  under  Jefferson  we  find 
a  markedly  greater  stress  laid  on  politics  than  previously.  Not 
only  was  the  general  political  effect  of  appointments  anxiously 
discussed,  but  party  services  were  vigorously  urged  as  paramount 
reason  for  receiving  office,  and  very  often  were  given  recogni- 
tion. There  were  some  complaints  that  the  new  Republican 
office-holders  engaged  actively  in  politics ;  General  Lincoln,  for 
example,  was  accused  of  causing  an  expense  of  three  thousand 
dollars  for  extra  clerk  hire  while  he  was  electioneering  in  Massa- 
chusetts.3 Such  complaints,  however,  were  not  numerous,  and 
there  is  no  indication  that  such  activity  was  required  or  expected. 

Jefferson  professed  to  be,  and  apparently  was,  free  from  \ 
nepotism ; 4  it  was  opposed  to  his  character,  and,  moreover,  he  '[ 
understood  full  well  its  political  danger.  To  do  a  favor  for  a 
friend,  however,  was  second  nature  to  him,  and  his  administra- 
tion of  the  civil  service  is  marred  by  favoritism.  July  3,  1806, 
he  wrote  to  John  Page  that,  having  consulted  "the  best  medical 
judge  "  on  the  subject,  he  expected  the  early  demise  of  the  com- 
missioner of  loans  for  the  Richmond  district.  "  The  office  is  a 
perfect  sinecure,"  he  wrote.  "  The  introduction  of  one  of  your 
sons  into  the  office  [as  clerk],  besides  adding  the  benefit  of  the 
additional  thousand  dollars  to  the  family,  would,  by  placing  him 
as  it  were  in  possession  of  the  office,  secure  his  succeeding  to 
it  in  that  event  which  you  and  I  ought  now  to  consider  as  not 

1  New    York  Evening  Post,  March    13,   1804;    "Tacitus,"   Letters    to    Thomas 
Jefferson. 

2  Jefferson  to  Gates,  March  8,  1801,  Jefferson,  Writings  (Ford  ed.),  viii.  II. 

8  American  Historical  Review,  iii.  270-291;  Connecticut  Courant,  June  15,  July 
27,  1801  ;  correspondence  of  Jefferson  and  Gallatin  for  the  period,  passim;  New 
York  Evening  Post,  April  13,  1802. 

4  Jefferson  to  George  Jefferson,  March  27,  1801,  Jefferson,  Writings  (Ford  ed.)> 
viii.  38.  Mention  is  made  of  rumors  of  family  influence.  See  Massachusetts  His- 
torical Society,  Collections,  7th  series,  i.  90,  93. 


GENERAL  PRINCIPLES.  51 

very  remote."  The  appointment  was  made ;  but  Page's  health 
failed,  and  Jefferson,  solicitous  lest  he  should  overexert  himself, 
wrote,  "  Would  it  be  a  relief  to  transfer  the  office  to  your  son 
Francis  ...  for  the  benefit  of  the  family  ? "  Francis  did  not 
succeed  his  father,  but  was  later  appointed  by  Madison  as  col- 
lector of  Yorktown.  Freneau,  while  editing  the  leading  admin- 
istration paper  of  Charleston,  South  Carolina,  held  one  of  these 
sinecures  until  1810,  when  financial  disaster  forced  him  to  relin- 
quish paper  and  position.1 

It  is  evident  that,  in  spite  of  favoritism  and  politics,  Jefferson 
succeeded  in  the  main  object  which  he  placed  before  himself  in 
dealing  with  the  patronage,  —  that  of  satisfying  the  people.  In 
this,  as  in  many  other  cases,  his  sympathetic  response  to  popu- 
lar desire  gave  him  unexpected  victory ;  to  satisfy  his  own  fol- 
lowers, and  at  the  same  time  not  to  alienate  the  masses  of  the 
opposition,  was  indeed  a  wonderful  feat.  So  cleverly  did  Jeffer- 
son  steer  his  bark  that  the  patronage  had  ceased  to  be  an  issue 
by  1809.  Technically  one  must  assign  to  Jefferson  the  in- 
troduction of  the  spoils  system  into  the  national  service,  for 
party  service  was  recognized  as  a  reason  for  appointment  to 
office,  and  party  dissent  as  a  cause  for  removal.  It  was  not, 
however,  the  sole  reason  required ;  and,  as  has  been  shown,  the 
character  of  the  civil  service  was  really  not  much  changed.2 
The  natural  question,  why  this  proscription,  proportionately  as 
extensive  as  that  of  Jackson,  affected  the  civil  service  and 
subsequent  politics  so  much  less,  can  best  be  answered  in  the 

discussion  of  Jackson's  administration.3 

I 

1  Jefferson,  Writings  (Ford  ed.),  viii.  136-137,  note  ;  Executive  Journal,  ii.  123 
(June,  1809);   Thomas,    Reminiscences  of  the  Past  Sixty-Jive  Years,  78.    Thomas 
bought  Freneau's  paper. 

2  There  was  very  little  complaint  at  loss  of  efficiency,  and  that   chiefly  in  the 
spring  of  1802,  during  the  changes  in  the  post-offices. 

8  I  have  not  discussed  the  question  of  the  reported  attempts  of  Jefferson  and 
Burr  to  obtain  support  for  the  presidency  by  offering  places  to  members  of  Congress, 
as  I  have  found  nothing  in  regard  to  it  that  throws  additional  light  on  Jefferson's 
policy. 


CHAPTER   III. 

THE  PATRONAGE   QUESTION  UNDER  DISCUSSION. 
1809—1829. 

WHAT  Madison's  policy  would  have  been  had  he  become 
president  under  circumstances  similar  to  those  which  Jefferson 
encountered  is  uncertain.  The  Federalist  press  supposed  that, 
as  secretary  of  state,  he  opposed  the  proscriptive  system,1  and 
at  one  time  announced  that  he  was  on  the  point  of  resigning 
because  of  it ; 2  yet  even  if  it  were  not  to  his  liking,  he  might 
have  been  forced  to  practise  it  had  he  become  chief  magistrate 
in  1 80 1.  As  it  was,  he  succeeded  an  administration  with  which 
he  was  in  complete  harmony ;  there  was  as  yet  no  loud  call  for 
rotation  in  office,  and  he  was  not  even  tempted  to  reconstruct 
the  civil  service. 

Madison  did  not,  however,  find  the  apparently  simple  task  of 
filling  the  natural  vacancies  an  easy  one.  His  lack  of  personal 
force  gave  hostile  factions  an  opportunity,  and  they  attempted 
•  to  control,  through  the  Senate,  the  distribution  of  the  patronage. 
A  threat  of  opposition  forced  the  president  to  relinquish  his 
project  of  nominating  Albert  Gallatin  for  secretary  of  state ;  and 
this  victory  did  not  make  his  opponents  more  considerate.  The 
nomination  of  General  Dearborn  as  secretary  of  war  was  de- 
feated ;  there  was  a  contest  over  the  confirmation  of  Monroe  as 
secretary  of  state  in  1811,  and  another  in  1813  when  Jonathan 
Russell  was  nominated  as  minister  to  Sweden.  We  have  some 
interesting  notes,  taken  by  Pickering,  on  the  debate  which  took 

1  Quincy,  Quincy,  74  ;    Massachusetts  Spy,  July  29,  1801  ;    Columbian  Centinel, 
August  5,  1 80 1. 

2  Columbian  Centinel,  July  22,  1 80 1. 

52 


MADISON >S  POLICY.  53 

place  when  the  name  of  Joel  Barlow,  for  minister  to  France,  was 
sent  in.     Pickering  sarcastically  defended  the  nomination,  saying 
that  Barlow  was  no  mere  poet,  for  he  had  made  too  much  money,1 
—  an  allusion  probably  to  the  Ohio  Company  frauds. 

The  War  of  1812  brought  unexpected  patronage  to  the  execu- 
tive ;  but  the  administration  escaped  much  of  the  toil  involved 
by  leaving  military  nominations  almost  wholly  to  the  state  dele- 
gations. William  Lowndes  wrote  to  his  wife  that  he  should 
have  liked  a  commission,  but  that  he  felt  a  scruple  about  asking 
for  one,  as  the  delegation  of  which  he  was  a  member  really 
made  the  appointment.2  The  advice  of  the  state  delegation  was 
not  always  followed,  however.  Gallatin  complained  that  a  Mr. 
Chrystie,  selected  by  the  New  York  members  for  a  lieutenant- 
colonelcy,  was  nominated  for  a  majority  only,  because  of  the 
hostility  of  the  secretary  of  war.3  The  nomination  of  Thomas 
Pinckney,  a  South  Carolina  Federalist,  received  some  opposition 
in  the  Senate,4  and  caused  general  surprise.  Even  Lowndes, 
an  extremely  liberal  man,  wrote  to  his  wife  regarding  it,  "  The 
Republican  party,  having  so  large  a  proportion  of  the  population 
of  the  State,  has  enough  of  talents  and  of  virtue  to  serve  the 
country,  if  the  administration  knew  how  to  select  and  employ 
them."  5  Madison,  however,  adhered  to  the  policy  of  the  Fed- 
eralists, in  making  the  war  a  national  and  not  a  party  measure. 
He  recognized  the  opposition,  not  only  in  the  military  but  also 
in  the  diplomatic  appointments,  by  making  James  A.  Bayard  a 
member  of  the  peace  commission  at  Ghent.  This  was  in  no 
sense  an  erasure  of  party  lines ;  it  was  merely  a  call  for  the 

1  Adams,  Administrations  of  Jefferson  and  Madison,  v.  4-8  ;   359-360;   Madison, 
Letters  and  Other  Writings,  ii.  598.     A  vote  was  not  taken  ;   the  name  was  with- 
drawn.    Executive  Journal,  ii.   626,  March   2,    1815  ;   Monroe,  Writings,  v.  194  ; 
Niles's  Register,  iv.  409-412  ;  William  Winston  Seaton  (1871),  100.    Another  notable 
rejection  was  that  of  Alexander  Wolcott,  nominated    for  associate   justice  of   the 
Supreme  Court. 

2  Ravenel,  Lowndes,  105  ;   Monroe,  Writings,  v.  201. 

8  Gallatin  to  Madison,  1812,  Gallatin,  Writings,  i.  500. 

4  Lowndes  wrote  to  his  wife,  March  23,  1812,  "There  is  some  little  objection  in 
the  Senate  to  the  confirmation  of  his  appointment,  the  result  of  that  illiberality  of 
faction  from  which  no  public  body  can  be  expected  to  be  altogether  exempt " 
(Ravenel,  Lowndes,  103). 

6  Ravenel,  Lowndes,  105. 


54  PATRONAGE  DISCUSSED. 

assistance  of  the  minority,  an  assistance  then  much  needed.  In 
the  selection  of  individuals  from  both  parties,  political  motives 
played  the  usual  prominent  part.1  It  was  bi-partisan,  not  non- 
partisan. 

Vastly  more  difficulty  was  experienced  in  reducing  the  army 
when  the  war  was  over  than  in  creating  it,  for  every  hero  wished 
a  reward,  and  his  claims  were  vociferously  urged  by  his  ad- 
mirers. The  work  of  selecting  the  officers  to  remain  in  the 
regular  army  was  largely  left  to  a  board  of  officers,  but  a  liberal 
discretion  was  retained  in  the  executive,  and  was  sometimes 
used.2  This  part  of  the  task  is  said  to  have  been  easily  accom- 
plished, owing  to  the  good  sense  of  General  Ripley ; 3  but  many 
who  could  not  thus  be  provided  for  cast  an  eye  on  the  civil  de- 
partments. Dallas  wrote  to  Madison,  August  3,  1815:  "The 
cases  of  General  Wilkinson,  General  Gushing,  and  General  Boyd 
are  urged  upon  me.  The  vacancies  at  Castine,  etc.,  are  too 
humble  for  these  gentlemen ;  and  I  am  requested  to  ask  your 
authority  to  create  vacancies  of  a  higher  kind  in  the  collector- 
ships  of  New  York,  New  London,  Newport,  etc.  There  is  no 
delicacy  used  on  the  occasion."4  On  August  10,  Madison  re- 
plied with  a  touch  of  irony :  "  The  cases  of  the  three  generals 
you  name  are  embarrassing,  but  the  mode  of  relief  merits  seri- 
ous consideration  also.  The  principle  of  it  is  entirely  new,  and 
the  extent  of  it  not  easily  limited."  Boyd,  he  says,  is  not 
in  need,  and  Wilkinson  is  dangerous.  "  Gushing' s  situation  is 
probably  urgent,  and  his  conduct  strengthens  his  claims.  But  is 
not  the  foundation  of  them  the  same  with  those  on  which  the 
actual  collector  of  New  London  received  and  has  retained  his 
appointment?  ...  It  is  true,  his  political  conduct  has  been 
justly  exceptionable,  but  it  is  not  on  that  ground  that  his  removal 
is  required.  Ellery  [at  Newport]  .  .  .  was  a  revolutionary  pa- 
triot in  high  public  trusts,  and  on  that  ground  also  has  been 
retained  .  .  .  notwithstanding  frequent  charges  of  political  mis- 
conduct. ...  I  am  disposed  to  take  into  fair  consideration  the 

1  Ravenel,  Lowndes,  113. 

2  Madison  to  Dallas,  April  14,  1815,  Dallas,  Dallas,  398  ;   memoranda,  Ibid.  414. 
8  Madison  to  Dallas,  and  Dallas  to  Madison,  April  20,  1815,  Ibid.  401. 

4  Ibid.  436. 


MADISOWS  REMOVALS.  55 

mode  proposed  for  rewarding  or  alleviating  the  cases  to  which  it 
would  apply ;  but  I  should  be  glad  to  learn,  before  it  be  adopted, 
some  practicable  rule  for  designating  the  officers  to  be  displaced, 
and  for  selecting  those  to  be  provided  for.  If  the  deciding  con- 
sideration be  the  wealth  of  the  former  and  the  poverty  of  the 
latter,"  the  rule  would  not  be  popular.  "  These  remarks  do  not 
exclude  the  resource  in  favor  of  meritorious  and  indigent 
officers,  which  may  be  found  in  special  removals  pointed  out  by 
legitimate  causes."  l  General  Gushing  was  appointed  collector 
at  New  London ; 2  how  Huntington,  the  incumbent,  was  disposed 
of  does  not  appear  on  the  Senate  journal.3  The  twenty-seven 
removals  made  by  Madison  4  would  seem  to  show  that  not  many 
of  these  "  indigent  officers  "  could  have  been  relieved  in  the  way 
suggested ;  and  the  correspondence  between  Madison  and  Dallas 
would  indicate  that  some  reason,  at  least  nominally  valid,  was 
required  in  all  such  cases.5  The  official  record  is  not,  however, 
entirely  truthful,  for  pressure  was  sometimes  brought  to  bear 
which  caused  officials  to  resign.  On  June  18,  1816,  Dallas 
wrote  to  Madison  that  the  removal  of  Mr.  Du  Plessis  from  the 
collectorship  at  New  Orleans  was  asked  for,  but  on  general 
grounds.  September  1 1  he  told  him  that  Beverly  Chew  was 
recommended  for  the  place,  but  was  insolvent.  Madison  an- 
swered, September  15,  that  as  Du  Plessis's  accounts  were  satis- 
factory and  Chew's  financial  situation  was  not  the  best,  it  would 
be  well  to  delay,  at  least  until  Congress  met.  Eventually  Du 
Plessis  resigned  and  Chew  was  appointed.6 

There  is  not  much  evidence  that  office  sought  the  man  under 
Madison.  The  death  of  an  officer  was  looked  on  with  regret,  as 
entailing  numberless  applications,  in  deciding  between  which 
political  quiet  would  seem  to  have  been  the  effectual  motive,  so 
far  as  one  can  judge  from  Madison's  rather  vague  statements.7 

1  Dallas,  Dallas,  440.  2  Executive  Journal,  iii.  20  (January  8,  1816). 

8  Appletorfs  Cyclopedia  gives  his  death  as  two  years  later  ;  he  may  have  retired, 
or  have  been  retired,  for  infirmity. 

*  Fish,  in  American  Historical  Association,  Report,  1899,  i.  71. 
6  Memoranda,  March  14,  1816,  Dallas,  Dallas,  449. 

6  Ibid.  454,  473,  474  ;  Executive  Journal,  iii.  72  (January  21,  1817). 

7  See  Madison  to  Dallas,  June  30,  and  Dallas  to  Madison,  July  I,  1816,  Dallas, 
Dallas,  456-457- 


56  PATRONAGE  DISCUSSED. 

William  Plummer  was  made  successor  to  Gardner  as  loan  officer 
in  New  Hampshire,  because  he  was  recommended  by  his  father, 
the  governor,  and  because  he  had  planned  a  history  of  the  War 
of  1812  to  counteract  the  Federalist  publications.1  Henry 
Wheaton  was  made  judge  advocate,  because  his  "talents  are 
unquestionable,  and  it  is  desirable,  on  many  accounts,  to  gratify 
him;  "2  and  Madison  was  very  sure  that  the  selection  of  a  cer- 
tain Albany  appointee  would  be  "  more  agreeable  "  to  Albany, 
and  to  the  state  in  general,  than  that  of  any  of  his  competitors. 
He  could  not,  however,  escape  the  toils  of  state  politics ;  and 
there  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  appointment  of  Dr.  Leib  to  the 
post-office  at  Philadelphia,  by  Granger,  still  postmaster-general, 
and  the  subsequent  removal  of  both  of  them,  were  due  to  politi- 
cal machinations  in  the  faction-ridden  state  of  Pennsylvania.3 

The  abuse  of  the  patronage  was  a  subject  much  discussed 
during  this  period ;  but,  so  far  as  the  national  civil  service  was 
concerned,  it  consisted  rather  in  lack  of  vigilance  in  guarding 
against  favoritism  and  the  influence  of  local  faction,  than  in  any 
direct  misuse  for  the  purpose  of  party  or  personal  advantage. 
One  practice  was  gaining  ground,  however,  which  was  regarded 
as  distinctly  dangerous.  It  has  been  shown  that,  because  of 
their  local  knowledge,  the  advice  of  congressmen  had  from  the 
first  been  considered  important ;  it  is  obvious  that  the  congress- 
men themselves  would  be  better  known  to  the  president  than 
any  other  citizens  of  the  more  distant  states,  and  that  he  would, 
therefore,  often  appoint  them  to  office.  Jefferson  gave  places  to 
twenty,  and  Madison  to  twenty-nine.4  The  dangers  anticipated 
from  this  custom  led  to  the  first  reform  movement. 

In  January,  jj  1 1,  Nathaniel  Maconintroduced  an  amendment 
to  the  constitution,  by  which  it  was  provided  that  no  senator 
or  representative  should  be  appointed  to  any  civil  office  or 
"employment,  under  the  authority  of  the  United  States,  until 

the   expiration  of   the  presidential  term  in  which  such  person 

•»» 

1  Dallas,  Dallas,  456,  459,  460  ;  Madison,  Letters  and  Other  Writings,  ii.  607  ; 
Executive  Journal,  iii.  72  (January  21,  1817). 

2  Memoranda,  1815,  Dallas,  Dallas,  414. 

8  J.  Q.  Adams,  Memoirs,  v.  481  ;  Nilefs  Register,  v.  414,  vii.  320. 
4  House  Documents,  19  Cong,  i  sess.  ix.  No.  164,  p.  II. 


AN  ATTEMPT  AT  REFORM.  57 

shall  have  served  as  senator  or  representative."  It  has  been 
seen  that  such  a  clause  was  proposed  in  the  Constitutional  Con- 
vention ; 1  and  the  twenty  years  of  experience  had  brought  the 
danger  more  clearly  before  men's  minds.  Roger  Sherman's 
idea,  that  modesty  would  prevent  the  presentation  even  of  the 
name  of  a  relative  of  a  colleague,  had  been  proved  delusive. 
Josiah  Quincy  moved  to  amend  Macon's  amendment  by  adding, 
"  and  no  person  standing  to  any  Senator  or  Representative  in 
the  relation  of  father,  brother,  or  son,  by  blood  or  marriage, 
shall  be  appointed  to  any  civil  office  under  the  United  States, 
or  shall  receive  any  place,  agency,  contract,  or  emolument  from 
or  under  any  department  or  officer  thereof,"  a  suggestion  which 
Mr.  Wright  sought  to  render  ridiculous  by  further  amending 
that  every  member  be  required  to  furnish  a  genealogical 
table.  The  amendments  were  rejected ;  the  original  suggestion 
received  seventy-one  votes  against  forty,  but  was  thrown  out, 
as  this  was  not  the  two-thirds  majority  required  for  a  constitu- 
tional amendment.2 

As  a  reform  measure  this  movement  seems  aimless  and 
ineffective.  It  was  truly  pointed  out  that  it  would  seriously 
hamper  the  president  by  removing  from  the  list  of  eligibles 
those  who  were  presumably  the  most  able  and  with  whom  he 
was  best  acquainted.  The  key  to  the  movement  lies  in  the 
fact  that  the  object  was  not  to  secure  a  more  efficient  civil 
service,  but  to  guard  against  a  political  danger.  Macon  was  a 
Republican  of  the  old  school,  and,  in  the  appointment  of  mem- 
bers of  the  legislature  by  the  president,  foresaw  the  destruction 
of  that  separation  of  powers  which  was  so  highly  prized. 
Quincy  condemned  that  "  consolidation,  which  has  grown  and 
is  strengthened  under  the  influence  of  the  office-distributing 
power,  vested  in  the  Executive.  A  consolidation  perceptible  to 
all,  and  which  is  the  more  fixed  and  inseparable,  inasmuch  as 
the  cement  is  constituted  by  the  strongest  of  all  amalgams  :  that 
of  the  precious  metals."  3 

1  Lucy  M.   Salmon,   Appointing  Power  of  the  President  (American    Historical 
Association,  Papers,  \.  No.  5),  13  ;   Niles's  Register,  xix.  193. 

2  For  the  whole  discussion,  see  Annals  of  Congress,  1 1  Cong.  3  sess.  454,  840- 
854»  897-900,  904-905  ;   Quincy,  Quincy,  219-223. 

8  Annals  of  Congress,  II  Cong.  3  sess.  454,  841,  846. 


58  PATRONAGE  DISCUSSED. 

In  1811  there  was  special  reason  for  dreading  this  danger, 
because  of  the  development  of  the  congressional  caucus  for  the 
nomination  of  candidates  for  the  presidency,  a  device  which 
seemed  calculated  to  break  down  utterly  the  barriers  which 
separated  the  departments  of  government,  and  to  open  a  wide 
breach  for  corruption.  In  1808  the  caucus  for  the  first  time  had 
been  really  influential  in  selecting  the  successful  candidate. 
Opposition  at  once  appeared;1  and  now  in  1811,  when  a  new 
election  was  approaching,  Macon  introduced  his  bill,  though  he 
disavowed  the '  intention  of  attacking  the  caucus.  An  amend- 
ment to  his  amendment  was  introduced,  extending  the  disqualifi- 
cation to  any  senator  or  representative  "who  shall  have  been  such 
at  the  time  of  the  election  of  any  President."  2  Macon  objected 
to  this  as  too  broad.  He  said  that  the  caucus,  at  which  it  was 
aimed,  should  have  no  weight  in  the  discussion,  as  it  was  unknown 
to  the  constitution,  and  hence  could  not  be  a  subject  of  legislation. 
He  would  not  dignify  it  by  direct  attack;  but  Quincy,  who 
delivered  the  main  speech  in  favor  of  the  original  amendment, 
was  openly  fighting  the  caucus.  "  The  Constitution,"  he  said, 
"  prohibits  the  members  of  this  and  of  the  other  branch  of  the 
Legislature  from  being  Electors  of  the  President  of  the  United 
States.  Yet  what  is  done  ?  The  practice  of  late  is  so  prevalent 
as  to  have  grown  almost  into  a  sanctioned  usage  of  party. 
Prior  to  the  presidential  term  of  four  years,  members  of  Con- 
gress having  received  the  privileged  ticket  of  admission  assemble 
themselves  in  a  sort  of  electoral  college,  on  the  floor  of  the 
Senate  or  of  the  House  of  Representatives.  They  select  a 
candidate  for  the  Presidency.  To  their  voice,  to  their  influ- 
ence, he  is  indebted  for  his  elevation.  So  long  as  this  condi- 
tion of  things  continues,  what  ordinary  Executive  will  refuse 
to  accommodate  those  who  in  so  distinguished  a  manner  have 
accommodated  him  ?  Is  there  a  better  reason  in  the  world  why 
a  man  should  give  you,  Mr.  Chairman,  an  office  worth  two  or 

1  A  pamphlet  of  1808  said  that,  if  the  public  could  know  Washington,  "They 
would  say  with  us,  that  of  all  the  places  on  the  continent  none  was  so  unfit  as  the 
seat  of  Government,  for  commencing  the  election.     They  would  duly  appreciate  the 
volunteer,  the  forbidden  services  of  the  Representatives,  they  would  duly  reward 
their  services"  {Address  to  the  People  of  the  American  States  who  Choose  Electors). 

2  Annals  of  Congress,  II  Cong.  3  sess.  841. 


THE  CAUCUS  AND   THE  PATRONAGE.  59 

three  thousand  dollars  a  year  for  which  you  are  qualified,  and 
which  he  could  give  as  well  as  not,  than  this,  that  you  had  been 
greatly  instrumental  in  giving  him  one  worth  five  and  twenty 
thousand  for  which  he  was  equally  qualified  ?  It  is  in  vain  to 
conceal  it.  So  long  as  the  present  condition  of  things  continues, 
it  may  reasonably  be  expected  that  there  shall  take  place  regu- 
larly between  the  President  of  the  United  States  and  a  portion 
of  both  Houses  of  Congress  an  interchange,  strictly  speaking,  of 
good  offices."1  When  the  time  came  for  the  caucus  of  1812, 
"  Messrs.  D.  R.  Williams,  Cheves,  and  Lowndes  from  South 
Carolina,  and  Macon  of  North  Carolina,  all  Democrats,  refused 
to  attend  the  .  .  .  meeting  of  members  of  Congress  to  nominate 
a  President  ...  on  the  ground  that  it  was  improper,  inexpedi- 
ent, indelicate,  unconstitutional,  and  a  monstrous  usurpation  of 
the  rights  of  the  people." 

This  attack  perhaps  tended  to  make  the  executive  a  little 
cautious.  A  Mr.  Smythe  of  Virginia,  who  had  voted  for  the 
establishment  of  a  new  judicial  district  in  that  state,  was  pro- 
posed, at  the  close  of  his  term  as  congressman,  for  the  new 
judgeship  thus  created.  President  Monroe  refused  to  nominate 
him,  solely  because  such  action  seemed  against  the  spirit, 
though  not  against  the  letter,  of  the  constitution.  Nevertheless, 
the  appointment  of  congressmen  continued,  fostered  by  the  fact 
that  they  were  such  persistent  applicants.  In  1821  John  Quincy 
Adams  said  that  one-half  of  the  members  of  Congress  were 
seeking  office,  and  that  the  other  half  wanted  something  for 
their  relatives.  In  the  same  year  Niles  stated  that  sixty  mem- 
bers were  applicants,  and  threatened  to  publish  the  names 
of  those  who  were  successful;  five  senators  and  forty-five 
representatives  are  said  to  have  applied  for  one  auditorship.2 
From  time  to  time  congressmen  were  successful  in  obtaining 
places  ranging  from  an  important  diplomatic  mission  to  a  post- 
office  worth  one  hundred  and  fifty-five  dollars  a  year.3  This 

1  Quincy,  Quincy,  222  ;   Niks' s  Register,  xxvi.  129. 

2  Ravenel,  Lowndes,  ill;   Nilefs  Register,  xx.  102,  xxvi.  37,  129  ;   Benton,  Thirty 
Years'1  View,  i.  84  ;   J.  Q.  Adams,  Memoirs,  v.  238. 

8  Noted  in  Niles's  Register  are  the  following  appointments  between  1812-1828:  3 
ministers  (xviii.  17,  xxv.  229,  xxvi.  16),  I  secretary  of  the  legation  (x.  125),  I  attor- 
ney (xxvii.  16),  i  fourth  auditor  (xxvi.  37),  2  receivers  of  public  monies  (xviii.  128), 


60  PATRONAGE  DISCUSSED. 

appetite  for  office,  far  keener  among  congressmen  than  it  is  to- 
day, was  caused  in  part  by  the  very  small  pay  that  they  received 
for  their  legislative  services.  The  six  dollars  a  day  voted  by 
the  first  Congress  was  still  the  legal  rate  of  compensation,  and 
when  the  fourteenth  Congress  changed  this  to  fifteen  hundred 
dollars  a  year,  the  popular  disapproval  was  shown  by  the  defeat 
of  many  of  its  members  on  that  issue  alone.1  Clay  had  to  retire 
from  the  speakership  to  recoup  his  fortunes.  To  a  friend  who 
was  thinking  of  running  for  Congress  he  sent  a  rather  dismal 
picture  of  the  monotony  of  the  life  and  the  expense  involved : 
after  the  first  few  months,  he  said,  it  retained  the  interest  only 
of  the  rival  leaders.2  It  was  not  strange,  then,  that  members 
were  eager  to  exchange  their  legislative  for  civil  positions. 

Thus  fed,  the  agitation  for  a  constitutional  amendment  similar 
to  that  proposed  by  Macon  continued  active.  Jackson  declared 
himself  emphatically  in  favor  of  an  amendment,  and  from  1820 
to  1840  almost  every  session  of  Congress  saw  a  bill  introduced 
to  recommend  one.  The  movement  attained  its  greatest  height 
between  1820  and  1830,  and  was  constantly  connected  with 
attacks  on  the  caucus.  When  the  latter  was  supersede^  by  the 
convention,  the  issue  became  less  important  and  the  discussion 
perfunctory.  It  was  used  as  an  election  bogie  ;  many  sincerely 
reprobated  the  custom,  but  popular  interest  had  subsided.3 

When  James  Monroe  became  president,  he  seemed  face  to 
face  with  the  vision  of  universal  good-will  which  Jefferson  had 
seen  as  through  a  glass  darkly.  Only  thirty-four  Federalist 

I  collector  (xvii.  223),  I  district  judge  (xviii.  240),  and  2  deputy  postmasters  (xxxvi. 
118,  161).  The  following  is  an  official  list  of  the  totals  for  each  administration  to 
April  25, 1826  :  Washington,  10 ;  J.  Adams,  13  ;  Jefferson,  25  ;  Madison,  29  ;  Monroe, 
35;  J.  Q.  Adams,  5  (House  Documents,  19  Cong.  I  sess.  ix.  No.  164,  pp.  11-12). 
Niles  affirms  that  Adams  appointed  to  temporary  positions  numbers  of  congressmen 
who  had  voted  for  him  in  the  contest  for  the  presidency.  Niles's  Register,  xxxvi.  267. 

1  Schurz,  Clay,  i.  138-140;   Niles's  Register,  x.  415  ;   Crawford  to  Gallatin,  Octo- 
ber 9,  1816,  and  March  12,  1817,  Gallatin,  Writings,  ii.  11,  28. 

2  Schurz,  Clay,  i.  202.    Crawford  thought  that  Clay's  dissatisfaction  was  for  politi- 
cal reasons.     Crawford  to  Gallatin,  April  23,  1817,  Gallatin,  Writings,  ii.  35. 

8  December  8,  1829,  Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers  of  the  Presidents,  ii.  448  ; 
See  Rufus  King  on  Benton's  bill  to  amend  the  constitutional  method  of  choosing 
president  and  vice-president,  Annals  of  Congress,  18  Cong.  I  sess.  32,  355-375  ; 
Ames,  Amendments  to  the  Constitution,  30-31.  Amendments  were  proposed  in  1793, 
1808,  1 8 10,  1 8 1 8,  and  the  last  in  1850  ;  33  in  all. 


MONROE  AND  JACKSON.  6l 

electors  cast  their  votes  against  him ;  and  the  project  of  com- 
pleting the  affiliation  of  parties,  by  treating  all  citizens  as  alike 
worthy  of  the  favors  of  the  government,  seemed  feasible.  Even 
before  the  election  had  actually  taken  place,  urgent  pressure 
was  brought  to  induce  Monroe  to  adopt  such  a  policy.  Andrew 
Jackson  wrote  to  him,  October  23,  1816,  recommending  Colonel 
William  H.  Drayton  for  the  expected  vacancy  in  the  position  of 
secretary  of  war.  "  I  am  told/'  he  said,  "  before  the  war  he  was 
ranked  with  the  Federalists,  but  the  moment  his  country  was 
threatened  he  abandoned  private  cares  and  a  lucrative  position 
for  the  tented  field.  Such  acts  as  these  speak  louder  than 
words.  '  The  tree  is  best  known  by  its  fruits,'  and  such  a  man  as 
this,  it  matters  not  what  he  is  called,  will  always  act  like  a  true 
American."  In  another  letter,  written  November  12,  before  he 
had  received  a  reply  to  the  first,  Jackson  again  recommended 
Drayton,  and  added :  "  Now  is  the  time  to  exterminate  the 
monster  called  party  spirit.  .  .  .  Consult  no  party  in  your 
choice ;  pursue  the  dictates  of  that  unerring  judgment  which  has 
so  long  and  so  often  benefited  our  country  and  rendered  con- 
spicuous its  rulers.  These  are  the  sentiments  of  a  friend.  They 
are  the  feelings  —  if  I  know  my  own  heart  —  of  an  undissembled 
patriot." 

To  these  letters,  Monroe  replied,  December  14,  with  a  long 
dissertation  setting  forth  the  rise  and  growth  of  the  Federalist 
party,  and  affirming  his  belief  that  government  could  be  con- 
ducted without  an  opposition.  He  asserted  that  the  administra- 
tion should  rest  strongly  on  the  Republican  party,  using  toward 
the  other  a  spirit  of  moderation,  and  evincing  a  desire  to  dis- 
criminate between  its  members  and  to  bring  the  whole  into  the 
Republican  fold  as  quickly  as  possible.  He  avoided,  however, 
the  expression  of  any  opinion  distinctly  favoring  the  appoint- 
ment of  any  Federalist  to  office.  Cabinet  officers,  he  thought, 
should  certainly  be  "  decided  friends,  who  stood  firm  in  the  day 
of  trial."  Moreover,  except  in  "  great  emergencies "  and  in 
case  of  "transcendent  talents,  the  four  heads  of  departments 
should  represent  the  four  great  sections  of  the  country." 1 '  In 
the  last  month  of  his  administration  he  did  appoint  a  Federalist 

1  Parton,  Jackson,  ii.  358-364. 


62  PATRONAGE  DISCUSSED. 

to  an  important  office,  —  George  Izard,  to  be  governor  of  Arkan- 
sas,—  and  told  Adams  that  he  regretted  that  he  could  not  have 
done  so  oftener,  but  that  he  had  gone  as  far  as  he  could  without 
forfeiting  the  confidence  of  his  own  supporters  and  thereby 
defeating  the  very  object  he  had  at  heart.1 

Monroe  was  not  a  man  from  whom  we  should  expect  innova- 
tions ;  and  the  rather  abundant  evidence  that  we  possess  in 
regard  to  the  detailed  working  of  his  administration  shows  a 
careful  adherence  to  the  traditional  methods  of  securing  the 
names  of  candidates,  and  of  judging  between  them.  While  this 
was  undoubtedly  the  intention,  it  could  not,  by  reason  of 
changed  circumstances,  be  followed  in  every  particular.  Though 
parties  seemed  dead,  politics  were  not;  and  three  opposing 
political  leaders,  three  rival  candidates  for  the  succession,  were 
members  of  the  cabinet.  Under  such  conditions  it  is  natural 
that  the  heads  of  departments  should  have  played  a  more 
prominent  part  in  the  distribution  of  the  patronage  than  ever 
before  or  since.  The  president  attempted  to  avoid  friction  by 
giving  to  each  head  complete  control  of  his  own  department. 
Adams  gives  an  account  of  the  appointment  of  Solomon  Van 
Rensselaer  to  the  post-office  at  Albany.  The  news  that  Meigs, 
the  postmaster-general,  intended  to  appoint  him  got  abroad,  and 
objections  were  made  ;  whereupon  the  case  was  referred  to  the 
president.  Crawford  and  Wirt  thought  that  Meigs  should  have 
assumed  full  responsibility,  but  that,  as  the  case  was  now  before 
the  president,  the  latter  must  act  on  it,  or  ground  his  refusal 
upon  the  general  principle  that  he  would  never  interfere  in 
such  appointments.  Adams  differed  with  them  on  both  points. 
In  the  end  the  president  refused  to  interfere,  although  he 
apparently  had  no  high  idea  of  Van  Rensselaer.2  Crawford 
complained  that  his  appointing  power  was  sometimes  interfered 
with.  He  wrote  to  Gallatin  that  the  Florida  appointments, 
even  those  "  connected  with  my  own  Department  have  been 
made  without  regard  to  my  wishes,  or  rather  without  ascertain- 
ing what  they  were  "  ;  and  said  he  surmised  that  the  rumor  that 

1  J.  Q.  Adams,  Memoirs,  iii.  494. 

2  Ibid.  v.  479-482,  484;   Monroe  to  Madison,  February  25,  and  to  Jefferson,  June  7, 
1813,  Monroe,  Writings,  v.  247,  261. 


UNIVERSITY 
>fe< 


THE  CABINET.  63 

he  had  influenced  the  Senate  to  reject  certain  military  appoint- 
ments had  "  soured "  Monroe,  who  favored  Calhoun  in  these 
new  selections.1  These  appointments  were  doubtless  of  the 
presidential  class,  and  were  decided  upon  in  cabinet  meeting 
when  Crawford  happened  to  be  absent.  No  instance  appears 
where  a  strictly  departmental  office  was  interfered  with. 

When  the  question  of  offices  came  before  the  cabinet,  the 
president  endeavored  to  hold  an  even  hand.  At  one  time  he 
announced  that  he  was  thinking  of  Mr.  Southard  for  the  vacant 
post  of  secretary  of  the  navy ;  he  said  that  Southard  was  a  good 
man  and  that  his  state  had  never  had  a  cabinet  officer,  but 
added  that  in  view  of  the  rivalry  between  the  members  of  the 
cabinet,  he  would  not  make  the  nomination  if  any  of  them 
objected.  This  seems  eminently  fair,  and  that  Monroe's  inten- 
tions were  good  is  beyond  question ;  but  Adams,  who  tells  the 
story,  adds  that  Southard  was  a  Calhoun  man.2  It  was,  in  fact, 
an  impossible  task  to  suit  all  three  of  these  ambitious  men ;  and 
the  cabinet,  with  its  rivalries,  so  graphically  revealed  in  Adams's 
diary  and  the  contemporaneous  letters  of  Crawford  and  Cal- 
houn, must  have  been  a  disagreeable  body  during  the  "  era  of 
good  feeling." 

The  relations  between  the  cabinet  and  the  Senate  during  the 
administration  are  illustrated  by  a  further  study  of  the  case 
of  Solomon  Van  Rensselaer.  On  January  3,  1822,  Rufus  King 
and  Martin  Van  Buren,  the  New  York  senators,  wrote  to  Post- 
master-general Meigs  that  they  heard  that  a  change  was  neces- 
sary in  the  Albany  post-office,  and  desired  "a  fit  and  full 
opportunity  for  all  concerned  to  make  their  representations  "  to 
him  on  that  subject.  He  replied  that  the  name  of  General  Van 
Rensselaer  had  been  presented  and  was  before  the  president 
for  consideration,  and  that  a  speedy  appointment  was  desirable ; 
and  he  continued  to  resist  all  attempts  to  delay  action.  It  was 
a  delicate  affair,  for  the  general  was  recommended  by  twenty- 
two  representatives  from  New  York  belonging  to  both  parties. 
Meigs  threw  the  responsibility  on  Monroe,  who,  as  has  been 
seen,  refused  to  shoulder  it.  King  dropped  out  of  the  contro- 

1  May  13  and  June  26,  1822,  Gallatin,  Writings,  ii.  242,  249. 

2  J.  Q.  Adams,  Memoir -s,  vi.  174. 


64  PATRONAGE  DISCUSSED. 

versy;  but  Van  Buren  induced  many  of  the  representatives  who 
had  signed  for  Van  Rensselaer  to  change  sides,  and  on  Janu- 
ary 7,  1822,  a  long  letter  with  many  signatures  was  sent  to 
Meigs,  summing  up  the  views  of  the  opposition.  They  wanted 
delay ;  they  wanted  to  consult  the  citizens  of  Albany ;  they 
recommended  Mr.  Lansing,  a  destitute  patriot  of  the  Revolu- 
tion ;  they  accused  Van  Rensselaer  of  being  a  violent  partisan ; 
but  they  rested  their  case  mainly  on  the  question,  "  Lansing's 
capacity  and  integrity  are  at  least  equal  to  Van  Rensselaer's ; 
should  not  preference  be  given  him  because  he  is  a  Republi- 
can ? "  There  is  evidence  that,  when  this  letter  was  written, 
the  appointment  was  known  to  have  been  already  made,  but 
that  the  letter  was  sent  to  record  their  opinion  that  appoint- 
ments should  in  the  future  be  confined  to  Republicans.  The 
administration  was  able  in  this  instance  to  resist  pressure  and 
appoint  the  man  of  its  choice.1  It  should,  of  course,  be  observed 
that  the  appointment,  as  it  was  in  the  post-office  department, 
did  not  require  the  confirmation  of  the  Senate ;  if  it  had,  it 
might  have  met  with  more  difficulty. 

In  1820  a  startling  attack  was  made  on  the  conduct  of  the 
civil  service.  DeWitt  Clinton,  in  what  is  known  as  the  "  green- 
bag  "  message  to  the  legislature  of  New  York,  and  in  a  subse- 
quent message  of  January  17,  1821,  charged  that  the  officers 
of  the  general  government  were  an  "  organized  and  disciplined 
corps."  Speaking  of  one  of  them,  he  said,  "  When  the  situa- 
tion, connexion,  education,  and  political  principles  of  this  officer 
of  the  United  States  are  considered,  there  can  be  no  doubt  but 
that  he  had  previously  ascertained  the  sense  of  his  political 
superiors,  and  that  he  was  instructed  to  act  accordingly."  He 
accused  Adams  of  partiality  in  selecting  the  newspapers  which 
were  to  publish  the  laws,  and  the  postmaster-general  of  making 
nine  removals  for  factional  reasons.  A  committee  was  ap- 
pointed to  investigate,  vor  rather,  as  the  lower  house  was  hostile 
to  the  governor,  to  disprove  these  charges.  \The  report  shows 

1  The  material  for  the  above  statements  is  from  letters  in  an  article  called  "A 
Political  Coincidence,"  by  A.  H.  Joline,  in  the  Collector,  vi.  39-40.  See  also  J.  Q. 
Adams,  Memoirs,  v.  479-482,  484,  vi.  495;  Niles's  Register,  xxxvi.  161;  Appletorfs 
Cyclopaedia  of  American  Biography,  an  article,  "  Solomon  van  Rensselaer." 


POLITICS.  65 

that  a  certain  amount  of  political  activity  on  the  part  of  the 
government  officials  was  considered  proper;  "and  when  the 
question  is  thus  one  purely  of  degree,  we  certainly  cannot  pre- 
sume to  pass  judgment  at  this  distance  of  time?j  The  removal 
of  the  postmasters  is  shown  to  have  been  at  the  request  of  the 
representatives  from  their  respective  districts,  the  presumption 
being  that,  in  most  cases,  the  government  would  not  look  be- 
hind the  reports.  /  In  at  least  one  case  the  cause  for  dismissal 
was  stated  to  be'  that  the  incumbent  had  lost  the  confidence 
of  the  people,  which  is  another  way  of  saying  that  he  was 
politically  opposed  to  the  person  who  asked  for  the  change. 
Several  of  these  removals  were  secured  by  Mr.  Van  Buren  on 
the  ground  that  the  incumbents  were  improperly  using  their 
influence  against  him  by  tampering  with  the  circulation  of  cer- 
tain newspapers.1 

The  general  impression  left  by  a  study  of  the  papers  relating 
to  these  charges  is  that  the  national  offices  in  New  York  were 
being  drawn  into  the  whirlpool  of  state  politics.  That  this  was 
chiefly  the  work  of  state  politicians,  rather  than  of  the  national 
administration,  seems  clear.  Monroe  and  William  Wirt  tried  to 
be,  and  actually  were,  above  faction.  Adams,  Calhoun,  and  Clay 
took  a  lively  interest  in  New  York  politics,  and  were  quick  to 
believe  in  the  vices  of  their  enemies  and  the  virtues  of  their 
friends ;  but  their  letters  show  little  real  understanding  of  local 
conditions  —  from  a  political  point  of  view  they  are  decidedly 
amateurish.2 

The  case  of  William  H.  Crawford,  secretary  of  the  treasury, 
demands  more  detailed  consideration.  About  no  man  of  equal 
prominence  in  American  history  do  we  know  so  little;  and 
the  most  definite  contemporary  testimony  in  regard  to  his  politi- 
cal character  is  that  given  by  his  rival,  John  Quincy  Adams, 
who  was  at  the  time  tremblingly  eager  for  the  presidency  and 

1  Hammond,  Political  Parties  in  New  York,  i.  552-564  ;  see  Van  Buren  to  Meigs, 
April  4,  1820,  in  the  pamphlet,  The  Van  Buren  Platform  (1848),  7.     For  the  gen- 
eral subject,  see  Niles's  Register,  xix.  376-380  ;  xx.  66-72,  97. 

2  J.   Q.   Adams,   Memoirs ;   Clay,   Private    Correspondence ;   Gallatin,    Writings 
(letters  of  Crawford);    Calhoun   Correspondence  (American   Historical  Association, 
Reports,  1899,  «•)•      For  Calhoun,  see  also  Edwards  Papers   (Chicago  Historical 
Society,  Collections,  iii.) ;   and  Edwards,  Illinois. 

F 


66  PATRONAGE  DISCUSSED. 

nervously  imputing  to  others  motives  of  which  he  knew  himself 
incapable.  Adams  certainly  thought  that  Crawford  was  using 
the  influence  of  his  position  to  build  up  a  faction,  and  he  was 
not  alone  in  that  opinion ; l  but  Crawford  believed  somewhat 
the  same  thing  of  Adams.2  In  tone,  however,  they  are  quite 
different :  Adams  is  shocked,  and  seems  to  say,  "  God,  I  thank 
Thee,  that  I  am  not  as  other  men  are  " ;  Crawford  speaks  of 
such  action  on  Adams's  part,  as  a  matter  of  course,  a  difficulty 
to  be  guarded  against,  and  one  might  readily  suspect  Crawford 
himself  of  adopting  the  tactics  he  so  easily  takes  for  granted  in 
the  case  of  his  rival. 

The  special  charge  against  Crawford  is  that  he  obtained,  for 
unworthy  purposes,  the  passage  of  the,  famous  Four  Years' 
Law.  This  act  was  passed  in  i82O.(f  It  established  a  fixed 
term  of  four  years,  in  place  of  the  previous  tenure  at  the  pleas- 
ure of  the  president,  for  district  attorneys,  collectors  of  cus- 
toms, naval  officers,  and  for  surveyors  of  customs,  money 
agents,  receivers  of  public  money  for  lands,  registers  of  land 
offices,  paymasters  in  the  army,  the  apothecary-general,  his 
assistant,  and  the  commissary-general  of  purchases.^}  It  was 
introduced  into  the  Senate  by  Mahlon  Dickerson  of  New 
Jersey,  but  Adams  says  that  Crawford  acknowledged  the  author- 
ship. Cits  ostensible  object  was  to  compel  the  regular  submis- 
sion oi  accounts)  but  according  to  Adams  its  real  purpose  was 
to  elect  Crawford  president  by  turning  all  office-holders,  their 
families  and  friends,  and  "  five  or  ten  times  an  equal  number 
of  ravenous  office-seekers,"  to  his  support.  This  charge  was 
not  made  until  1828,  and  Adams  then  added  that  the  sickness  of 
Crawford  during  the  last  eighteen  months  of  Monroe's  admin;, 
istration  prevented  his  active  use  of  the  weapon  he  had  forged*4 
Fortunately  we  have  Crawford's  own  statement  of  the  purpose 
of  the  bill,  in  a  letter  of  June  12,  1820,  evidently  written  to  the 

1  J.  Q.  Adams,  Memoirs,  v.  483,  vi.  387. 

2  Crawford  to  Gallatin,  October  27,  1817,  Gallatin,  Writings,  ii.  55. 

8  Statutes  at  Large,  iii.  182.  The  commissions  were  to  fall  in  from  time  to  time, 
beginning  in  September,  1821,  and  allowing  every  one  in  office  to  complete  four 
years  of  service. 

4  Annals  of  Congress,  16  Cong.  I  sess.  26  (December  16,  1819);  J.  Q.  Adams, 
Memoirs,  vii.  424-425. 


WILLIAM  H.   CRAWFORD.  67 

president.  He  said  that  he  had  told  inquirers  that  reappoint- 
ment  would  take  place  —  when  there  were  no  reasonable 
grounds  of  dissatisfaction  —  unless  some  one  was  found  with 
stronger  claims  than  the  incumbent;  and  that  one  advantage 
of  the  new  system  lay  in  the  possibility  of  discontinuing  unsat- 
isfactory public  servants  without  putting  any  stain  upon  their 
characters.1  The  dissimilarity  of  these  two  statements  demands 
examination. 

Little  is  to  be  gleamed  from  the  contemporaneous  discussion. 
The  debate  in  Congress,  at  least  the  report  of  it,  is  barren  ; 
and  there  was  practically  no  public  comment.  Jefferson  and 
Madison,  however,  corresponded  rather  vigorously  on  the  sub- 
ject. About  this  time  Tench  Coxe  applied  to  both  of  them  for 
their  influence  in  securing  a  post.  Jefferson,  in  forwarding 
Coxe's  letter  to  Madison,  said  :  "  This  is  a  sample  of  the  effects 
we  may  expect  from  the  late  mischievous  law  vacating  every 
four  years  nearly  all  the  executive  offices  of  the  government.  It 
saps  the  constitutional  and  salutary  functions  of  the  president, 
and  introduces  a  principle  of  intrigue  and  corruption,  which 
will  soon  leaven  the  mass,  not  only  of  Senators,  but  of  citizens. 
It  is  more  baneful  than  the  attempt  ...  to  make  all  officers 
irremovable  but  with  the  consent  of  the  Senate " ;  it  puts  all 
appointments  under  their  control  every  four  years,  and  "will 
keep  in  constant  excitement  all  the  hungry  cormorants  for 
office."  Madison  replied,  agreeing  with  Jefferson  and  claim- 
ing that  the  law  was  unconstitutional.  He  wrote  also  to 
Monroe  in  a  similar  strain,  deprecating  particularly  the  increase 
in  the  power  of  the  Senate ;  and  Adams  says  that  Monroe  re- 
gretted that  he  had  signed  the  bill,  and  resolved  to  renominate 
the  incumbent  in  every  instance  in  which  there  was  no  miscon- 
duct.2 This  criticism,  however,  only  slightly  touches  the 
question  of  the  purpose  of  the  bill ;  no  reflections  were  cast  on 
Crawford,  who  was,  in  fact,  the  special  representative  of  the 
old-fashioned  Republicans,  and  a  particular  friend  of  Macon, 

1  Fragment  of  a  manuscript  letter  from  the  Bureau  of  Rolls,  Washington,  loaned 
to  the  author  by  Dr.  U.  B.  Phillips. 

2  Jefferson,  Writings  (Ford  ed.),  x.  168-169  ;   Madison,  Letters  and  Other  Writ- 
ings,  iii.  196,  200;  J.  Q.  Adams,  Memoirs,  vii.  424. 


68  PATRONAGE  DISCUSSED. 

the  watch-dog  of  the  patronage.  Madison  feared  an  encroach- 
ment on  the  appointing  power  of  the  president,  and  Jefferson 
apprehended  corruption  in  general. 

The  question  now  arises,  Did  the  bill  have  any  legitimate 
object?  Certainly,  in  1820,  some  method  of  securing  more 
regular  accounts  might  have  seemed  advisable.  A  special  re- 
port presented  at  this  time  by  Crawford  showed  many  defal- 
cations ;  some  dating  from  Washington's  administration,  and 
amounting  in  all  to  $929,390  uncovered  by  bonds.  This  is  not 
surprisingly  bad  considering  the  lax  business  methods  of  the 
country,  nor  yet  is  it  strikingly  good.1  The  military  accounts 
showed  a  deficit  of  about  a  million  dollars,  part  of  which,  it 
was  supposed,  could  be  accounted  for.  Although  there  was 
some  general  distrust  of  the  integrity  of  the  public  service,  bills 
to  secure  a  greater  accountability  did  not  pass  readily ; 2  Craw- 
ford refused  to  accept  the  secretaryship  of  the  treasury  until 
one  that  he  then  prepared  had  been  adopted.3 

Was  this  bill,  then,  calculated  to  secure  a  greater  sense  of 
responsibility  ?  It  was  certainly  a  crude  method,  one  quite  in- 
applicable now ;  but  in  a  service  scattered  as  was  that  of  1820, 
when  means  of  communication  were  so  slow  and  unreliable,  and 
the  individual  officer  had  so  large  a  degree  of  independence,  the 
prospect  of  a  thorough  overhauling  at  definite  periods  might 
well  have  served  as  a  spur  to  accuracy  and  promptness.4  It 
would  also  enable  the  administration  to  freshen  and  invigorate 
the  service  by  dropping  the  old  and  incapable  without  fixing 
upon  their  characters  the  stain  of  removal.  An  especially  sig- 
nificant fact,  which  will  be  developed  at  length  in  the  next 
chapter,  is  that  this  practice  of  limiting  the  term  of  office  was 
very  common  in  the  states  at  this  time,  and  was  found  in  both 
Georgia  and  South  Carolina  —  states  with  which  Crawford  was 

1  Senate  Documents,  16  Cong.  I  sess.  ii.  No.  89.     This  total  is  obtained  by  a  com- 
parison and  combination   of  the  figures  for  the  several  departments  of  the   civil 
service. 

2  Annals  of  Congress,  18  Cong.  I  sess.  236-241 ;   National  Intelligencer,  May  20, 
1820. 

8  Statutes  at  Large,  14  Cong.  2  sess.  ch.  45  ;  Crawford  to  Gallatin,  March  12,  1817, 
Gallatin,  Writings,  ii.  24-25. 
4  Niles's  Register,  xxii.  99. 


THE  FOUR   YEARS^  LAW.  69 

most  familiar  and  in  which  the  limited  tenure  did  not  lead  to 
actual  rotation  in  office. 

It  is  evident  that  the  law  would  serve  equally  well  as  an  in- 
centive to  continued  political  activity,  if  that  was  likely  to  be  of 
account  in  the  day  of  reckoning,  and  that  it  was  as  aptly  framed 
for  the  easy  dropping  of  political  rivals  as  for  ridding  the  ser- 
vice of  decrepit  members.  Who  were  the  persons  that  Crawford 
mentioned  as  having  stronger  claims  upon  the  nation  than  the 
incumbents  ?  Were  they  simply  necessitous  military  officers, 
such  as  secured  recognition  from  Madison  ?  were  they  promi- 
nent Republicans?  or  were  they  the  political  supporters  of 
William  H.  Crawford  ?  It  is  impossible  to  answer  fully  all  the 
questions  thus  suggested,  but  some  light  may  be  thrown  upon 
them.  James  A.  Hamilton  wrote  to  Crawford,  February  25, 
1823,  that  he  had  just  had  an  interview  with  Governor  Gibbs  of 
Rhode  Island  to  discover  the  cause  of  the  latter' s  dissatisfaction 
with  Crawford.  Gibbs  said  that  it  was  based  on  Crawford's 
refusal  to  make  certain  removals  in  the  customs  service  of  that 
state,  and  added  that  this  small  matter  was  likely  to  turn  Rhode 
Island  to  Clay  in  the  coming  contest.  Hamilton  argued  that  it 
was  improper  to  remove  subordinate  officials  merely  because  of 
their  political  opinion ;  whereupon  Governor  Gibbs  replied  that 
one  of  the  men  complained  of  not  only  held  incorrect  political 
views,  but  used  the  influence  of  his  position  to  induce  others 
to  support  them.1  The  man  thus  mentioned  still  retained  his 
position  in  1825;  but  part  of  his  duties  had  been  taken  from 
him,  and  his  emoluments  had  been  reduced  by  a  half.2 

This  case  is  certainly  not  conclusive  as  to  Crawford's  methods 
of  dealing  with  the  patronage ;  hence  resort  must  be  had  to  in- 
direct evidence.  Would  the  law  of  1820  work  advantageously 
to  Crawford  ?  Not  all  the  offices  affected  by  it  fell  within,his 
department,  and,  as  he  believed  that  his  rivals  were  intriguing 
against  him,  he  might  well  have  feared  lest  it  prove  a  boome- 

1  From  a  manuscript  letter  in  possession  of  Miss  F.  Crawford  of  Dunbar,  Missis- 
sippi, lent  by  Dr.  U.  B.  Phillips. 

2  From  a  comparison  of  the  Blue  Books  of  1823  and  1825.     Cogswell,  the  name 
mentioned  by  Hamilton,  is  not  found  in  either;  but  Hamilton  must  have  mistaken 
the  name.     Doubtless  the  man  referred  to  was  Coggeshall,  weigher  and  gauger  at 
Newport. 


70  PATRONAGE  DISCUSSED. 

rang.  To  be  sure,  the  largest  share  fell  to  him ;  but  as  all 
presidential  appointments  were  discussed  in  cabinet  meeting, 
how  could  he  expect  to  carry  on  an  extensive  campaign  of  per- 
sonal aggrandizement  under  the  noses  of  two  avowed  rivals 
and  President  Monroe  ?  As  a  matter  of  fact,  many  of  the  men 
appointed  to  such  positions  under  the  secretary  of  the  treasury 
favored  the  election  of  Calhoun.1  Crawford  might  reap  some 
slight  profit  from  the  law,  in  that  he  had  a  high  probability  of 
success ;  and  those  who  believed  that  he  might  be  the  next 
'president  would  be  nerved  to  more  active  service,  while  those 
who  did  not  so  believe  would  not  support  him  under  any  cir- 
cumstances. Possibly,  too,  he  might  have  intended  thus  to 
bind  the  New  York  politicians  to  him,  as  his  supporters  there 
were  men  who  practised  the  spoils  system  in  their  own  state 
and  afterward  helped  to  introduce  it  into  national  politics. 
They  would  seem,  however,  for  some  time  after  the  passage 
of  this  act,  to  have  made  no  real  agreement  to  support  him.  No 
definite  conclusion  seems  safe,  except  that  serious  doubt  is 
thrown  on  Adams's  statement  as  to  the  purpose  of  the  bill. 
It  is  a  safe  conjecture  that  Crawford  expected  it  to  be  of  value 
in  the  conduct  of  public  business,  particularly  because  it  in- 
creased the  flexibility  of  the  service  to  the  profit  both  of  the 
nation  and  of  the  Republican  party ;  that  he  intended  to  trans- 
form it  into  an  instrument  to  secure  his  election  and  to  introduce 
the  spoils  system  seems  distinctly  improbable. 

As  the  election  of  1824  approached,  and  the  closeness  of  the 
contest  became  more  and  more  apparent,  the  supporters  of  the 
several  candidates  made  efforts  to  attract  the  Federalist  vote, 
which,  though  small,  might  prove  decisive.  In  the  interest  of 
Jackson,  his  correspondence  with  Monroe  advocating  the  ap- 
pointment of  Federalists  was  brought  to  light  and  published.2 
The  enemies  of  John  Quincy  Adams  made  public  his  father's 
correspondence  with  Mr.  Cunningham,  filled  with  invectives 

1  See  Crawford's  complaint  about  the   Florida   appointments    (above,   p.  62). 
Also  a  letter  from  James  Latham  to   Edwards,  November   12,   1823,    "Colo.  Cox, 
Mr.  Enos  [who  had  just  been  appointed  land  officer,  after  a  close  contest],  and 
Maj'r  lies  has  purchased  Springfield  and  have  altered  the  name  to  Calhoun  with  the 
general  satisfaction  of  the  people  "  (Edwards  Papers,  211). 

2  Parton,  Jackson,  ii.  359. 


ADAMS  AND   THE  FEDERALISTS.  71 

against  the  Essex  junto.1  Both  of  these  publications  had  great 
effect ;  and  when  the  election  by  the  House  of  Representatives 
drew  near,  there  were  persistent  reports  that  Adams  would 
proscribe  his  father's  enemies.  Under  these  circumstances,  Mr. 
Warfield  of  Maryland  wrote  to  Webster  that,  as  the  vote  of  that 
state  might  rest  with  him,  he  desired  certain  information  with 
regard  to  Adams's  attitude  on  the  subject.2 

Webster  replied  that  his  own  vote  would  be  for  Adams,  and 
that  this  would  not  be  the  case  did  he  "  not  believe  that  he 
[Adams]  would  administer  the  government  on  liberal  prin- 
ciples, not  excluding  Federalists,  as  such,  from  his  regard " ; 
he  deprecated  the  desire  to  see  any  particular  man  in  office, 
and  the  " portioning "  of  offices  among  men  of  "different 
denominations,"  but  thought  it  "just  and  reasonable  to  be 
expected  "  that  "  by  some  one  clear  and  distinct  case,  it  may 
be  shown  that  the  distinction  above  alluded  to  does  not  operate 
as  cause  of  exclusion.  Some  such  case  will  doubtless  present 
itself,  and  may  be  embraced,  probably,  in  proper  time  and  man- 
ner. ...  It  will  then  be  understood  that  the  field  is  open." 
He  added  a  note  to  the  effect  that  he  wrote  this  letter  on  his 
own  responsibility,  but  before  sending  it  showed  the  draft  to 
Adams,  who  approved  but  was  afraid  that  it  might  seem  to  refer 
to  a  cabinet  appointment,  a  difficulty  which  Webster  obvi- 
ated by  underlining  it  as  above.  Adams  says  that  he  told 
Webster  that  Clay  or  Crawford  would  probably  pursue  the 
same  course  as  he.3  On  February  16,  Webster  wrote  to  his 
brother  :  "  If  there  is  any  faith  in  man,  we  shall  have  a  liberal 
administration.  I  think  it  not  unlikely  that  if  it  were  pressed, 
there  might  be  a  Federalist  in  the  cabinet,  but  our  friends  are 
not  at  all  satisfied  that  such  a  measure  would  be  discreet  .  .  . 

1  Correspondence  between  the  Hon.  John  Adams  .  .  .  and  .  .  .   William    Cun- 
ningham (Boston,  1823). 

2  February  3,  1825,  Webster,  Private  Correspondence,  i.  377. 

8  February  5,  1825,  Ibid.  378-380  ;  J.  Q.  Adams,  Memoirs,  vi.  492-493,  vii.  539. 
In  regard  to  Crawford,  Adams  was  doubtless  mistaken,  as  Gallatin,  his  intimate  friend 
and  candidate  for  the  vice-presidency,  had  written,  just  after  the  publication  of  the 
Monroe- Jackson  letters,  strongly  disapproving  the  doctrine  "  of  paying  no  regard  to 
party  in  the  selection  of  the  great  offices  of  government "  (May  22,  1824,  Gallatin, 
Writings,  ii.  259). 


72  PATRONAGE  DISCUSSED. 

We  may  be  deceived,  but  if  we  are,  it  will  be  a  gross  decep- 
tion." The  "clear  and  distinct  case"  was  the  appointment 
of  Rufus  King  as  minister  to  Great  Britain.1  In  1827  Webster 
declared  himself  satisfied  that  Adams  was  fairly  living  up  to 
the  policy  thus  outlined.  The  latter  could  not  go  as  far  as 
he  wished,  however,  because  of  the  opposition  of  the  rank  and 
file  of  his  own  party ;  and  he  often  lamented  the  fact  that  he 
could  not  appoint  more  Federalists,  as  they  were  usually  the 
hest  men  presented  for  the  various  vacancies.2 

President  Adams  carried  political  tolerance  to  an  extreme/) 
even  offering  to  continue  Crawford  in  the  cabinet.  The  latter 
had  the  good  sense  to  decline ;  but  Postmaster-general  McLean 
was  retained  throughout  the  administration,  in  spite  of  Adams's 
firm  belief  that  the  whole  patronage  of  that  department  was 
being  used  to  promote  the  interests  of  Jackson.  The  retention 
of  McLean  under  these  circumstances  was  hardly  consonant 
with  the  president's  determination  that  offensive  partisanship, 
whether  for  or  against  the  administration,  should  be  sufficient 
cause  for  removal ;  and  as  only  twelve  removals  altogether 
were  made  during  his  term,  it  is  quite  evident  that  this  deter- 
mination was  not  carried  out.3  Adams  abhorred  the  task  of 
selecting  officials ;  and  it  is  not  surprising  to  find  him,  when 
first  elected,  summarily  closing  an  interview  with  certain  senators 
who  urged  him  not  to  renominate  those  whose  terrns  were  about- 
to  expire  under  the  new  Four  Years'  Law,  but  to  initiate  "  aj 
principle  "of  change  or  rotation  in  office."  The  purity  of  his 
conduct  of  the  civil  service  is  illustrated  by  the  prominence 
given  to  the  charge  that  he  interfered  with  the  appointment 
of  a  postmaster.* 

1  Webster,  Private  Correspondence,  i.  381  ;   J.  Q.  Adams,  Memoirs,  vi.  523. 

2  Webster,  Private   Correspondence,  i.   415,  417,  421.     Rufus  King  was  sent  as 
minister  to  England,  and  afterward  the  post  was  offered  to  Webster  ;   Van  Tyne, 

Webster,  135-136.  In  March,  1827,  Webster  recommended  that,  when  the  district 
judge  for  Pennsylvania  should  die,  Mr.  Hopkinson  be  appointed  to  placate  the  Fed- 
eralists {Ibid.  122-124).  December  II,  1828,  Hopkinson  was  nominated  {Executive 
Journal,  iii.  621);  J.  Q.  Adams,  Memoirs,  vii.  207. 

zlbid.\\.  508;  vii.  277,  281  ;  viii.  163,  x.  447.  See  also  Schurz,  Clay,  i.  259- 
261,  281  ;  Fish,  in  American  Historical  Association,  Reports,  1899,  i.  73. 

4  J.  Q.  Adams,  Memoirs,  vi.  514,  520-521 ;  Daily  National  Journal,  March  24, 
1829. 


ADAMS  AND   CLAY.  73 

The  ferret  eyes  of  the  opposition  press  were  a  little  better  re- 
warded in  the  case  of  Henry  Clay.  Clay  advised  the  president, 
probably  wisely,  to  remove  the  most  active  of  his  opponents 
among  the  office-holders ;  and  himself  struck  a  few  newspapers 
from  the  list  of  those  paid  for  printing  the  laws.  The  number, 
however,  was  very  small :  a  comparison  of  the  last  list  under 
Monroe  with  the  first  under  Adams  shows,  out  of  seventy-five 
papers,  ten  changes,  four  being  a  usual  number,1  and  only  one 
was  of  importance.  In  the  District  of  Columbia  the  printing  was 
taken  from  Gales  and  Seaton,  publishers  of  the  National  Intelli- 
gencer, and  given  to  Peter  Force,  who  was  editing  the  National 
Journal.  The  reason  for  this  change  was  doubtless  political,  as 
the  Intelligencer  had  supported  Crawford ;  but  if  such  a  change  is 
ever  justifiable,  it  was  in  this  instance.  The  printing  in  the  Dis- 
trict of  Columbia  gave  a  certain  prestige  to  the  paper  receiving 
it,  which  thus  became  to  a  certain  extent  an  official  organ ;  it  was 
therefore  expedient  that  this  paper  should  be  in  hearty  sym- 
pathy with  the  administration.  That  Clay  did  not  exclude  op- 
ponents in  general  is  seen  by  the  fact  that  one  of  the  papers 
he  selected  was  the  Jackson  Republican  of  Nashville;  he  seems, 
indeed,  to  have  continued  the  custom  of  giving  the  printing  to 
at  least  one  opposition  paper  in  every  state.2 
(^While  the  administration  gave  its  enemies  but  slight  basis 
for  criticism,  the  lack  of  sympathy  between  Congress  and  the 
executive  afforded  an  excellent  opportunity  to  those  who  wished 
to  effect  a  reform  in  the  civil  service.  Macon,  who  had  never 
lost  sight  of  the  matter  since  his  futile.. attempt  iiriSii,  once 
more,  in  1826,  introduced  the  subject ;:  but,  as  his  health  was 
poor,  Thomas  H.  Ben  ton  was  made  chairman  of  the  commit- 
tee appointed  to  consider  it,  and  was  ably  assisted  by  Judge 
White  of  Tennessee,  who  was  to  be  conspicuous  in  a  similar 
movement  ten  years  later.^7  The  report  of  this  committee  shows 
a  much  broader  comprehension  of  the  problem  than  is  found 
in  any  of  the  speeches  of  fifteen  years  before,  and  a  vastly  more 

1  Senate  Documents,  19  Cong.  I  sess.  iv.  No.  88,  pp.  30-45,  149. 

2  J.  Q.  Adams,  Memoirs,  vi.  50,  399 ;  Jefferson,  Writings  (Washington  ed.),  ix. 
206;   Quincy,y.  Q.  Adams,  193. 

8  Benton,  Thirty  Years'  View,   i.  80-82. 


74  PATRONAGE  DISCUSSED. 

ambitious  attempt  to  handle  it.  Accompanying  the  report 
were  documents  showing  the  valiie  of  each  office  under  the 
government,  and  indicating  to  whom  the  appointment  belonged. 
From  these  figures,  and  from  predictions  as  to  the  future,  which 
have  proved  not  extravagant,  the  committee  deduced  the  propo- 
sition that  the  appointing  power  of  the  president  should  be 
reduced.1 

With  this  general  object  in  view,  six  bills  were  introduced.  \ 
The  first  was  directed  against  the  control  of  the  press ;  the 
number  of  papers  in  the  several  states  to  which  the  printing 
of  the  laws  should  be  assigned  was  to  be  limited  to  one-half  the 
number  of  representatives  from  each  state.  The  essential 
point  of  this  proposition  lay  in  the  provision  that  these  papers 
were  to  be  selected  by  the  congressional  delegation  from  each 
state,  a  majority  ruling ;  if  they  neglected  to  make  the  selection, 
the  secretary  of  state  might  do  it  as  before.  It  is  significant 
that  the  committee  did  not  show  itself  eager  to  reduce  the 
amount  of  the  patronage,  but  only  to  shift  the  control :  the 
first  bill  would  allow,  in  some  states,  a  considerable  increase 
of  subsidized  newspapers,  three  being  the  customary  number. 
By  other  bills  the  president  was  required  to  state  the  cause 
of  each  removal  of  a  presidential  officer;  the  appointment 
of  postmasters  receiving  compensation  above  a  fixed  amount 
was  to  be  subject  to  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate ; 
and  a  blow  was  struck  at  the  executive  by  the  provision  that 
military  and  naval  commissions  should  read  "  during  good  be- 
havior" instead  of  "at  pleasure."  ^ The  Four  Years'  Bill  was 
to  be  repealed,  and  in  its  place  was  to  be  substituted  a  regula- 
tion that  collectors  and  disbursers  of  the  public  revenues  should 
submit  their  accounts  to  Congress  once  in  four  years,  on  penalty 
of  losing  their  commissions.^, 

This  report  is  certainly  n6t  without  merit.  The  repeal  of  the 
Four  Years'  Law  was  highly  desirable,  and  there  was  certainly 
no  good  reason  why  the  larger  post-offices  should  remain  out- 
side the  list  feubject  to  confirmation  while  the  collectorships  and 
naval  offices  were  on  it.  It  is  evident  that  the  ultimate  object 
of  the  reformers  was  still  not  so  much  to  improve  the  service 

1  Senate  Documents,  19  Cong.  I  sess.  iv.  No.  88,  pp.  1-12. 


CONTROL   OF  THE  PATRONAGE.  75 

as  to  reduce  the  power  of  the  president,  which  they  rightly 
judged  was  liable  to  great  extension.  Their  method,  however, 
was  different  from  that  advocated  by  Quincy.  In  1811  the 
functions  of  the  president  were  respected  ;  the  aim  then  was  to 
reduce  his  power  to  control  Congress :  now  the  design  was  to 
divide  the  patronage  between  the  executive  and  legislative  de- 
partments. This  was  the  first  distinctly  aggressive  act  on  the 
part  of  the  Senate  in  the  great  struggle  between  that  body  and 
the  president  for  the  control  of  the  patronage.  There  had  been 
friction  before : l  the  Four  Years'  Law  Madison  believed  to  be 
a  usurpation  on  the  part  of  the  Senate.  In  the  first  Congress 
the  claims  of  the  Senate  had  been  advocated.  Now  for  the 
first  time,  however,  was  presented  a  well-considered  programme 
of  encroachment.  The  bills  reported  by  this  committee  were 
tabled  by  Macon  himself,  as  he  was  too  feeble  to  conduct  the 
debate  necessary  before  they  could  be  adopted ; 2  but  they  were 
not  lost  sight  of.  They  remained  a  tangible  threat  held  over 
the  head  of  any  president  who  should  fail  to  recognize  the  pre- 
rogatives of  the  Senate. 

During  no  administration  before  1828  was  there  so  much 
contemporary  criticism  of  the  civil  service  as  in  that  of  John 
Quincy  Adams,  and  none  has  received  more  praise  from  pos- 
terity. 'Part  of  the  praise  is  doubtless  due  to  the  fact  that 
Adams/  was  the  last  of  the  presidents  sometimes  called  "  states- 
men*1 in  rather  invidious  distinction  from  the  "politicians" 
who  succeeded  ;  most  of  the  criticism  is  explained  by  the  con- 
ditions of  the  time,  which  will  be  discussed  in  the  next  chapter. 
A  detailed  study  of  actual  conditions  shows  that  there  was  some 
ground  for  both.** 

The  efficiency  of  government  service  cannot  be  expected  long 
to  maintain  a  standard  much  higher  than  that  of  the  community 
in  which  it  works.  Principles  of  business  promptness  and 
responsibility  were  not  highly  developed  in  the  United  States 
during  the  first  fifty  years  of  its  existence,  and  the  common 
belief  that  the  administration  of  the  government  before  1828 

1  In  Washington's,  Adams's,  and  Madison's  administrations,  above,  pp.  22,  23,  53. 
See  also  Niles's  Register,  v.   276 ;   Gallatin,  Writings,  ii.  242. 

2  Benton,  Abridgment  of  Debates,  viii.  533-540,  560. 


76  PATRONAGE  DISCUSSED. 

attained  a  level  of  efficiency  which  it  has  since  sought  in  vain 
to  recover,  seems  to  be  unfounded.  Yet  of  the  central  offices  it 
was  to  some  extent  true  :  one  able,  honest  man  succeeded  another 
in  the  chief  positions  of  state,  and  by  many  years  of  unbroken 
service  was  enabled  to  master  fully  the  details  of  his  duties.  It 
was  impossible,  however,  to  find  men  of  exceptional  character 
for  all  the  minor  and  local  offices.  The  annual  reports  of  the 
comptroller  of  the  treasury,  and  occasional  special  reports,  as 
that  of  Crawford  in  1820,  bring  to  light  a  record  far  from  brill- 
^  iant.  Defalcations  are  shown,  beginning  with  the  time  of  Wash- 
ington, and  amounting  in  1820  to  $927,390  in  the  civil  service 
and  to  about  the  same  in  the  military;  for  these,  causes  are 
assigned  varying  from  the  dishonesty  of  a  trusted  clerk  to  the 
absconding  of  the  officer  himself  to  the  West  Indies.  It  is 
evident  that  even  the  "  Fathers  "  could  not  wrench  the  govern- 
ment entirely  away  from  its  environment.  Under  Adams  the 
service  was  probably  more  honest  than  it  had  been  at  any  time 
since  the  War  of  1812,  as  it  was  able  to  stand  the  fiery  test  of 
investigation  by  the  Jackson  leaders  and  to  reveal  only  one 
defaulter;  but  there  was  enough  irregularity  to  furnish  the 
small  spark  that  alone  was  necessary  to  raise  a  great  smoke  of 
accusation.1 

Emphasis  must  again  be  laid  on  the  fact  that  honesty  and 
efficiency  are  not  entirely  synonymous,  and  that  the  latter  is  not 
so  easily  measured  as  the  first.  That  there  were  active,  able 
men  in  office  under  Adams  is  evinced  by  the  careers  of  some 
of  them  after  they  were  turned  out  by  Jackson ; 2  but  it  is  prob- 
able that  there  was  also  a  certain  amount  of  dead  timber.  Al- 
though Jefferson  was  the  only  president  as  yet  to  abuse  the 
removing  power,  none  of  the  others  seem  to  have  used  it  with 

I      proper  vigor.     The  neglect  to  remove  officers  who  were  dragging 
through  long  sicknesses  sure  to  end  in  death  is  certainly  to  be 

1  Niles's  Register,  i.  320-321,  xvi.  71,  xvii.  426,  xxii.  251,  xxxvi.  238,  298,  309,  315, 
322,  358,  373,    384,   421,  xxxvii.  399,  xxxii.  5  ;    National  Intelligencer,   May   20, 
1820. 

2  One  was  appointed  to  office  by  the  governor  of  Virginia  (Niles's  Register,  xl. 
345) ;   another  received  a  service  of  plate  from  the  merchants  of  the  port  for  which 
he  was  collector  —  a  dubious    compliment   (xxxviii.  292);   others  obtained  elective 
offices  (xxxvii.  275,  xxxix.  156). 


EFFICIENCY  OF  THE  SERVICE.  77 

condoned ; l  but  the  continuance  of  this  practice  gave  strength 
to  the  popular  impression  that  officials  were  beginning  to  feel 
a  property  in  office.  Less  excusable  was  the  failure  to  prune 
the  service  of  superfluous  officers,  of  which  there  was  at  least 
one  well  authenticated  case,  —  that  of  the  Norfolk  custom-house, 
where,  with  a  constantly  diminishing  revenue,  the  full  staff  was 
retained  from  the  days  when  its  trade  had  promised  to  make  it 
the  peer  of  any  port  in  the  country.2  The  retention  of  men 
whose  usefulness  had  passed  was  due  to  the  fact  that  it  was 
inhumane  to  discharge  them  without  adequate  provision,  which, 
in  a  country  as  democratic  as  the  United  States  was  at  the  time, 
could  not  be  given  except  in  the  form  of  salary.  Thus  the  civil 
service  became  a  pension  fund  for  its  disabled  members.  This 
policy  would  not  have  been  so  disastrous  if  the  notion  had  not 
extended.  Instances  have  been  related  already  where  civil  posts 
were  bestowed  to  reward  distinguished  success  in  war  or  politics  ; 
and  they  might  be  multiplied,  with  many  a  contemporary  note 
of  commendation.3  Thus  the  idea  was  gaining  ground,  among 
the  most  intelligent  classes  too,  that  past  service  rather  than 
future  efficiency  should  be  the  primary  reason  for  appointment. 
From  the  political  point  of  view,  the  question  of  efficiency 
was  of  little  moment ;  there  were  few  complaints  of  the  manner 
in  which  the  service  was  conducted,4  and  some  of  its  very  best 
features  contributed  most  to  its  unpopularity.  During  the  period 
of  twenty-eight  years,  from  1801  to  1829,  there  was  something 
like  a  system  of  promotion :  consuls  were  transferred  to  more 
and  more  important  ports,  to  become  in  time,  perhaps,  charges 
d'affaires;  naval  officers  became  collectors  of  customs,  and  dis- 
trict attorneys,  judges.5  Commendable  as  this  practice  was, 

1  Niles's  Register,  xxvi.  16  ;  Senate  Documents,  16  Cong.  I  sess.  ii.  No.  89. 

2  Senate  Documents,    19  Cong.  I   sess.  iv.  No.  88,  p.  9 ;    American  Historical 
Review,  ii.  247. 

8  Nile? 's  Register,  v.  207,  xiii.  160,  xvii.  428,  xxvi.  16;   Madison  to  Monroe,  No- 
vember 19,  1820,  Madison,  Letters  and  Other  Writings,  iii.  187-188. 

4  The  National  Republican  and  Ohio  Political  Register,  October  28,  November  4, 
December  6,  1825,  contains  a  few  such  complaints. 

5  Judicial  promotions  are  mentioned  in  Niles's  Register,  xxvii.  32,  304  ;   and  in 
Coleman,  Chittenden,  60-76 ;   consular,  in  Niles's  Register,  xxix.  192,  xxxiii.  208,  322 
(double  promotion),  and  in  Executive  Journal,  i.  121  ;   customs  service,  in  Niles's 


78  PATRONAGE  DISCUSSED. 

it  did  foster  in  the  service  a  bureaucratic  feeling,  and  in  the 
public  an  apprehension  lest  government  officers  should  consider 
themselves  a  class.  An  examination  of  the  various  Blue  Books 
shows,  moreover,  that  sons  were  often  appointed  to  succeed 
fathers,  which  increased  the  disapprobation.  A  bureaucracy 
is  always  aristocratic  ; 1  and  this  tendency  was  strengthened  by 
the  custom,  established  by  Washington  and  continued  in  general 
by  his  successors,  of  appointing  citizens  rather  prominent  in 
their  communities.  Men  originally  of  standing,  holding  life 
offices,  and  with  the  hope  of  placing  their  sons  somewhere  in 
the  national  service,  are  not  likely  to  be  popular  in  the  heat  of 
a  democratic  revolution  ;  and  when  the  people  voted  in  1828 
that  John  Quincy  Adams  should  leave  office,  they  undoubtedly 
intended  to  vote  that  most  of  the  civil  servants  should  go  with 
him. 

Register,  xxxii.  75  ;  miscellaneous,  Ibid.  xvi.  50,  xxviii.  44,  and  in  Jackson  Gazette, 
June  28,  1828. 

1  See,  for  instance,  McDuffie's  speech,  September  2,  1826;  Niles's  Register,  xxxi. 
124. 


CHAPTER   IV. 

GENESIS   OF  THE   SPOILS   SYSTEM. 
1775-1828. 

THUS  far  the  national  civil  service  alone  has  been  considered ; 
but  it  is  no  longer  possible  to  ignore  the  states,  inasmuch 
as  many  national  officers  were  appointed  from  the  states  to 
act  in  the  states,  and  much  of  the  service  was  thus  affected 
by  local  political  ideals.  It  has  been  seen  that  members  of 
Congress  possessed  great  influence  over  appointments.  Many 
members  chosen  in  New  York  and  Pennsylvania  owed  their 
election  to  a  skilful  abuse  of  the  patronage  at  home,  and  few 
abandoned  their  arts  at  the  threshold  of  the  capital.  Thus  it 
happened  that,  while  the  main  fountain  remained  fairly  pure, 
the  stream  of  the  patronage  was  mudded  by  the  soil  through 
which  it  flowed.  It  is  to  the  states,  too,  that  we  must  look  for 
prophecies  of  the  future ;  for  nearly  all  our  great  national  po- 
litical movements  have  grown  slowly  and  unevenly,  appearing 
first  in  one  state,  then  in  another,  and  remaining  for  many  years 
local  in  their  manifestation. 

Slowly  but  persistently  there  were  found  developing  in  the 
states,  during  the  period  we  have  been  studying,  two  tendencies 
that  burst  suddenly  and  violently  into  national  politics :  first, 
the  custom  of  using  the  public  offices  openly  and  continuously 
as  ammunition  in  party  warfare ;  second,  the  evolution  of  the 
idea  of  rotation  in  office.  These  together  constituted  the  spoils 
system)  It  has  not  seemed  expedient  to  treat  at  length  the  his- 
tory of  every  state,  or  to  study  transitory  tendencies  or  inchoate 
theories  in  such  states  as  are  taken  up  ;  attention  will  be  con- 
fined to  those  states  and  those  phases  of  state  history  which  are 
typical  and  suggestive. 

79 


80  GENESIS  OF  THE  SPOILS  SYSTEM. 

Rotation  in  office  is  said  to  have  been  an  old  Dutch  custom, 
/"^brought  over  to  New  Amsterdam  and  continued  in  New  York.1 
It  is  to  be  found  also  in  colonial  New  England  pf  but  perhaps 
the  most  significant  instance  of  its  early  use  in  America  was  its 
incorporation  by  William  Penn  in  the  Pennsylvania  "  Frame 
of  government "  of  1682,  which  provided  that  no  councillor 
should  hold  his  office  for  more  than  three  years  continuously, 
being  then  obliged  to  retire  for  one  yeara"  that  all  may  be  fitted 
for  government  and  have  experience  df^the  care  and  burden  of 
it."3  This,  then,  was  what  the  colonists  ordinarily  meant  by 
rotation  ;  it  was  to  be  applied  to  the  lawmakers,  and  its  objects 
were  to  educate  the  people  and  equalize  the  burdens  of  office- 
holding.  With  the  quickening  of  political  life,  office  ceased  to 
be  a  burden ;  but  the  notion  that  it  was  a  means  of  education 
persisted,  and  was  welcomed  by  the  democratic  sentiment  of 
the  Revolution. 

Although  the  "  frame  of  government "  had  been  discontinued 
in  1696,  this  particular  provision  was  revived  in  the  radical  con- 
stitution devised  for  Pennsylvania  in  1776.  A  similar  regu- 
lation was  adopted  by  the  neighboring  state  of  Maryland  with 
regard  to  the  delegates  to  Congress.  New  Hampshire  followed 
Maryland's  example,4  and  this  restriction  was  finally  incorporated 
in  the  Articles  of  Confederation.  In  the  Philadelphia  conven- 
tion of  1787  a  debate  arose  over  a  proposition  to  apply  rotation 
to  the  office  of  senator.  Doubtless  the  unfavorable  experience 
of  the  Confederation  had  much  to  do  with  the  defeat  of  the 
proposal ;  but  the  persistence  with  which  it  was  urged  is  evinced 
by  the  fact  that  it  is  found  among  the  amendments  to  the  con- 
stitution proposed  by  various  state  conventions.5 

1  A.  E.  McKinley,   Transition  from  Dutch   to  English  Rule  in  New   York,  in 
American  Historical  Review,  vi.  712. 

2  In  the  New  England  Confederation  of  1643,  and  many  other  instances. 
8  Poore,  Charters  and  Constitutions,  ii.  1520. 

4  Ibid.  ii.  821,  1291,  1531,  1544. 

6  Mrs.  Catharine  Macaulay  Graham  to  Washington,  June,  1790,  "It  is  true,  that, 
in  that  sketch  of  a  democratical  government,  I  endeavoured  to  keep  out  corruption 
by  enforcing  a  general  rotation  ;  but  I  must  acknowledge  to  you,  that  the  corruptions, 
which  have  crept  into  our  legislature  since  the  revolution,  with  the  wise  caution  used 
by  the  French  patriots  in  the  rules  to  which  they  have  subjected  their  National 
Assembly,  have  led  me  to  alter  my  opinion"  (Washington,  Writings  (Sparks  ed.), 


ORIGIN  OF  ROTATION.  8 1 

The  weakness  of  the  argument  that  rotation  would  educatej 
the  public  in  the  business  of  government  was  brought  out  by' 
Pelatiah  Webster,  who  said  that,  instead  of  making  many  men 
experienced  in  affairs,  it  made  "  many  jacks  at  all  trades,  but 
good  at  none."  The  idea  of  its  educational  value,  however, 
was  not  dropped,  but  was  transmogrified.  Elbridge  Gerry  said 
of  rotation  that  it  "keeps  the  mind  of  man  in  equilibrio,  and 
teaches  him  the  feelings  of  the  governed,  and  better  qualifies 
him  to  govern  in  his  turn."  This  version  of  the  benefits  of 
rotation,  that  it  was  intended  to  educate  the  office-holder  in  the 
virtues  of  the  people,  grew  in  popularity  during  the  first  quarter 
of  the  nineteenth  century,  when  it  was  not  supposed  that  the 
people  needed  instruction  in  the  arts  of  government.1 

Education  was  not,  however,  the  only  motive  for  the  adop- 
tion of  rotation  during  the  revolutionary  period.  The  Massa- 
chusetts constitution  of  1 780  provided,  "  In  order  that  the 
people  may  not  surfer  from  the  long  continuance  in  place  of 
any  Justice  of  the  Peace,  who  shall  fail  of  discharging  the  im- 
portant duties  of  his  office  with  ability  or  fidelity,  all  commis- 
sions  of  Justices  of  the  Peace  shall  expire  and  become  void,  in  I 
the  term  of  seven  years."  The  New  Hampshire  constitution 
of  1784  gave  them  tenure  for  five  years  instead  of  during 
"good  behavior,"  "in  order  that  the  people  may  not  be 
oppressed."  Elbridge  Gerry  had  this  conception  also  in  mind, 
for  he  spoke  of  the  practice  as  a  "  check  to  the  overbearing 
insolence  of  office."  2 

This  new  theory  led  to  an  extension  of  rotation  from  legisla- 
tive to  executive  offices,  and  in  this  form  it  continued  to  gain 
ground  until  1830.  By  that  date,  fifteen  states  had  some  such 
regulation  in  regard  to  the  office  of  governor ;  that  is,  he  should 
have  a  definite  term,  could  serve  a  definite  number  of  terms, 
and  then,  either  forever,  or  for  some  fixed  period,  could  not  serve 
again.  ^  Nineteen  states  had  similar  regulations  in  their  con- 

x.  71,  note);   Elliot,  Debates,  ii.  34 ;   Federalist  (Ford  ed.),  644.    New  York,  Virginia, 
and  North  Carolina  wished  to  apply  it  to  the  presidency. 

1  Pelatiah  Webster,  Political  Essays,  205  ;    Ford,  Pamphlets  on  the  Constitutions, 
II  ;  Niks' s  Register,  xxiii.  162,  xxvii.  216. 

2  Poore,  Charters  and  Constitutions,  ii.  1290;  Ford,  Pamphlets  on  the  Constitu- 
tions, p.  u,  §  9. 

G 


82  GENESIS  OF  THE  SPOILS  SYSTEM. 

stittitions  in  regard  to  some  officesS  and  included  in  this  num- 
ber were  nearly  all  the  states  that  nad  new  constitutions.  The 
states  differ  interestingly  in  details.  Even  conservative  Massa- 
chusetts distrusted  the  officer  in  charge  of  the  public  funds, 
and  Maine  followed  her  example  in  1820  by  providing  that  the 
treasurer  should  not  hold  continuously.  Pennsylvania  and 
the  states  that  copied  her  contented  themselves  with  restricting 
the  eligibility  of  the  chief  executive,  and  did  not  see  fit  to  apply 
rotation  where  it  might  have  proved  a  more  practical  safeguard. 

In  eleven  states  the  office  of  sheriff  or  marshal  was  made 
rotative,  a  fact  which  is  significant  because  of  the  light  it 
throws  on  an  otherwise  anomalous  provision  in  one  of  the 
laws  for  the  organization  of  the  national  government.  Of  all 
the  officers  provided  for  by  the  great  administrative  acts  of  the 
first  Congress,  the  marshals  alone  were  to  serve  a  fixed  term ; 
all  the  others,  even  the  district  attorneys,  created  by  the  same 
act,  were  to  serve  during  the  pleasure  of  the  executive.1  The 
reappointment  of  the  marshals  was  not  forbidden,  and  seems 
to  have  taken  place  as  a  matter  of  course;  but,  standing  as  a 
solitary  exception  to  the  general  rule,  this  limitation  attached 
to  one  class  of  commissions  could  not  have  been  the  result  of 
oversight,  but  must  have  had  some  object,  although  a  search 
for  direct  evidence  as  to  its  cause  has  been  in  vain.  In  1821 
Madison  had  quite  forgotten  it,  and  supposed  that  the  only 
precedents  for  the  Four  Years'  Law  of  1820  were  to  be  found 
in  the  case  of  the  territorial  offices,  the  regulations  for  which 
were  carelessly  adopted  in  toto  from  the  Confederation.2 

The  indirect  evidence  to  which  one  naturally  first  turns  is 
the  practice  of  the  colonies  and  of  England.  Virginia  and 
Pennsylvania  at  one  time  chose  their  marshals  or  sheriffs  annu- 
ally,3 and  so,  apparently,  did  New  Hampshire;4  in  the  other 
colonies,  either  they  served  indefinitely  or  the  practice  is  ob- 

1  Statutes  at  Large,  i.  87,  92. 

2  Madison  to  Jefferson,  January  7,  1821,  Madison,  Letters  and  Other  Writings,  iii. 
202. 

3  Channing,  Town  and  County  Government  (Johns  Hopkins  University,  Studies, 
ii.  No.  10),  46;    E.  R.  L.  Gould,  Local  Government  in  Pennsylvania   {Ibid.  i. 
No.  3),  21. 

4  New  Hampshire  Colonial  Records,  i.  21. 


SIGNIFICANCE  OF  ROTATION.  83 

scure.1  English  precedent  may  have  had  unusual  weight  in 
this  case,  for  several  of  the  framers  of  the  judiciary  act  were 
close  students  of  English  law.  Blackstone,  whose  work  was 
certainly  consulted,  says  that  the  under-sheriffs,  whose  func- 
tions would  most  resemble  those  of  the  marshals,  could  serve 
but  one  year,  under  heavy  penalty.  These  precedents  may 
explain  the  provision  of  the  national  law,  but  the  widespread 
application  of  rotation  to  this  particular  office  must  have  rested 
on  some  living  principle.  The  fact  seems  to  be  that  the  sheriff 
or  marshal  was  regarded  with  suspicion  because  of  his  relation 
to  the  court,  particularly  for  his  part  in  the  selection  of  the  jury. 
It  was  this  latter  function  that  rendered  him  more  dangerous 
than  the  attorney,  whose  term  is  seldom  regulated.2 

Rotation,  therefore,  meant  to  the  men  of  the  formative  period 
the  limitation  of  the  number  of  years  during  which  a  man  might 
continuously  hold  an  elective  office.  Its  main  objects  were  to 
educate  as  many  of  the  people  as  possible  in  the  business  of| 
political  life,  and  to  protect  them  from  the  usurpations  of  men 
habituated  to  office.  It  did  not  in  strictness  apply  to  thej 
appointive  offices  of  the  civil  service,  nor  could  it  logically  be 
extended  to  very  many  of  them,  as  few  were  calculated  to  give 
much  political  experience,  or  conferred  powers  liable  to  become 
dangerous  to  the  people.  By  association  of  ideas,  however, 
rotation  in  office  came  to  be  regarded  as  an  end  in  itself,  and 
to  be  regarded  as  applicable  to  all  offices.  The  first  steps  in 
this  extension  are  apt  to  be  overlooked,  for  formal  rotation  was 
never  widely  extended  by  legislative  enactment.  The  simple 
fixation  of  a  term  of  office,  however,  even  when  reappointment 

1  The  Connecticut   practice   is  very  difficult  to  distinguish.     In  October,  1771, 
Oliver  Walcott  resigned  his  commission  as  sheriff,  which  was  signed  November  14, 
1751  {Connecticut  Colonial  Records,  xiii.  568);    yet  in  1676  the  sheriff  or  marshal 
seems  to  have  been  appointed  for  but  one  year  {Ibid.  ii.  275).     It  is  possible  that 
each  county  had  a  separate  custom   {General  Laws  and  Liberties  of  Connecticiit 
Cotonie,  18),  or  that  it  was  the  custom  to  reelect  the  old  incumbent  without  renewing 
his  commission  {Connecticut  Colonial  Records,  iii.  252).     The  attorneys  were  chosen 
from  time  to  time  {Ibid.  v.  48,  vii.  279).     The  Connecticut  practice  is  of  importance 
because  of  the  prominence  of  Oliver  Ellsworth  in  framing  the  national  judiciary. 

2  Note  that  the  assembly  of  1675  *n  Virginia  provided  that  sheriffs  hold  one  year 
and  that  the  office  rotate.     Hening,  Statutes,  ii.  341. 


84  GENESIS   OF  THE  SPOILS  SYSTEM. 

was  not  forbidden,  was  caused  by  the  same  democratic  feeling 
that  led  to  rotation,  and  ultimately  produced  the  same  results ; 
this  introduction  of  the  fixed  term  for  general  administrative 
offices  should,  therefore,  be  regarded  as  a  stage  in  the  evolu- 
tion of  the  idea  of  rotation.1 

The  process  of  transition  is  illustrated  by  the  case  of  the 
marshal  which  has  just  been  considered.  The  office  involved 
powers  which  might  become  dangerous  to  the  people,  and,  as  it 
was  elective,  rotation  was  applied  to  protect  them  ;  when  ap- 
pointment was  substituted  for  election,  a  definite  term  was  pro- 
vided to  take  the  place  of  rotation.  The  justices  of  the  peace 
were  not  usually  elective,  and,  as  their  functions  were  such  as 
might  possibly  become  dangerous,  it  was  provided  that  they 
should  be  commissioned  for  fixed  periods.  In  both  these  cases 
limitation  of  term  was  clearly  a  substitute  for  rotation.  Asso- 
ciated thus  closely  with  the  popular  doctrine  of  rotation,  the 
limited  term  came  to  be  regarded  as  essentially  democratic,  and 
was  soon  extended  to  offices  which  conferred  no  dangerous 
powers.  As  in  the  case  of  rotation,  the  form  remained  popular 
after  the  principle  had  been  forgotten. 

South  Carolina  was  the  first  state  to  make  this  extension  on 
a  large  scale.  It  is  found  in  her  first  constitution  of  1/76,  and 
was  gradually  extended,  until  by  1812  nearly  all  the  offices 
were  limited  in  term.  In  this  state  there  were  no  swiftly  suc- 
ceeding party  changes,  and  the  limited  term  does  not  seem  to 
have  led  to  a  real  rotation  in  office.  State  politics  were  excep- 
tionally pure,  and  there  are  no  indications  of  an  abuse  of  the 
patronage,  except  possibly  at  the  time  of  the  nullification 
troubles.2  By  1820  the  idea  was  gaining  ground  in  Pennsyl- 
vania, where  rotation  had  always  been  popular,3  in  Ohio,  and 
in  most  of  the  newer  states. 

Such  a  movement  could  not  advance  far  without  affecting  the 
national  government,  and  a  rapid  survey  of  a  few  of  the  laws 

1  McMaster  ( United  States,  iii.  146-183)   discusses  the  fixation  of  the  term  for 
judges. 

2  Poore,  Charters  and  Constitutions,  ii.  1625,  1632 ;   Cooper,  Statutes,  v.  238,  352, 
570,  674,  vi.  60,  164,  189,  322 ;   Grayson,/.  L.  Petigru,  129. 

8  S.  B.  Harding,  First  Pennsylvania  Constitution.  American  Historical  Associa- 
tion, Report,  1894,  pp.  371-402. 


LIMITED   TERMS.  85 

relating  to  the  tenure  of  office  will,  besides  illustrating  this  fact, 
put  in  its  proper  relation  Crawford's  Four  Years'  Bill,  the  politi- 
cal aspect  of  which  has  already  been  discussed.  The  Northwest 
Ordinance,  which  was  continued  in  force,  and  the  governmental 
provisions  of  which  were  extended  to  the  territory  south  of  the 
Ohio,  by  the  first  Congress,  provided  a  fixed  term  for  governor 
and  secretary,  but  allowed  the  judges  to  hold  for  good  behavior. 
This  precedent  with  regard  to  territories  was  always  followed 
by  the  Federalists.  In  organizing  the  judiciary  they  made  the 
singular  distinction  between  marshals  and  attorneys  which  has 
already  been  noted,  and  the  term  of  directors  of  the  Bank  of 
the  United  States  they  fixed  in  1791  at  one  year.  At  the  close 
of  Adams's  administration  they  provided  that  the  justices  of  the 
peace  in  the  District  of  Columbia  should  hold  for  five  years.1 

Under  Jefferson  the  tendencies  of  the  times  readily  found 
expression,  and  it  is  therefore  not  surprising  to  find  that  the 
demand  for  short  terms  was  distinctly  recognized.  The  law 
providing  for  the  government  of  Louisiana  limited  the  term 
of  the  judges  to  four  years,  a  provision  which  remained  in  the 
various  laws  for  that  territory.  Not  so  when  Michigan  was 
set  off.  There  the  older  arrangement  was  followed,  perhaps 
because  the  territory  was  already  under  the  Ordinance  of  1787, 
for  in  1812,  when  Missouri  was  set  off  from  Louisiana,  the  lim- 
ited term  was  again  employed.  The  practice  continued  to  be 
irregular.  In  1817  Alabama  was  provided  with  judges  holding 
for  good  behavior;  while  in  1819  Arkansas,  a  portion  of  Louisi- 
ana, was  to  have  them  with  a  four  years'  term.  In  1817  the 
office  of  reporter  of  the  Supreme  Court  was  created  for  three 
years  only,  and  was  so  continued  by  successive  acts  until  1842? 

The  law  of  1820,  then,  did  not  fail  to  cast  its  shadow  before, 
nor  did  the  unfavorable  comment  which  it  excited  prevent  the 
more  extensive  application  of  its  principles.  In  1822  and  1823 
new  territorial  acts  limited  the  terms  of  the  judges ;  the  Michi- 
gan law  was  changed  in  this  respect,  and  the  surveyors-general 
were  added  to  the  officers  holding  with  a  limited  tenure.3 

1  Statutes  at  Large,  i.  123,  193,  549  ;   ii.  107. 

2  Ibid.  ii.  284,  309,  331,  746 ;   iii.  371,  376 ;   v.  545. 
8  Ibid.  iii.  655,  657,  697,  769. 


86  GENESIS  OF  THE  SPOILS  SYSTEM. 

After  the  incoming  of  Jackson  the  idea  of  a  fixed  term  seems 
to  have  been  fully  recognized.  Indian  agents,  postmasters, 
some  clerks,  the  judges  for  Iowa,  were  all  to  have  commis- 
sions expiring  at  the  end  of  four  years.  In  1840  a  term  of 
five  years  was  fixed  for  certain  receivers-general  of  public 
moneys.  The  office  of  commissioner  of  pensions  was  created 
for  two-year  periods  only.  A  surprising  exception  occurred  in 
1836,  when  the  act  organizing  Wisconsin  provided  that  judges 
should  be  appointed  to  serve  during  good  behavior.  Possibly 
this  exception  was  a  result  of  the  great  discussion  of  the  civil 
service  which  occurred  in  that  year.1 

Whatever  may  have  been  true  of  Crawford,  it  is  certain  that 
many  other  politicians  wished  this  limitation  to  lead  to  actual 
rotation  in  the  minor  offices.  When  certain  senators  requested 
Adams  to  send  in  "different  nominations,  and  to  introduce  a 
principle  of  change  or  rotation,"  2  they  gave  voice  to  a  growing 
demand.  It  is  evident  that  the  end  to  be  obtained  was  exactly 
opposite  to  that  which  made  rotation  popular,  for  every  limita- 
tion of  the  term  of  appointive  offices,  every  new  nomination 
called  for,  increased  the  power  of  the  executive;  but,  though 
its  meaning  had  completely  changed,  the  word  "  rotation  "  con- 
tinued to  have  a  true  democratic  ring  in  popular  discussions. 
Later,  a  still  further  twist  was  given  to  its  significance :  offices 
came  to  be  regarded  simply  as  prizes ;  and  the  phrase  "  rotation 
in  office  "  served  to  give  a  pleasing  and  respected  form  to  the 
doctrine  that  they  should  be  shared  as  widely  and  as  rapidly 
as  possible. 

While  the  path  of  the  spoils  system  was  thus  being  prepared, 
and  a  theoretical  basis  for  it  established,  the  actual  practice  was 
keeping  pace  with  the  theory.  ^  New  York  was  the  first  state 
in  which  the  offices  were  openly  and  continuously  used  for 
partisan  purposes^  There  the  royal  appointments  had  been 
conspicuously  badf  and  colonial  politics  especially  active.  This- 
experience  was  probably  responsible  for  the  elaborate  attempt, 
made  in  the  first  constitution,  to  limit  the  appointing  power  of 
the  executive,  and  to  secure  proper  recognition  for  the  various 

1  Statutes  at  Large,  iv.  736,  779  ;  v.  13,  26,  88,  187,  238,  369,  388,  597,  etc. 

2  J.  Q.  Adams,  Memoirs,  vi.  520-521. 


NEW  YORK  POLITICS.  8/ 

geographical  sections.  The  state  was  divided  into  four  districts, 
each  represented  by  an  equal  number  of  senators.  One  senator 
from  each  district  was  elected  by  the  House  of  Representatives 
to  serve  in  the  council  of  appointment.  With  these  four  the 
governor  was  associated,  but  in  exactly  what  capacity  was  not 
made  clear  by  the  constitution.  The  original  idea  seems  to 
have  been  that  the  nominations  should  be  made  by  the  council, 
and  that  the  governor  was  to  approve  or  disapprove ; l  but  later 
the  governor  claimed  that  the  exact  reverse  was  true. 

The  conditions  which  governed  the  working  of  this  machinery 
of  appointment  were  complicated,  and  do  not  readily  admit  of 
brief  explanation.  New  York  politics  had  been  controlled  in 
the  colonial  period  by  family  groups  or  combinations,  based 
largely  on  land  and  old  manorial  privileges.  The  power  of 
some  of  these  groups  was  broken  by  the  Revolution,  but  a  large 
part  of  the  population  lacked  American  political  experience 
and  ideals,  and  were  still  ready  to  follow  leaders;2  hence  the 
influence  of  certain  families  remained.  The  Livingstons  were 
the  most  conspicuous;  the  Van  Rensselaers  were  prominent 
for  years ;  and  the  Schuylers,  united  with  Alexander  Hamilton 
by  marriage,  dominated  the  Federalist  party.  Besides  these 
older  families,  the  long  governorship  of  George  Clinton  seems 
to  have  created  a  strong  permanent  interest,  which  passed  to 
his  nephew,  De  Witt  Clinton,3  while  in  New  York  City  the 
democracy  was  marshalled  by  such  organizations  and  leaders 
as  Tammany  Hall  and  Aaron  Burr.  Although  Republican  for- 
mulas were  used,  politics  continued  to  be  a  game  played  by 
a  number  of  factions,  some  aristocratic,  some  democratic,  by 
bosses  and  patrons.  The  political  situation  reproduced  in  min- 
iature that  of  England  during  the  eighteenth  century. 

1  Poore,  Charters  and  Constitutions,!*.  1336;  Federalist  (Ford  ed.),  513;  Assembly 
resolution,  October  2,  1777,  Clinton  Papers,  ii.  357. 

2  C.  Becker,  Nominations  in  Colonial  New  York,'\n  American  Historical  Review, 
vi.  260-275  ;  a  delegation  from  German  Flats,  for  example,  laid  a  petition  before 
Governor  Clinton  in  1779,  "hoping  your  natural  affection  towards  true  and  faithful 
Subjects  will  give  us  redress"  {Clinton  Papers,  iv.  746). 

3  In  1804  sixteen  members  or  connections  of  the  Livingston  and  Clinton  families 
held  office  in  state  or  nation,  and  drew  $60,500  in  annual  salaries.    Lancaster  Journal, 
Extra,  March  21,  1804. 


88  GENESIS  OF  THE  SPOILS  SYSTEM. 

Probably  no  system  of  appointment  could  have  been  better 
devised  to  continue  this  condition  than  that  just  described  for 
New  York.  It  successfully  divested  every  one  of  any  feeling  of 
responsibility,  and  opened  an  opportunity  for  an  endless  variety 
of  jobs  and  deals,  combinations  and  recombinations.  The 
council,  although  requested  by  the  House  of  Representatives, 
refused  to  publish  its  minutes.1  How  completely  the  popular 
will  could  be  thwarted  may  be  seen  later. 

From  1777  until  1795  continuously  George  Clinton  was  gov- 
ernor. His  opponent  at  his  first  election  was  Philip  Schuyler, 
whom  he  seems  to  have  much  respected,  and  whom  he  later 
appointed  surveyor-general.2  Many  of  the  offices  had  been 
filled  before  he  entered  on  his  duties,  and  he  wrote  that  he 
would  remove  no  man  from  office  without  a  hearing.  Either 
he  or  the  council  of  appointment  did,  however,  distress  one  man 
by  making  him  third,  instead  of  second,  on  a  list  of  judges.  In 
answer  to  some  protest  from  Schenectady,  he  said  that,  so  far  as 
he  had  anything  to  do  with  appointments,  the  people  of  every 
part  of  the  state  should  be  equally  represented.  The  Tryon 
County  people  proposed  that  they  be  allowed  to  choose  their 
own  county  officers,  because  three  of  the  council  of  appointment 
are  "  unquainted  with  us,  and  the  other  hath  but  an  imperfect 
knowlidge  of  us  " ;  but  Clinton  would  not  accede  to  the  request, 
although  the  method  was  actually  used  in  the  case  of  Vermont, 
the  conditions  of  which  were  totally  unfamiliar  to  him  and  his 
colleagues.  He  urged  the  Vermonters  to  be  impartial,  and  to 
have  regard  for  merit  and  abilities ;  in  particular  he  hinted  that 
they  give  lucrative  offices  to  refugees.3  During  his  first  govern- 
orship, Clinton  had  little  call  to  be  prescriptive ;  almost  the 
only  opponents  in  office  were  those  whom  he  placed  there,  and 
it  should  be  said  that  these  were  numerous.  He  closely  con- 
trolled the  council  of  appointment,  and  once  when  the  Federal- 
ists secured  it,  he  managed  to  delay  a  good  deal  of  business  until 
a  new  council  was  elected.  Although  his  use  of  the  patronage 
was  moderate,  it  was  skilful,  and  was  one  of  the  chief  means  by 
which  he  maintained  his  hold  on  the  state.4 

1  New  York  Council  of  Appointment,  Military  Minutes,  i.  186-187. 

2  Clinton  Papers,  iv.  537,  note.     8  Ibid.  ii.  552,  746-784  ;   iii.  54, 165,  173,  217,  398. 
4  Hammond,  Political  Parties  in  New  York,  i.  53  ff.;   5,  33,  83,  104;   38. 


COUNCIL   OF  APPOINTMENT.  89 

The  establishment  of  the  national  government  weakened  the 
influence  of  the  state  executive  in  New  York,  particularly  as 
the  new  appointments  were  largely  controlled  by  Hamilton. 
The  latter,  however,  could  not  successfully  cope  with  the  gov- 
ernor in  the  use  of  offices  for  party  purposes  ;  and  the  Living- 
stons were  driven  by  the  neglect  of  the  national  government 
into  alliance  with  Clinton,1  who,  in  spite  of  lost  patronage  and 
the  strong  government  reaction  of  the  early  nineties,  was  able 
to  keep  his  office  until  1795.  His  successor,  John  Jay,  announced 
in  his  first  message  to  the  legislature  that  he  would  "  regard  all 
his  fellow  citizens  with  an  equal  eye,  and  .  .  .  advance  merit 
wherever  found."  Appointments  were,  however,  confined  to 
Federalists.  The  few  direct  removals  seem  to  have  been  made 
for  cause,  but  some  for  party  purposes  were  brought  about  in- 
directly as  follows :  the  commissions  of  justices  of  the  peace 
ran  for  only  three  years,  but  it  was  customary  to  recommission 
the  incumbents  ;  under  Jay,  when  the  new  lists  were  made  out, 
the  names  of  Clintonians  were  omitted.2  It  is  probable  that 
Jay  was  deceived  into  signing  these  commissions,  and  that  the 
first  intimation  he  received  of  their  prescriptive  character  was 
from  the  denunciations  of  the  opposition  press. 

In  1800  the  New  York  Republicans  elected  a  council  of  which 
De  Witt  Clinton  was  a  member.  The  council  promptly  claimed 
for  its  members  a  nominating  power  concurrent  with  that  of  the 
governor,  to  whom  it  denied  even  a  veto.  This  interpretation 
the  Federalists  had  successfully  maintained  against  Clinton  in 
1794;  and,  as  has  been  mentioned,  it  seems  to  have  been 
what  was  intended  when  the  constitution  was  framed.  Jay, 
however,  rejected  it ; 3  hence  during  the  last  part  of  his  term  the 
appointing  power  was  dead-locked,  and  the  curious  spectacle 

1  Hammond,  Political  Parties  in  New  York,  i.  30.    Lamb,  collector  of  New  York, 
seems  to  have  been  the  only  important  exception,  and  he  was  not  personally  un- 
friendly to  Hamilton.      Leake,  Lamb,  321  ;    Hammond,  Political  Parties  in  New 
York,  i.  107;   Lodge,  Hamilton,  82. 

2  Hammond,  Political  Parties  in  New  York,  i.  95,  119,  127,  notes,  580  ;   Poore, 
Charters  and  Constitutions,  ii.  1337.     See,  however,  New  York  Evening  Post,  January 
14,  25,  1802. 

8  Hammond,  Political  Parties  in  New  York,  i.  8i;  Jay  to  New  York  legislature, 
February  26,  1801;  Jay,  Correspondence  and  Public  Papers,  iv.  289. 


go  GENESIS  OF  THE  SPOILS  SYSTEM. 

was  presented  of  a  Republican  council  maintaining  the  correct- 
ness of  a  Federalist  precedent,  while  a  Federalist  governor,  sup- 
ported by  the  advice  of  Clinton,  the  Republican  ex-governor, 
denounced  it  as  unconstitutional.  A  constitutional  convention 
called  to  pass  upon  the  question  in  1801  decided  in  favor  of  the 
council.  From  this  time  until  1821  the  history  of  the  patronage 
in  New  York  coincides  with  that  of  the  council  of  appointment.1 
The  establishment  of  the  supremacy  of  the  council  greatly 
facilitated  the  growth  of  the  spoils  system.  In  1801  George 
Clinton  was  again  elected  governor ;  but  he  was  then  old,  and 
his  nephew,  De  Witt  Clinton,  controlled  the  council  and  the 
appointments.  He  followed  quite  exactly  the  tactics  of  Jeffer- 
son, reinstating  with  a  great  flourish  of  trumpets  the  few  who 
had  been  removed  during  Jay's  term,  and  with  this  start  carry- 
ing out  a  genuine  proscription,  so  severe  that  his  uncle  refused, 
in  some  instances,  to  sign  the  minutes  of  the  council.  According 
to  the  Evening  Post,  it  was  still  felt  necessary  to  justify  removals 
by  traducing  the  character  of  those  removed  ;  but  this  sense  of 
shame  soon  disappeared,  and  all  parties  acted  openly  on  the 
belief  that  they  were  held  together  by  the  cohesive  power  of 
public  office,  and  that  to  the  victors  belonged  the  spoils.2 
('The  spoils  system  was  particularly  dangerous  in  New  York, 
because  of  the  enormous  extent  of  the  patronage.  The  council 
of  appointment,  according  to  a  report  presented  in  the  constitu- 
tional convention  of  1821,  filled  directly  8287  military  and  6663 
civil  offices,  and  compensation  was  relatively  high.  It  ap- 
pointed nearly  all  the  state  officers,  all  mayors,  and  some  minor 
city  officers,  militia  officers,  and  justices  of  the  peace^  The 
potentialities  of  this  mass  of  patronage  are  illustrated  ^>y  the 
machine  created  by  Judge  Spencer,  one  of  the  chief  political 

1  New  York  Council  of  Appointment,  Military  Minutes,  i.  555-563  ;  Hammond, 
Political  Parties  in  New  York,  i.  155,  168. 

2  Columbian  Centinel,  August  19,  1801;  New   York  Evening  Post,  February  23, 
1801,  January  14,  February  19,  1802;   New  York  Council  of  Appointment,  Military 
Minutes,  i.  562.     Hammond,  Political  Parties  in  New  York,  i.  134,  178,  227,  234, 
236,  238,  315-327,  330,  442,  460,  469.     See  also  the  lives  of  the  New  York  leaders, 
as  Burr,  Van  Buren,  Tompkins,  De  Witt  Clinton,  etc.,  passim. 

8  Hammond,  Political  Parties  in  New  York,  ii.  65.  Niles  says  that  there  were 
709  civil  offices  in  New  York  City.  Niles' s  Register,  xxi.  128;  New  York  Evening 
Post,  January  26,  1802. 


SPOILS  SYSTEM  IN  NEW  YORK.  91 

figures  of  the  time.  Apart  from  his  abilities,  which  were  very 
good,  he  owed  his  influence  to  his  manipulation  of  the  appoint- 
ments of  justices  of  the  peace.  In  his  circuits  he  would  make 
friends  of  prominent  local  politicians,  who  would  recommend  to 
him  persons  to  be  appointed  justices  of  the  peace.  He  would 
obtain  the  desired  commissions  at  Albany,  and  this  would  aid 
his  friends  in  securing  an  election  to  the  legislature.  Once 
there,  they  would  vote  for  a  council  of  appointment  which  would 
listen  to  the  suggestions  of  Judge  Spencer.1 

The  danger  to  the  political  morality  of  the  state  was  keenly 
appreciated,  and  was  one  of  the  chief  causes  for  summoning 
the  convention  of  1821.  In  the  new  constitution  then  framed 
the  council  of  appointment  was  abolished,  and  the  appointing 
power  was  given  to  the  governor  by  and  with  the  advice  and 
consent  of  the  Senate.  Only  28  military  and  325  civil  ap- 
pointments, however,  were  left  to  be  thus  disposed  of ;  for  the 
vast  rhajority  of  the  minor  offices,  as  those  of  justice  of  the 
peace  and  the  militia  offices,  were  to  be  filled  by  direct  popular 
election.  The  spoils  system,  however,  was  too  firmly  established 
to  yield  to  these  measures.  Indeed,  the  power  of  the  governor 
was  more  increased  by  the  abolition  of  the  council  of  appoint- 
ment than  it  was  lessened  by  the  withdrawal  of  the  minor  offices ; 
and  his  power  over  the  patronage  that  remained  was  still  further 
extended  by  the  fact  that  the  convention  fixed  a  definite  term 
for  many  of  the  offices  which  had  previously  been  held  "at 
pleasure."  The  making  of  the  minor  offices  elective,  more- 
over, did  not  remove  them  from  the  realm  of  politics  ;  it  merely 
necessitated  a  new  method  of  management.  Manipulation  of 
the  legislature  ceased  to  be  sufficient ;  small  elective  and  petty 
nominating  bodies  had  to  be  controlled.  The  want  was  soon 
supplied ;  and  the  Albany  Regency,  whose  members  first  per- 
fected a  caucus  system,  and  acquired  the  art  of  managing  directly 
the  small  subdivisions  of  the  electorate,  obtained  as  its  reward  a 
firm  and  lasting  hold  on  New  York  politics.2 

1  Hammond,  Political  Parties  in  New  York,  i.  420. 

2  Poore,  Charters  and  Constitutions,  ii.  1336,1345.     Hammond,  Political  Parties 
in  New  York,  ii.  66,  72,  429;  Mackenzie,  Van  Bur  en,  112,207,  VR&  passim;  Weed, 
Autobiography,  108. 


92  GENESIS  OF  THE  SPOILS  SYSTEM. 

Almost  contemporaneous  with  the  establishment  of  the  spoils 
system  in  New  York  was  its  triumph  in  Pennsylvania,  but  the 
conditions  of  its  rise  were  very  different.  The  revolution  of 
1776  in  the  latter  state  was  preceded  by  a  long  and  bitter  tri- 
angular contest  between  the  Quakers,  the  proprietary  party,  and 
certain  democratic  elements.  The  last  named  won,  and  in  their 
hour  of  triumph,  organized  by  George  Bryan  and  advised  by 
Benjamin  Franklin,  they  framed  what  was  probably  the  most 
democratic  constitution  the  country  has  ever  known.  With  a 
legislature  of  but  one  house  and  a  multiple  executive,  it  afforded 
none  of  those  checks  and  balances  that  were  considered  essen- 
tial by  most  statesmen  of  the  period.  From  the  first,  therefore, 
the  more  conservative  elements  of  the  population,  under  the 
name  of  Republicans,  fought  for  a  revision.  This  struggle, 
which  continued  until  the  adoption,  in  1790,  of  a  constitution 
which  provided  for  a  stronger  executive,  served  to  divide  the 
state  into  two  distinct  parties  and  to  prevent  the  development 
of  such  factions  as  were  found  in  New  York ;  it  accounts  largely 
for  the  early  development  of  party  organization  and  nominating 
conventions,  and,  through  these,  of  the  spoils  system.1 

Under  the  first  constitution  most  appointments  in  Pennsyl- 
vania were  controlled  by  the  legislature,  either  alone  or  in  con- 
junction with  the  president  of  the  commonwealth  who  also  was 
practically  elected  by  it.  Though  no  instances  of  removal  have 
been  found,  complaint  was  made  that  offices  were  used  to  win 
adherents,  and  it  is  mentioned  as  remarkable  that  Rittenhouse 
should  have  held  his  office  of  treasurer  for  thirteen  successive 
years,  under  legislatures  now  of  one  party,  now  of  the  other. 
In  1783  the  Council  of  Censors  called  the  attention  of  the  leg- 
islature to  the  low  standard  of  the  holders  of  public  offices.2 
MifHin,  the  first  governor  under  the  new  constitution,  began  his 
term  by  refusing  to  reappoint  certain  officers  who  had  served 
under  the  old.  Although  elected  as  a  Constitutionalist,  that  is, 

1  Lincoln,    The  Revolutionary  Movement  in   Pennsylvania,  286,  and   passim ; 
Christopher  Marshall,  Diary,  68  ;   Graydon,  Memoirs,  288,  332,  342. 

2  Lincoln,  The  Revolutionary  Movement  in  Pennsylvania,  280 ;   Poore,  Charters 
and  Constitutions,  ii.  1540-1548 ;  Graydon,  Memoirs,  332 ;  Barton,  Rittenhouse,  339 ; 
Sharpless,  Two  Centuries  of  Pennsylvania  History,  21 1. 


SPOILS  SYSTEM  IN  PENNSYLVANIA.  93 

as  of  the  more  democratic  party,  he  soon  turned  Federalist, 
and  apparently  confined  his  appointments  to  members  of  that 
party.1 

Such  was  the  situation  that  Thomas  McKean  found  when,  in 
1 799,  he  was  elected  governor,  first  of  the  fin  de  sttcle  Repub- 
lican victors.  He  accused  of  combination  against  him  the 
"  officers  and  expectants  of  office  under  the  President  of  the 
United  States,  not  only  in  Pennsylvania,  but  in  neighboring 
states,"  and  he  wrote  to  John  Dickinson,  "  I  have  been  obliged 
(though  no  Hercules)  to  cleanse  the  Augean  stable."  To  Jef- 
ferson, in  July,  i So i,  he  outlined  his  theory  of  the  civil  service. 
"  It  appears,"  he  said,  "  that  the  anti- Republicans,  even  those  in 
office,  are  as  hostile  as  ever,  though  not  so  insolent.  To  over- 
come them  they  must  be  shaven,  for  in  their  offices  (like  Sam- 
son's hair-locks)  their  great  strength  lieth ;  their  disposition  for 
mischief  may  remain,  but  their  power  of  doing  it  will  be  gone. 
It  is  out  of  the  common  order  of  nature,  to  prefer  enemies  to 
friends;  the  despisers  of  the  people  should  not  be  their  rulers." 
The  whole  tone  of  this  letter  indicates  that  already  in  Pennsyl- 
vania the  civil  offices  were  considered  as  ammunition  for  politi- 
cal warfare,  —  a  fact  which  Jefferson  must  have  seen  clearly  when 
he  wrote  to  McKean,  "  Some  states  require  a  different  regimen 
from  others."2 

It  is  impossible  to  say  exactly  how  far  McKean  carried  out 
the  policy  he  sketched.  The  Eagle  reported  that,  of  twenty- 
one  particular  appointments,  seven  were  reappointments,  one  a 
promotion,  and  thirteen  were  new.  Probably  most  of  the  latter 
were  occasioned  by  removals.  The  proscription  did  not  stop 
with  the  limits  of  the  governor's  authority,  for  the  mayor  of 
Philadelphia  is  said  to  have  swept  all  Federalists  from  office  in 
that  city.  In  making  appointments,  McKean  seems  to  have 
consulted  his  own  pleasure;  he  is  said  to  have  been  guilty 
of  nepotism  and  favoritism,  and  his  conduct  received  much 

1  Charles   Biddle,  Autobiography,  243,  245  ;    Hildreth,    United  States,  v.  361  ; 
Buchanan,  McKean,  98 ;    Philadelphia   Gazette   and   Universal  Daily  Advertiser, 
January  13,  1800;   New  York  Evening  Post,  February  12,  1802. 

2  Pittsburg  Gazette,  December  7,  1799;  Armor,  Lives  of  the  Governors  of  Penn- 
sylvania, 302.     Jefferson,  Writings  (Ford  ed.),  viii.  78. 


94  GENESIS  OF  THE  SPOILS  SYSTEM. 

unfavorable  criticism.1  When,  in  1805,  the  Duane  branch  of 
the  party  broke  with  him,  and  he  was  reflected  a  second  time 
by  a  combination  of  the  Quids  and  Federalists,  he  removed 
from  office  men  whom  he  had  himself  appointed.  It  is 
unnecessary  to  follow  the  successive  party  changes;  the  only 
point  of  interest  is  that  henceforth  the  spoils  system  was 
accepted  in  Pennsylvania.  Here,  as  in  New  York  in  1821, 
the  politicians  took  advantage  of  the  democratical  slogan  of 
"  rotation  in  office  "  to  effect  a  limitation  of  tenure,  and  thus  to 
make  more  easy  the  path  of  the  spoilsman.2 

The  results  of  the  spoils  system  in  New  York  and  Pennsyl- 
vania seem  to  have  been  as  different  as  were  the  circumstances 
of  its  growth.  The  average  standard  of  men  called  into  the 
New  York  state  service  was  certainly  higher.  Nearly  always 
some  men  of  eminent  ability  were  to  be  found  in  the  civil  list. 
This  was  partly  due  to  the  system  of  family  cliques  which  made 
politics  fashionable,  and  also  partly  to  the  fact  that  at  first  the 
confusion  of  factions,  and  later  the  even  balance  of  parties, 
always  afforded  an  opportunity  for  talent.  Many  other  causes 
might,  of  course,  be  enumerated.  Besides  this  difference  there 
seems  to  have  been  more  actual  corruption  in  Pennsylvania  than 
in  the  neighboring  state,  if  we  except  New  York  City.  Cases 
of  actual  sale  of  office  are  reported.  Niles  gives  an  instance 
in  which  a  note  was  actually  sued  out,  the  drawer  of  which  had 
promised  to  pay  the  holder  a  certain  sum  if  he  were  appointed 
to  a  post  which  the  latter  was  about  to  resign,3  the  consideration 

1  Pennsylvania  Eagle,  January  25, 1800 ;  Lancaster  Journal,  December  29,  1801 ; 
Armor,  Lives  of  the  Governors  of  Pennsylvania,  302  ;  Brown,  The  Forum,  i.  343- 
347;  Claypoole's  American  Daily  Advertiser,  May  I,  1800;  Buchanan,  McKean,  90, 
92,  97,  98  ;  Philadelphia  Gazette  and  Universal  Daily  Advertiser,  January  13,  1800  ; 
Gallatin  to  Jefferson,  September  12,  1801,  Gallatin,  Writings,  i.  48;  Pennsylvania 
Magazine,  xvii.  474. 

2  Niles's  Register,  xvi.  157;   xxxiii.  332-337;   xxxvi.  67,  164.    The  Connecticut 
Courant,  January  27,  1801,  contains  an  interesting  letter  of  Samuel  Bryan,  register- 
general,  to  a  member  of  the  legislature,  accusing  it  of  yielding  to  the  "  malignant 
rage  of  Party  Spirit,"  and  also  records  the  proposal  of  the  House  to  have  him  arrested 
for  slander  in  consequence.     The  zeal  for  office  is  illustrated  by  the  fact  that  there 
were   thirty  candidates  for  the   clerkship  of  the  legislature.    Lancaster  Journal, 
December  17,  iSoi  ;   Poore,  Charters  and  Constitutions,  ii.  1345;   Laws  of  Penn- 
sylvania (edition  of  1834),  162,  184  (edition  of  1837),  143,  628,  898. 

8  Niles1  s  Register,  xvi.  107,  160;  xvii.  157,  428. 


RESULTS  OF  THE  SPOILS  SYSTEM.  95 

presumably  being  the  influence  of  the  old  occupant  with  the  gov- 
ernor. Naturally  the  offices  of  the  national  government  local 
to  these  states  did  not  escape  the  contagion.  The  charges 
of  Governor  McKean  and  Governor  Clinton,  and  the  case  of 
Dr,  Leib,  have  been  mentioned;1  and  it  is  to  be  presumed 
that  New  York  and  Pennsylvania  appointments  caused  presi- 
dents before  Jackson's  day  to  pass  sleepless  nights. 

While  these  two  states  are  most  noted  and  most  notable  for 
the  abuse  of  the  patronage  during  this  period,  they  did  not  stand 
alone.  In  many  localities  where  there  was  no  complaint  of  pro- 
scription, the  immunity  was  due  to  the  long  and  continued  domi- 
nation of  one  party ;  the  same  process  was  going  on,  but  took 
the  form  of  the  silent  exclusion  of  one  party  from  power.  In 
New  Hampshire  there  was  nothing  like  a  spoils  system ;  but  in 
1 80 1  it  was  stated  that  all  the  vacancies  would  be  filled  with 
Federalists,  and  again  in  1815,  when  the  governor  and  council 
belonged  to  different  parties,  the  appointments  were  in  deadlock.2 
Moreover,  the  Langdon  family  controlled  and  absorbed  all  the 
patronage  which  the  Republicans  could  command.3  Rhode 
Island  was  praised  as  the  land  of  "  steady  habits " ;  attention 
was  called  to  the  fact  that  one  treasurer  had  served  for  forty- 
five  years,  and  that  there  had  been  only  six  secretaries  in  colony 
and  state  during  one  hundred  and  twenty-seven  years.  Our 
wonder  somewhat  diminishes  when  we  find  that  the  total  annual 
state  expenditure  in  1828  was  only  $8010.75;*  anc*  tne  praise 
is  not  entirely  deserved,  for,  when  the  Rhode  Island  Tammany 
Society  succeeded  in  carrying  the  state  for  the  Republicans  in 
1810,  they  made  a  partial  sweep.  When  the  Federalists  came 
back  the  next  year  they  acted  magnanimously  in  leaving  some 
of  their  opponents  in  office,5  and  so  the  evil  was  stayed. 

Of  the  northern  states,  Massachusetts  was  perhaps  the  most 
exemplary  in  the  conduct  of  the  civil  service ;  yet  there,  as  in 
Rhode  Island,  an  element  existed  eager  for  the  spoils.  Under 

1  Niles 's  Register,  xvi.  107,  160,  xvii.  428 ;  Pittsburg  Gazette,  December  7,  1799. 

2  Columbian  Centinel,  June  13,  1801  ;  Niles's  Register,  viii.  352. 
8  Columbian  Centinel,  March  I,  1801. 

*  Niles' s  Register,  xvi.  239  ;  xxxi.  222  ;  xxxiv.  234. 

^Massachusetts  Spy,  etc.,  May  15,  1811;  Jernegan,  The  Tammany  Societies  of 
Rhode  Island,  22. 


96  GENESIS  OF  THE  SPOILS  SYSTEM. 

the  early  state  government  there  was  practically  no  complaint 
as  to  appointments  ;  but  when  the  Federalists  began  to  condemn 
Jefferson's  removals,  their  opponents  replied  by  accusing  them 
of  excluding  all  Republicans  from  office.  The  best  vindication 
of  their  administration  is  found  in  the  conduct  of  James  Sullivan, 
the  first  Republican  governor.  He  was  a  strong,  conscientious 
man,  and  refused  to  make  any  removals.  The  radicals  of  the 
party  under  the  lead  of  Levi  Lincoln  controlled  the  executive 
council  and  urged  proscription,  finally  putting  on  file  a  protest 
in  which  they  argued  that  to  make  no  removals  "  would  be 
arraigning  the  wisdom  and  justice  of  the  national  administration, 
a  censure  and  reproach  of  its  most  deliberate  acts."  Had  they 
been  able  to  add  that  the  conduct  of  the  Federalist  governors 
had  been  notoriously  unfair,  Sullivan  could  hardly  have  resisted. 
The  next  year  the  executive  council  was  composed  of  Federalists, 
who  worked  harmoniously  with  Sullivan  ;  and  when  the  suc- 
ceeding election  brought  in  once  more  a  Federalist  governor,  no 
removals  were  made.1 

In  1810  another  Republican,  Elb ridge  Gerry,  was  elected 
governor.  In  his  first  term  he  made  no  removals  and  reap- 
pointed  those  whose  commissions  expired,  although  he  doubtless 
found  the  great  majority  of  office-holders  Federalists.  His 
course  disappointed  his  followers ;  and  there  is  probably  some 
grain  of  truth  in  the  charge  of  his  enemies,  that  the  Republicans 
made  a  change  of  policy  a  condition  of  his  renomination,  — • 
that  is,  there  was  probably  some  understanding  as  to  what 
course  he  would  pursue.  After  his  reelection  the  Republican 
legislature  proceeded  to  make  the  path  toward  a  proscription  as 
smooth  as  possible.2  They  did  this  by  the  trick,  so  often  men- 
tioned, of  fixing  a^  definite  tenure  for  certain  offices,  thus  hiding 
the  increase  of  executive  patronage  under  the  guise  of  a  demo- 
cratic innovation.3  The  most  important  offices  to  which  this 

1  Lowell,  The  New-England  Patriot,  132;  Bradford,  Massachusetts,  iii.  95  ;  Massa- 
chusetts Spy,  February  12,  August  21,  1811. 

2  Austin,  Gerry,  ii.  322;  Massachusetts  Spy,  etc.,  August  7,  14,  21,  1811. 

3  Of  the  Massachusetts  laws  passed  in  June,  1811,  ch.  xxxiii.  provided  for  the 
reorganization  of  the  circuit  court  and  the  court  of  common  pleas  ;   ch.  xlix.  forbade 
county  treasurers  to  serve  more  than  five  years  continuously;  ch.  Ixxi.  gave  sheriffs  a 


SPOILS  SYSTEM  TRIED  IN  MASSACHUSETTS.  97 

limited  term  was  applied  were  those  of  the  county  sheriffs  and 
the  clerks  of  the  county  courts.  Still  further  to  smooth  the  path 
of  the  governor,  the  appointment  to  the  offices  last  mentioned 
was  transferred  from  the  court  itself  to  the  governor  and  coun- 
cil,1 and  it  was  of  course  arranged  that  the  commissions  should 
expire  during  the  term  for  which  Governor  Gerry  had  been 
elected. 

When  the  time  came  for  Gerry  to  declare  himself,  the  respect- 
able old  commonwealth  was  stirred  to  its  depths.  The  protests 
of  the  Federalists  were  long  and  caustic  and  edifying,  while  on 
the  Republican  side  a  stern  puritanic  note  was  raised  by  a  coun- 
try minister  who  preached  his  election  sermon  from  the  text, 
"  But  if  ye  will  not  drive  out  the  inhabitants  of  the  land  from  be- 
fore you,  then  it  shall  come  to  pass  that  those  that  ye  let  remain 
of  them  shall  be  pricks  in  your  eyes  and  thorns  in  your  sides,  and 
shall  vex  you  in  the  land  wherein  ye  dwell."2  Governor  Gerry 
fulfilled  the  wishes  of  his  party,3  and  was  bombarded  with  pro- 
tests from  the  public  in  general,4  and  from  dispossessed  office- 
holders. He  tried  to  explain  and  justify  his  conduct,  arguing 
that  the  reappointment  of  the  former  discredited  office-holders 
would  alarm  the  Republicans ;  that  Democratic  principles  de- 
manded that,  when  the  offices  fell  vacant,  equal  consideration 
should  be  shown  to  all  citizens,  no  preference  being  extended  to 
incumbents.5  His  extenuations  could  not,  however,  do  away 
with  the  appearance  of  sharp  practice.  It  must  have  been  hard 
for  the  most  discriminating  Federalist  to  believe  that  the  limita- 
tion of  terms  was  made  simply  to  hasten  the  triumph  of  pure 
democracy,  when  he  saw  that  about  forty  members  of  the  legis- 

term  of  five  years,  adding,  "The  Governor  shall  remove  from  office  all  Sheriffs  now 
in  commission,  who  shall  not  be  reappointed." 

1  Laws  of  1811,  ch.  viii.     This  law  was  repealed  in  1814  (see  laws  of  that  year, 
ch.  Ixxvii.). 

2  Massachusetts  Spy,  December  II,  1811. 

8  Austin  says  that  he  placed  one  Federalist  and  two  Democrats  in  every  circuit, 
and  retained  some  of  the  most  highly  paid  officials.  Austin,  Gerry,  ii.  343. 

*  Columbian  Centinel,  January  22,  27,  February  15,  19,  1812  ;  Massachusetts  Spy, 
October,  December,  1811,  passim  ;  February  12,  1812. 

6  Austin,  Gerry,  ii.  Appendix  B.     See  also  Massachusetts  Spy,  etc.,  December  II, 
1811  ;    Columbian  Centinel,  January  15,  1812. 
H 


98  GENESIS  OF  THE  SPOILS  SYSTEM. 

lature  received  offices  which  they  had  helped  to  make  vacant, 
not  to  mention  the  number  given  to  relatives  of  members.  As 
the  Massachusetts  Spy  expressed  it :  — 

"  'Tis  a  mighty  fine  thing,  Sir,  to  be  son-in-law 
To  a  very  magnificent  three-tailed  Bashaw." l 

The  Republican  administration  of  Massachusetts  was  thor- 
oughly discredited  by  this  affair  of  the  patronage  combined 
with  that  of  the  gerrymander,  and  it  seems  no  exaggeration, 
as  the  election  was  so  close,  to  attribute  to  these  scandals  the 
defeat  of  Gerry,  although  he  personally  erred  rather  in  weak- 
ness than  by  desire.2  Governor  Strong,  who  succeeded  him, 
had  his  conduct  marked  out  by  public  opinion.  By  one  order 
he  removed  all  the  Gerry  appointees  whose  predecessors  had 
been  removed,  and  reinstated  the  old  officers.3 

After  the  defeat  of  Gerry  no  more  is  heard  of  the  misuse  of  the 
patronage  in  Massachusetts  for  many  years.  The  Federalist 
party  gradually  disappeared,  but  its  exit  was  marked  by  no  great 
proscription.  The  soil  of  the  state  was  not  kind  to  the  spoils 
system,  a  majority  of  the  population  disapproved  of  it  and  did 
not  intend  to  allow  it.  We  note,  however,  that  a  minority 
were  ready  and  willing  to  introduce  the  practice,  and  were 
longing  after  the  plums  now  out  of  their  reach.  If  they  could 
not  command  the  state,  they  might,  by  allying  themselves  with 
a  national  party,  obtain  control  of  the  federal  patronage ;  and 
this  is  just  what  happened  when  Jackson  was  elected. 

In  the  old  South,  between  the  Potomac,  the  Alleghanies, 
and  the  ocean,  there  is  less  evidence  of  discontent  and  new 
methods.  Of  South  Carolina,  Calhoun  said  in  1849,  "Party 
organization,  party  discipline,  party  proscription,  —  and  their 
offspring,  the  spoils  principle,  have  been  unknown";4  and  this 
seems  to  have  been  generally  true,  although  Grayson  says  that 
during  the  nullification  contest  men  were  bribed  "  with  money, 
with  promises  of  office."6  In  Georgia  there  is  a  faint  evidence 

1  Massachusetts  Spy,  etc.,  July  26,  October  23,  1811. 

2  Barry,  Massachusetts,  iii.  346,  364-369  ;    Columbian  Centinel,  June  6,  1812. 
8  Columbian  Centinel,  June  24,  1812  ;   Bradford,  Massachusetts,  iii.  129. 

4  Calhoun,  Discourse  on  the  Constitution  and  Government  of  the  United  States  in 
his  Works,  i.  405.  6  Grayson,/.  L.  Petigru,  129. 


A  FRONTIER  SPOILSMAN.  99 

of  a  desire  for  the  spoils  system  in  1829,  when  George  R. 
Gilmer,  a  representative  of  the  Troup  faction,  was  elected  gov- 
ernor through  the  assistance  of  the  Clarke  faction ;  and  the 
Clarke  leaders  wished  him  to  divide  the  patronage  between  the 
two  bodies  of  his  supporters.1  He  refused,  and  for  a  long 
time  there  is  no  mention  of  the  spoils. 

The  frontier  democracy  of  the  West  shared  the  character- 
istics of  both  North  and  South.  During  this  period  the  people 
were  divided  according  to  personal  sympathy  and  special  issues, 
and  consequently  party  lines  were  fluctuating.  Hence  there 
was  no  persistent  and  studied  use  of  patronage  to  maintain 
party  organization ;  but  offices  were  none  the  less  used  by  the 
leaders  to  promote  the  ends  of  the  moment,  while  the  people 
demanded  that  all  public  servants,  appointive  as  well  as  elec- 
tive, should  be  in  sympathy  with  the  majority.  The  conditions 
of  this  section  are  best  illustrated  by  a  study  of  Illinois,2  for 
which  the  career  of  Ninian  Edwards  serves  as  a  convenient 
nucleus,  if  for  no  other  reason  than  because  the  Chicago  His- 
torical Society  has  preserved  and  published  his  wide  and  can- 
did correspondence.  It  will,  moreover,  be  profitable  to  discuss 
the  national  civil  service  in  Illinois  rather  than  the  trifling  and 
disorganized  service  of  the  state  itself. 

Ninian  Edwards  was  a  Kentuckian  of  wealth  and  ability, 
belonging  to  the  class  of  Western  politicians  who  relied  more 
on  the  impression  caused  by  gentlemanly  bearing  and  elo- 
quence than  on  a  democratic  aping  of  the  manners  of  their 
constituents.  While  he  made  no  pretence  of  being  one  of 
the  people,  he  was  a  close  and  successful  student  of  their 
desires.  When  he  went  to  Washington  in  1818  as  senator, 
he  was  thrown  into  close  contact  with  William  Wirt,  a  friend 
of  his  boyhood,  representative  of  the  best  traditions  of  Re- 
publican purity.  One  could  not  be  long  in  Washington  at 
that  time  without  being  drawn  into  the  presidential  campaign, 

1  Gilmer,   The  Georgians,  316  ;    Phillips,  Georgia  and  State  Rights  (American 
Historical  Association,  Reports,  1901,  ii.),  no-iii. 

2  The  struggle  in  Kentucky  over  the  reorganization  of  the  supreme  court  brought 
about  by  the  bank  issue  is  also  a  good   illustration.     See  Shaler,  Kentucky,  180- 
185  ;    Little,   Hardin,    155  ;    National  Republican   and  Ohio   Political  Register, 
December  30,  1825  ;  Jackson  Gazette,  February  7,  1829. 


100  GENESIS  OF  THE  SPOILS  SYSTEM. 

and  Edwards  soon  became  an  ardent  supporter  and  close  friend 
of  Calhoun.1  In  1823  he  had  the  pleasure  of  introducing  to 
his  leader  his  brother-in-law,  General  Duff  Green,  a  Western 
editor,  who  afterwards  became  connected  with  Calhoun  by  the 
marriage  of  their  children.2  These  bonds  of  friendship  and 
marriage  formed  the  basis  of  Edwards's  political  affiliations. 

In  1820  Edwards  became  interested  in  the  appointments  to 
land  offices  in  Illinois.  The  other  senator  from  the  state  was 
Thomas,  a  political  rival,  and  a  supporter  of  Crawford's  can- 
didacy for  the  presidency.  Edwards  did  not  hope  to  secure 
all  the  new  positions  for  his  supporters  or  friends,  but  he  made 
a  vigorous  effort  to  obtain  an  equal  share  of  the  patronage. 
December  22,  1820,  he  wrote  to  President  Monroe  advising 
that  at  least  one  appointment  be  made  from  eastern  Illinois, 
recommending  several  available  candidates,  and  condemning 
one  of  the  men  who  had  been  already  nominated,  but  whose 
nomination  had  not  yet  been  acted  on.  In  conversation  with 
Crawford,  the  secretary  of  the  treasury,  he  was  more  explicit, 
suggesting  that  all  the  nominations  be  left  to  the  senators 
to  divide  equally  between  their  respective  parties.  This 
proposition  was  considered  as  an  attack  on  the  prerogatives 
of  the  president,  and  was  vigorously  condemned  by  William 
Wirt  in  a  long  though  friendly  letter.  Wirt  said  the  president 
thought  it  wrong  that  a  president  of  the  United  States  "  should 
permit  himself  to  be  influenced  by  considerations  of  local  par- 
ties in  a  state,  and  that  he  should  nominate  with  reference  to 
the  local  effect  on  the  respective  senators  in  their  states.  For 
my  own  part,"  he  adds,  "  I  should  consider  it  a  species  of 
bribery."  Wirt  in  another  letter  made  perhaps  the  first  sug- 
gestion of  "  senatorial  courtesy."  "  There  is,  indeed,  another 
course  which  he  may  take  and  I  think  he  ought  to  take ;  w'hich 
is,  to  nominate  no  person  whom  either  senator  declares  un- 
worthy of  an  office,  if  he  can  find  a  deserving  man  in  the  state 

1  Calhoun  thinks  that  Edwards  should  be  one  of  the  ministers  to  our  "  southern 
neighbors"  (Calhoun  to  Edwards,  June  12,  1822,  Edwards,  Illinois,  489-491). 

2  Calhoun  to  Edwards,  September  23,  1823:  "I  have  been  much  pleased  with 
Gen'l  Green.     He  is  intelligent  and  decisive  ;  and  must  in  time  become  important 
in  the  West"  (Edwards  Papers,  210). 


SENATORIAL   COURTESY.  IOI 

free  from  such  objection,  —  unless,  indeed,  the  objection  itself 
is  destroyed  by  being  discovered  to  proceed  from  a  personal 
feeling,  or  weakened  by  flowing  from  the  animosity  of  local 
faction."  l 

Edwards  disclaimed  all  intention  of  weakening  the  executive 
power,2  but  continued  to  urge  that  appointments  be  made  on 
a  political  basis.  He  was  supported  in  this  last  position  by  his 
other  friend,  Calhoun,  who  wrote  to  him  August  20,  1822: 
"  Since  the  return  of  the  President  to  the  city,  I  ;ha#fj  ^rged  ojn 
his  attention  the  subject  of  making  appointments  to  the  office* 
to  which  you  referred,  and  brought  before  .-him  &eVr/,ari}ejs 
which  you  mentioned.  ...  I  do  trust  that  he  begins  to  feel 
the  necessity  of  taking  a  decided  stand.  I  agree  with  you  that 
it  is  much  easier  to  put  down  the  opposition,  where  its  existence 
is  once  acknowledged,  than  to  prove,  to  the  satisfaction  of  the 
people,  its  existence.  Until  the  President  shall  uniformly 
make  the  distinction  between  friends  and  foes,  in  his  ap- 
pointments, this  cannot  be  done.  If  he  will  not  see  the 
opposition  .  .  .  the  country  will  be  incredulous  as  to  its 
existence."3 

This  episode  either  caused  or  intensified  that  enmity  to 
Crawford  which  blighted  Edwards's  future  career.  In  1823  he 
published  in  the  Republican^  the  Calhoun  organ  at  Washington, 
over  the  signature  "A.  B.,"  a  series  of  attacks  on  Crawford's 
management  of  the  treasury  department.  Then  he  gave  weight 
to  these  letters  by  acknowledging  the  authorship,  but  too  late, 
as  it  seemed,  for  the  charges  to  be  investigated  before  the 
presidential  election  of  1824,  or  till  after  he  himself  had  left 
Washington  on  a  foreign  mission.  Crawford's  friends  acted 
with  promptness,  recalled  Edwards  to  give  testimony,  and 
secured  a  report  which  found  the  charges  unsubstantiated.  Ed- 
wards felt  compelled  to  resign  his  appointment  as  minister  to 
Mexico,  and  was  visited  with  a  general  popular  condemnation, 
which  most  historians  have  considered  just.  He  did  not,  how- 
ever, lose  the  friendship  of  Calhoun,  received  a  mild  support 

1  Edwards  Papers,  168,  176,  181-185. 

2  Edwards  to  Crawford,  January  II,  1821  ;  Ibid.  183-185. 

8  Edwards,  Illinois^  491-492.  *  Benton,  Thirty  Years'  View,  i.  ch.  xiv. 


102  GENESIS  OF  THE  SPOILS  SYSTEM. 

from  John  Quincy  Adams,  and  was  elected  governor  of  Illinois 
in  I826.1 

As  governor  of  Illinois,  with  intimate  friends  at  Washington, 
he  continued  his  attempt  to  influence  the  distribution  of  the 
national  patronage  within  the  state.  September  21,  1826,  he 
wrote  to  Clay,  now  secretary  of  state,  that  his  election  as 
governor  had  been  opposed  by  the  Jackson  men,  that  his 
success  had  given  him  full  control  of  the  situation,  and  that  he 
Could  dictate  ther  political  allegiance  of  Illinois.  "  In  regard  to 
tfte  Presideritral  election,"  he  adds,  "  I  am  entirely  uncommitted, 
and  tit  is"  My  eawdid /opinion  that  I  shall  remain  so.  So  long  as 
^bme'dlf  the"  Jackson  papers  continue  to  assail  me,  as  they  have 
done,  and  are  now  doing,  my  pride  would  never  suffer  me  to  be 
led  into  any  kind  of  cooperation  with  them.  And  so  long  as 
Mr.  Adams'  officers  are  permitted  imprudently  to  use  his  own 
declarations,  and  conduct  to  my  disadvantage  in  my  own  State, 
as  is  done  in  the  accompanying  handbill,  though  it  may  not 
drive  me  from  neutrality,  I  never  will  enlist  under  his  banners. 
Some  of  his  warmest  friends  however  have  more  cause  of 
complaint  against  the  author  of  this  handbill.  And  I'  am 
persuaded  that  the  time  is  at  hand,  when  the  wis'dom  of 
Mr.  Jefferson's  course  in  regard  to  the  patronage  of  the 
administration  must  become  too  obvious  to  be  any  longer 
neglected."  2 

Governor  Edwards  must  have  felt  that  he  had  indeed  cor- 
rectly gauged  popular  sentiment  when  but  a  few  days  after 
writing  this  letter  he  received  one  in  exactly  the  same  tone 
from  a  friend  in  Philadelphia  :  "  Mr.  Adams's  magnanimity  and 
forbearance,  in  regard  to  non-removals  from  office,  excites  my 
astonishment.  ...  I  marvel  that  Mr.  Clay  is  not  more  on  the 
qui  vive,  in  this  respect.  .  .  .  This  policy  not  only  places 
weapons  in  the  hands  of  Mr.  Adams's  foes,  but  it  takes 

1  D.  P.  Cook  to  Edwards,  April  17,  1824:  "I  shall  give  the  papers  to  Mr.  Clay 
to-morrow.     I  want  first  to  show  them  to  some  of  my  friends,  who  will  aid  me.     Mr. 
Calhoun,  and  so  do  I,  think  it  will  he  best  not  to  publish  them  in  the  Republican 
until  after  they  are  printed  by  the  House.  .  .  .     Mr.  Adams'  friends  will  aid,  and 
stand  by  you.    If  Clay  acts  fairly,  I  think  there  will  be  no  danger  "  {Edwards  Papers, 
223-224).     J.  Q.  Adams,  Memoirs,  vi.  387,  389. 

2  Edwards  Papers,  259-263. 


STATE  AND  NATIONAL  POLITICS.  103 

weapons  out  of  the  hands  of  his  friends."  l  The  administration 
was  obdurate,  though  courteous.  The  president  wrote  to 
Edwards,  August  22,  1827:  "Your  recommendation  for  the 
appointment  of  a  sub-agent  at  Peoria  will,  in  the  event  of  a 
vacancy  in  that  office,  receive  the  deliberate  consideration  to 
which  it  is  entitled,  and  a  disposition  altogether  friendly  to  him 
as  recommended  by  you.  And  your  opinion  in  regard  to  any 
appointment  of  the  General  Government,  in  the  state  of  Illinois, 
will  be  always  acceptable  to  me."  2 

The  desire  of  the  Jackson  men  in  Washington  to  favor  this 
political  trickster  was  not  restrained  by  the  cool  temperament 
and  old-fashioned  political  ideas  of  John  Quincy  Adams.  John 
McLean,  the  postmaster-general,  but  a  supporter  of  Jackson, 
wrote  to  Edwards,  November  i,  1826,  "Had  your  letter  been 

received  before  I  re-appointed ,  I  should,  as  I  have  always 

done,  have  appointed  the  person  you  named."3  September  i, 
1826,  Duff  Green,  who  was  now  established  in  Washington, 
wrote  :  "  I  hear  that  Anderson  is  dead.  Let  Cook  [Edwards's 
most  important  political  friend  in  Illinois]  write  immediately  to 
Mr.  Adams  and  demand  as  matter  of  right  that  he  be  appointed 
his  successor.  Mr.  Adams  will  scarce  deny  him  and  if  nomi- 
nated I  will  rely  upon  Calhoun  and  my  friends  in  the  Senate 
to  get  him  through  without  opposition."  Consequently,  when 
Governor  Edwards,  after  a  long  hesitation,4  was  forced  at 
length  to  abandon  his  neutral  position,  the  policy  of  the  two 
parties  with  regard  to  the  patronage  was  one  of  the  reasons 
which  caused  him  to  take  his  followers  to  the  Jackson  camp. 

By  the  year  1828,  then,  in  every  state  throughout  the  North 
and  West  the  spoils  system  either  was  established  or  there 
existed  an  element  eager  to  introduce  it.  The  movement  was 
a  growing  one,  and  it  was  but  a  question  of  time  and  circum- 
stance when  the  custom  would  become  national.  The  leaders 
of  the  Albany  Regency,  confident  by  reason  of  their  success  at 
home,  looked  for  widespread  influence  through  the  control  of 

1  S.  Simpson  to  Edwards,  September  22,  1826  ;  Ibid.  263-264. 

2  Edwards,  Illinois,  147.  8  flid.  484. 

*  Edwards  Papers,  253-254.  Wirt,  writing  to  Edwards,  March  22, 1828,  still  hoped 
that  he  would  support  the  administration.  Edwards,  Illinois,  455. 


104  GENESIS  OF  THE  SPOILS  SYSTEM. 

the  national  patronage.  Less  powerful  state  leaders  hoped  to 
make  secure  their  local  position ;  while  petty  politicians  the 
country  over  longed  to  see  the  federal  offices  change  hands  as 
often  as  did  those  of  the  states  —  at  least  until  they  fell  into 
their  hands.  The  people  in  general,  as  was  pointed  out  in  the 
last  chapter,  disliked  the  life  tenure  and  the  aristocratic  man- 
ners of  the  officials  of  the  existing  regime;  those  who  enjoyed 
the  national  salaries  should,  they  thought,  be  of  the  people.  In 
the  frontier  states  particularly,  the  superb  self-confidence  born 
of  the  pioneer's  single-handed  victory  over  nature  balked  not  at 
the  full  measure  of  democracy,  but  boldly  asserted  that  all  men 
were  created  equally  able  to  fulfil  the  duties  of  government 
offices. 

It  was  an  age  of  lotteries,  and  the  prospect  of  a  com- 
plete change  in  the  administration  offered  to  all  prizes  mbre 
dazzling  than  had  ever  before  been  presented  to  the  public. 
The  positive,  virile  virtue  of  loyalty  to  one's  friends  ranked 
higher  in  the  moral  code  of  most  Americans  of  that  day  than 
the  more  complex  one  of  justice  to  one's  enemies.  To  reward 
his  friends  and  to  punish  his  enemies  was  the  proper  conduct 
of  a  victor.  The  Jackson  managers,  therefore,  were  wise  in  em- 
phasizing the  demand  for  a  reform  in  the  conduct  of  the  civil 
service.  They  proposed  to  forbid  the  appointment  of  congress- 
men to  office,  and  to  introduce  rotation  in  office ; l  but  the  first 
measure  of  reform,  and  for  many  the  culminating  one,  was  to 
be  the  turning  out,  as  one  New  Yorker  expressed  it,  of  the 
"  damned  rascals  "  who  supported  Adams,  and  the  substitution 
of  original  Jackson  men  in  their  places.  Thus  the  attack  on 
the  civil  service  appealed  alike  to  the  people  and  to  their  lead- 
ers, to  the  democracy  of  the  East  and  of  the  West.  It  was  a 
phase,  and  a  most  important  one,  of  the  great  revolution  which 
brought  Andrew  Jackson  into  the  presidency;  and  John  Quincy 
Adams's  attempt  to  preserve  the  ancient  decorum  of  office  but 
hastened  its  overthrow. 

1  Political  Mirror,  65. 


CHAPTER   V. 

THE  ESTABLISHMENT  OF  THE  SPOILS   SYSTEM. 
1829-1837. 

THE  election  of  Jackson  threw  both  his  friends  and  his  foes 
into  a  fever  of  expectancy.  There  was  enough  of  the  Delphic 
element  in  his  utterances  to  give  color  to  every  story  as  to  his 
intentions ;  and  rumor  followed  hot  upon  rumor  through  the 
streets  of  Washington,  out  into  the  country  presses,  and  back 
again  in  new  fantastic  guise.  The  office-holding  class  and  their 
friends  put  on  a  bold  face.  Webster  wrote  in  January,  1829, 
"  Great  efforts  are  making  to  put  him  up  to  a  general  sweep,  as 
to  all  offices ;  springing  from  great  doubt  whether  he  is  disposed 
to  go  it."  The  inaugural  did  not  cast  Webster  down ;  he  wrote 
of  it  March  4,  1829,  "What  it  says  about  reform  in  office  may 
be  either  a  prelude  to  a  general  change  in  office,  or  a  mere  sop 
to  soothe  the  hunger,  without  satisfying  it,  of  the  thousand 
expectants  for  office  who  throng  the  city,  and  clamor  all  over 
the  country.  I  expect  some  changes,  but  not  a  great  many  at 
present." l 

This  blindness  of  the  administrative  class,  whose  views  Web- 
ster voiced,  is  not  without  excuse.  Impregnated  with  tradition, 
they  felt  themselves  indispensable,  and  could  not  believe  that 
/the  new  president  would  attempt  to  run  the  government  without 
them  :  it  very  often  happens  that  a  revolution  surprises  no  one 
so  much  as  its  victims.  Their  sense  of  security  was  doubtless 
/  fostered  by  those  letters  of  Jackson  to  Monroe  which  have  been 
already  cited ; 2  though  if  they  could  have  interpreted  these  in 

1  Webster,  Private  Correspondence,  i.  467,  473. 

8  See  also  Jackson  to  Kremer,  May,  1824,  Political  Mirror*  68* 


106      THE  ESTABLISHMENT  OF  THE  SPOILS  SYSTEM. 

the  light  of  an  intimate  knowledge  of  Jackson's  character,  they 
would  have  realized  that  his  lenity  toward  Federalists  arose, 
not  from  a  disregard  of  party  lines,  but  from  a  conviction  that 
the  old  alignment  of  parties  should  be  replaced  by  a  new  one 
depending  on  personal  allegiance  to  himself ; 1  that  while  he 
^ould  not  proscribe  a  man  for  being  a  Federalist  or  a  Republi- 

/can,  he  would  do  so  for  a  failure  to  support  the  candidacy  of 
Andrew  Jackson.  While  this  air  of  confidence  was  sufficiently 
widespread  to  deceive  most  historians  who  have  treated  of  the 
period  into  a  belief  that  the  cataclysm  of  1829  was  wholly 
unexpected,2  assurance  was  not  universal  even  among  Jackson's 
opponents;  and  doubtless  many  hearts  beat  fearsomely  when, 
on  the  Sunday  before  inauguration,  Robert  Little  preached 
from  the  text,  "  When  Christ  drew  near  the  city  he  wept  over 
it."3 

\yThe  supporters  of  Jackson  were  boastfully  confident  that 
he  would  interpret  reform  as  they  desired.  The  Richmond 
Enquirer,  the  most  powerful  newspaper  of  the  South,  prophe- 
sied January  i,  1829,  "A  salutary  reform  will  be  attempted 
under  the  coming  Republican  administration  .  .  . ;  in  perfect- 
ing it  friends  will  be  preferred  to  opponents  —  cooperatives  to 
assailants."  On  the  same  day  it  said :  "  Some  have  been  pleased 
to  speak  of  reform  in  this  case  as  synonymous  with  proscription. 
This  is  a  designed  perversion  of  the  word.  The  National  Jour- 
nal is  loquacious  as  a  parrot  —  in  its  denunciations  of  the 
anticipated  'proscription.'  If  that  pensioned  press  can  torture 
a  salutary  change  in  the  administration  of  the  general  govern- 
ment, more  or  less  applicable  to  all  departments,  and  to  official 
agents  generally,  into  a  proscription  for  opinion's  sake,  its 
powers  are  considerably  greater  than  we  or  the  public  have 
hitherto  given  it  credit  for.  As  well  may  the  people  be  charged 
with  proscription  for  having  removed  an  unfaithful  executive 

^  and  elected  another.  They  began  the  work,  they  conferred  the 
power  to  effect  it."  The  official  organ  of  the  new  party  at 
Washington  was  the  Daily  Telegraph,  edited  by  General  Duff 

1  Nilefs  Register,  xl.  113  ;   Derby,  Political  Reminiscences,  65. 

2  See,  for  example,  Parton,  Jackson,  iii.  209  j  McMaster,  United  States,  v.  525. 
8  William  Winston  Beaton,  210. 


UNCERTAINTY.  IO? 

Green.1  Certainly  no  one  who  read  its  pages  could  plead  igno- 
rance as  to  the  intentions  of  the  Jackson  managers.  As  early 
as  November  2,  1828,  it  announced,  "We  know  not  what  line 
of  policy  General  Jackson  will  adopt ;  we  take  it  for  granted, 
however,  that  he  will  reward  his  friends  and  punish  his 
enemies." 

These  and  numerous  other  editorials  of  similar  import  ex- 
pressed not  only  a  popular  expectation,  but  also  a  popular 
demand.  The  editors  and  politicians  did  not  think  that  Jackson 
would  falter ;  but  if  he  should,  they  were  prepared  to  teach  him 
a  lesson.  The  proscription  was  delayed  at  first,  in  order  to 
avoid  friction  with  the  Senate.  This  check  caused  the  Tele- 
graph to  "  hint  it  for  the  benefit  of  those  of  our  party  who  are 
styled  leading  men,  that  every  attempt  to  sustain  in  office,  by 
their  influence,  those  who  should  be  removed,  whether  the  feel- 
ing proceed  from  -mistaken  sympathy  or  from  a  wish  to  propiti- 
ate, it  must  prove  alike  injudicious,  and  it  will  necessarily  have 
a  tendency  to  lessen  the  regard  of  the  Republican  party  of 
the  nation,  and  ultimately  overthrow  ties  which  bind  the  great 
majority  to  their  political  interest."2  The  Telegraph  was  right ; 
\the  politicians  demanded  the  spoils,  and  they  had  the  support 
of  the  people.  Jesse  Hoyt  wrote  to  Van  Buren  at  this  time, 
"  I  have  said  from  the  commencement  of  the  contest  that  I 
would  not  support  any  administration  who  would  support  men 
in  power  that  had  contributed  to  overthrow  the  democratic 
party  in  this  State.  I  have  preached  this  doctrine  too  long, 
and  it  has  taken  too  [blank]  a  footing  here,  to  be  easily  got  rid 
of.  This  is  not  only  the  doctrine  in  theory,  but  we  require  it 
to  be  reduced  to  practice."8  The  time  had  come  when  the 
spoils  system  was  to  be  made  national,  and  Jackson  must  assume 
\the  task  or  cease  to  be  the  leader  of  the  people. 

There  does  not  seem  to  be  room  for  doubt  that  the  president 
was  ready  to  gratify  the  wishes  of  his  supporters,  and  yet  con- 
siderable interest  attaches  to  the  steps  by  which  the  new  policy 
was  adopted.  Something  had  been  done  toward  committing 

1  Senate  Journal,  20  Cong.  2  sess.  133  ;   House  Journal,  20  Cong.  2  sess.  271. 

2  Daily  Telegraph,  March  23,  1829,  from  Madisonian,  March  28,  1841. 
8  March  21,  1829,  Mackenzie,  Van  Buren,  211. 


IOS      THE  ESTABLISHMENT  OF  THE  SPOILS  SYSTEM. 

the  president  even  before  his  arrival  at  Washington.  The  pro- 
scription was  by  some  dated  from  1827,*  when  the  printing  of 
the  Senate  was  taken  from  the  National  Intelligencer.  The 
majority  which  enabled  the  Jackson  managers  to  take  this  action 
also  allowed  them  to  postpone  the  confirmation  of  nominations 
sent  in  by  President  Adams  in  the  last  months  of  his  term,  and 
thus  to  prevent  a  recurrence  of  "  midnight  appointments."  The 
committee  to  which  certain  judicial  nominations  were  referred 
reported :  "  Because  there  are  several  propositions  for  a  change 
of  the  judicial  system  now  depending,  and  because  the  adminis- 
tration of  the  government  is  about  to  change  hands,  it  is  inexpedient 
to  advise  and  consent  to  the  nominations  now."2 

Those  politicians  therefore,  who  wished  the  administration  to 
"go  the  whole  hog,"  as  Webster  said,  had  certain  accomplished 
facts  to  which  they  could  point ;  but  they  had  also  strong  oppo- 
sition to  overcome.  Major  Lewis  warned  the  general  that  if  he 
adopted  the  principle  of  rotation  and  fully  carried  it  out,  the 
days  of  the  republic  would  be  numbered.3  The  foremost  advo- 
cate of  moderation,  however,  was  John  McLean,  the  postmas,- 
ter-general  under  Monroe  and  Adams.  He  fully  believed  in 
making  appointments  for  political  reasons,  and  apparently  was 
i  /not  vigorously  opposed  to  removals  in  general ;  but  he  was 
unwilling  personally  to  conduct  a  general  slaughter  of  the  post- 
masters, as  he  had  appointed  very  many  of  them  himself  and- 
was  very  popular  among  them.  This  situation  caused  much 
difficulty  to  the  cabinet-makers.  At  first  it  was  announced  that ' 
he  would  be  continued  in  his  old  position.  Later  an  exchange 
was  arranged  with  Major  Eaton,  who  had  been  selected  for  the 
war  department ;  but  this  proved  unsatisfactory ;  and  finally 
McLean  asked  for,  and  obtained,  the  nomination  for  associate 
justice  of  the  Supreme  Court;  Barry,  who  was  to  have  had  that 
position,  consenting  to  take  the  post-office.4 

1  Mrs.  Seaton  to  her  mother,  March  I,  1827,  William  Winston  Seaton. 

2  John  Chambers  to  Crittenden,  1829,  Coleman,  Crittenden,  79-80. 
8  Parton,  Jackson,  iii.  224. 

4  McLean's  selection  was  commented  on  favorably  by  men  of  all  parties :  Richmond 
Enquirer,  March  3,  10,  1829  ;  Daily  National  Journal,  March  7,  1829,  J.  Q.  Adams, 
Memoirs,  viii.  112.  J.  A.  Hamilton,  Reminiscences,  99-100.  On  the  formation  of 
the  cabinet,  see  also  Duff  Green's  letters  to  Edwards,  Edwards  Papers. 


THE  INAUGURATION.  109 

This  change  astonished  the  Senate,  and  was  at  once  per- 
ceived to  be  an  omen  of  evil.  The  opinion  got  abroad  that  the 
change  was  made  because  McLean,  though  willing  to  remove 
officers  for  officious  partisanship  in  the  last  election,  refused  to 
discriminate  in  so  doing  between  the  followers  of  Jackson  and 
those  of  Adams.1  The  National  Journal,  March  7,  1829,  said, 
r -'"The  President  is  to  lose  the  valuable  services  of  the  able  and 
independent  officer,  who,  in  the  discharge  of  his  important  duties, 
has  given  universal  satisfaction,  for  the  purpose  of  increasing 
the  power  and  patronage  of  the  President." 

If  Jackson  had  really  hesitated  as  to  the  advisability  of 
adopting  a  proscriptive  policy,  the  demonstration  at  Wash- 
ington on  the  occasion  of  his  inauguration  must  have  been  a 
convincing  argument  in  favor  of  it.  In  the  first  administrations 
the  personal  solicitation  of  office-seekers  was  discouraged.2 
When  Jefferson  took  his  seat,  the  newness  of  the  Capitol  and 
conditions  of  transportation  forbade  the  assembling  of  a  large 
crowd.  Of  the  second  Adams's  inauguration,  Mrs.  Seaton 
wrote,  "  The  city  is  thronged  with  strangers,  and  Yankees 
swarm  like  the  locusts  of  Egypt  in  our  houses,  our  beds,  and 
our  kneading-troughs."  3 

This  visitation,  however,  was  utterly  forgotten  in  the  horror 
and  vexation  with  which  old  residents  beheld  the  Jacksonian 
invasion,  the  first  appearance  of  a  species  of  four-year  locusts 
that  has  never  since  failed  to  devastate  our  capital  city.  The 
difference  was  not  in  numbers  of  candidates  alone,  though  that 
was  marked,  but  still  more  decidedly  in  character.  The  trimly 
dressed  gentlemen  of  the  old  regime,  with  their  high  stocks  and 
good  breeding,  were  jostled  by  hack  politicians  from  New  York 
and  country  editors  and  farmers  from  the  West)  "After  the 
ceremony  was  over,"  wrote  Story,  "  the  President  went  to  the 
palace  to  receive  company,  and  there  he  was  visited  by  immense 
crowds  of  all  sorts  of  people,  from  the  highest  and  most  pol- 
ished down  to  the  most  vulgar  and  gross  in  the  nation.  I  never 
saw  such  a  mixture.  The  reign  of  King  Mob  seemed  trium- 

1  Sargent,  Public  Men  and  Events,  i.  116  ;  Poore,  Perlefs  Reminiscences,  i.  98. 

2  See  Washington,  Writings  (Sparks  ed.),  x.  6. 

8  February  24,  1825,  William  Winston  Seaton,  176. 


1 10     THE  ESTABLISHMENT  OF  THE  SPOILS  SYSTEM. 

phant."  What  happened  at  the  executive  mansion  was  so 
dramatic  that  it  has  been  described  at  length  by  all  the  writers 
on  the  period.  The  wild  stampede  to  the  White  House;  the 
crowding  round  and  crushing  of  the  president,  indicative  of  a 
new  familiarity  between  the  people  and  the  government,  to  the 
immediate  detriment  of  both ;  the  mad  scramble  for  the  good 
things,  —  the  cakes  and  ices  and  orange  punch  served  out  in 
lavish  style,  but  wasted  through  careless  distribution :  all  the^e 
scenes  are  not  picturesque  only,  but  are  also  emblematic.1 

Webster  wrote  to  his  sister  on  that  day :  "  A  monstrous 
crowd  of  people  is  in  the  city.  I  never  saw  any  thing  like  it 
before.  Persons  have  come  five  hundred  miles  to  see  General 
Jackson,  and  they  really  seem  to  think  that  the  country  is 
rescued  from  some  dreadful  danger."  2  It  was  evident,  however, 
that  they  did  not  come  solely  to  rejoice  in  this  salvation.  An 
office-seeking  friend  of  Amos  Kendall's  said,  "  I  am  ashamed 
of  myself,  for  I  feel  as  if  every  man  I  meet  knew  what  I  came 
for."  "  Don't  distress  yourself,"  replied  Kendall,  "  for  every 
man  you  meet  is  on  the  same  business."  Reports  were  rife 
that  the  office-hunters  pressed  their  claims  in  a  manner  which 
was  "the  reverse  of  courteous,"  that  they  intruded  upon  the  * 
president's  private  hours,  and  "perforated"  all  the  rooms  of 
his  mansion  "to  get  a  peep  at  him."  These  rumors  were 
denied,  and  the  organization  of  the  presidential  household  was 
described  as  rendering  such  persecution  impossible ;  but  the 
accounts  of  members  of  the  government  confirm  the  story,  — \ 
Hamilton,  Ingham,  and  Van  Buren  all  bear  witness  to  the  num- 
ber and  pertinacity  of  the  applicants.3  Van  Buren  formulated 
a  scheme  to  rid  the  streets  of  the  mob  before  making  removals ;  * 
but  it  was  not  tried,  and  the  disorder,  though  modified  as  time 
went  on,  seems  to  have  continued  until  the  most  desirable  places 

1  Parton,  Jackson,  iii.  170.     Poore,  Perley's  Reminiscences,  i.  93-94  ;    Sargent, 
Public  Men  and  Events,  i.  163. 

2  Webster,  Private  Correspondence,  i.  473. 

3  Kendall,   Autobiography,  307-308  ;    Nilefs  Register,  xxxvi.    152  ;    New    York 
Evening  Post,  April  17,  1829;  J.A.Hamilton,  Reminiscences,  98;  Shepard,    Van 
Buren,  178-179. 

4  Van    Buren    to    Hamilton,    March,    1829,    J.    A.    Hamilton,    Reminiscences^ 
129. 


JACKSOWS  PROGRAMME. 

had  been  disposed  of.     This  crowd  was  in   effect  a  monster 
petition  in  favor  of  removals/^ 

The  administration  did  rioTlsee  fit  to  make  a  definite  pro- 
nouncement of  its  policy.  Retrenchment,  rather  than  proscrip- 
tion, was  hinted  at  in  the  inaugural,  "In  the  performance  of  a 
task  thus  generally  delineated,  I  shall  endeavor  to  select  men 
whose  diligence  and  talents  will  insure  in  their  respective  sta- 
tions able  and  effective  cooperation,  depending  for  the  advance-  i 
ment  of  the  public  service  more  on  the  integrity  and  zeal  of  I 
the  public  officers  than  on  their  number." l  The  editor  of  the 
Nashville  Gazette  went  to  Washington,  and  after  he  returned 
announced,  "  In  all  cases  where  the  official  influence  was  prosti- 
tuted in  the  last  contest,  to  subserve  the  electioneering  purposes 
of  the  coalition,  the  incumbents  will  be  removed  " ;  others,  how- 
ever, even  Adams  men,  were  to  be  allowed  to  retain  office 
"provided  no  other  objection  existed."  The  Richmond  En- 
quirer, in  commenting  on  this,  na'fvely  remarked,  "After  this 
wholesome  purgation,  what  portion  of  the  original  executive 
functionaries  will  be  found  worthy  to  be  retained  in  the  service, 
is  not  as  yet  foreseen."2  After  the  acts  of  the  administration 
had  revealed  its  policy,  Jackson,  in  his  first  annual  message, 
December,  1829,  formulated  the  principles  which  had  guided 
him  i  - — 

"  There  are,  perhaps,  few  men  who  can  for  any  great  length 
of  time  enjoy  office  and  power  without  being  more  or  less  under 
the  influence  of  feelings  unfavorable  to  the  faithful  discharge 
of  their  public  duties.  Their  integrity  may  be  proof  against 
improper  considerations  immediately  addressed  to  themselves, 
but  they  are  apt  to  acquire  a  habit  of  looking  with  indifference 
upon  the  public  interests  and  of  tolerating  conduct  from  which 
an  unpracticed  man  would  revolt.  Office  is  considered  as  a 
species  of  property,  and  government  rather  as  a  means  of  pro- 
moting individual  interests  than  as  an  instrument  created  solely 
for  the  service  of  the  people.  Corruption  in  some  and  in  others 
a  perversion  of  correct  feelings  and  principles  divert  govern- 
ment from  its  legitimate  ends,  and  make  it  an  engine  for  the 

1  Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers  of  the  Presidents,  ii.  438. 

2  Kendall,  Autobiography,  433;  Richmond  Enquirer,  April  7,  14,  1829. 


112      THE  ESTABLISHMENT  OF  THE  SPOILS  SYSTEM. 

support  of  the  few  at  the  expense  of  the  many.  The  duties  of 
all  public  offices  are,  or  at  least  admit  of  being  made,  so"  plain 
and  simple  that  men  of  intelligence  may  readily  qualify  'them- 
selves for  their  performance;  and  I  can  not  but  believe  that 
more  is  lost  by  the  long  continuance  of  men  in  office  than  is 
generally  to  be  gained  by  their  experience.  I  submit,  therefore, 
to  your  consideration  whether  the  efficiency  of  the  government 
would  not  be  promoted,  and  official  industry  and  integrity  better 
secured,  by  a  general  extension  of  the  law  which  limits  appoint- 
ments to  four  years. 

"  In  a  country  where  offices  are  created  solely  for  the  benefit 
of  the  people  no  one  man  has  any  more  intrinsic  right  to  official 
station  than  another.  Offices  were  not  established  to  give  sup- 
port to  particular  men  at  the  public  expense.  No  individual 
wrong  is,  therefore,  done  by  removal,  since  neither  appointment 
to  nor  continuance  in  office  is  matter  of  right.  The  incumbent 
became  an  officer  with  a  view  to  public  benefits,  and  when  these 
require  his  removal  they  are  not  to  be  sacrificed  to  private  in- 
terests. It  is  the  people,  and  they  alone,  who  have  a  right  to 
complain  when  a  bad  officer  is  substituted  for  a  good  one.  He 
who  is  removed  has  the  same  means  of  obtaining  a  living  that 
are  enjoyed  by  the  millions  who  never  held  office.  The  pro- 
posed limitation  would  destroy  the  idea  of  property  now  so 
generally  connected  with  official  station,  and  although  indi- 
vidual distress  may  be  sometimes  produced,  it  would,  by  pro- 
moting that  rotation  which  constitutes  a  leading  principle  in  the 
republican  creed,  give  healthful  action  to  the  system."  l 

The  policy  thus  enunciated  threw  every  office  in  the  civil 
service  open  to  competition.  The  vague  charge  of  misusing 
office  to  support  Adams  was  one  that  could  be  brought,  and 
proved  ex  parte,  against  any  office-holder.  The  contrast  of  this 
policy  with  Jefferson's  practice  of  opening  up  first  one  set  of 
offices  and  then  another  is  striking.  This  possibility  of  a  simul- 
taneous change  of  the  entire  civil  list  meant  that  the  appointing 
power  must  deal  at  once  with  a  great  number  and  a  great 
variety  of  cases  ;  and  the  complexity  of  its  task  was  increased 
by  the  other  principle,  that  the  duties  of  the  various  offices  were 

1  Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers  of  the  Presidents,  ii.  448-449. 


MACHINERY.  113 

so  plain  and  simple  that  any  men  of  intelligence  could  perform 
them.     It  was  ABC  democracy :  any  applicant  could  aspire 
to   any  office.      When  it  is  remembered  in  addition  that  the  \ 
offices  were  hundreds  and  the  office-beggars  were  thousands,  the 
difficulties  of  distribution  are  apparent. 

Necessity  is  sure  to  evolve  anyjnacJbin^.  that  is  really  essen- 
tial, but   time   is   required   for   the   process.      Thus,  although 
means  were  finally  found  for  systematically  dividing  the  spoils, 
they  were  not  discovered  early  enough  to   save   the   Jackson    . 
administration  from  embarrassment.      As  of  old,  congressmen  ' 
were  active  and  anxious  to  relieve  the  president  by  assuming 
the   whole  task  themselves  ;  delegations  arranged  slates,  and 
it   was   reported   that   Congress   dictated   the  appointment   of 
Ingham  as  secretary  of   the   treasury.      On   the  whole,  how- 
ever, congressional   influence  seems   to   have  been   less   than 
usual,  and  each   member   exerted   influence   according  to   his 
individuality.1     Much  stress  seems  to  have  been  placed  on  peti-f 
tions.      Duff  Green  urged    on  Governor  Edwards   the   impor- 
tance of  "  signatures  " ;  and  a  marshalship  in  Pennsylvania  is 
said  to  have  been  awarded  to  that  candidate  whose  petition  was 
largest.     A  man  who  desired  the  register's  office  at  Crawfords- 
ville  brought  a  petition  from  the  Republican  members  of  the 
state  legislature,  with  private   letters.     Probably  petitions  car- 
ried more  weight  than  had  been  usual,  though  letters  of  influ- 1 
ential  men  almost  equalled  them  in  importance.2 

Occasionally  testimonials  were  brought  proving  the  unfitness 
of  the  incumbents  of  the  positions  applied  for.  Some  notes 
of  this  character  have  been  published  by  a  Mr.  Derby,  who 
claimed  that  he  carried  them  with  him  to  Washington.  "  I 

certify   that    I    heard    Major   [Melville  ?]    say    that   he 

believed   Jackson  to   be   a   damned   rascal "  :   "I   certify  that 

many  times,  in  conversation,  Major  said,  that  he  was  a 

public  officer  under  Adams,  and  thought  it  his  duty  to  stick 
by  his  superior  officer,  and  believed  he  had  more  knowledge 

1  J.  A.  Hamilton,  Reminiscences,  102,  170  ;  Richmond  Enquirer,  April  3,  1829  ; 
Niles's  Register,  xl.  375. 

2  Edwards  Papers,  427  ;   J.  A.  Hamilton,  Reminiscences,  98  ;   Derby,  Political 
Reminiscences,  52-53. 

I 


114      THE  ESTABLISHMENT  OF  THE  SPOILS  SYSTEM. 

in  his  little  finger,  than  old  Jackson  had  in  his  whole  body."  l 
Few  applicants,  however,  had  sufficiently  definite  ideas  of  what 
they  wanted  to  enable  them  to  bring  charges  against  a  specific 
officer.  Samuel  Swartwout,  in  a  letter  to  Jesse  Hoyt,  expresses 
the  general  attitude :  "  /  hold  to  your  doctrine  fully,  that  NO 

D D  RASCAL  WHO  MADE  USE  OF  HIS  OFFICE  OR  ITS  PROFITS  for 

the  purpose  of  keeping  Mr.  Adams  in,  and  Gen.  Jackson  out  of 
power,  is  entitled  to  the  least  lenity  or  mercy,  save  that  of  hanging. 
So  we  think  both  alike  on  that  head.  Whether  or  not,  I  shall 
get  anything  in  the  general  scramble  for  plunder,  remains  to  be 
proven;  but  I  rather  guess  I  shall.  What  it  will  be  is  not  yet 
so  certain ;  perhaps  Keeper  of  the  Bergen  lighthouse.  I  rather 
think  Massa  Pomp  stands  a  smart  chance  of  going  somewhere, 
perhaps  to  the  place  you  have  named  or  to  the  devil."  2 
/Jackson's  two  most  important  advisers  with  regard  to  the 
listribution  of  the  patronage  were  Martin  Van  Buren,  secre- 
'tary  of  state,  and  General  Duff  Green,  administration  editor 
and  political  manager  of  the  Calhoun  faction.  Van  Buren 
tried  to  avoid  the  turmoil  of  the  conflict;  he  did  not  reach 
Washington  until  March  22 ;  and  he  wrote  to  James  Hamilton, 
his  representative  with  the  president,  that  he  was  anxious  that 
his  preferences  for  the  cabinet  should  not  be  pressed  in  his 
name,3  though  he  was  glad  enough  to  have  Hamilton  urge 
them.  The  most  important  New  York  appointment,  tha't  of 
Swartwout  as  collector,  was  made  against  his  wishes,  and  some 
of  his  New  York  supporters  were  restive  at  this  unexpected 
passivity;4  but  he  was  none  the  less  a  power.  "^^His  was  the 
velvet  glove ;  his  influence  with  Jackson  lay  in  the  very  fact 
that  he  knew  when  to  give  way ;  his  followers  he  rather  man- 
aged than  commanded,  letting  them  fight  out  their  family 
quarrels  among  themselves ;  but  in  the  end  the  person  who 
could  serve  him  was  rewarded.  He  was  aptly  called  the 
"  Little  Magician."/  As  head  of  the  Albany  Regency  he  was 

1  Derby,  Political  Reminiscences,  40. 

2  Mackenzie,  Benjamin  F.  Butler  and  Jesse  Hoyt,  50-51.     Swartwout  got  the 
great  prize  of  the  collectorship  of  New  York. 

8  J.  A.  Hamilton,  Reminiscences,  92. 

4  Ibid.  123  ;  Mackenzie,  Van  Buren,  210. 


FACTIONS. 


looked  upon  by  many  Northern  politicians  as  the  best  mar  on 
whom  to  rely  for  support  when  asking  for  office,  and  mmy 
delegations  were  sent  to  Washington  to  assure  him  of  support 
in  his  candidacy  for  the  succession  and  ±o  request  his  aid  in 
pushing  through  a  slate  of  appointments./ It  mattered  not  how 
few  Jackson's  supporters  might  be  in  any  district  —  they  were 
sure  to  be  divided  as  to  the  sharing  of  the  spoils.  When,  there- 
fore, one  faction  had  declared  for  Van  Buren,  the  other  was 
swift  to  enroll  under  the  banner  of  the  only  other  prominent 
candidate  for  the  presidency,  Vice-president  Calhoun.  The  lat- 
ter interfered  in  the  politics  of  the  patronage  much  less  than  Van 
Buren  did,  much  less  than  he  had  done  himself  at  an  earlier* 
period ;  but  was  ably  represented  by  that  typical  office-monger, 
General  Green,1  and  so  the  Calhoun  followers  were  as  well 
taken  care  of  as  those  of  Van  Buren. 

One  of  these  factional  contests  took  place  in  Boston,  and  was 
described  in  an  elaborate  political  pamphlet  written  by  one  of 
the  participants  after  he  had  deserted  to  the  Whig  party,  and 
corroborated  by  the  Boston  press  of  the  period.  The  regular 
state  organization  declared  for  Calhoun,  and  sent  Nathaniel 
Greene,  editor  of  the  Statesman,  to  the  capital  to  press  upon  the 
administration  a  list  of  appointments.  Another  faction,  repre- 
sented by  the  Bulletin,  cried  "  Stop  thief,"  hastily  rallied  in 
support  of  the  Van  Buren  plan  of  a  second  term  for  Jackson, 
and  sent  a  counter  embassy  to  make  plain  to  the  president  their 
services  in  the  past  and  their  influence  for  the  future.  Both 
delegations  were  well  received,  and  the  offices  were  divided 
between  them.2 

A  similar  conflict  in  Illinois  may  be  studied  in  the  letters  of 
Duff  Green  himself  to  Governor  Edwards.  The  latter  expected 
to  profit  by  the  adoption  of  a  policy  which  he  had  so  long  advo- 
cated, and  his  friends  supposed  that  he  would  have  "  as  much 
influence  over  General  Jackson  as  any  other  man  in  this  state." 
He  evidently  desired  to  declare  openly  for  Calhoun,  and  to 
rely  upon  General  Green's  influence  at  Washington  ;  but  Green 

1  Sargent,  Public  Men  and  Events,  i.  157  ;  Nilcfs  Register,  xxxvii.  103  ;  Amos 
Kendall,  Autobiography,  306. 

2  Van  Tyne,  Webster,  141 ;  Derby,  Political  Reminiscences. 


Il6      THE  ESTABLISHMENT  OF  THE  SPOILS  SYSTEM. 

wrote  :  "  It  is  particularly  desirable  that  the  conflicting  interests 
of  our  party  be  made  to  harmonize  and  to  prevent  a  premature 
collision.  It  is  agreed  on  all  hands  that  Gen'l  Jackson  shall 
hold  a  position  for  re-election  if  necessary  or  expedient.  Per- 
haps he  may  desire  it,  and  if  so,  no  one  can  prevent  his  re-elec- 
tion. You  will  therefore  plainly  see  the  impropriety  of  getting 
up  at  this  time  any  new  organization  of  parties  based  upon  any 
speculation  as  to  a  competition  between  Van  Buren  and  your 
personal  friend."  1 

The  inevitable  conflict  came,  however ;  and  Kinney,  an  ancient 
political  foe  of  Edwards,  went  to  Washington,  declared  for  Van 
Buren,  and  secured  all  the  Illinois  appointments.  As  early  as 
July,  1829,  one  of  the  governor's  friends  wrote,  "I  have  seen 
that  your  expectations  have  not  been  realized  with  regard  to 
the  reforming  system."  Green  wrote  to  him  explaining  the 
unfavorable  nominations,  blaming  Edwards  for  not  securing 
enough  signatures  in  favor  of  his  candidates,  promising  him 
better  luck  in  the  future,  and  urging  him  to  stand  by  Jackson ; 
but  through  all  the  letters  there  is  a  tone  of  nervousness  and 
apprehension.  By  the  spring  of  1830  Green  gave  up  his  hope 
of  defeating  Van  Buren  by  secret  manoeuvre,  and  acknowledged 
that  his  plans  and  those  of  his  opponents  must  come  into  early 
conflict.  He  was  not  ready  to  break  with  Jackson,  but  he 
wrote :  "  My  own  individual  opinion  is  that  Gen.  Jackson  will 
not  be  a  candidate,  and  that  Mr.  Calhoun  will  be  the  candidate 
of  the  South  and  West,  and  that  he  will  also  obtain  the  De- 
mocracy of  New  England.  Pennsylvania,  New  York,  and  Ohio 
are  more  doubtful " ;  and  he  added  that  the  Van  Buren  plan 
was  to  have  Jackson  reflected.2  It  is  clear  from  the  oscillation 
of  his  policy  that  Duff  Green  felt  that  he  was  losing  ground, 
but  not  until  October,  1830,  did  he  confess  to  Edwards  that  his 
power  was  waning.  "  The  appointments  in  your  State,"  he 
wrote,  "  have  been  the  source  of  much  anxiety  to  me.  I  could 
not  control  them."  In  November  he  gave  up  all  hope  of* 
reconciling  the  two  factions  or  of  keeping  on  good  terms  with 
both,  but  wrote  to  Edwards  declaring  for  Calhoun,  and  adding, 

1  Edwards  Papers,  379-381,  389-391. 

2  Jbid.  204,  427-430,  450-456,  488. 


DUFF  GREEN'.  117 

"I  feel  strong  enough  for  the  crisis."     In  January,   1832,  he 
again  wrote  to  Edwards,  "  Instead  of  using  the  patronage  upon    v 
the  high  principle  on  which  it  was  given  to  him  of  promoting    L 
the  public  good,  he  [Jackson]  uses  it  as  a  personal  chattel,  to 
be  administered  to  advance  his  own  re-election  and  to  advance 
the  private  interests  of  a  few   dependants." l     The   fact  that 
his  mortification  over  appointments  rankled  so  long  after  the 
actual  break  with  Jackson  took  place  would  seem  to  point  to 
that  as  one  reason  for  his  following  Calhoun  to  the  tents  of  the 
Myrmidons. 

Duff  Green  was  not  the  only  political  leader  who  had  cause 
complain  that  his  recommendations  were  slighted.  In  regard 
to  appointments,  as  in  all  other  matters,  Jackson  was  indepen-.  / 
dent,  and  would  willingly  sacrifice  party  welfare  to  the  calls  of 
friendship  or  of  personal  whim.  Private  considerations  alone 
seem  to  have  led  to  the  choice  of  Major  Eaton  to  be  secretary 
of  war,  and  of  Swartwout  as  collector  at  New  York.2  Parton, 
in  his  life  of  Jackson,  gives  as  authentic  the  autobiographical 
account  of  a  "  Successful  Politician  " ;  it  is  at  any  rate  char- 
acteristic. A  young  man,  belonging  to  one  of  the  prominent 
political  families  of  New  York,  but  himself  of  no  prominence, 
obtains  a  small  clerkship  at  Washington  through  the  influence 
of  Van  Buren,  and  his  duties  bring  him  into  close  contact  with 
the  president.  One  day  he  asked  Jackson  if  he  is  not  lonesome. 
"  Why  should  I  be  lonesome,  with  the  house  filled  with  people  ? " 
said  the  president.  "Yes,"  said  the  young  clerk,  "there  are 
plenty  here,  but  they  all  have  axes  to  grind."  The  general 
confessed  that  he  was  lonesome,  and  as  it  developed  that  this 
young  man  had  no  axe  to  grind,  he  became  the  president's 
friend.  Subsequently  one  of  the  very  fat  offices  in  /New  York 
became  vacant,  and  he  applied  for  it  on  his  own  responsibility, 
obtained  it,  and  later  received  a  reappointment\  (Of  course 
Van  Buren  did  not  like  to  see  such  an  office  wasted  ^on  a  politi- 
cal nonentity,  but  he  was  too  wise  to  interfere  with  his  chief. 

1  Edwards  Papers,    548,    553,    578-579.      Green's  letters  to  Edwards  were  not 
intended  for  the  public  eye,  contain  no  cant,  and  exhibit  his  true  feeling,  though  not 
all  his  feelings. 

2  J.  A.  Hamilton,  Reminiscences,  97,  102;   Poore,  Perley's  Reminiscences,  i.  128. 


Il8      THE  ESTABLISHMENT  OF  THE  SPOILS  SYSTEM. 

When,  however,  he  became  president,  he  appointed  another 
man  to  the  post.1 

The  position  of  postmaster  at  Albany  was  an  important  one 
for  the  New  York  democracy.  In  1829  it  was  still  held  by  that 
General  Solomon  Van  Rensselaer  whose  appointment,  it  will 
be  remembered,  had  been  vigorously  opposed  by  Van  Buren, 
who  now  felt  sure  of  his  revenge,  and  arranged  for  a  new 
appointment.  General  Van  Rensselaer,  however,  went  to  Wash- 
ington, gained  access  to  the  president,  and  prepared  to  tear 
open  his  shirt  and  show  the  wounds  which  he  had  received  in 
fighting  for  his  country.  He  was  instantly  confirmed  in  his 
post.2  Men  might  flatter  themselves  that  they  guided*  Old 
Hickory,  but  they  needed  to  drive  with  a  very  loose  rein,  and 
must  be  ready  to  yield  the  direction  on  any  show  of  resistance. 

The  plans  of  the  party  leaders  were  still  further  disturbed  by 
the  Senate.  We  have  seen  that  friction  between  the  two 
branches  of  the  appointing  power  was  by  no  means  unusual, 
but  never  before  1829  had  it  assumed  any  considerable  degree 
of  political  importance.  Now  trouble  was  anticipated  from  the 
first,  as  the  Senate  would  be  controlled  by  the  opposition  and 
would  be  sure  to  oppose  the  proscriptive  policy.  For  some 
days  after  the  4th  of  March,  Branch,  Eaton,  and  Berrien, 
although  nominated  as  members  of  the  cabinet,  retained  their 
seats  in  the  Senate,  in  order  to  facilitate  the  starting  of  the 
administration.  So  eager  were  the  Jackson  managers  to  secure 
a  quiet  launching  for  their  new  experiment  in  government  that 
they  deferred  some  nominations  likely  to  be  resisted ;  and  such 
men  as  Amos  Kendall  and  William  B.  Lewis  were  appointed  to 
office  the  day  after  the  Senate  adjourned.  Thus  the  special 
session  passed  off  peacefully,3  and  no  difficulty  was  to  be  feared 
for  eight  months. 

With  the  first  regular  session  in  December,  1829,  began  an 
obstinate  struggle.  During  the  summer  Jackson  had,  to  a  great 
extent,  accomplished  his  proscription  :  the  full  issue  was  before 

1  Parton,  Jackson,  iii.  255. 

2  Poore,  Perley's  Reminiscences,  i.  no,  173  ;   Forney,  Anecdotes,  281-282. 

8  Columbian  Centinel,  March  14,  1829  ;  Massachusetts  Spy,  April  8,  1829  ;  Nilefs 
Register,  xxxvi.  34. 


THE  SENATE.  119 

the  country,  and  the  opposition  prepared  to  make  the  most  of 
the  popular  outcry  which,  voiced  by  the  anti-Jackson  press, 
seemed  to  offer  a  chance  for  successful  attack.  They  could 
not,  of  course,  take  the  stand  of  rejecting  all  nominations; 
public  opinion  would  not  have  endured  a  course  so  factious. 
Amos  Kendall  says  that  they  did  "  reject  on  frivolous  grounds 
many  of  his  [Jackson's]  best  nominations " ;  and  Louis 
McLane  wrote  to  Hamilton,  "  It  is  impossible  that  some  evil 
spirit  is  not  at  work  in  that  body,  otherwise  the  reckless  course 
of  the  opposition  must  have  united  the  majority  in  spite  of  all 
men's  dislike;  but  I  confess  I  want  the  clue  to  some  of  the 
rejections." * 

The  fact  is  that  the  Senate  refused  to  confirm  some  of  the 
most  prominent  Jackson  politicians,  men  of  great  ability  but 
particularly  obnoxious  to  the  opposition,  —  men  like  Isaac  Hill 
and  Mordecai  M.  Noah'.2  Amos  Kendall  himself,  one  of  the 
most  efficient  public  officers  that  Jackson  appointed,  was  con- 
firmed only  by  the  casting  vote  of  Vice-president  Calhoun. 
Some^.of  the  men  rejected  would  seem  to  have  deserved  their 
fate ;  but  whether  rejected  for  good  reasons  or  bad,  they  be- 
came sure  of  the  good-will  of  the  presment,  who  was  moved  to 
inexpressible  wrath  at  this  unprecedented  opposition  to  his  will. 
Sometimes  he  would  give  the  victim  a  new  position ;  generally 
he  would  renominate  him,  even  a  third  time.  This  bootless 
contest  went  on  as  long  as  the  opposition  controlled  the  Senate, 
the  most  conspicuous  rejection  being  that  of  Van  Buren  when 
nominated  as  minister  to  England.3 

The  opposition  soon  saw  the  futility  of  thus  cutting  off  nomi- 
nations  in  detail,  and  sought  to  devise  some  general  bulwark 
to  protect  such  of  their  friends  as  still  remained  in  office,  and  to 
put  a  limit  to  the  power  of  the  executive.  The  Senate  adopted 
a  resolution  in  1831,  declaring  "that  it  is  inexpedient  to  appoint 
a  citizen  of  any  one  State  to  an  office  which  may  be  vacated  or 

1  Kendall,  Autobiography,  301  ;  J.  A.  Hamilton,  Reminiscences,  166. 

2  Niles's  Register,  xxxviii.  142,  216,  229. 

8  J.  Q.  Adams,  Memoirs,  vi.  252 ;  Calhoun's  speech  in  the  Senate,  February,  1835 
(Calhoun),  Works,  ii.  445  ;  Executive  Journal,  iv.  181,  255,  315,  333,  397,  447, 
448  ;  Mies' s  Register,  xl.  249  ;  Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers  of  the  Presidents, 
ii.  574- 


120     THE  ESTABLISHMENT  OF  THE  SPOILS  SYSTEM. 

become  vacant  in  any  other  State  .  .  .  without  some  evident 
necessity  for  such  appointment."  Jackson  replied  by  a  mes- 
sage, March  2,  1833,  in  which  he  claimed  that  this  was  an 
attempt  unconstitutionally  to  restrain  the  president's  appointing 
power,  and  said  that  he  felt  it  to  be  his  duty  to  abstain  from 
any  further  efforts  to  fill  the  offices  nominations  to  whicrThad 
called  out  the  resolution.1  In  January,  1832,  a  more  sweeping 
resolution  was  introduced  by  Senator  Ewing :  "  That  it  is  inex- 
pedient for  the  Senate  to  advise  and  consent  to  the  appoint- 
ment of  any  person,  to  fill  a  supposed  vacancy  in  any  office, 
occasioned  by  the  removal  of  a  prior  incumbent,  unless  such 
prior  incumbent  shall  appear  to  have  been  removed  for  a  suffi- 
cient cause." 

These  resolutions  were  intended  simply  to  guide  the  Senate 
in  the  execution  of  its  constitutional  function  of  advising  and 
consenting  to  appointments ;  but  there  were  many  anti-Jackson 
men  who  wished  to  go  farther,  and  to  revive  the  old  claim  of 
the  Senate  to  share  in  the  removing  power.2  A  very 'good 
case  might  be  made  out  for  such  a  construction  of  the  consti- 
tutional clauses  governing  the  subject;  but  from  the  point  of 
view  of  expediency  such  a  course  was  most  undesirable,  and 
the  more  moderate  of  the  opposition  discountenanced  it.  John 
Quincy  Adams  saw  the  danger  of  tampering  with  constitutional 
principles  to  further  the  ends  of  the  hour,  and  his  son  wrote 
an  able  pamphlet  against  the  proposed  action ;  while  the  vener- 
able Madison,  in  almost  his  last  letter,  urged  adherence  to  the 
accepted  interpretation,  which  he  had  done  so  much  to  establish.3 
^Nevertheless,  in  1835  a  committee  to  investigate  the  patron- 
age proposed  that  the  president  submit  to  the  Senate  the  reasons 
for  each  removal,  a  suggestion  which  had  little  practical  sig- 
nificance, as  there  was  no  chance  of  making  it  a  law,  owing  to 
the  attitude  of  the  House  of  Representatives.  Jackson  was 
sure  to  disregard  a  mere  resolution  of  the  Senate.  In  fact, 
when  the  reasons  for  the  removal  of  Gideon  Fitz  were  requested 

1  Clay  to  J.  S.  Johnston,  April  6,  1830,  Clay,  Works,  iv.  257  ;  Executive  Journal, 
iv.  150  ;   Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers  of  the  Presidents,  ii.  636. 

2  Senate  Journal,  22  Cong.  I  sess.  108  ;  Niles's  Register,  xxxviii.  100. 

8  J.  Q.  Adams,  Memoirs,  ix.  127,  218-234  ;  C.  F.  Adams,  C.  F.  Adams,  ix.  385  ; 
Madison,  Letters  and  Other  Writings,  iv.  385. 


CONFUSION.  121 

on  the  ground  that  such  information  was  necessary  to  enable 
the  Senate  to  act  wisely  on  the  nomination  of  his  successor,  the 
president  refused  to  comply,  arguing  that  the  power  of  removal 
belonged  to  him  exclusively,  and  that,  should  the  Senate  in 
executive  session  consider  the  causes  of  removal,  the  officer 
wpuld  thus  be  subjected  to  trial  by  a  secret  tribunal.1 
CjSuch  crude  machinery  as  did  exist  for  distribution  of  offices  \ 
was  thus  subjected  to  the  double  strain  of  Jackson's  indepen-  ^ 
dence  and  the  opposition  of  the  Senate,  which  made  it  impossible 
for  the  leaders  of  the  party  to  use  the  patronage  with  the  best 
possible  political  effect.;,  The  spoils  system  was  introduced,  but 
the  spoils  were  rather  enjoyed  as  the  fruit  of  the  victory  of  1828 
than  employed  in  the  manner  best  calculated  to  secure  victory 
"anSw  in  1832.  An  illustration  of  the  utter  confusion  prevailing 
in  Washington  early  in  the  administration  is  found  in  the  case 
of  the  Hartford  post-office.  One  Norton  was  appointed  to  the 
position  in  place  of  Low  removed.  He  transferred  his  family 
from  Washington  to  Hartford,  entered  upon  the  duties  of  his 
office,  and  the  next  day  found  himself  superseded  by  John  M. 
Niles.  Petitions  in  favor  of  Mr.  Norton's  retention  received 

signatures,  but  he  was  unable  to  regain  the  post:2 
_  In  spite  of  this  confusion  and  clash  of  interests,  it  is  possible 
(to  distinguish  some  guiding  principles  which  controlled  appoint- 
ments when  Jackson  was  tractable  and  the  Senate  tired  of  op- 
position. Samuel  Swartwout  wrote  to  Jesse  Hoyt  (March  14^ 
1829),  "The  great  goers  are  the  new  men;  the  old  troopers  ' 
being  all  spavined  and  ringboned  from  previous  hard  travel."3 
A  new  generation,  or  rather  the  Democratic  half  of  a  new 
generation,  came  to  the  front  with  Jackson,  bringing  fresh  blood 
and  strange  manners  into  the  civil  service.  Moreover,  old  party 
distinction  disappeared,  and  men  of  Federalist  antecedents  re- 
ceived recognition,  though  the  prejudice  against  them  had  by 
no  means  died  out.4 

1  Jackson  to  the  Senate,  February  10,  1835  (Richardson),  Messages  and  Papers 
of  the  Presidents,  Hi.  132-134. 

2  Niles1  s  Register,  xxxvi.  149,  244  ;  Massachusetts  Spy,  June  IO,  1829. 
8  Mackenzie,  Benjamin  F.  Butler  and  Jesse  Hoyt,  51. 

4  J.  A.  Hamilton,  Reminiscences,  passim ;  Massachusetts    Spy,  April    15,    1829; 
United  States  Telegraph,  March  10,  1829  ;  Niles' s  Register,  xl.  113. 


122      THE  ESTABLISHMENT  OF  THE  SPOILS  SYSTEM. 

It  is  the  general  opinion  that  fitness  for  the  duties  of  office 
was  scarcely  considered  by  Jackson.  James  A.  Hamilton,  who 
was  present  at  cabinet  discussions  and  was  in  constant  corre- 
spondence with  Van  Buren,  tells  us  that  it  was  never  mentioned. 
Hamilton's  memory,  however,  was  very  poor,  and  his  statement 
is  contradicted*  by  letters  which  he  himself  made  public.  Thus, 
Van  Buren  wrote  to  him  in  March,  1829:  "I  cannot,  from  my 
total  want  of  knowledge  as  to  Barry's  professional  talents,  speak 
as  to  the  propriety  of  his  appointment.  Politically  it  would  be 
well."  February  15,  1829,  Van  Buren  wrote  to  Major  Eaton: 
"  You  want  for  the  other  concern  [evidently  the  cabinet]  prac- 
tical, intelligent,  and  efficient  men,  who  are  conversant  with  the 
affairs  of  the  nation,  and  in  whom  the  people  have  confidence, 
—  men  whose  capacities  are  adapted  to  the  discharge  of  the 
public  business,  whether  they  might,  or  might  not,  shine  in  the 
composition  of  essays  on  abstract  and  abstruse  subjects."1^  It 
is  evident  that  efficiency  was  considered,  though  it  was  made 
of  less  importance  than  in  previous  administrations  and  was 
differently  defined. 

One  class  of  appointments  has  brought  to  Jackson,  as  to 
other  presidents,  perhaps  undeserved  credit,  —  that  of  literary 
men  to  diplomatic  posts.  Such  appointments  are  generally  non- 
political  and  are  therefore  lauded ;  but  poets  and  novelists  are 
seldom  better  diplomats  than  are  politicians,  and  it  is  almost  as 
mischievous  to  use  the  civil  service  as  a  pension  fund  for  liter- 
ary celebrities  as  for  disabled  soldiers  or  defeated  congressmen. 
The  few  appointments  of  this  character  made  by  Jackson  brought 
in  a  flood  of  applications  from  budding  geniuses  all  over  the 
country.  Livingston,  when  secretary  of  state,  wrote  to  an  in- 
coming senator  who  had  recommended  such  a  young  man  for 
appointment  that  he  had  seen  the  latter  and  could  not  make 
him  a  consul,  —  that  the  selection  of  Cooper  and  Irving  did  not 
mean  that  all  novelists  were  good  diplomats.2 

In  the  majority  of  cases  the  most  important  reasons  for 
appointment  were  political.  Some  of  the  fortunate  had  been 
"original  Jackson  men";  others  had  made  sacrifices  by  join- 

1  J.  A.  Hamilton,  Reminiscences,  93,  97,  129,  139. 

2  Hunt,  Livingston,  364,  368-369. 


PRINCIPLES.  123 

ing  the  party  at  the  last  moment ;  some,  like  Henry  Lee  and 
William  B.  Lewis,  had  done  Jackson's  writing  for  him.  John 
Randolph,  who  spent  ten  days  in  Russia  as  minister,  and  drew 
$21,407  on  his  return,  contributed  the  support  of  his  name.1 
As  a  class,  the  editors  fared  the  best.  The  newspapers  had 
been  very  influential  in  the  campaign  of  1828,  spreading  broad- 
cast charges  of  dishonesty  in  Adams's  civil  service,  and  of 
bargain  and  corruption.  The  day  of  the  great  newspapers, 
moreover,  had  not  come  :  the  local  sheet  was  the  powerful 
factor ;  and  as  the  list  of  subscribers  was  small,  advertisements 
cheap,  and  the  cost  of  distribution  heavy,  such  papers  were 
seldom  very  profitable,  and  often  ruined  their  owners.2  It  was 
for  this  reason  particularly  that  men  like  Nathaniel  Greene  of 
Boston,  Dabney  F.  Carr  of  Baltimore,  Mordecai  M.  Noah  of 
New  York,  Amos  Kendall,  Duff  Green,  and  many  others  were 
acknowledged  to  deserve  office.  Such  appointments  were  very 
generally  attacked,  but  Niles  pointed  out  that  they  were  not 
objectionable  if  the  editors  resigned  from  their  papers  ;  other- 
wise he  said,  the  franking  privilege  gave  them  an  undue  advan- 
tage over  their  competitors.3 

It  was  not  proposed  that  editors  resign,  or  that  appointees 
generally  relax  their  political  exertions  on  receiving  office ; 
office  was  not  merely  a  reward  for  past  service,  but  an  incite- 
ment to  further  activity.  Amos  Kendall  wrote  for  the  Wash- 
ington press;4  and  Mr.  Noah,  in  an  editorial  concerning  his 
appointment  as  naval  officer  at  New  York,  said  that  since  his 
new  duties  did  not  interfere  with  the  duties  and  obligations  he 
owed  to  the  Republican  party,  he  would  not  abate  the  attention 
hitherto  paid  to  the  columns  of  the  Enquirer,  which  he  hoped 
to  improve  in  every  department.5  Duff  Green,  in  return  for 
the  government  printing,  made  his  journal  the  official  mouth- 
piece of  the  administration.  When  the  break  between  the 
president  and  vice-president  took  place,  a  new  paper  was  estab- 

1  J.  A.  Hamilton,  Reminiscences,  98  ;   Derby,  Political  Reminiscences,  27.     Jack- 
son allowed  much  more  freedom  of  action  to  his  supporters  than  one  might  suppose. 
Livingston  voted  against  the  confirmation  of  Henry  Lee  (Hunt,  Livingston,  354). 
Adams,  John  Randolph,  296. 

2  Derby,  Political  Reminiscences,  43.  *  Kendall,  Autobiography,  372. 
*  Niles' s  Register,  xxxvi.  221,  250.  6  Niles's  Register,  xxxvi.  221. 


124      THE  ESTABLISHMENT  OF  THE  SPOILS  SYSTEM. 

lished,  the  Globe,  and  to  its  editors,  Blair  and  Rives,  was 
given  what  government  printing  the  Democrats  could  control.1 

Service  was  expected  of  other  officers  as  well.  March  30, 
1834,  William  B.  Lewis  wrote  to  Hamilton:  "Tell  Swartwout 
to  peel  off  his  coat  and  roll  up  his  sleeves  also ;  but,  perhaps, 
as  he  has  to  go  through  the '  glorious  Senate,'  it  would  not  be 
prudent  for  him  to  do  so.  Price,  as  his  nomination  will  be  cer- 
tainly confirmed  before  the  8th,  must  do  his  own  and  Swart- 
wout's  part  too."2  Charles  T.  Congdon,  in  his  Reminiscences 
of  a  Journalist?  says  that  in  1840  he  saw  a  circular  from  Ken- 
dall to  the  deputy  postmasters,  asking  them  to  work  for  Van 
Buren,  and  adding,  "  I  shall  take  care  that  the  high-minded  and 
patriotic  men  who  do  this  service  shall  have  no  cause  to  regret 
their  exertions."  Political  assessments  also  appear  promptly  on 
the  incoming  of  the  spoils  system ;  Derby  describes,  apparently 
truthfully,  an  early  instance  of  such  practice  in  Boston.4  The 
significant  fact  in  regard  to  the  making  of  appointments  is 
the  prominence,  hitherto  unusual,  which  was  given  to  partisan 
activity  past  and  future :  the  Federalists  demanded  fitness  and 
harmony  of  opinion ;  Jefferson  in  addition  considered  past 
usefulness  to  the  party ;  under  Jackson  the  promise  of  future 
activity  became  of  paramount  importance.  To  faith  must  be 
added  good  works. 

We  have  discussed  the  machinery  by  which  the  spoils  were 
divided,  and  the  principles  by  which  this  machinery  was  con- 
trolled ;  the  question  now  arises  as  to  how  complete  a  change 
was  made  in  the  public  offices.  The  impression  is  very  general 
that  the  sweep  was,  proportionally,  the  largest  in  our  history ; 
but  doubtless  the  novelty  of  the  proceeding,  and  the  consequent 
effect  it  made  upon  contemporaries,  is  largely  responsible  for 
this  view,  which  is  decidedly  a  mistaken  one^  The  very  hap- 
hazard manner  in  which  the  matter  was  handled  was  as  favor- 
able to  the  retention  of  some  officers  as  to  the  removal  of  others. 
There  were  Jackson  men  at  Washington  who  worked  to  retain 

1  House  Journal,  24  Cong,  i  sess.  10  (December  7,  1835). 

2  J.  A.  Hamilton,  Reminiscences,  282. 
8  p.  66. 

*  Derby,  Political  Reminiscences,  85,  97. 


EXTENT  OF  PROSCRIPTION'.  12$ 

some  old  public  servants,  either  for  personal  reasons  or  because 
of  their  merit.  Hamilton  claims  that  he  saved,  among  others, 
Henry  Wheaton ;  and  Van  Buren  felt  that  only  with  the  great- 
est delicacy  could  he  remove  "  old  Mr.  Maury  — who,  having  been 
appointed  by  General  Washington,  has,  on  that  account,  some 
sanctity  attached  to  his  commission."  x 

Of  an  approximate  total  of  612  presidential  officers,  only 
252  were  removed.  The  number  of  removals  would  be  more 
imposing  if  the  deputy  postmasters  were  included ;  but  they 
were  not  made  presidential  officers  until  1836.  Niles,  April  3, 
1830,  gives  a  list  of  400  removals  in  this  department,  and  Benton 
places  the  number  at  6oo.2  As  there  were  about  8oqo  deputy 
postmasters  in  the  country,3  the  proportion  removed  was  not 
large ;  but  in  many  cases  the  emoluments  were  so  very  small  as 
to  discourage  competition.  Moreover,  Jackson  did  not  find  the 
civil  service  entirely  hostile  to  him.  Adams's  postmaster-general, 
McLean,  was  one  of  Jackson's  most  conspicuous  supporters ; 
and,  though  he  was  a  moderate  man  and  the  charges  that  he  had 
actively  used  his  appointing  power  to  further  his  political  views 
are  probably  untrue,  it  is  not  to  be  supposed  that  he  rigidly  ex- 
cluded Jackson  men  from  office  previous  to  Jackson's  election.4 
It  is  to  be  presumed,  therefore,  that  a  rather  large-  portion  of 
the  appointees  of  the  post-office  department  were  Jackson 
men.  Adams  estimated,  doubtless  with  some  exaggeration, 
that  more  than  four-fifths  of  the  customs  ..officials  were  opposed 
to  his  election  in  1825;  and  as  he- made  no  removals,  many 
would  naturally  oppose  him  in"  1829.  Some  .of  these  Jackson 
men  found  in  office  were  doubtless  removed  as  a  result  of  the 
clashing  of  various  interests  at  Washington ; 5  still  many  must 
have  retained  their  places.  A  third  explanatory  consideration 

1  J.  A.  Hamilton,  Reminiscences,  98  ;  Van  Buren  to  Jackson,  April  14,  1892  ;  Ibid. 

IS*- 

2  Fish,  in   American   Historical  Association,  Reports,   1899,  i.  74 ;    Statutes  at 
Large,   v.    80 ;     Niles 's    Register,   xxxviii.    105 ;    Benton,    Thirty    Year?   View,   \. 
160. 

8  8115.  (Official Register,  1829). 

*  J.  Q.  Adams,  Memoirs,  vii.  275,  343,  351-356,  viii.  8-9;  Livingston,  Eminent 
Americans,  ii.  794. 

6  J.  Q.  Adams,  Memoirs,  vi.  547  ;  viii.  193. 


126     THE  ESTABLISHMENT  OF  THE  SPOILS  SYSTEM. 

is  that  comparatively  few  removals  were  made  in  the  South, 
particularly  the  sea-board  South.1  From  these  states  came  few 
office-beggars,  that  is,  beggars  for  the  smaller  offices ;  for  posi- 
tions of  dignity  they  were  as  eager  as  any  section,  and  Virginia 
undoubtedly  felt  slighted  at  being  left  out  of  the  cabinet.2  With 
these  facts  in  mind,  we  may  conclude,  therefore,  that  Jackson's 
opponents  were  almost  completely  swept  out  of  the  paying  presi- 
dential offices  in  the  North  and  West. 

The  fate  of  subordinates  in  local  offices  and  in  the  depart- 
ments at  Washington  is  obscure.  The  Blue  Books  or  Official 
Registers  give  the  changes  every  two  years,  but  no  indica- 
tion as  to  cause.  The  policy  varied,  too,  with  each  appointing 
official,  who  seems  to  have  been  allowed  a  very  large  measure 
of  discretion.  Van  Buren  wrote  to  Hamilton  in  March,  1829: 
"As  to  the  publication  in  the  newspapers  I  have  more  to  say. 

1  Niles  (Register^  xxxviii.  105)  gives  a  list  of  removals  of  postmasters  by  states  as 
follows :  — 

Maine    .     . 15       Maryland 14 

New  Hampshire 55       Delaware 16 

Vermont 22       Virginia 8 

Massachusetts 28      North  Carolina 4 

Rhode  Island 3       South  Carolina o 

Connecticut 20      Alabama 2 

New  York 131       Georgia 2 

New  Jersey 14      Mississippi 5 

Pennsylvania 35       Louisiana 4 

Ohio 51       Tennessee 12 

Indiana 19       Kentucky 16 

Illinois _3      Missouri _7 

396  90 

If  the  seaboard  South  —  the  Jeffersonian  South  —  be  taken  by  itself,  the  dispro- 
portion is  still  more  striking :  — 

Virginia 8  Northern  States 396 

North  Carolina 4  Delaware 16 

South  Carolina o  Maryland 14 

Alabama 2  Kentucky 16 

Georgia 2  Tennessee 12 

Mississippi 5  Missouri 7 

Louisiana 4  4*61 

25 
There  were  five  for  the  territories,  making  491  in  all 

a  Richmond  Enquirer t  March  10,  1829. 


DEPARTMENTAL   OFFICERS.  127 

So  far  as  depends  on  me,  my  course  will  be  to  restore  by  a 
single  order  every  one  who  has  been  turned  out  by  Mr.  Clay 
for  political  reasons,  unless  circumstances  of  a  personal  charac- 
ter have  since  arisen  which  would  make  the  reappointment  in 
any  case  improper.  To  ascertain  that,  will  take  a  little  time. 
There  I  would  pause."1  In  1825  there  were  twelve  clerks  in 
the  office  of  the  secretary  of  state;  by  September  30,  1829,  the 
number  had  grown  to  fifteen,  but  only  four  of  the  original  twelve 
were  still  there ;  in  1833  but  two  of  these  four  remained.  Amos 
Kendall,  on  becoming  fourth  auditor,  insisted  that  he  should 
control  the  appointment  of  his  clerks.2  In  1829  there  were  six- 
teen in  his  office,  one  more  than  there  had  been  in  1825  ;  eight 
of  those  serving  in  1825  were  still  employed,  but  one  was  at 
a  reduced  salary.  In  1833  tw°  of  these  eight  survivors  had 
disappeared,  but  their  places  had  not  been  filled. 

The  Globe,  November  4,  1841,  stated  that  there  were  employed 
in  Washington  220  Democrats  receiving  $277,115,  and  281 
Whigs  with  salaries  amounting  to  $336,308 ;  and  Benton  says 
that  a  majority  of  the  employees  there  were  opposed  to  Jackson.3 
Such  estimates  are  totally  unreliable,  for  parties  during  the 
period  were  in  too  chaotic  a  condition  to  allow  an  accurate  com- 
putation ;  but  it  is  evident  that  many  subordinates  were  retained, 
some  because  they  were  indispensable,  and  some  because  they 
imitated  the  Vicar  of  Bray.  In  the  local  offices  a  similar  diver- 
sity of  practice  is  observable.  In  Baltimore,  Philadelphia,  New 
York,  and  Boston  notable  changes  were  made,4  while  in  many 
places  there  was  no  abnormal  break  whatever. 

In  the  discussion  of  Jefferson's  administration,  it  was  pointed 
out  that  the  attack  on  the  judiciary  should  be  connected  with 
the  general  policy  toward  the  patronage.  The  Jackson  man- 
agers were  not  greatly  disturbed  by  a  hostile  judiciary,  —  they 
ignored  it  when  it  interfered  with  their  plans ;  but  there  was 
another  bit  of  patronage,  not  officially  belonging  to  the  public 

1  J.  A.  Hamilton,  Reminiscences,  129. 

2  Kendall,  Autobiography,  308. 

8  Benton,  Thirty  Years'  View,  i.  160. 

*  JViles's  Register,  xxxvi.  119,  149,  163  ;  Columbian  Centinel,  April  22,  29,  1829  ; 
Derby,  Political  Reminiscences,  70-78. 


128      THE  ESTABLISHMENT  OF  THE  SPOILS  SYSTEM. 

service,  which  they  were  unwilling  to  let  slip  through  their  fin- 
gers,—  the  United  States  Bank.  Jefferson  wrote  to  Gallatin, 
July  12,  1803:  "As  to  the  patronage  of  the  Republican  Bank 
at  Providence,  I  am  decidedly  in  favor  of  making  all  the  banks 
Republican,  by  sharing  deposits  among  them  in  proportion 
to  the  disposition  they  show ;  if  the  law  now  forbids  it,  we 
should  not  permit  another  session  of  Congress  to  pass  without 
amending  it."1  In  the  days  before  the  free  banking  system, 
all  banks  had  the  birthmark  of  politics ;  and  it  is  not  surprising 
that  those  in  control  of  the  national  government  demanded  a 
<  share  of  the  bank  patronage.  A  recent  writer  has  shown  that 

Jackson's  attitude  was  not  determined  by  the  Portsmouth  epi- 
sode, but  has  pointed  out  on  the  other  hand  that  Biddle  endeav- 
,  ored  to  conciliate  Jackson  by  favorable  appointments,  turning 
Jthe  Nashville  branch  into  a  Democratic  institution  and  corre- 
isponding  continually  with  Major  Lewis  on  this  subject.  Soon 
* the  break  between  the  government  and  the  bank  became  irrecon- 
'  cilable  and  the  exchange  of  favors  ceased.2 

Jackson  promised  more  than  the  removal  of  unpopular  offi- 
cers ;  he  announced  that  he  would  reform  the  administration, 
and  made  efforts  to  carry  out  this  pledge.  His  first  step,  like 
Jefferson's  when  he  became  president,  was  thoroughly  tojny£s- 
Jigatethe  accounts  of  the  preceding  administration,  in  hope 
that  facts  tolTs^o'iscredit  might  be  discovered.  Amos  Kendall 
says  :  "  Among  the  custom-house  officers  and  other  receivers  of 
public  moneys,  numerous  peculators  were  discovered  and  hurled 
from  office.  The  depredations  of  those  who  were  removed 
within  the  first  eighteen  months  of  General  Jackson's  adminis- 
tration, in  this  department  of  the  public  service,  were  at  least 
$280,000."  3  The  real  result,  however,  was  to  show  the  substan- 
tial honesty  of  the  service  under  Adams.  In  some  instances  it 
was  found  that  the  government  was  the  debtor.  The  unfavor- 
able balance  against  Tobias  Watkins,  whose  case  was  most  com- 
mented on  by  the  Jackson  press,4  was  apparently  only  technical. 

1  Jefferson,  Writings  (Ford  ed.),  viii.  252. 

2  Catterall,  The  Second  Bank  of  the  United  States,  187-189. 

3  Kendall,  Autobiography,  298,  309-322. 

*  Nibs's  Register,  xxxvi.  235-240,  276-280,  285,  298,  315,  332,  341-344. 
374-376»  389»  42I>  xxxvii.  399,  411;   Massachusetts  Spy,   June  17,  1829. 


RETRENCHMENT.  129 

Various  administrative  reforms  were  attempted.  To  quote 
again  from  Kendall :  "  The  unrestrained  power  of  the  treasurer 
over  the  public  funds,  by  which  they  could  be  drawn  upon  his 
individual  check,  was  taken  away  by  a  new  regulation.  Frauds 
in  payment  of  fishing  bounties  were  stopped,  and  two  collectors, 
believed  to  have  been  engaged  in  them,  removed  from  office ;  in 
consequence  of  which  there  was  a  saving,  in  the  first  year  of  the*' 
administration  in  that  branch  of  expenditure,  of  $51,271.41."  l 

As  for  retrenchment,  Niles  asserted  that  the  only  action 
taken  had  been  the  abolition  of  the  office  of  draughtsman  in  the 
House  of  Representatives.2  This  is  somewhat  unfair.  The 
Democrats  had  larger  plans;  in  1830  a  House  committee 
brought  in  an  elaborate  scheme,  if  not  to  reduce  expenditures, 
at  least  to  control  them;3  and  in  1833  the  president  sent  to 
Congress  a  report  from  the  secretary  of  state,  proposing  a 
reformation  of  the  consular  service.  This  latter  plan,  while  not 
extensive,  was  wholesome ;  consuls  were  to  be  discouraged  from 
entering  into  trade,  adequate  salaries  were  to  be  provided,  and 
fees  were  to  be  curtailed  and  regulated,4  That  more  was  not 
accomplished  was  not  solely  the  fault  of  the  Jackson  leaders, 
for  they  did  not  have  complete  control  of  Congress.  Even  with 
this  hindrance,  some  good  was  done.  For  example,  the  roll  of 
salaries  (there  were  some  duplications  of  officers)  at  the  Nor- 
folk custom-house  was  reduced  from  forty-one  in  1825  to  thirty- 
three  in  1829  and  seventeen  in  1833  ;  the  reduction  in  the 
amount  paid,  however,  was  only  from  $15,991.86  in  1825  to 
$13,164.50  in  1833.  Nevertheless,  it  needs  no  accumulation  of 
evidence  to  show  that  the  whole  method  of  appointment  told 
against  effective  administration.  The  interest  in  reform  lay  hi 
finding  opponents  wrong,  rather  than  in  watching  friends  care- 
fully. Hamilton  says  that  the  president  told  him,  "  Go  to  the 
duties  of  your  office,  and  make  as  much  money  as  you  can." 
Kendall  was  an  efficient  officer;  but  the  "close  devotion"  for 
six  hours  each  day  which  he  exacted  from  his  clerks,5  he  would 

1  Kendall,  Autobiography,  298.  2  Nibs's  Register,  xxxviii.  25. 

8  House  Reports,  21  Cong.  I  sess.  i.  No.  150. 
*  Senate  Documents,  22  Cong.  2  sess.  i.  No.  83. 

5  J.  A.  Hamilton,  Reminiscences,  140;   Kendall,  Autobiography,  317-320. 
K 


THE  ESTABLISHMENT  OF  THE  SPOILS  SYSTEM. 

probably  have  dubbed  aristocratic  leisure  before  he  came  into 
office. 

•  Political  reform  fared  worse  than  administrative.  The  appoint- 
ment of  numerous  members  of  Congress  to  office  by  the  party 
which  had  long  been  denouncing  such  practice  delighted  Jack- 
son's opponents,1  and  grieved  many  of  his  friends.  In  Tennes- 
see, Mr.  Miller,  who  intended  to  run  for  Congress  in  support 
of  Jackson,  withdrew,  ostensibly  at  least,  because  the  latter  had 
seduced  one  governor  and  three  senators  into  his  cabinet.2  Jack- 
son felt  such  criticism,  and  in  his  first  annual  message  said, 
"  While  members  of  Congress  can  be  constitutionally  appointed 
to  offices  of  trust  and  profit  it  will  be  the  practice,  even  under 
the  most  conscientious  adherence  to  duty,  to  select  them  for 
such  stations  as  they  are  believed  to  be  better  qualified  to 
fill  than  other  citizens,"  and  he  advised  Congress  to  prepare 
an  amendment  prohibiting  such  appointments,3  but  it  took 
no  action  on  the  recommendation,  and  interest  in  this  issue 
gradually  died  out  after  the  overthrow  of  the  congressional 
caucus. 

Early  in  Jackson's  term,  Philip  Hone  visited  Washington  and 
conversed  with  many  persons  prominent  in  society  and  in  poli- 
tics. He  records :  "  The  prescriptive  course  which  has  been 
pursued  in  relation  to  removals  and  appointments  has  served 
to  cool  their  friends  and  to  exasperate  their  enemies.  .  .  .  (If 
Jackson  succeeds  for  another  term,  it  will  be  owing  to  the  dnrl- 
culty  of  agreeing  upon  his  successor,  rather  than  to  the  popu- 
larity of  his  administration.^  An  intense  gloom  hung  over  the- 
city  in  the  spring  of  1829;*  and  when,  shortly  after  the  pro- 
scription began,  John  Henshaw,  a  clerk  in  the  treasury  depart- 
ment, committed  suicide,  Adams  attributed  his  act  to  fear  of 
removal.5  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  public  opinion  of 
Washington  condemned  the  administration,  especially  because 

1  Sargent,  Public  Men  and  Events,  i.  167. 

2  Jackson  Gazette,  April  4,  1829. 

8  December  8,  1829,  Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers  of  the  Presidents,  ii.  448. 

4  Hone,  Diary,  i.  15  (March  26,  1831);   William  Winston  Seaton,  210. 

6  Niles's  Register,  xxxvi.  149  ;  J.  Q.  Adams,  Memoirs,  viii.  144.  Henshaw  was  a 
Jackson  man,  and  his  act  was  most  credibly  attributed  either  to  insanity  or  to  melan- 
choly. Niles's  Register,  xxxvi.  181;  Richmond  Enquirer,  May  2,  1829. 


WASHINGTON.  131 

of  its  policy  of  removals.  The  capital  was  thirty  years  old,  with 
a  stable  population  and  an  established  society.  Its  solitary 
industry  was  government,  and  when  its  respected  citizens  were 
thrown  out  of  office  there  was  little  for  them  to  do  but  to  go 
iback  and  try  to  reestablish  their  connection  with  the  home  com- 
munities from  which  they  had  long  been  severed.  The  altera- 
tion of  political  methods  affected  Washington  more  nearly  than 
any  other  part  of  the  country,  and  it  took  time  to  make  the 
adjustment.  July  13,  1829,  Van  Buren  wrote  to  Hamilton, 
"  Mr.  Calvert  .  .  .  damns  us  up  hill  and  down  for  reducing  the 
value  of  real  estate."1  When  it  is  recalled  that  in  1801  very 
few,  even  of  the  higher  officers,  had  brought  their  families  to 
the  wilderness  town  on  the  Potomac,2  and  that  consequently  few 
homes  were  broken  up  by  Jefferson's  removals,  it  will  seem  less 
strange  that  this  proscription  has  not  lived  in  the  popular 
memory,  while  that  of  Jackson  is  a  well-established  tradition. 

In  the  country  at  large  the  feeling  was  not  so  intense ;  but 
the  big-letter  headings  of  the  Columbian  Centinel  indicate  a 
disposition  to  make  party  capital  out  of  the  innovation ;  while 
the  newspaper  correspondence  on  the  subject  is  voluminous, 
containing  many  letters  from  dismissed  officers,  which  show  the 
evils  of  rotation  and  the  true  aim  of  the  civil  service.  Particu- 
larly the  case  of  the  venerable  Major  Melville,  called  the  "last 
of  the  Mohawks,"  or  participators  in  the  Boston  Tea-Party,  was 
exhibited  to  excite  sympathy.  The  character  of  many  of  the 
new  appointees  was  roundly  attacked.  Yet  the  contest  was 
not  without  its  amenities :  McLean  wrote  to  one  man  removed, 
that  he  had  faithfully  performed  his  duties ;  and  the  Adams 
papers  occasionally  acknowledged  that  good  appointments  were 
made.3 

Aside  from  personal  hardships  and  the  more  obvious  evils  of 
frequent  change  of  officers,  the  opposition  press  most  deplored 
the  tendency  of  the  new  system  to  create  a  class  of  office- 
seekers.  The  Massachusetts  Spy  feared  that  the  nature  of  our 

1  J.  A.  Hamilton,  Reminiscences,  142. 

2  See,  for  example,  Pickering  to  Adams,  May  12, 1800,  John  Adams,  Works,  ix.  54. 
8  Niles>s  Register,  xxxvi.  242 ;  Ibid,  xxxviii.  112  ;  Massachusetts  Spy,  April  i,  1829 ; 

Columbian  Centinel,  April  29,  1829;  Kentucky  Reporter,  October  20,  1830. 


132      THE  ESTABLISHMENT  OF  THE  SPOILS  SYSTEM. 

institutions  tempted  every  man  to  fit  his  son  for  a  profession, 
that  the  ranks  were  becoming  overcrowded,  and  that  the  un- 
successful would  be  encouraged  to  seek  government  support ; 1 
and  even  the  Jackson  Gazette  voiced  similar  fears.  It  is  inter- 
esting to  note  that  De  Tocqueville,  in  spite  of  his  American 
experience,  believed  that  office-hunting  was  characteristic  rather 
of  monarchies  than  of  democracies.2  The  true  significance  of 
the  crowd  of  applicants  we  shall  discuss  later. 

The  dissatisfaction  was  not  entirely  confined  to  the  opponents 
of  Jackson.  Hamilton  wrote,  April  23,  1829,  that  he  was 
"cruelly  disappointed  at  the  manner  in  which,  and  to  the 
extent  removals  and  appointments  are  made "  ;  and  he  was 
not  alone.3  Particularly  in  the  Southern  press  a  note  of  dissent 
is  perceived :  removals  are  defended  as  necessary  under  the 
circumstances,  but  obviously  it  was  not  universally  desired  that 
the  custom  should  become  established.  In  contradistinction  to 
Jackson's  optimistic  observation  in  regard  to  the  ability  of  any 
American  to  fill  any  vacancy,  \hzjackson  Gazette  said  that  even 
the  subordinate  places  required  several  months,  or  even  years 
of  experience.4 

No  doubt  or  misgiving,  however,  can  be  found  in  the  jubilant 
note  of  the  Telegraph  and  the  Globe :  they  foretold,  welcomed, 
and  defended  every  step  in  the  progress  of  the  spoils  system. 
"  Reform,"  said  the  Telegraph,  —  "  the  very  word  acts  like  an 
electric  shock  upon  some  men."  5  They  had  no  sympathy  for 
men  removed, — those  who  could  not  get  a  living  otherwise 
were  not  worth  their  salaries  to  the  government,  —  Jet  them 
"root,  hog,  or  die."  "There  are  many  clerks  in  the  depart- 
ments," wrote  a  correspondent  to  the  Telegraph,  March  27, 
1829,  "  who  feel  they  have  a  vested  right  in  the  premises,  based 
on  the  proscriptive  claims  of  the  term  of  twenty,  thirty,  and 
forty  years'  actual  possession.  ^Secondly,  some  approximation 
of  equality  in  the  distribution  of  the  government  favors  among 
its  citizens  ought  always  to  be  held  in  the  view  of  the  republic/N 

1  April  8,  1829. 

2  Democracy  in  America,  ii.  ch.  xx. 

3  J.  A.  Hamilton,  Reminiscences,  136;   Parton,  Jackson,  iii.  212. 

4  April  25,  1826. 

5  Telegraph,  March  26,  1829,  and  November,  1828,  to  November,  1830,  passim. 


SUCCESS.  133 

The  arguments  of  the  Telegraph  were  widely  echoed  by  the 
press,1  and  were  summed  up  by  Marcy  in  his  famous  phrase, 
"  To  the  victors  belong  the  spoils."  The  elections  showed  that, 
if  the  people  did  not  support  Jackson  because  of  his  method  of 
reform,  they  at  any  rate  supported  him  in  spite  of  it. 

1  E.g.  Boston  Statesman,  November  18,  1828,  quoted  in  Derby,  Political  Reminis- 
cences, 37-38. 


CHAPTER   VI. 

IMMEDIATE   EFFECTS   OF  THE  NEW  POLICY. 
1837-1845. 

JACKSON  had  sown  the  wind,  and  Van  Buren  was  to  reap  the 
whirlwind ;  nor  can  there  be  much  doubt  that,  so  far  as  the 
civil  service  is  concerned,  he  deserved  the  harvest  that  he  gar- 
nered. Martin  Van  Buren  is  a  man  with  a  recently  rehabilitated 
reputation  :  we  find  in  him  now  a  force  and  an  ability  unacknowl- 
edged by  his  contemporaries,  and  the  temptation  is  to  go  to  the 
extreme  and  to  sink  the  politician  in  the  statesman.  It  is  true 
that  in  1829  he  did  not  directly  meddle  in  minor  politics  to 
any  considerable  extent,  and  that  as  president  he  made  but 
eighty  removals.1  His  indirect  influence  under  Jackson,  how- 
ever, we  have  seen  to  be  enormous ;  and  the  chief  reason 
for  his  moderation  while  at  the  head  of  the  government  was 
that  the  personnel  of  the  service  was  favorable  to  him,  as  is 
shown  by  the  large  number  of  office-holders  who  supported  his 
candidacy  at  the  Baltimore  convention.2  It  is  quite  true  that 
the  spoils  system  was  not  the  work  of  Van  Buren  or  'of  Jack- 
son, or  of  any  one  man ;  it  was  the  result  of  a  gradual  develop- 
ment :  but  evolution  cannot  relieve  an  individual  of  his  personal 
responsibility  any  more  than  predestination  excuses  a  man's 
sin.  The  fact  remains  that  Van  Buren  stood  before  the  coun- 
try as  the  head  of  the  Albany  Regency  and  the  representative 
supporter  of  the  spoils  system ;  that  he  associated  with  politi- 
cians who  represented  what  was  worse  in  the  politics  of  the 

1  Fish,  in  American  Historical  Association,  Reports,  1899,  i.  75. 

2  Niles's  Register,  xlviii.  248. 

134 


VAN-  BUREN.  135 

time;  and  that  he  appointed  Jesse  Hoyt  to  succeed  Samuel 
Swartwout  as  collector  at  New  York.1 

It  is  because  of  the  opportunity  which  it  affords  for  a  study 
of  the  results  of  the  spoils  system  on  governmental  efficiency  that 
Van  Buren's  administration  is  chiefly  interesting  to  the  student 
of  the  civil  service.  Principles  remained  as  Jackson  had  enun- 
ciated them;  qualifications  were  the  same  as  in  1829;  and  the 
machinery  was  in  a  state  of  transition  between  the  confusion 
which  we  observed  in  the  last  chapter  and  the  definite  order  of 
the  fifties.  While  the  materials  for  such  a  study  are  unusually 
abundant,  it  is  peculiarly  difficult  to  arrive  at  a  fair  judgment. 
Conditions,  as  we  have  seen,  varied  greatly  in  different  parts 
of  the  country,  and  Jackson  added  another  element  of  diversity. 

A  spoils  system  does  not  drive  ability  from  the  civil  service ; 
it  rather  attracts  many  brilliant  men  who  think  they  can  sail 
best  in  troubled  waters ;  it  appeals  to  the  gambler's  instinct. 
Such  men  have  characteristics  different  from  those  of  the 
seekers  after  the  safe  monotony  of  a  life  position,  but  their 
capacities  are  fully  as  great.  The  really  deleterious  change 
that  the  spoils  system  does  make  is  to  throw  open  the  doors  of 
office  to  a  very  inferior  class  of  men,  and  to  lower  the  mini- 
mum of  capacity  required.  This  fact,  by  increasing  the  distance 
between  the  extremes,  makes  the  task  of  generalization  more 
difficult,  A  special  condition  must  also  be  given  due  weight  at 
this  time, — the  panic  of  1837. 

Investigation  into  the  efficiency  of  the  civil  service  under  Van 
Buren  is  not  much  aided  by  popular  criticism  of  the  details  of 
administration,  for  comments  on  them  are  almost  as  rare,  dur- 
ing the  twelve  years  from  1829  to  1841,  as  during  the  previous 
period.  The  department  of  the  national  government  that  most 
nearly  affects  the  larger  part  of  our  population  is  the  post-office. 
At  the  beginning  of  Jackson's  administration,  when  the  great 
change  of  personnel  had  disturbed  the  delicate  machinery  of 
the  mails,  there  was  some  public  fault-finding,2  but  after  the 

1  Mackenzie,  Benjamin  F.  Butler  and  Jesse  /Tiy/and  Martin  Van  Buren,  passim  ; 
Von  Hoist,  United  States,  ii.  354,  note  ;   Executive  Journal,  v.  66  (January  29,  1838). 

2  Massachusetts  Spy,   May   13,   1829,  quoted  in  Albany  Argus,  July  17,  1829; 
Richmond  Enquirer,  May  18,  1841  ;  Niles's  Register ;  xxxvi.  315.    There  are  more 


136        IMMEDIATE  EFFECTS  OF  THE  NEW  POLICY. 

first  few  months  it  was  heard  no  more;  the  tolerance  of  the 
American  public  cannot  be  exaggerated.  There  was  some  con- 
gressional investigation,  but  it  was  hushed  by  the  death  of 
Barry.  Our  discussion  must  therefore  be  based  chiefly  on  offi- 
cial documents,  and,  in  the  main,  be  confined  to  two  depart- 
ments, —  the  land  office  and  the  customs  service. 

The  land  office  was  peculiarly  liable  to  suffer  from  all  the 
adverse  conditions  of  the  times.  The  local  offices  were  widely 
scattered,  and  often  in  places  difficult  of  access ;  the  officers  were 
therefore  comparatively  independent.  The  majority  of  them, 
moreover,  were  situated  along  the  frontier,  or  in  the  newer  dis- 
tricts, where  it  was  often  impossible  to  find,  except  at  long  in- 
tervals, proper  means  of  forwarding  to  the  central  government 
the  money  received  for  lands.  Local  banking  institutions  were 
unsound  and  local  currency  worthless  a  hundred  miles  away. 
Moreover,  the  frontier  lacks  the  business  knowledge,  and  conse- 
quently the  high  standard  of  business  honesty,  of  a  long-estab- 
lished community.  As  Mr.  Garesche,  a  clever  agent  of  the 
treasury,  wrote  to  Secretary  Woodbury,  the  code  of  morality  in 
general  was  lower  than  that  acknowledged  in  the  East.  When, 
in  addition  to  these  circumstances,  the  sudden  expansion  of 
land  purchases,  springing  from  $5,000,000  in  1834  to  nearly 
$25,000,000  in  I837,1  is  remembered,  with  the  temptations  to 
speculation  thus  brought  to  the  land  officers,  it  cannot  be 
astonishing  that  irregularities  are  to  be  found. 

During  these  years  the  treasury  department  had  special  agents 
travelling  about  the  country  examining  the  condition  of  the 
offices,  the  local  standing  of  the  officers,  and  sometimes  their 
political  affiliations.  Whether  the  investigations  on  the  latter 
point  were  or  were  not  in  pursuance  of  verbal  instructions  can- 
not be  ascertained,  but  the  fact  that  the  subject  is  very  often  not 
mentioned  would  seem  to  indicate  that  they  were  not.  A  char- 
acteristic summing  up  of  such  an  investigation  is  as  follows : 
"  Messrs.  Ball  and  Leiper  appear  intelligent  men,  and  no  doubt 
will  conduct  the  business  with  fidelity  and  impartiality.  They 

complaints  in  letters  than  in  the  press,  and  the  blame  is  generally  thrown  on  the 
difficulties  of  travel  rather  than  on  the  government. 
1  Bourne,  Distribution  of  the  Surplus. 


THE  LAND   OFFICE.  137 

are  zealous  supporters  of  the  administration,  and  very  popular." l 
Mr.  Garesche,  the  ablest  of  these  agents,  reported  that  very  few 
officers  understood  bookkeeping:2  there  is  scarcely  an  office 
reported  in  which  the  examiner  did  not  find  errors  that,  on  ex- 
amination, proved  careless  rather  than  fraudulent ;  the  different 
sets  of  books  hardly  ever  coincided.  In  1836  Garesche  was 
sent  to  New  Orleans  to  investigate  fraudulent  land  purchases, 
which  rumor  magnified  to  such  an  extent  that  the  governor 
mentioned  the  subject  in  a  message  to  the  legislature ;  but  close 
examination  by  a  legislative  committee  revealed  scarcely  any- 
thing definite,  except  some  looseness  in  dealing  with  purchasers.3 

Such  incompetent  bookkeepers  could  not  successfully  cover 
up  extensive  frauds ;  but  the  government  was  not  as  particular 
as  it  should  have  been  in  enforcing  the  land  laws,  and  a  clever 
man  could  buy  as  much  land  as  he  wished  regardless  of  restric- 
tions. Many  of  the  officers  bought  land  extensively  on  their 
own  account,  sometimes  covering  it  with  the  name  of  a  near 
relative  or  partner.4  Some  loaned  out  for  their  own  advantage 
the  government  balances  that  they  held ;  and  many  were  in  the 
habit  of  exchanging  money,  a  practice  which  might  or  might 
not  be  dishonest,  but  which  was  certainly  improper  considering 
the  monetary  conditions  of  the  time.  One  receiver  of  public 
money  was  reported  as  farming  out  his  office.5  The  locating  of 
purchases  upon  the  plats  seems  to  have  been  poorly  done,  a 
circumstance  from  which  resulted  much  -confusion  ;  but  the  only 
complaint  commonly  made  to  the  special  agents  by  the  public 
was  that  the  land  surveying  was  not  done  rapidly  enough,6  and 
this  may  have  been  the  result  of  the  voracious  demand  rather 
than  of  inactivity. 

That  the  crisis  of  1837  should  under  these  conditions  have 

1  Senate  Documents,  23  Cong.  I  sess.  vi.  No.  439,  p.  26. 

2  Ibid.  p.  19. 

8  House  Documents,  25  Cong.  2  sess.  ix.  No.  297,  p.  297. 

4  Senate  Documents,  23  Cong.  I  sess.  vi.  No.  439,  p.  2;  House  Documents,  25 
Cong.  2  sess.  ix.  No.  297,  pp.  192,  205,  297  ff.  Every  report  contains  a  list  of  such 
lands. 

6  Senate  Documents,  23  Cong.  I  sess.  vi.  No.  439,  p.  28 ;  House  Documents,  25 
Cong.  2  sess.  ix.  No.  297,  pp.  192,  292. 

6  Senate  Documents,  23  Cong.  I  sess.  vi.  No.  439,  p.  18. 


138         IMMEDIATE  EFFECTS  OF  THE  NEW  POLICY. 

staggered  the  land  office  can  cause  no  surprise.  The  statement 
of  Clay,  that  sixty-four  out  of  sixty-seven  of  its  local  officers  were 
defaulters,  may  have  been  temporarily  true ; l  but  owing  to  the 
wise  leniency  and  careful  nursing  of  Secretary  Woodbury  the 
loss  was  not  so  great  as  might  have  been  anticipated.  It  is 
impossible  to  state,  with  any  near  approach  to  accuracy,  what 
the  loss  finally  amounted  to;  $750,000  would  fairly  approxi- 
mate it.2 

If  we  may  trust  the  apparently  frank  reports  of  the  special 
agents,  it  is  noticeable  that  nearly  all  these  men  had  the  confi- 
dence of  their  communities ; 3  and  often,  though  they  had  an 
unfavorable  balance  against  them,  they  retained  the  confidence 
of  the  treasury  department.  An  interesting  case  is  that  of  the 
receiver  of  public  money  at  Columbus.  He  had  speculated  with 
government  funds  and  had  lost,  and  he  appeared  as  a  defaulter. 
Mr.  Garesche,  who  examined  the  case,  wrote  to  Woodbury : 
"  The  man  seems  really  penitent ;  and  I  am  inclined  to  think,  in 
common  with  his  friends,  that  he  is  honest,  and  has  been  led 
away  from  his  duty  by  the  example  of  his  predecessor,  and  a 
certain  looseness  in  the  code  of  morality  which  here  does  not 
move  in  so  limited  a  circle  as  it  does  with  us  at  home.  Another 
receiver  would  probably  follow  in  the  footsteps  of  the  two.  You 
will  not,  therefore,  be  surprised  if  I  recommend  his  being  re- 
tained, in  preference  to  another  appointment;  for  he  has  his 
hands  full  now,  and  will  not  be  disposed  to  speculate  any 
more.  .  .  .  He  has,  moreover,  pledged  his  word  that,  if  re- 
tained, he  will  strictly  obey  the  law.  .  .  .  Lenity  towards  him 
.  .  .  might  stimulate  him  to  exertions  which  severity  might  per- 
haps paralyze."  He  further  stated  that  the  deficit  amounted  to 
$55*965.54,  and  that  the  defaulter  owned  land  that,  if  sold  at 

1  Speech  at  a  Harrison  convention,  August  17,  1840,  Clay,  Works,  vi.  218. 

3  House  Documents,  25  Cong.  3  sess.  iv.  No.  122,  particularly  pp.  15-37;  House 
Reports,  25  Cong.  3  sess.  ii.  No.  313  (pp.  143-147  give  a  list  of  the  unfavorable 
balances).  The  amount  due  from  receivers  on  the  list  of  defaulters,  January  15, 
1838,  was  $1,073,837.41,  of  which  $248,159.13  had  accrued  prior  to  March,  1829. 
Niles's  Register,  Ivi.  140-141. 

3  What  few  complaints  are  found  are  chiefly  made  by  disappointed  land  pur- 
chasers, and  they  rarely  make  out  a  good  case.  See  House  Documents,  25  Cong. 
2  sess.  ix.  No.  297. 


THE  COLLECTION  OF  CUSTOMS.  139 

$1.2$  per  acre,  would  amount  to  $61, 549.98.!  We  may  disagree 
with  Mr.  Garesche  as  to  the  expediency  of  retaining  the  officer 
under  the  circumstances,  but  he  was  certainly  right  in  his  esti- 
mate of  conditions.  It  was,  in  the  mind  of  most  frontiersmen 
and  inhabitants  of  new  places,  a  very  long  step  between  stealing 
another's  money  and  speculating  with  it.  The  main  fault  lay  in 
the  general  unfamiliarity  with  business  methods ;  and  we  may 
question  whether  even  Adams  could  have  kept  the  service  en- 
tirely above  its  environment,  though  he  might  well  have  done 
better  than  Jackson  and  Van  Buren. 

Somewhat  different  was  the  plight  of  the  customs  department. 
There  the  defalcations  were  less  widespread ;  but  the  individual 
cases  were  more  striking,  and  the  losses  were  due  to  simon- 
pure  dishonesty.  Educated  by  thirty  years  of  corrupt  politics, 
the  New  York  politicians  were  ready  to  make  the  most  of  the 
chance  that  Jackson  gave  them.  Swartwout  proved  a  "  king  of 
defaulters  "  ;  his  stealings  were  estimated,  in  1838,  at  $1,250,000. 
So  cleverly  had  his  books  been  falsified  that  as  late  as  1836  he 
deceived  a  committee  politically  hostile  to  him.  He  passed  the 
evening  of  his  days  abroad,  accompanied  in  his  flight  by  Price, 
the  district  attorney,  who  stole  a  paltry  $60,000  on  his  own  ac- 
count, but  aided  Swartwout  in  his  operations.2 

Jesse  Hoyt,  who  succeeded  to  the  New  York  collectorship,  was 
more  fortunate  rather  than  essentially  better  than  Swartwout. 
He  drew  the  interest  on  large  sums  of  public  money,  and  left  a 
temporary  deficit  of  $160,563.31,  which  would  have  been  much 
larger  if  he  had  not  written  off  in  his  own  favor,  without  any 
legal  justification,  $201,580  as  a  one  per  cent  fee  on  the  duties 
collected.3  The  congressional  reports  make  it  clear  that  the 

1  House  Documents,  25  Cong.  2  sess.  ix.  No.  297,  pp.  241-258.      Von  Hoist, 
unfamiliar  with  the  American  idiom,  understood  Garesche  as  saying  that  the  man 
had  "  his  hands  full "  of  stolen  money,  and  as  advising  Woodbury  to  keep  him  for 
that  reason,  on  the  analogy  of  the  fox  and  the  gorged  flies  ;   and  he  uses  the  case  as 
a  text  for  a  denunciation  of  the  administration.     Von  Hoist,  United  States,  ii.  355, 
note. 

2  Woodbury's  Report,  House  Documents,  25  Cong.  2  sess.  v.  No.  1 1 1  ;  Ibid.  25 
Cong.  3  sess.  ii.  No.  13,  iii.  No.  54,  iv.  No.  122;  Von  Hoist,  United  States,  ii.  350- 
354;   Poore,  Perley's  Reminiscences,  i.  129;    Globe,  May  22,  1839. 

3  House  Documents,  27  Cong.  2  sess.  vi.  No.  212,  pp.  65-67.    The  entire  report 
contains  1720  pages. 


140        IMMEDIATE  EFFECTS  OF  THE  NEW  POLICY. 

custom-house  was  regarded  as  the  Democratic  citadel  of  New 
York,  and  that  the  collector's  chief  function  was  to  return  a 
Democratic  majority.1  Some  idea  of  the  loss  of  efficiency  is 
given  by  the  fact  that,  while  the  collection  of  customs  under 
Adams  cost  one  and  one-half  per  cent,  it  cost  under  Swartwout 
two  and  one-half,  and  under  Hoyt  five  and  one-half ; 2  it  is  im- 
possible to  estimate  the  financial  loss  of  the  government,  as 
much  of  this  was  the  result  of  fraudulent  assessment  and  con- 
nivance at  the  illegal  entry  of  goods.  These  evils,  unlike  those 
of  the  land  office,  were  due  solely  to  the  spoils  system :  Jackson 
alone  was  responsible  for  Swartwout;  Van  Buren  alone  was 
responsible  for  Jesse  Hoyt,  and  neither  Swartwout  nor  Hoyt 
would  have  been  appointed  by  any  previous  administration. 

The  spoils  system  was  violently  attacked  from  the  beginning. 
The  leaders  of  the  opposition  were  personally  affected  by  it. 
Clay  wrote,  "  Our  poor  friends,  Cutts,  Watkins,  and  Lee,  are 
among  the  sufferers."  3  It  was  easy  for  those  who  were  being 
despoiled  to  see  distinctly  the  evils  which  the  system  brought  in 
its  train.  Clay  wrote,  May  15,  1829,  "Incumbents,  feeling  the 
instability  of  their  situation,  and  knowing  their  liability  to 
periodic  removals,  at  short  terms,  without  any  regard  to  the 
manner  in  which  they  have  executed  their  trust,  will  be  disposed 
to  make  the  most  of  their  uncertain  offices  while  they  have 
them,  and  hence  we  may  expect  immediate  cases  of  fraud, 
predation  and  corruption."  In  a  debate  in  1831,  Webster 
magniloquently  elaborated  these  and  other  evils ;  and  in  the 
same  year  the  National  Republican  convention  in  New  York 
violently  denounced  the  proscription.4 

The  efforts  of  the  Whig  leaders  to  check  Jackson's  course 
were  futile,  as  we  have  seen,  but  they  served  to  make  both  sides 
think  out  their  principles.  The  first  attempt  to  define  the  pro- 
gramme of  the  opposition  was  made  March  7,  1834,  when  Clay 

1  House  Documents,  27  Cong.  2  sess.  vi.  No.  212,  pp.  67,  459-462,  479-481,  487- 
488  ;  Senate  Documents,  23  Cong.  I  sess.  v.  No.  422,  vi.  Nos.  435,  442  ;  House  Docu- 
ments, 27  Cong.  2  sess.  ii.  No.  77,  vi.  No.  212. 

a  D.  B.  Eaton's  report,  House  Executive  Documents,  46  Cong.  2  sess.  No.  94. 

8  Clay,  Private  Correspondence,  226. 

4  Clay,  Works,  v.  376  ;  Sargent,  Public  Men  and  Events,  i.  286  ;  Niles's  Register, 
xl.  278. 


THE  WHIG  PROGRAMME.  141 

introduced  into  the  Senate  a  series  of  resolutions  embodying 
some  doubtful  constitutional  interpretations  and  referring  several 
questions  to  committees.1  At  the  next  session  of  Congress  a 
committee  was  appointed  to  consider  the  whole  subject  of  the 
reduction  of  the  patronage,  and  to  report  to  the  Senate  such 
measures  as  seemed  advisable.  Calhoun  was  chairman,  and 
Judge  White,  who  had  served  on  the  similar  committee  of  1826, 
was  an  active  member.  Benton,  who  had  been  the  leading 
figure  in  the  previous  investigation,  was  now  in  favor  with  the 
administration,  and  so  could  take  no  prominent  part  in  a  pro- 
ceeding which  was  an  implied  criticism  of  Jackson.  The  report 
was  submitted  February  9,  1835,  and  was  at  once  ordered  to  be 
printed  for  public  distribution,  together  with  Benton's  report 
of  i826.2  The  bills  which  were  its  logical  outcome  were 
not  presented  with  the  report  itself,  but  may  be  combined 
with  it  in  treatment.  The  suggestions  in  brief  were:  (i)  a 
constitutional  amendment  to  secure  the  distribution  of  the 
surplus ;  (2)  a  provision  that  banks  be  charged  interest  on  the 
national  money  left  with  them  on  deposit  —  measures  intended 
to  cut  down  the  patronage.  In  addition,  the  following  regu- 
lations in  regard  to  that  part  of  the  civil  service  which  must 
be  retained  were  proposed :  (3)  that  the  Four  Years'  Bill  be 
repealed ;  (4)  that  the  accounts  of  all  disbursing  officers  be 
periodically  laid  before  the  Senate ;  (5)  "  that,  in  all  nominations 
made  by  the  President  to  the  Senate,  to  fill  vacancies  occasioned 
by  removal  from  office,  the  facts  of  the  removal  shall  be  stated  to 
the  Senate  at  the  same  time  that  the  nomination  is  made,  with 
a  statement  of  the  reasons  for  such  removal."3 

The  debate  brought  forth  by  this  report  was  brilliant.  Web- 
ster devoted  the  greater  part  of  his  speech  to  the  exposition  of 
his  favorite  doctrine  that  the  Senate  possessed  the  constitutional 
right  to  advise  and  consent  to  removals.  He  was  willing  to 
support  the  bill  proposed,  because  he  thought  that  the  restric- 

1  Senate  Documents,  23  Cong.  I  sess.  iii.  No.  155. 

2  Senate  Journal,  23  Cong.   2  sess.    148.     In  regard  to  it,  see  Madison,  Letters 
and  Other  Writings,  iv.   34  ;  J.  Q.  Adams,  Memoirs,  ix.  357  ;  Tyler,  The  Tylers, 

i.  524. 

8  Senate' Documents,  23  Cong.  2  sess.  iii.  Nos.  108,  109  ;  Congressional  Debates,  23 
Cong.  2  sess.  361,  422. 


142         IMMEDIATE  EFFECTS  OF  THE  NEW  POLICY. 

tions,  and  particularly  the  regulation  that  the  president  should 
present  to  the  Senate  the  causes  of  removals,  "  mild  and  gentle  " 
as  they  were,  would  have  some  effect  in  correcting  the  evils 
which  beset  the  progress  of  the  government.  Clay  took  the 
same  general  ground,  but  proposed  an  amendment  resembling 
the  Tenure-of-Office  Bill  of  1867.  Calhoun  delivered  by  far  the 
ablest  speech,  but  he,  too,  occupied  himself  chiefly  with  the 
constitutional  question,  taking  it  up  from  the  point  of  view  of 
expediency.1 

These  speeches,  and  others,  were  eloquent  and  sincere ;  they 
exhibited  high  ideals  of  the  civil  service  pleasing  to  contem- 
plate, and  are  full  of  passages  suitable  for  quotation  by  the 
civil  service  reformer.  When  we  turn,  however,  to  the  meas- 
ures proposed,  we  find  a  paucity  of  invention  painful  to  con- 
template. If  these  men,  after  ten  years  of  discussion  of  the 
civil  service,  could  not  propose  measures  better  calculated  to 
improve  it,  their  ability  has  been  overrated.  The  fact  is,  that 
what  had  so  long  occupied  their  attention  was  not  primarily 
the  civil  service,  but  the  patronage :  their  first  object  was  not 
to  secure  good  work,  but  to  reduce  the  power  of  the  president ; 
it  was  still  political  and  administrative  reform  which  they  felt 
necessary.  The  bill  passed  the  Senate  by  a  vote  of  thirty-one 
to  sixteen,2  slept  for  a  year,  and  then  was  killed  by  the  House 
in  committee  of  the  whole.  The  Whigs,  therefore,  were  con- 
strained to  wait  for  the  adoption  of  their  plans  until  they  should 
obtain  control  of  all  branches  of  the  government. 

The  interest  in  these  debates  evinced  in  the  country  at  large 
was  great  enough  to  urge  the  Whig  leaders  to  redoubled 
efforts;3  and  when  the  crises  of  1837  and  1839  came,  they 
pointed  to  them  as  a  fulfilment  of  their  predictions.  With  un- 
remitting zeal  they  belabored  the  administration  for  the  fraud 
and  incompetency  which  infested  the  service.  As  far  as  issues 
are  discernible  in  the  noisy  campaign  of  1840,  reform  was  the 

1  Webster,  Works,  ii.  88  ff. ;  Congressional  Debates,  23  Cong.  2  sess.  461,  518-524, 

553-563. 

2  Ibid.  576. 

8  See  a  petition  from  the  legislature  of  Connecticut  (House  Documents,  25  Cong. 
2  sess.  xi.  No.  442)  and  a  resolution  of  the  Tennessee  legislature,  October  12, 
1835  (Good  Government,  June  15,  1896). 


THE  WHIG   VICTORY.  143 

most  prominent.  Particularly  was  this  true  in  the  South, 
where  the  state-rights  men,  a  little  out  of  sympathy  with  many 
of  the  schemes  of  their  Northern  allies,  could  join  unequivocally 
in  the  plan  to  curtail  the  powers  of  the  chief  executive.  The 
Democrats  vainly  brought  countercharges,  claiming  that  all 
the  defaulters  had  been  Federalists  and  were  now  at  heart 
Whigs.1  This  was  quite  too  absurd  to  fool  the  people,  and 
the  result  of  the  election  was  to  place  the  Whigs  in  full  control 
of  the  government  and  give  them  an  opportunity  to  put  into 
effect  the  reform  that  they  had  been  so  long  preaching. 

How  was  the  reform  to  begin?  Should  the  Whigs  follow 
the  precedent  set  by  Jackson  ?  These  questions  forced  them- 
selves peremptorily  forward  in  the  very  hour  of  victory. 
Though  Harrison,  in  a  letter  to  the  people  of  Tennessee,  indi- 
cated that  he  would  not  make  removals  for  opinion's  sake, 
the  question  could  not  be  considered  as  settled.  The  cabinet 
eagerly  discussed  it,  and  the  opposition  papers  announced  that 
a  prescriptive  policy  was  being  forced  upon  the  president  by 
the  Whig  leaders,  especially  by  Clay.  Whatever  might  be  the 
position  of  the  leaders,  the  insistent  call  of  the  office-seeking 
mob,  numbering  from  thirty  to  forty  thousand,  that  travelled 
to  Washington  could  not  be  mistaken.  We  have  the  testimony 
of  Adams  that  they  were  orderly  and  well-behaved ;  but  their 
influence  on  the  policy  of  the  administration  was  precisely  the 
same  as  that  of  their  predecessors  in  1829,  and  they  found  a 
voice  in  the  blatant  Madisonian.  Whatever  its  repugnance, 
the  cabinet  during  March,  1841,  decided  upon  an  extensive 
change  of  personnel  throughout  the  civil  service.2 

Much  time  might  be  spent  in  discussing  the  chain  of  events 
that  led  up  to  this  decision ;  but  it  would  be  time  wasted,  for 

1  See  speech  of  Mr.  Duncan  in  Congress,  Globe,  May  23,  1839.     Lists  are  given 
showing  money  lost  to  the  government  by  defalcations  of  Federalists,  beginning  with 
the  $12,898  hypothecated  by  John  Adams,  and  including  the  $1,250,000  taken  by 
Swartwout.     It  will  be  remembered  that  in  1836  Swartwout  supported  White  for  the 
presidency. 

2  Poore,  Perley's  Reminiscences,  i.  259,  382  ;   Globe,  April  27,  1841 ;  J.  Q.  Adams, 
Memoirs,  x.  439  ;  Richmond  Enquirer,  March  6,  II,  1841;   Tyler,  The  Tylers,  ii.  32. 
Niles,  quoting  from  the  Madisonian  of  April  6,  1841,  attributes  to  the  pertinacity 
of  these  men  the  death  of  Harrison.    Niles 's  Register,  Ix.  83. 


144        IMMEDIATE  EFFECTS  OF  THE  NEW  POLICY. 

the  result  was  practically  dictated  by  circumstances.  It  was 
a  fundamental  weakness  of  the  civil  service  as  established  in 
the  United  States  at  that  time,  that  when  one  party  had  begun 
to  turn  out  its  opponents,  its  successors  were  almost  forced  to 
do  the  same.  The  long  continuance  of  the  Republican  party 
in  power  after  1801  had  put  off  the  evil  time,  but  had  not 
changed  the  conditions.  Ninety-nine  out  of  every  hundred 
Whigs  thought  that  the  Democrats  deserved  punishment  for 
the  proscription  of  1829,  and  that  the  most  appropriate  penalty 
would  be  to  turn  them  out  of  the  offices  they  had  usurped. 
For  many  years,  moreover,  the  Whigs  had  been  criticising  the 
civil  service  as  corrupt,  and  naturally  their  first  step  in  reform 
was  to  put  new  blood  into  it:  similia  similibus  curantur. 
When  it  is  remembered,  in  addition,  that  the  majority  of  the 
Whigs  were  human  Americans,  who  wanted  a  good  office  if 
they  could  get  it,  it  must  be  conceded  that  a  proscription  was 
inevitable. 

One  result  of  the  proscription  was  an  amusing  volte  face,  not 
uncommon  in  American  journalism.  The  Democratic  papers 
were  filled  with  material  that  might  have  been  cribbed  from 
their  opponents  of  1829.  They  resorted  to  the  old  device,  that 
the  Federalists  used  in  Jefferson's  time,  of  publishing  each 
day  extracts  from  speeches  which  had  been  delivered  by  the 
Whig  leaders  in  condemnation  of  Jackson,  and  beneath  these 
headings  citing  specimens  of  their  practice  now  that  they  were 
in  power.  The  more  conservative  Whig  papers  barely  men- 
tioned offices,  and  printed  appointments  only,  omitting  re- 
movals, as  Niles  claimed  that  Jackson  editors  did  twelve  years 
earlier.  The  Madisonian,  however,  boldly  took  up  the  gospel 
of  the  Telegraph,  and  resorted  to  all  the  old  arguments  of  the 
spoilsmen,  —  rotation,  and  the  duty  of  the  executive  to  com- 
plete the  proscription  that  the  people,  by  removing  the  elective 
officers,  had  begun.  Papers  of  a  middle  type  did  not  defend 
removals  in  general,  but  rejoiced  in  the  ejectment  of  "brawling 
and  unscrupulous  public  lecturers."1 

The  most  effective  answer  to  criticism  that  the  Whigs  could 

1  Richmond  Enquirer,  May  7,  10,  1841;  April  13,  1841,  quoting  Springfield 
Gazette. 


WHIG  PROGRAMME  REJECTED.  145 

have  given  would  have  been  the  adoption  of  the  measures 
which  they  themselves  had  proposed  in  1835.  This  obvious 
course  they  did  not  follow,  either  because  they  had  become  con- 
vinced that  such  schemes  were  impracticable,  or  because  they 
merely  considered  that  circumstances  alter  cases.  When  Mr. 
Watterson,  in  June,  1841,  introduced  a  resolution  preceded  by  a 
long  preamble  setting  forth  the  sentiments  of  Webster,  Clay, 
and  Crittenden  on  the  question  of  the  patronage,  and  calling 
for  "  the  names  of  all  officers  dismissed  .  .  .  with  the  reasons 
for  the  dismissals  in  each  particular  case,"  the  House  refused, 
by  a  vote  of  130  to  57,  to  suspend  the  rules  to  allow  the  reso- 
lution to  be  considered.1  Two  reports  were  presented  to 
Congress :  one  to  the  House  by  Garrett  Davis  in  1842, 
recommending  that  the  law  of  1820  be  repealed,  and  that  re- 
movals be  made  for  stated  cause  only;  and  the  other  to  the 
Senate  by  J.  T.  Morehead  in  1844,  embodying  an  argument 
for  the  right  of  the  Senate  to  advise  and  consent  to  removals ; 
but  no  action  was  taken  on  either  of  them.2 

Instead  of  carrying  out  their  programme  and  so  justifying  their 
good  faith,  the  Whigs  attempted  the  impossible  task  of  defend- 
ing their  own  action  by  showing  how  black  were  their  oppo- 
nents. Commissions  were  appointed  to  investigate  government 
offices  wherever  mismanagement  was  suspected.  One  was  sent 
to  Norfolk;  another  headed  by  Matthew  St.  Clair  spread  dis- 
may through  Washington ;  the  most  important  was  that  of 
which  Poindexter  was  chairman,  and  which  exposed  the  rotten- 
ness of  the  national  service  in  the  city  of  New  York.  These 
commissions  exposed  much  fraud ;  but  some  of  them  committed 
the  error  of  sitting  behind  closed  doors,  and  they  were  therefore 
denounced  by  the  Democrats  as  "espionage  commissions,"3 
whereby  their  findings  were  greatly  discredited,  and  the  excuse 
which  they  were  expected  to  furnish  for  the  Whig  proscription 
was  deprived  of  its  effect. 

1  House  Journal,  27  Cong.  I  sess.  147-148. 

2  House  Reports,  27  Cong.  2  sess.  iv.  No.  945  ;  Senate  Documents,  28  Cong.  I  sess. 
vii.  No.  399. 

3  Niles's  Register;  Richmond  Enquirer,  May  2,  1841  ;  Richardson,  Messages  and 
Papers  of  the  Presidents,  iv.  152,  154,  162;  House  Documents,  27  Cong.  2  sess.  ii. 
No.  77,  iv.  Nos.  213,  230,  vi.  No.  212  ;  Richmond  Enquirer •,  May  21,  28,  1841. 

L 


146        IMMEDIATE  EFFECTS  OF  THE  NEW  POLICY. 

The  mere  fact  that  removals  were  made  does  not  prove  that 
the  spoils  system  was  adopted ;  and  it  is,  therefore,  important 
to  study  more  closely  the  position  of  the  great  Whig  statesmen 
in  1841,  and  the  general  policy  of  the  party.  Clay  was  un- 
doubtedly the  leader,  and  he  seems  to  have  disdained  petty 
politics.  Curtis,  the  friend  of  Webster,  endeavored  to  secure 
Clay's  support  for  the  collectorship  at  New  York  by  promising 
to  work  for  the  latter's  nomination  for  the  presidency  in  1844 
—  the  matter  to  be  kept  secret  from  Webster.  Clay  seems  to 
have  been  shocked  at  the  proposition,  to  have  rejected  it,  and 
to  have  desired  to  inform  Webster.  He  made  it  a  rule  to  sup- 
port no  applicants  for  positions ; 1  but  this  attitude  was  more  a 
matter  of  convenience  than  of  probity,  and  is  therefore  not  par- 
ticularly commendable,  for,  when  appointments  have  to  be  made 
by  personal  selection,  if  the  best  men  refuse  to  interfere,  the 
choice  is  thereby  left  to  their  inferiors.  He  evidently  found  it 
difficult  to  maintain  his  aloofness.  March  15,  1841,  he  wrote 
to  General  Harrison  that  he  had  not  said  that  Mr.  Curtis  should 
not  be  appointed  to  the  New  York  collectorship.  "  I  have  never," 
he  said,  "  gone  beyond  expressing  the  opinion  that  he  is  faith- 
less and  perfidious,  and,  in  my  judgment,  unworthy  of  the 
place."2 

Webster  wrote  to  Everett,  February  2,  1841,  that  he  did  not 
know  what  would  be  done  in  regard  to  the  foreign  agents. 
"  As  to  officers  out  of  the  cabinet,"  he  said,  "  little  or  nothing 
is  yet  known.  The  richer  collectorships  and  attorneyships  are 
subjects  of  much  competition;  so  are  the  post-offices  in  the 
great  cities.  I  intend  to  exert  my  influence  to  get  a  snug  little 
place  for  I.  P.  Davis,  and  that  is  all  the  purpose,  relative  to  such 
matters,  that  I  have  as  yet  expressed."  3  His  later  official  con- 

1  Gay,  Private  Correspondence,  448-451. 

2  Ibid.  452-453.     He  asks  Harrison  whether  he  has  dictated  "in  the  administra- 
tion of  the  public  patronage?    The  whole  cabinet  as  well  as  yourself,"  he  adds, 
"  can  say  that  I  have  recommended  nobody  for  any  office.     I  have  sought  none  for 
myself  or  my  friends.     I  desire  none.     A  thousand  times  have  my  feelings  been 
wounded  by  communicating  to  those  who  have  applied  to  me,  that  I  am  obliged  to 
abstain  inflexibly  from  all  interference  in  official  appointments."     See  also  Tyler 
to  Clay,  April  30,  1841,  Tyler,  The  Tylers,  iii.  94. 

8  Webster,  Private  Correspondence,  ii.  100. 


WHIG  MACHINERY.  147 

nection  with  the  administration  forced  him  to  take  somewhat 
more  interest  in  appointments ;  but  all  the  evidence  confirms 
the  impression  derived  from  this  letter,  that  on  the  whole  he 
considered  the  selection  of  civil  servants  a  subject  unworthy 
of  his  serious  attention.1 

The  sudden  death  of  Harrison  and  the  accession  of  John 
Tyler  spread  consternation  through  the  ranks  of  the  Whig 
office-seekers.  It  was  feared  that  he  might  be  unwilling  to 
remove  Democrats ;  but,  as  Greeley  says,  "  he  turned  out  better 
than  had  been  expected."  Tyler  felt  bound  by  the  hopes  that 
General  Harrison  had  excited,  and  appointed  many  to  whom 
the  latter  had  promised  places,  but  whom  he  did  not  live  long 
enough  to  commission.  In  the  end  of  April  he  wrote  a  friendly 
letter  to  Clay :  "  My  attention  is  turned  to  the  removals  from 
office  after  the  manner  that  you  suggest,  and  I  hope  that  to  the 
recent  appointments  you  have  nothing  to  object.  The  post- 
office  at  Lexington  shall  be  attended  to."  The  proscription 
was  therefore  continued  in  spite  of  the  "accident"2 

The  machinery  for  distribution  was  not  much  in  evidence 
in  1841.  Whig  congressmen  naturally  received  many  requests 
for  the  use  of  their  influence ;  but  Adams  thought  that  success 
depended  on  whether  the  congressman  was  in  favor  with  the 
cabinet;3  and  this  administration  seems  to  have  more  closely 
controlled  appointments,  both  general  and  local,  than  that  of 
twelve  years  before.4  Senator  Tallmadge  wrote  to  President 
Harrison:  "The  more  I  reflect  on  the  subject,  the  more  I  am 

surprised  at  the  nomination  suggested  to  you  of  Mr. as 

Marshal  for  the  Northern  district  of  New  York.  I  do  not 

1  See  Webster  to  Button,  May  9,  1830  ;  Ibid.  i.  500  ;   Harvey,  Reminiscences  of 
Webster,  178  ;   Poore,  Perley's  Reminiscences,  i.  382.     Van  Tyne  (  Webster,  375-389) 
discusses  his  effort  to  secure  a  place  for  his  son  in  1849,  but  there  is  scarcely  any 
reference  to  general  appointments. 

2  Greeley,  Recollections  of  a  Busy  Life,  215,  310;  Tyler,  Parties  and  Patronage, 
68  ;  Tyler,  The  Tylers,  ii.  32,  310,  iii.  94. 

8  J.  Q.  Adams,  Memoirs,  x.  436,  441,  460.  Of  one  applicant  he  said,  "  I  might  as 
well  undertake  by  my  influence  to  obtain  for  him  the  office  of  porter  at  the  gate  of 
heaven"  {Ibid.  446). 

*  Even  the  names  of  men  to  be  appointed  inspectors  in  the  custom-houses  were 
sometimes  sent  from  the  capital.  See  Richmond  Enquirer,  May  18,  21,  1841;  Tyler, 
The  Tylers,  iii.  94-96. 


148         IMMEDIATE  EFFECTS  OF  THE  NEW  POLICY. 

know  the  man  and  I  never  heard  of  him  —  and  I  insist  upon 
it,  that  it  is  my  right,  representing  the  State  of  New  York,  to 
be  heard  in  relation  to  the  appointments  in  the  state  —  no 
man  knows  more  about  the  state  than  myself  —  and  I  repeat 

that  the  appointment  of is  the  best  appointment 

that  can  be  made.  ...  I  am  willing  to  take  the  responsibility 
of  it."  This  vigorous  protest  was  heeded,  but  not  until  Tall- 
madge  had  written  several  letters  and  had  secured  the  support 
of  "  a  large  portion  of  the  Whig  senators  of  New  York,  the 
leading  members  of  the  Assembly  and  all  the  acting  canal 
commissioners."1  The  local  party  organization  of  New  York 
City  made  an  effort  to  control  minor  appointments  there,  but 
with  only  fair  success  ; 2  and  the  hand  of  the  administration  was 
everywhere  felt.  In  the  country  as  a  whole  there  would  seem 
to  have  been  less  machinery  and  less  friction  than  in  1829. 

Claims  for  office  were  based  on  a  great  variety  of  grounds. 
There  were  charges  of  nepotism ; 3  and  the  removal  of  Dr. 
Martin,  the  experienced  chief  clerk  of  the  state  department  to 
make  way  for  Webster's  son,  was  certainly  in  questionable  taste, 
though  some  excuse  for  it  is  afforded  by  the  intimate  relations 
which  exist  between  that  officer  and  the  secretary  of  state.4 
As  usual,  the  martyrs  of  the  Jacksonian  persecution  were  con- 
sidered as  having  just  claims  upon  the  administration ;  but  the 
most  convincing  argument  that  the  office-seeker  could  submit 
in  support  of  his  application  was  service  to  the  party.  Activity 
or  docility  in  Congress  still  commanded  recognition,  though  it 
had  now  come  to  be  regarded  as  undignified  to  leave  the  legis- 
lative for  the  administrative  service,  and  the  old  opposition  to 
the  appointment  of  congressmen  had  not  entirely  disappeared. 
Levi  Lincoln  endeavored  to  avoid  this  latter  criticism  by  resign- 
ing his  seat  before  receiving  his  nomination  to  the  collectorship 
at  Boston.5 

Newspaper  men  were  still  the  most  important  single  class  of 

1  From  manuscripts  not  available  for  reference. 

2  House  Documents,  27  Cong.  2  sess.  vi.  No.  212,  p.  68. 

3  The  Richmond  Enquirer,  May  7,  1841,  notes  in  office  two  of  Clay's  relatives, 
two  of  Webster's,  and  one  each  of  Chittenden's,  Ewing's,  and  Tyler's. 

4  Tyler  to  Hugh  S.  Legare,  May  16,  21,  1843,  Tyler>  The  Tylers,  iii.  112. 

6  J.  Q.  Adams,  Memoirs,  x.  460;  Richmond  Enquirer,  April  2,  May  20,  1841. 


WHIG  PRINCIPLES.  149 

party  workers,  and  they  were  given  fitting  recognition,1  although 
the  Whigs  had  criticised  the  appointment  of  editors  by  Jackson. 
Not  so  many,  however,  obtained  prominent  posts  as  previously, 
for  the  business  was  becoming  more  profitable  and  leading  edi- 
tors did  not  need  office.  After  a  bitter  debate  which  very 
nearly  resulted  in  a  duel  between  Clay  and  King  of  Alabama, 
Thomas  Allen  received  the  printing  of  the  Senate  as  a  reward 
for  his  dashing  conduct  of  the  Madisonian.  The  Madisonian 
followed  Tyler  in  his  quarrel  with  the  Whigs,  whereupon  the 
latter  returned  to  the  ever  loyal  National  Intelligencer?1 

Politicians  of  a  low  grade  were  occasionally  successful,  par- 
ticularly those  from  Pennsylvania,  where  the  Whigs  had  a 
reputation  for  sharp  practice.  The  appointment  of  Alexander 
Ferguson,  popularly  known  as  Bela  Badger,  to  the  naval  office 
at  Philadelphia  was  considered  very  discreditable.3  The  quali- 
fications of  the  man  who  was  appointed  collector  at  New  York 
are  described  as  follows  in  a  letter  from  Peter  B.  Porter  to  Clay : 
"Although  not  personally  popular,  [Curtis]  is  represented  as 
possessing  an  extraordinary  share  of  tact  or  stratagem ;  and  as 
being  able,  by  his  skill  in  planning  and  combining,  and  his  un- 
tiring industry  in  executing,  to  produce  the  most  astonishing 
political  results.  That,  with  the  office  of  Collector  (which  he 
[Weed]  considers  as  second  only  in  influence  to  that  of  Post- 
master-General) he  could,  on  all  important  occasions,  command 
the  vote  of  the  city  of  New  York,  and  par  consequence,  of  the 
State.  .  .  .  Now  I  do  not  doubt  that  Mr.  Curtis  is  a  man  of 
rare  address.  .  .  .  And  I  have  as  little  doubt  that  if  he  suc- 
ceeds in  obtaining  the  office,  its  patronage  will  be  disposed  in 
favors  to  his  particular  political  friends."  4 

1  The  Richmond  Enquirer,  April  6,  1841,  quoting  from  the  New  York  Herald, 
gives  half  a  dozen  such  cases.     The  statement  that  Tyler  never  made  such  appoint- 
ments is  disproved  by  the  single  case  of  the  editor  of  the  Statesman. 

2  Richmond  Enquirer,  May  n,  1841;  Blair  and  Rives  secured  the  Senate's  print- 
ing in  1841  {Congressional  Globe,  26  Cong.  2  sess.  197).      Clay,  however,  had  the 
matter  reconsidered  after  March  4,  and  the  establishment  of  the  Whig  majority,  and 
Allen  was  then  appointed  {Ibid.  256;  Senate  Journal,  27  Cong.  I  sess.  25).    For  the 
appointment  of  Gales  and  Seaton,  see  Senate  Journal,  28  Cong.  I  sess.  21. 

8  Niles's  Register,  xxxvii.  132;    Globe,  April  26,  1841  ;  Richmond  Enquirer,  May 
14,  1841.     He  was  removed  a  year  later.     Executive  Journal,  vi.  153. 
4  January  28,  1841,  Clay,  Private  Correspondence,  448-450. 


150        IMMEDIATE  EFFECTS  OF  THE  NEW  POLICY. 

While  the  methods  of  selection  were  thus  much  the  same 
under  the  Whigs  as  under  the  Democrats,  the  former  drew,  in 
many  parts  of  the  country,  from  the  wealthier  portion  of  the 
population,  and  so  commanded  a  greater  share  of  business 
ability.  Webster  sent  an  able  circular  to  the  heads  of  depart- 
ments, instructing  them  to  prevent  all  interference  with  elec- 
tions on  the  part  of  public  officers  and  all  assessments  for 
political  purposes,  and  to  require  promptness  in  rendering 
accounts.1  There  were  more  complaints  at  the  appointment 
of  abolitionists  than  at  the  conduct  of  the  service.2  Although 
the  repeal  of  the  subtreasury  act  left  public  money  at  the  dis- 
cretion of  the  public  officers,  there  were  no  defalcations  and  no 
frauds  for  the  succeeding  administration  to  investigate.  The 
climax  of  praise  is  reached  when  we  are  able  to  quote  from 
the  diary  of  John  Quincy  Adams,  for  a  date  some  time  after 
the  starting  of  the  new  government,  that  "  as  yet,  the  appoint- 
ments have  not  been  absolutely  discreditable."  3 

The  sweep  of  1841  was  by  no  means  so  nearly  complete  as 
that  of  1829.  The  458  removals  made,  out  of  a  possible  total 
of  924,*  would  seem  to  represent  a  proportionately  greater 
change  than  at  that  time;  but,  for  reasons  which  will  appear 
later,  only  304  of  these  removals  should  be  here  considered. 
Of  the  usual  conditions,  three  —  the  number  of  officers  who  are 
indispensable,  of  offices  whose  emoluments  are  too  small  to  at- 
tract, and  of  friends  in  office  —  should  all  be  kept  in  mind ;  but 
the  exemption  of  the  South  is  not  so  marked  as  formerly,  and 
one  new  condition  must  be  added.  In  1841,  for  the  first  time, 
many  officers  resigned  to  escape  removal.  Among  them  was 
George  Bancroft,  collector  at  Boston,  in  commenting  on  whose 
resignation  the  prejudiced  Madisonian  said  that  he  took  this 

1  Mies' s  Register,  Ix.  51-52. 

2  The  appointment  of  General  Wilson  to  be  surveyor-general  of  Wisconsin  was  par- 
ticularly obnoxious.     The  influence  of  Joel  Eastman  and  of  Webster  was  supposed 
to  be  responsible  for  these  appointments.    Richmond  Enquirer,  January  29,  May  14, 
1841.    The  Globe,  May  28,  1841,  makes  some  complaint  of  confusion  owing  to  change 
of  personnel.     For  praise,  see  Richmond  Enquirer,  May  23,  1841  ;  National  Intelli- 
gencer, June  2,  1844. 

8  J.  Q.  Adams,  Memoirs,  x.  449. 

4  Fish,  in  American  Historical  Association,  Reports,  1899,  i.  76. 


THE  WHIG  PROSCRIPTION.  151 

action  because  of  some  technicality  of  the  customs  law  by  which 
a  resigning  officer  might  receive  certain  fees  that  would  not  be 
paid  to  one  who  was  removed.1  The  proscription  extended,  as 
was  customary,  beyond  the  presidential  offices  into  the  depart- 
mental and  local  offices.  Levi  Lincoln,  at  Boston,  is  reported 
to  have  had,  within  three  or  four  days,  830  personal  applications 
for  the  fifty  places  within  his  gift.2 

This  study  of  the  conduct  of  the  civil  service  under  the  first 
administration  of  the  Whigs  reveals  the  fact  that  they  adopted 
all  the  characteristic  practices  of  the  spoils  system.  Their 
leaders  were  indifferent;  either  willingly  or  perforce  they  per- 
mitted a  repetition  of  the  deeds  which  they  had  so  violently 
condemned.  The  fact  that  the  offices  were  better  executed  and 
the  public  better  served  than  previously  proves,  not  that  the 
spoils  system  was  non-existent,  but  that  it  is  not  absolutely 
synonymous  with  bad  service ;  that  efficiency  depends  more  on 
the  characteristics  of  the  men  appointing  and  appointed  to  office 
than  on  the  method  of  selection. 

Special  attention  should  be  paid  to  Tyler's  154  removals, 
which  involved  a  curious  episode  after  the  resignation  of  Web- 
ster, when  the  break  with  the  Whigs  was  complete  and  the 
president  alone  was  responsible  for  the  policy  pursued.  Tyler 
had  looked  with  disgust  on  the  Jacksonian  proscription ;  and 
his  son,  Lyon  G.  Tyler,  asserts  that  he  retained  his  scruples  on 
becoming  president,  and  countenanced  removals  only  because 
he  felt  bound  to  fulfil  many  of  the  promises  of  Harrison ;  and 
that  even  this  feeling  of  obligation  did  not  prevent  his  tearing 
in  pieces  whole  lists  of  proposed  appointments  which  involved 
removals.3  A  minute  study  of  his  conduct,  however,  shows  that, 
as  the  fight  grew  fiercer,  he  found  it  impossible  to  forego  the 
use  of  a  weapon  so  ready  to  his  hand  as  the  patronage. 

Tyler  considered  himself  a  "  Republican  "  of  the  old  school, 
and  Levi  Lincoln  argued  on  this  supposition  in  July,  1841, 
when  he  desired  the  treasurer  at  Boston,  who  was  not  a  Whig, 

1  Madisonian,  March  12,  1841. 

2  Richmond  Enquirer,  March  II,  April  2,  1841,  quoting  Boston  Post. 

8  Congressional  Debates,  23  Cong.  2  sess.  596 ;  Tyler,  Parties  and  Patronage,  68; 
Tyler,  The  Tylers,  ii.  310. 


152         IMMEDIATE  EFFECTS  OF  THE  NEW  POLICY. 

to  be  retained.  By  the  summer  of  1842  to  be  a  Democrat 
became  a  recommendation  to  Tyler.  W.  W.  Irwin,  one  of  the 
"  corporal's  guard,"  wrote  to  Caleb  Gushing  in  regard  to  the 
postmaster  at  Harrisburg,  "  He  is  a  Democrat  and  I  don't  want 
to  see  him  removed."  May  16,  1843,  Tyler  wrote  to  Hugh  S. 
Legare,  who  was  acting  as  secretary  of  state,  advising  him  to 
appoint  as  chief  clerk  Dr.  Martin,  who  had  been  removed  by 
Webster.  This  appointment,  he  said,  would  be  equivalent  to 
putting  a  Democrat  at  the  head  of  a  department.  Not  only 
were  the  Democrats  to  be  placated,  but  a  third  party  was  to  be 
formed,  and  the  president  eagerly  looked  about  for  places  to 
give  to  friends  and  supporters.  J.  A.  Scoville  wrote  to  Calhoun, 
October  25,  1842,  "  I  wish  with  all  my  heart  we  had  the  control 
of  Mr.  Tyler's  appointments,  but  Mr.  Rhett  writes  me  that  he 
thinks  Tyler  is  working  for  his  own  nomination."  When  Cal- 
houn became  secretary  of  state,  he  wrote  to  R.  M.  T.  Hunter : 
"  The  claims  on  the  part  of  Mr.  Tyler's  political  and  personal 
friends  on  him  are  pressing,  .  .  .  many  of  them  have  had  their 
expectations  excited  for  a  long  time.  .  .  .  Acting,  as  I  sup- 
pose, under  the  force  of  the  circumstances  alluded  to,  he  makes 
most  of  his  appointments  on  his  own  responsibility  without 
consulting  the  appropriate  Department.  This,  however,  is  in 
strict  confidence."  l 

Vacancies  did  not  occur  often  enough  to  answer  the  presi- 
dent's needs,  and  he  gradually  began  a  proscription  of  his  own. 
April  i,  1842,  he  wrote  to  N.  Beverley  Tucker:  "  Do  you  know 
Samuel  Merry,  the  receiver  of  public  money  at  St.  Louis,  who 
and  what  is  he  ?  And  if  he  is  not  the  proper  sort  of  man,  how 
would  Mr.  Brown  like  the  place  ?  "  While  this  sweep  was  not 
extensive,  it  included  many  valuable  posts,  among  them  the 
ministry  to  Brazil ;  the  collectorships  at  Portland,  Boston, 
Savannah,  Mobile,  Baltimore,  and  New  York ;  the  post  of  sur- 
veyor at  New  Orleans,  Baltimore,  and  New  York ;  the  naval 
office  at  New  York;  the  post-offices  at  Indianapolis,  Philadelphia, 
and  Albany ;  the  governorships  of  Florida  and  Wisconsin ;  and 
many  more  of  salient  political  importance.  The  climax  was 

1  Calhoun  Correspondence  (American  Historical  Association,  Reports,  1809,  ii.), 
602,  856.  Tyler,  The  Tylers,  iii.  94-96,  103,  1 12. 


TYLERS  PROSCRIPTION.  153 

reached  in  the  spring  of  1844,  when  the  president  was  pushing 
with  all  his  might  and  main  the  annexation  of  Texas.  In  June 
the  Tribune,  apropos  of  the  removal  of  the  surveyor  at  New 
York,  remarked,  "All  our  office-holders  who  are  not  of  the 
latest  Tyler  and  Texas  stamp,  with  India  rubber  consciences 
and  a  firm  belief  in  the  integrity  and  disinterestedness  of  the 
Accident,  will  soon  go  overboard." l 

It  is  not  surprising  that  a  president  without  a  party  en- 
countered difficulty  with  the  Senate,  and  that  scarcely  a  post 
was  filled  without  one  or  two  rejections  or  withdrawals.  Par- 
ticularly unwilling  were  his  opponents  to  allow  him  to  fill  an 
associate  judgeship  of  the  Supreme  Court,  although  he  made  a 
very  creditable  selection  for  it.  The  Whigs  especially  opposed 
this  nomination  before  the  election  of  1844,  in  hopes  that  the 
appointment  might  be  deferred  until  Clay  became  president. 
After  the  election  had  taken  away  this  hope,  the  Senate  con- 
firmed the  nomination  of  Samuel  Nelson,  previously  chief  justice 
of  New  York.2 

Tyler's  appointments  were,  as  Calhoun  said,  made  from  the 
ranks  of  his  personal  and  political  friends,  with  the  personal 
element  fully  as  prominent  as  the  other.3  His  personal  friends 
were  men  of  ability  and  honesty,  and  consequently  the  service 
suffered  no  detriment  except  that  which  was  inevitable  from  the 
frequent  changes.  Among  his  appointees  were  Caleb  Cush- 
ing,  Robert  Rantoul,  Jr.,  and  Henry  A.  Wise,  men  of  ability ; 
while  many  others,  themselves  unfamiliar,  had  names  which 
indicate  local  respectability.  The  only  removal  of  special 
interest  was  that  of  Solomon  Van  Rensselaer,  who  was  at  last 
deprived  of  office. 

In  the  summer  of  1844  the  political  status  of  Tyler  and  his 
friends  was  precarious.  Nominally  a  candidate  for  reelection, 

1  Tyler,   The  Tylers,  iii.  99-100.     Executive  Journal  for  the  period.     See  also 
Appendix  D,  below. 

2  Tyler   nominated  John  C.  Spencer,  then   Silas  Wright,  then  Chancellor  Wai- 
worth  ;  after  the  election  he  withdrew  this  name  and  presented  Nelson's.     Hammond, 
Silas  Wright,  396-401. 

8  On  the  one  hand,  he  .was  charged  with  nepotism  (JDaily  Atlas,  December  25, 
1844),  on  ti16  other  with  paying  insufficient  attention  to  friendship  (Tyler,  The 
Tylers,  ii.  404,  note). 


154         IMMEDIATE  EFFECTS  OF  THE  NEW  POLICY. 

he  really  had  no  chance  whatever  of  success.  What,  then, 
would  be  the  standing  of  the  men  he  had  placed  in  office  ? 
Most  of  them  were  Democrats  and  could  support  Folk's  nomi- 
nation. Could  not  Tyler,  by  withdrawing  in  his  favor,  secure 
consideration  for  them  ?  These  questions  were  in  everybody's 
mouth.  Robert  J.  Walker,  unwilling  to  risk  Texan  annexation 
by  a  divided  vote,  wrote  to  Polk  asking  if  Jackson  would  not 
reinstate  Tyler  in  the  Democratic  party ;  while  Tyler's  friends 
suggested  to  Jackson  a  union  of  forces,  whereby  they  would  be 
brought  "  into  the  support  of  Polk  and  Dallas,"  and  would  be 
"received  as  brethren  by  them  and  their  friends,  all  former 
differences  forgotten."  Jackson  answered  these  propositions 
with  an  emphatic  "  no " ;  but  Tyler  apparently  believed  that, 
openly  or  tacitly,  some  arrangement  had  been  reached.  He 
withdrew  from  the  race,  and  on  September  13,  1844,  wrote  to 
his  daughter  that  if  Polk  came  to  power,  the  new  administration 
would  be  a  continuance  of  his  own.1 

Polk  seems  to  have  been  in  some  danger  of  committing  him- 
self to  this  policy,  as  he  requested  Tyler  to  give  a  certain  posi- 
tion to  his  brother.  Tyler  readily  assented  to  this  proposition, 
which  seemed  to  establish  his  position  in  the  Democratic  party ; 
but  if  he  really  thought  that  an  agreement  had  been  made  to 
retain  his  friends  in  office,  he  showed  bad  faith  and  an  extreme 
lack  of  tact  by  continuing,  between  the  election  and  the  inau- 
guration of  Polk,  to  make  removals  and  appointments,  for 
which  at  that  time  there  could  have  been  no  motive  other  than 
a  desire  to  provide  for  his  friends.  The  result  was  that  Polk, 
even  if  he  wavered  for  a  time,  in  the  event  justified  the  confi- 
dence of  Jackson,  who  wrote  to  him :  "  J/he  offices  are  filling  up 
by  Tyler.  ...  I  have  said  to  my  friend  Blair  that  you  have 
sufficient  energy  to  give  yourself  elbow  room,  whenever  it 
becomes  necessary."2 


1  Tyler,  Parties  and  Patronage,  81-82  ;  Tyler,  The  Tylers,  iii.  139-146. 

2  Tyler,  The  Tylers,  iii.  88,  155.     Niles  quotes  the  Globe  and  the  Richmond  Whig 
to  the  effect  that  the  "  nondescripts "  will  get  nothing  from  Polk,  and  advises  that 
Whigs  and  Democrats  combine  to  exclude  Tyler  men  from  office.     Niles's  Register, 
Ixiv.  331.     Executive  Journal,  vi.  December  16,  23,  30,  1844,  January  27,  February  21, 
1845. 


THE  SPOILS  SYSTEM  ESTABLISHED.  155 

"  The  revival  of  the  old  democracy  by  the  elevation  of 
General  Jackson  in  1828,  and  the  accession  of  a  new  set  of 
men  in  1829,  presented  the  first  rabid  and  hungry  scenes 
of  office-begging  that  the  government  of  this  country  ever 
experienced.  The  spirit  with  which  the  democratic  dynasty 
of  1829  went  into  power  began  to  leaven  the  whole  political 
world  in  the  country.  Violence  and  rancor  increased  through- 
out the  republic.  .  .  .  On  Harrison's  accession  was  there 
reform  or  change  in  their  exhibitions  ?  Not  at  all.  .  .  .  The 
torrent  of  office  beggars  set  over  him  and  the  cabinet  like  the 
torrent  of  Niagara  over  its  precipitous  cliffs.  .  .  .  The  princi- 
ple of  rewarding  friends  and  punishing  foes,  by  using  the  public 
offices  of  the  country  for  the  purpose,  has  been  recognized  and 
practised  for  the  last  twenty  years  by  both  parties;  but  it  is 
a  practice  and  a  principle  which  has  existed  only  in  modern 
times."  This  editorial  from  the  New  York  Herald  of  1849  was 
in  substance  perfectly  true.  Both  parties  were  now  thoroughly 
committed  to  proscription ;  and  he  was  indeed  a  hypocrite,  as 
Marcy  said,  who  did  not  acknowledge  that,  as  an  actual  fact,  to 
the  victor  belonged  the  spoils.  So  far  as  the  national  service 
was  concerned,  this  policy  was,  moreover,  an  innovation  of 
"  modern  times " :  some  political  removals  had  indeed  been 
made  by  Adams,  many  by  Jefferson,  and  there  was  from  the 
first  some  play  of  factions  about  the  federal  offices  in  various 
states;  but  not  until  1829  did  the  genuine  spoils  system  come 
into  existence ;  and  since  that  date  it  has  flourished  without  , 
break,  though  with  some  recent  diminution. 

We  have  found  that,  by  turning  our  attention  from  national 
politics  to  those  of  the  states,  it  is  possible  to  discover  for  the 
spoils  system  a  pedigree  the  authenticity  of  which  is  vouched 
for  by  strong  family  resemblance.  In  1820  it  was  an  institu- 
tion of  New  York  and  Pennsylvania ;  it  found  adherents  even 
in  staid  Massachusetts,  and  strong  pressure  was  being  brought 
to  induce  the  central  government  to  give  it  favor.  As  years 
passed,  adherents  increased  and  pressure  grew,  until  we  are 
surprised,  not  so  much  that  it  received  general  recognition  at 
last,  as  that  its  adoption  was  delayed  so  long.  This  steady 
progress,  advancing  with  constantly  accelerated  speed  towards 


156        IMMEDIATE  EFFECTS  OF  THE  NEW  POLICY. 

universal  acceptance,  overcoming  the  repugnance  of  the  Whig 
leaders,  although  they  were  committed  against  such  use  of  the 
patronage,  and  of  Tyler,  although  his  father  had  been  one  of 
the  first  to  raise  his  voice  against  the  evils  of  political  appoint- 
ments, implies  such  an  impelling  force  behind  the  movement  as 
can  be  roused  only  by  an  institution  peculiarly  adapted  to  the 
time  and  fitted  to  serve  some  important  function  in  the  body 
politic.  It  is  not  sufficient,  therefore,  to  have  traced  the  rise  of 
the  spoils  system  :  we  cannot  claim  to  have  any  adequate  under- 
standing of  its  history  until  we  have  discovered  the  cause  of  its 
strength  by  discovering  the  need  which  it  fulfilled. 

The  true  cause  for  the  introduction  of  the  spoils  system  was 
the  triumph  of  democracy.  If  the  people  as  a  whole  are  to 
exert  any  tangible  influence  on  the  conduct  of  government,  they 
must  be  organized.  Unorganized  they  may  effect  a  revolution, 
but  they  cannot  thereby  control  administration.  The  division  of 
the  people  into  parties  is  not  sufficient  to  secure  this  pervasive 
influence ;  it  gives  them  an  opportunity  to  vote  on  special  ques- 
tions and  at  stated  intervals,  but  not  to  select  the  questions  or 
to  vote  when  the  issue  is  fresh  in  the  public  mind.  If  the 
majority  is  to  mould  the  policy  of  the  party,  if  the  demos  is  to 
be  kept  constantly  awake  and  brought  out  to  vote  after  the 
excitement  of  the  hour  has  passed  away,  it  is  necessary  that  the 
party  be  organized.  There  must  be  drilling  and  training,  hard 
work  with  the  awkward  squad,  and  occasional  dress  parade. 

This  work  requires  the  labor  of  many  men  :  there  must  be 
captains  of  hundreds  and  the  captains  of  tens,  district  chiefs 
and  ward  heelers.  Now,  some  men  labor  for  love  and  some  for 
glory ;  but  glory  comes  only  to  the  leaders  of  ten  thousands,  to 
the  very  few  —  it  cannot  serve  as  a  general  inducement,  and 
even  those  who  love  must  live.  It  is  an  essential  idea  of  democ- 
racy that  these  leaders  shall  be  of  the  people  ;  they  must  not  be 
gentlemen  of  wealth  and  leisure,  but  they  must — the  mass  of  them 
at  any  rate  —  belong  to  the  class  that  makes  its  own  living.  If, 
then,  they  are  to  devote  their  time  to  politics,  politics  must  be 
made  to  pay.  It  is  here  that  the  function  of  the  spoils  system 
becomes  evident ;  the  civil  service  becomes  the  pay-roll  of  the 
party  leader ;  offices  are  apportioned  according  to  the  rank  and 


THE  CAUSE  OF  THE  SPOILS  SYSTEM.  157 

merits  of  his  subordinates,  and,  if  duties  are  too  heavy  or  new 
positions  are  needed,  new  offices  may  be  created.  To  apply  these 
facts  to  America,  the  spoils  system  paid  for  the  party  organiza- 
tion which  enabled  the  democracy  of  Pennsylvania  to  rule  after 
1800  and  which  established  "a  government  of  the  people  "in 
the  United  States  in  1829. 

An  interesting  illustration  of  the  interrelation  of  democracy 
and  these,  its  two  concomitants,  is  to  be  found  in  the  history 
of  the  old  South  before  the  war.  There  democracy  did  indeed 
exist,  but  without  party  organization  or  the  spoils  system,  and 
the  aristocracy  habitually  controlled  the  government.  It  is  to 
be  noticed,  however,  that  when  in  a  party  convention  the  leaders 
of  the  South  met  the  leaders  of  the  North,  the  latter  often  had 
to  yield ;  for  they  knew  that  although  the  platform  might  be  a 
little  distasteful  to  the  rank  and  file  of  their  supporters,  party 
organization  and  discipline  would  prevent  the  dissatisfaction 
from  reaching  the  polls  —  the  party  would  stick  together.  In 
the  South,  on  the  other  hand,  very  many  men  formed  their  own 
political  opinions  and  acted  upon  them,  while  many  more  fol- 
lowed some  particular  leader,  irrespective  of  party. 

The  armor  in  which  democracy  won  its  early  victories  in  this 
country,  and  to  which  it  still  clings  in  great  part,  may  now  seem 
crude  and  heavy  and  inapt  to  the  wearer ;  but  we  should  not 
forget  that  at  the  time  of  its  introduction  it  was  the  very  best 
that  had  been  devised ;  that  by  it,  for  the  first  time  in  history,  a 
numerous  and  widely  scattered  people  was  enabled  itself  to  direct 
its  whole  force  to  its  own  advancement ;  and  present  apprecia- 
tion of  the  evils  of  the  spoils  system  should  not  blind  us  to  the 
fact  that  in  the  period  of  its  establishment  it  served  a  purpose 
that  could  probably  have  been  performed  in  no  other  way,  and 
that  was  fully  worth  the  cost. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

THE   SPOILS   SYSTEM  TRIUMPHANT. 
1845-1865. 

As  it  was  in  the  beginning 
Is  to-day  official  sinning, 
And  shall  be  evermore. 

—  RUDYARD  KIPLING. 

THE  period  from  1845  to  1865  marks  the  apogee  of  the  spoils 
system  in  the  United  States  :  the  old  traditions  of  respectability 
had  passed  away,  and  the  later  spirit  of  reform  had  not  arisen ; 
the  victors  divided  the  spoils  and  were  unashamed.  The  gen- 
eral interest  was  turned  almost  completely  from  attempts  to 
limit  the  patronage  of  the  executive  and  to  improve  the  service, 
to  the  rival  fortunes  of  the  office  beggars.  These  were,  per- 
haps, watched  with  an  interest  the  more  keen  because  of  the 
lack  of  sporting  contests,  of  national  base-ball  leagues,  and  in- 
ternational yacht  races.  Horace  Greeley  paraded  a  contempt 
for  such  petty  squabbles,  and  attributed  to  his  subscribers  a  like 
disdain,  but  nevertheless  added  that  those  who  wished  the  cor- 
rect news  in  regard  to  such  matters  should  read  the  Tribune?- 
The  presidential  election  became  a  quadrennial  "  event,"  with 
the  civil  service  as  the  prize.  Every  4th  of  March  great  mobs 
filled  the  capital,  and  the  streets  and  saloons  were  crowded  with 
men  betting  heavy  expense  and  vast  loss  of  time  on  the  chance 
of  getting  something  out  of  the  hurly-burly.2  This  period  can 

1  New  York  Tribune,  March  10,  23,  1853,  March  23,  1857. 

2  The  New   York  Herald,  March  8,  1849,  said:    "We  know  something  of  the 
scenes  exhibited  by  office  beggars  at  Washington  on  the  change  of  the  dynasty.     Any 
one  who  saw  the  sight  presented  in  the  month  of  March,  1829,  on  the  first  accession 

158 


POLK.  159 

best  be  made  clear  by  first  giving  a  brief  account  of  each 
administration,  and  then  examining  the  structure  of  the  spoils 
system. 

Of  no  previous  president  had  so  little  been  known  before 
inauguration  as  of  Polk,  and  consequently  the  development  of 
his  policy  was  closely  watched.  Whig  papers  predicted  that  a 
sweep  would  be  made,  but  for  a  time  it  hung  fire.  March  28, 
1845,  John  Quincy  Adams  heard  that  Buchanan,  Walker,  and 
Mason  were  against  a  general  turnout;  Marcy,  Bancroft,  and 
Johnson  for  it,  and  that  Polk  also  favored  it.  By  April  2  the 
proscription  had  begun,  and  Adams  talked  of  it  with  Joseph 
Gales,  who  said  that  for  the  first  time  rotation  was  distinctly 
avowed  as  a  motive  for  making  removals.1 

Within  the  Democratic  party  there  were  many  men  who 
thought  that  they  could  dictate  to  this  upstart  president,  but 
those  who  knew  him  did  not  share  this  opinion.  Buchanan 
wrote  to  Governor  Shunk  of  Pennsylvania,  December  18,  1844: 
"  You  ask  my  advice  in  regard  to  recommendations  from  you 
to  President  Polk.  I  think  you  ought  to  be  cautious  in  giv- 
ing them,  if  you  desire  that  they  shall  produce  the  effect  your 
recommendations  well  deserve."  Buchanan's  impression  that 
caution  would  be  necessary  in  dealing  with  the  president  must 
have  been  strengthened  when,  in  February,  1845,  the  latter  told 
him  that  he  must  retire  from  the  cabinet  if  he  became  a  candi- 
date for  the  presidency;  and  that  while  head  of  a  department  he 
must  not  be  long  absent  from  Washington.2  The  clearest  indi- 
cation of  Folk's  independence  is  given  by  his  treatment  of  the 
various  Democratic  factions.  Calhoun  probably  expected  to 
retain  his  position  as  secretary  of  state,3  for  his  policy  seemed 

of  General  Jackson  to  the  presidency,  or  the  similar  exhibition  that  was  displayed  in 
March,  1841,  when  General  Harrison  became  chief  magistrate,  can  readily  conceive 
the  crowds  of  expectants,  the  hungry  and  importunate  beggars,  the  miserable  scramble 
for  office,  and  the  terrible  annoyance  to  the  president  and  cabinet,  which  will  be 
revived  with  full  energy  about  these  days  in  Washington."  See  also  Ibid.  April  6, 
1849,  March  9,  1853,  March  u,  14,  25,  1857;  Boston  Daily  Advertiser,  March  13, 
1849;  Republic,  June  14,  1849;  New  York  Tribune,  March  12,  1857. 

1  Boston  Courier,  March  I,  1845  >  J«  Q-  Adams,  Memoirs,  xii.  187,  190. 

2  Curtis,  Buchanan,  i.  528. 

8  Calhoun  to  Mrs.  F.  G.  Clemson,  March  u,  1845,  Calhoun  Correspondence 
(American  Historical  Association,  Report,  1899,  ii.),  647-648. 


160  THE  SPOILS  SYSTEM  TRIUMPHANT. 

to  harmonize  with  that  of  the  president,  yet  he  was  allowed  to 
retire.  Tyler,  as  we  have  seen,  hoped  that  his  friends  would 
be  left  in  their  respective  offices,  but  he  was  disappointed. 
Polk  did  confirm  his  own  brother  in  the  post  of  charge  d'affaires 
at  Naples,  to  which  Tyler  had  appointed  him,  and  continued 
a  few  others  in  office.  John  G.  Mason,  Tyler's  secretary  of 
the  navy,  was  made  attorney-general  because  he  was  Folk's  per- 
sonal friend,  and  some  members  of  the  third  party  were  trans- 
ferred to  inferior  places;  but  the  majority  were  removed  or 
they  resigned.1 

Much  more  striking  was  the  fate  of  the  Globe.  Since  its 
foundation  it  had  been  the  exponent  of  the  Jacksonian  democ- 
racy, and  the  flairs  fully  expected  that  such  would  continue  to 
be  the  case.  The  fact  that  they  had  supported  the  nomination 
of  Van  Buren  and  opposed  the  annexation  of  Texas  was  offset 
by  their  acquiescence  in  accomplished  events ;  while  a  recogni- 
tion of  their  claims  would  tend  to  salve  the  wounds  which  the 
Baltimore  convention  had  caused;  moreover,  the  influence  of 
the  dying  Jackson  was  enlisted  on  their  side.  All  this  availed 
not  against  Folk's  desire  to  be  master.  The  venerable  Mr. 
Ritchie  was  called  from  the  Richmond  Enquirer  and  established 
at  Washington  as  editor  of  the  Union,  which  was  destined  to 
occupy  until  1857  the  position,  now  given  it  of  official  organ 
of  the  Democratic  party.2  Polk  seems  to  have  used  the  patron- 
age for  the  purpose  of  pushing  through  his  own  policy,  rather 
than  of  cementing  alliances  with  hostile  factions.3 

Three  hundred  and  forty-two  removals  were  made  during 
Polk's  administration ;  but  the  country  was  by  this  time  so 
used  to  the  practice  that  little  complaint  is  heard,  save  in  the 
case  of  one  long  lingering  survivor  of  the  Revolution.  The 
president  was,  however,  criticised  as  introducing  politics  into 
the  naval  service  by  displacing  General  McNeil  and  his  assist- 

1  Executive  Journal,  vii.  12,  14, 15  ;  New  York  Observer,  March  22,  1845  >  Boston 
Courier,  March  15,  26,  1845  >  New  York  Observer,  March  22,  1845  ;  Executive  Jour- 
nal, vi.  348,  377,  433,  441,  443,  vii.  12,  14,  15. 

2  Von  Hoist,  United  States,  iii.  6. 

8  The  report  got  abroad  that  he  was  determined  to  appoint  none  who  persever- 
ingly  annoyed  him.  See  Connecticut  Courant,  March  23,  1845  >  Boston  Courier, 
March  27,  1845. 


TAYLOR.  16 1 

ants  from  the  dry  dock  at  Brooklyn,1  a  criticism  that  grew  more 
general  as  the  Mexican  War  progressed.  Wise  men  regretted, 
what  we  must  all  now  most  deeply  lament,  that  the  policy  of 
rotation  led  to  the  recall  of  Henry  Wheaton,  at  a  time  when  the 
perfection  of  his  equipment  promised  a  splendid  fruition  for 
American  diplomacy.2  In  regard  to  appointments,  Webster 
wrote  to  his  son  Fletcher,  March  13,  1845,  "  I  must  do  him 
the  justice  to  say,  however,  that  he  appears  to  me  to  make 
rather  good  selections  from  among  his  own  friends."  On  the 
whole,  many  of  his  appointments  were  praised,3  while  none 
excited  any  very  marked  disapproval,  except  from  those  imme- 
diately interested. 

In  1849  the  Whigs  still  had  some  qualms  of  conscience  about 
making  any  extensive  sweep ;  but,  as  the  Republic  said,  "  If, 
forsooth,  the  administration  adopt  the  construction  contended 
for  by  the  party  of  the  spoils  [that  the  Whigs  should  make 
no  removals],  proscription  will  be  perpetuated  and  the  Whig 
Republican  party  proscribed  forever."4  "  Thus  far  on  my  way 
to  Washington,"  wrote  Seward,  "  I  find  myself  floating  on  a 
strongly  increasing  tide  of  people.  .  .  .  The  world  seems 
almost  divided  into  two  classes,  both  of  which  are  moving  in 
the  same  direction ;  those  who  are  going  to  California  in  search 
of  gold,  and  those  going  to  Washington  in  quest  of  office.  How 
many  adventurers  are  preparing  themselves  for  disappointment, 
revenge,  and  misanthropy !  "  5 

The  man  who  was  to  determine  the  fate  of  these  eager  pil- 
grims was  even  less  known  politically  than  Polk,  and  among 

1  Fish,  in  American  Historical  Association,  Reports,  1899,  i.  77 ;  New  York  Ob- 
server, March  29,  1845. 

2  William  R.  King  wrote  to  Buchanan,  March  28,  1846:  "I  greatly  doubt    the 
policy  of  making  removals  when  the  incumbent  possesses  talent  and  information,  and 
from  a  long  residence  has  acquired  facilities  for  obtaining  useful  information.  .  .  . 
This  I  know  runs  counter  to  your  theory  of  rotation  in  office;   which  may  be  correct 
as  respects  office  at  home,  but  should  not,  I  think,  apply  to  those  held  abroad " 
(Curtis,  Buchanan,  i.  567).     See  also  W.  V.  Keller,  Henry  Wheaton,  on  Apprecia- 
tion (1902). 

3  Webster,  Private  Correspondence,  ii.  206 ;  Boston  Courier  (Whig),  March  25, 
26,  1845. 

4  June  14,  1849. 

e  Seward,  Seward,  ii.  100;  Boston  Daily  Advertiser,  March  13,  1849. 
M 


162  THE  SPOILS  SYSTEM  TRIUMPHANT. 

his  many  negative  recommendations  which  were  pressed  upon 
public  notice  was  the  suggestion  that,  as  he  was  not  a  politi- 
cian, he  would  have  no  friends  to  reward  with  office,  and  could 
therefore  proceed  with  impartiality,  but  after  the  election 
enough  "original"  Taylor  men  sprang  up  to  absorb  all  offices 
had  he  yielded  to  them.  Taylor's  policy  continued  for  some 
time  problematical.  He  said  in  his  inaugural  that  he  would 
make  "honesty,  capacity  and  fidelity  indispensable  prerequi- 
sites to  the  bestowal  of  office  "  ;  but  many  feared  that  a  fourth 
prerequisite  was  intended,  though  not  mentioned ;  namely, 
antenomination  support  of  General  Taylor.  It  was  thought 
that  he  might,  acting  under  the  direction  of  his  secretary  of 
state,  Clayton,  try  to  build  up  a  new  faction.  In  Massachu- 
setts the  division  between  the  Taylor  men,  of  whom  Abbott 
Lawrence  was  the  most  prominent,  and  the  supporters  of  Web- 
ster, who  could  not  get  over  their  disappointment  at  losing  the 
nomination,1  was  very  bitter ;  and  it  was  expected  that  this  and 
similar  feuds  would  be  reflected  in  the  appointments.  Taylor 
did  not  quite  justify  these  predictions,  for,  while  he  held  aloof 
from  the  old  party  leaders,  he  did  not  refuse  them  recognition, 
and  appointed  friends  and  relatives  of  both  Webster  and  Clay 
to  office.  Yet  Clay  was  much  displeased,  and  considered  the 
appointments  of  Taylor  both  "wrong  and  impolitic";  he  was 
disappointed  at  finding  a  second  Whig  President  intractable, 
and  was  incensed  at  the  weight  given  to  Crittenden's  advice, 
which  Seward  described  as  being  "  at  once  honest,  misconceived, 
and  erroneous."  2 

A  significant  contest  took  place  in  regard  to  the  New  York 
appointments.  Seward  became  friendly  with  the  president's 
brother,  and  expected,  as  senator,  to  control  the  patronage  in 
that  state;  but  Taylor  developed  an  unusual  respect  for  the 
vice-president,  and  when  the  time  came,  Mr.  Fillmore,  an  oppo- 
nent of  Seward,  was  found  firmly  intrenched  in  the  confidence 
of  the  executive.  February  27,  1849,  Seward,  always  optimis- 

1  Boston  Courier,  March  27,  1845  J   Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers  of  the  Presi- 
dents, v.  6;  New  York  Herald,  March  15,  1849;   Curtis,  Webster,  ii.  356-358. 

2  Clay,  Private  Correspondence,  613-614  ;   Clay  to  Nicholas  Dean,  June  21,  1849 ; 
Ibid.  587  ;  Seward  to  Weed,  February  27,  1849 ;   Seward,  Seward,  ii.  101. 


SENATORS  AND   GOVERNORS.  163 

tic,  wrote  to  his  wife  that  he  and  Mr.  Fillmore  had  "begun  to 
agree."  Later,  when  more  aware  of  his  difficulties,  he  wrote 
to  Weed,  "  I  have  stipulated  for  time  and  inaction  concerning 
Marshals,  Postmasters,  District  Attorneys,  and  there  I  leave 
these  matters."  At  that  time  he  was  employed  until  eleven 
every  morning  with  applicants  for  office.  March  10  he  wrote 
again  to  Weed  :  "  Mr.  F.  cannot  now  agree  to  anything  but  that 
he  and  I  shall  go  together  to  the  Secretary  and  each  name  a 
candidate  for  Marshal.  .  .  .  The  Cabinet  is  not  unfavorable, 
but  timid  in  their  conduct  between  F.  and  myself.  General 
Taylor  has  got  out  by  casting  all  responsibility  on  the  Cabinet." 
Again,  March  24 :  "  Let  Governor  Fish  now  write  to  me  when 
you  have  any  advice  to  give  the  Cabinet.  Some  of  the  members 
take  that  point  with  great  respect.  It  is  the  State  Administra- 
tion at  Albany  that  is  to  be  strengthened,  and  the  Governor  is 
its  acknowledged  head.  This  saves  the  necessity  of  deciding 
between  the  V.  P.  and  the  Senator."  This  suggestion  was 
acted  upon  and  the  affair  was  settled ;  Seward  wrote,  March 
29,  that  "  every  member  of  the  Cabinet  breathed  more  freely." 
In  the  preliminary  encounter  as  a  whole,  Fillmore  fared  rather 
better  than  Seward ;  but  later  events  brought  the  latter  into  the 
closest  intimacy  with  the  president,  who  came  to  listen  attentively 
to  the  seductive  voice  of  Seward's  alter  ego,  Thurlow  Weed.1 

Under  Taylor  540  of  the  929  presidential  officers  were  re- 
moved ;  and  in  his  first  year,  out  of  the  total  civil  service  of 
17,780,  3406  were  removed  and  2802  resigned.  When  Con- 
gress met  in  December,  1849,  this  record  was  violently  attacked, 
Senator  Bradbury  leading  the  way  with  a  resolution  asking  the 
president  to  lay  before  the  Senate  "  all  charges  which  have  been 
preferred  or  filed  in  any  of  the  departments  against  individuals 
who  have  been  removed,  .  .  .  with  a  specification  of  the  cases, 
if  any,  in  which  the  officers  charged  have  had  opportunity  to  be 
heard,  and  a  statement  of  the  number  of  removals  made  under 
each  department,"  a  resolution  which  he  amended  later  by  add- 
ing, "including  subordinates  in  the  customs-houses,  and  other 
branches  of  the  public  service."  The  debate  was  acrimonious, 

1  Bancroft,  Seward,  i.  206 ;  Seward,  Seward^  ii.  100,  107 ;  Weed,  Autobiography, 
587>  590-59L 


1 64  THE  SPOILS  SYSTEM  TRIUMPHANT. 

but  purely  partisan,  the  Democrats  accusing  the  president  of 
insincerity,  and  the  Whigs  defending  his  action  on  the  ground 
that  it  was  made  necessary  by  the  previous  conduct  of  the  Demo- 
crats. No  useful  suggestions  were  made  in  the  discussion.1 

When  Fillmore  succeeded  to  the  presidency  in  1850,  there 
was  almost  as  complete  a  change  of  policy  as  if  an  opposing 
party  had  come  into  power,  and  the  drooping  interest  in  the 
patronage  revived.  July  12,  1850,  Seward  wrote  that  Washing- 
ton was  "  filling  up  with  strangers " ;  and  letters  and  news- 
papers are  full  of  the  absorbing  topic.  Seward,  of  course,  fell 
from  favor.  He  wrote  to  Weed,  July  15  :  "I  shall  not  touch, 
or  attempt  to  touch,  an  appointment.  I  shall  vote  for  all 
appointments."  In  order  to  get  rid  of  Weed,  Fillmore  offered 
him  the  Austrian  mission.  On  the  other  hand,  the  traditional 
leaders  of  the  party  felt  their  influence  revive.  Clay  wrote  to 
his  son,  in  August,  that  his  relations  with  Mr.  Fillmore  were 
"perfectly  friendly  and  confidential,"  which  of  course  meant 
that  his  advice  was  generally  followed,  and  added  that  he 
anticipated  that  his  candidate  for  the  Lexington  post-office 
would  prevail.  Fillmore  made  eighty-eight  removals,  indicat- 
ing that  he  did  not  attempt  entirely  to  undo  the  work  of  his 
predecessor,  but  that  he  did  make  use  of  his  power  to  support 
his  policy  by  rewarding  his  friends.2 

The  independent  attitude  of  Polk  had  been  followed  by  the 
split  in  the  Democratic  party  in  1848.  Probably  in  the  tangle 
of  motives  which  drew  the  adherents  of  Van  Buren  to  the  point 
of  actual  separation,  resentment  at  their  exclusion  from  office 
would  be  found  to  be  a  cord  of  some  strength.  When,  there- 
fore, all  factions  came  together  in  1852,  it  was  expected  that  all 
would  receive  a  share  of  the  fruits  of  victory.  President  Pierce 
was  not  adverse  to  such  a  policy:  like  Polk,  in  being  a  dark 
horse,  he  differed  from  him  both  in  distinctly  aiming  for  a 
second  term  and  in  trying  to  conciliate  and  patch  together  the 

1  Fish  in  American  Historical  Association,  Reports,  1899,  i.  78  ;    Congressional 
Globe,  31  Cong.  I  sess.  74,  160  ;   Appendix,  480-496  ;  also  31  Cong.  2  sess.  36-42. 

2  Seward,  Seward,  ii.  145  ;   Weed,  Autobiography,  596-598 ;   Clay,  Private  Corre- 
spondence, 6ii;   Fish,  in  American  Historical  Association,  Reports,  1899,  i.  79 ;   New 

York  Herald,  March  15,  1849;   Rhodes,  United  States,  i.  184. 


FILLMORE.  165 

various  factions  of  the  party,  rather  than  in  boldly  taking  the 
lead. 

He  settled  to  his  task  in  a  businesslike  way ;  but  though  he 
fixed  hours  for  callers,  he  was  pursued  by  them  at  all  times  and 
in  all  places.  The  cabinet  officers  received  applicants,  mechani- 
cally heard  their  stories,  filed  their  papers,  and  then  discussed 
their  cases.  It  had  by  this  time  become  the  custom  to  put 
aside  all  ordinary  business  for  the  first  month  after  the  inaugu- 
ration, in  order  that  the  administration  might  devote  all  its  ener- 
gies to  the  war  of  the  spoilsmen.  Pierce  made  Marcy  secretary 
of  state,  a  step  which,  it  was  feared,  indicated  a  tendency  to  favor 
the  "  Softs "  in  the  New  York  appointments ;  but  a  slate, 
greatly  commended  for  its  cleverness,  was  arranged  for  the 
state,  which  offset  this  danger  by  giving  the  best  local  appoint- 
ments to  the  faithful  "  Hards  "  or  "  Hunkers,"  while  the  "  Softs" 
or  "Barnburners,"  or  "Van  Buren  men,"  received  just  enough 
to  keep  them  quiet.1 

Through  the  country  at  large,  office-seekers  were  divided  into 
"  Old  Fogies  "  and  "  Young  Americans."  The  "  Old  Fogies  "  in 
New  York  State  were  the  members  of  the  Albany  Regency ; 
they  had  for  a  long  time  monopolized  appointments,  and  as  early 
as  1845  were  unpopular  as  habitual  office-holders.  It  was 
pointed  out  that  an  aristocracy  was  but  a  group  of  men  enjoying 
the  sole  benefit  of  state  emoluments,  and  that  by  this  definition 
the  Regency  had  ceased  to  be  democratic.2  Since  1830  national 
politics  had  been  controlled  by  one  generation  of  leaders  in  both 
parties,  and  each  proscription  meant,  to  a  great  extent,  simply 
the  return  of  those  exiled  by  the  last.  Was  this  rotation  in 
office  ?  Marcy  was  an  Old  Fogy,  and  seems  to  have  been  largely 
influential  in  selecting  men  for  foreign  posts ;  the  New  York 
Herald  was  led  to  complain  that  Young  America  was  exiled  to 
Central  America.  It  advertised  white  hair-dye  for  office-seekers.3 
Aside  from  these  family  quarrels,  Pierce's  appointments  excited 
comparatively  little  comment ;  the  press  was  apathetic. 

1  New  York  Herald,  March  II,  18,  21,  23,  30,  1853  ;  New  York  Tribune,  March 
21,  1853  ;   McLaughlin,  Cass,  283. 

2  New  York  Tribune,  October  I,  1845  ;  Ne™  York  Herald,  March  17,  1853. 

3  March  22,  24,  1853. 


1 66  THE  SPOILS  SYSTEM  TRIUMPHANT. 

For  President  Buchanan  it  was  left  to  round  out  the  spoils 
system.  Pierce  had  made  883  removals,1  thus  practically  exor- 
cising all  non-Democratic  elements  from  the  civil  service.  Now 
Buchanan  attained  the  presidency,  as  the  Herald  said,  "  with 
infinite  labor,  at  vast  expense,  and  by  the  skin  of  his  teeth." 
Much  of  this  effort  had  been  caused  by  the  office-holders,  nearly 
all  of  whom  had  aided  Pierce  in  his  struggle  for  renomination. 
Should  they  be  spared,  though  they  were  Democrats  ?  Were 
not  the  supporters  of  the  successful  candidate  the  real  victors  ? 
Buchanan  decided  that  the  civil  service  should  be  remanned, 
and  announced  that  no  one  should,  unless  under  exceptional 
circumstances,  receive  a  reappointment  after  his  commission 
expired.  The  argument  used  to  defend  this  innovation  was, 
of  course,  the  long-suffering  one  of  rotation  in  office,  which 
now  was  understood  as  implying  that  offices  were  but  prizes 
and  should  not  be  enjoyed  for  more  than  four  years  by  any 
good  Democrat.2  The  idea  was  not  a  new  one,  for  Andrew 
Johnson,  when  member  of  Congress  in  1846,  had  offered  a 
resolution  to  the  effect  that  subordinate  positions  should  be 
held  for  eight  years  as  a  maximum.3 

Much  criticism  of  this  new  practice  was  nevertheless  aroused. 
Marcy  said  that  the  maxim,  "  To  the  victors  belong  the  spoils," 
was  attributed  to  him,  but  that  he  never  would  have  advised 
pillaging  one's  own  camp.  Yet  so  good  was  party  discipline 
that  no  serious  trouble  resulted,  and  many  faithful  partisans  even 
resigned  voluntarily  in  order  to  maintain  their  standing  in  the 
party.  The  principle  of  rotation  was  not  carried  to  an  entirely 
logical  conclusion ;  many  an  officer  escaped  incidentally  through 
some  unusual  political  influence,  and  the  whole  South  was  ex- 
empted. It  was  said  that  the  North  and  West  demanded  change, 
but  not  the  South ; 4  and  Buchanan  was  enough  of  a  Democrat 
to  execute  the  will  of  the  people  according  to  local  tastes. 

1  Fish,  in  American  Historical  Association,  Reports,  1899,  i.  80. 

2  Curtis,  Buchanan,  ii.  185-186  ;  New  York  Tribune,  March  10,  1857  ;    Connecti- 
cut Courant,  March   14,  May  9,  1857;    New   York  Herald,  March  4,  16,  18,  23, 

1857- 

8  Congressional  Globe,  29  Cong.  I  Sess.  192-193. 

4  Connecticut  Courant,  March  21,  1857;  New  York  Herald,  March  23,  1852; 
March  16,  18,  28,  1857  ;  New  York  Tribune,  March  12,  20,  28,  30,  1857.  The 


BUCHANAN  AND  ROTATION.  167 

Buchanan's  interpretation  of  rotation  in  office  was  acted  upon 
steadily  until  Roosevelt  succeeded  McKinley  in  1901 ; 1  and 
another  innovation  made  in  1857  nas  continued  to  the  present 
time,  and  will  probably  prove  permanent,  that  is,  the  abolition 
of  the  official  organ  of  the  administration.  He  gave  to  Allen, 
the  editor  of  the  Union,  the  collectorship  of  Portland,  Maine, 
and  announced  that  no  paper  would  succeed  to  the  intimate  rela- 
tion with  the  government  which  it  had  occupied.2  Yet  the 
Union  continued  its  existence  and  still  enjoyed,  to  some  extent, 
the  confidence  of  the  cabinet. 

At  the  time  of  the  inauguration,  the  Herald  expressed  the 
hope  that  the  new  president  would  not  attempt,  as  the  last 
one  had  done,  to  conciliate  all  factions,  but  would  pursue  an 
independent  course.  This  required  more  moral  courage  than 
Buchanan  possessed,  and  he  soon  became  involved  in  the  usual 
meshes  of  intrigue,  while  endeavoring  to  arrange  all-satisfying 
slates  for  Boston,  Philadelphia,  Baltimore,  and  New  York.3 
The  contests  for  the  appointments  in  these  cities  throw  much 
light  on  the  politics  of  the  time,  and  one  example  is  worth 
giving  as  an  illustration  of  the  influences  at  work  in  securing 
appointments.  In  New  York,  the  focus  of  the  excitement, 
the  most  respected  of  the  factions  was  the  New  York  Hotel 
set,  consisting  of  the  capitalists  of  the  Democratic  party. 
These  men  were  reported  to  have  a  special  claim  on  the 
president,  as  they  had  contributed  heavily  to  carry  the  Penn- 
sylvania state  election,  which  had  such  an  important  bearing 
on  the  nominating  convention  of  1856;  and  it  was  whispered 
besides  that,  unless  they  were  conciliated,  Robert  J.  Walker 
would  not  accept  the  governorship  of  Kansas.  They  se- 
cured the  collectorship  for  Augustus  Schell,  an  eminently 

hold  of  rotation,  in  the  West,  is  amply  illustrated  in  the  history  of  Lincoln's  attempt 
to  get  into  Congress.     See  Tarbell,  Lincoln,  ii.  194-206. 

1  There  was  at  this  time  the  usual  flood  of  applications,  but  they  were  not  acted 
upon. 

2  New   York  Herald,  March  24,  28,  1857.     Some  hoped  that  he  would  appoint 
some  "  Old-Line  Whigs "  who  voted  for  him.      Connecticut   Courant,   March    14, 

1857. 

8  New  York  Herald,  March  4,  II,  1 8,  20,  26,  1857  ;  New  York  Tribune,  March 
17,  18,  1857. 


1 68  THE  SPOILS  SYSTEM  TRIUMPHANT. 

respectable  gentleman.1  At  the  opposite  extreme  of  the  social 
scale  was  the  unterrified  city  democracy  of  the  "  Bloody  Sixth,"2 
headed  by  the  mayor,  Fernando  Wood.  The  New  York  Hotel 
set  furnished  money,  Wood  supplied  votes.  Isaiah  Rynders, 
as  the  chief  representative  of  this  element,  obtained  an  impor- 
tant office,  —  the  marshalship ;  he  was  a  notorious  politician, 
with  an  evil  reputation  of  many  years'  standing,  and  his 
appointment  was  gleefully  derided  by  the  opposition  press.3 
Between  these  extremes  were  cliques  and  factions  of  varying 
degrees  of  respectability  and  rapacity.  "  Prince  John  "  Van 
Buren,  one  of  the  most  accomplished  of  political  anglers,  landed 
the  next  most  important  office,  the  postmastership,  for  his  friend, 
Isaac  Fowler,  or  rather,  he  secured  for  him  an  exemption  from 
the  principle  of  rotation.  The  naval  office  was  obtaine'd  by 
General  Sickles  for  his  friend,  Samuel  B.  Hart.4 

In  national  politics,  Buchanan  favored  the  South,  and  his  ad- 
ministration of  the  patronage  reflects  this  tendency.  One  of 
the  most  notable  instances  was  that  of  the  California  appoint- 
ments. All  the  patronage  for  that  state  was  given  to  Dr.  Gwin, 
of  a  well-known  proslavery  expansionist  family  of  Mississippi ; 
while  Broderick,  the  other  senator,  of  more  moderate  views, 
was  totally  excluded  from  favor.  The  Kansas  appointments 
afford  another  example  of  the  same  tendency. 
f  Buchanan's  removals  were  scattered  through  his  entire  term.5 
The  Democratic  party  was  gradually  disintegrating  under  the 
'stress  of  the  slavery  contest;  the  orthodox  were  becoming 
steadily  fewer,  while  the  recalcitrant  needed  constant  punish- 
ment. The  most  important  break  was  that  which  occurred 
when  Douglas  proved  unwilling  to  support  the  administration  ' 
in  its  Kansas  policy;  when,  in  1858,  he  was  contending  with 

1  New  York  Tribune,  March  21,  24,  25,  27,  1857;   New  York  Herald,  March  27, 

1857. 

2  New  York  Herald,  March  21,  1857. 

8  New    York  Tribune,  March  25,  1857;    Connecticut  Courant,  March,  22,  1845, 
March  28,  1857. 

4  New  York  Herald,  March  7,  March  17,  25,  1857. 

5  Forney,  Anecdotes,  221 ;  New  York  Herald,  March  4,  1853 ;  New  York  Tribune, 
March  25,  1857;    Connecticut  Courant,  April  4,  II,  1857;   Brooks,  Lincoln,  206; 
Fish,  in  American  Historical  Association,  Reports,  1899,  i.  81. 


FACTIONAL  FIGHTS.  169 

Lincoln  for  the  senatorship  from  Illinois,  he  was  read  out  of 
the  party,  and  the  whole  executive  patronage  was  turned  against 
him.1  It  was  probably  because  of  these  feuds  that  Buchanan's 
appointments  were  more  severely  criticised  than  those  of  any 
previous  president  except  Jackson.  In  themselves  they  do  not 
seem  to  have  been  noticeably  worse. 

We  are  very  prone  to  disentangle  the  web  of  the  past,  pick 
out  the  salient  features,  and  then  imagine  that  they,  and  they 
alone,  absorbed  contemporary  attention  as  well  as  our  own. 
Thus,  when  we  speak  of  the  Republican  victory  of  1861  and  the 
inauguration  of  Lincoln,  we  think  of  the  on-coming  Civil  War, 
and  picture  the  men  of  that  date  as  occupied  wholly  with  the 
insoluble  problems  of  slavery.  Very  differently  employed,  how- 
ever, was  the  mind  of  the  average  politician :  it  was  a  party 
victory,  and  the  customary  scenes  of  party  triumph  were  to  be 
witnessed  in  the  threatened  capital.  Lincoln  said  that  he  felt 
like  a  man  who  was  letting  offices  in  one  end  of  his  house 
while  the  other  was  burning  down.2  An  interesting  illustration 
of  conditions  in  Washington  is  given  by  one  of  the  participants, 
who  says  that  a  large  number  of  enthusiastic  Republicans  who 
desired  post-offices  formed  a  guard  to  protect  the  president  from 
assassination,  thinking  that  thereby  they  might  obtain  easy 
access  to  him  and  so  press  their  claims  to  the  best  advantage.3 

Contemporaries  complained  that  Lincoln  devoted  too  much 
time  to  such  matters  ; 4  and  now  that  criticism  of  him  has  become 
somewhat  akin  to  treason,  lamentation  is  made  that  these  petty 
affairs  were  so  much  forced  upon  him.  The  fact  is,  it  was  part 
of  Lincoln's  God-given  fitness  for  his  time  and  place  that  he  was 
a  politican  as  well  as  a  statesman.  The  Republican  party  was 
new ;  it  was  composed  of  diverse,  hostile  elements ;  it  was  full 
of  petty  jealousies,  and  its  discipline  was  not  good  :  if  it  was  to 
be  kept  together,  much  depended  on  a  proper  disposition  of  the 
favors  the  president  could  bestow.  If  he  had  had  no  patronage, 

1  See  speech  of  Forney  on  this  occasion,  October  28,  1858,  Forney,  Anecdotes, 

363-365- 

2  Lamon,  Recollections  of  Abraham  Lincoln,  212. 

8  Address  of  Mr.  Keyes  of  Madison,  Wisconsin,  at  a  convocation  at  the  University 
of  Wisconsin,  February,  1902. 

4  Dana  to  Adams,  March  9,  1863,  Adams,  Dana,  ii.  264. 


1 70  THE  SPOILS  SYSTEM  TRIUMPHANT. 

if  the  spoils  system  had  not  been  in  vogue,  all  might  have  been 
well ;  but,  as  conditions  were,  the  appointment  to  a  petty  post- 
office  might  be  fraught  with  much  import  to  the  safety  of  the 
Union. 

Lincoln  made  1457  removals,  there  being  1639  places  within 
his  gift.1  When  it  is  remembered  that  to  many  posts  in  the 
South  no  appointments  could  be  made,  and  that  consequently  no 
removals  are  noted,  it  will  be  seen  that  the  sweep  was  the  most 
thoroughgoing  that  had  ever  been  made ;  indeed,  it  was  almost 
complete.  This  fact  is  partly  to  be  explained  by  the  long  years 
during  which  Southern  influence  had  been  predominant  at 
Washington,  a  circumstance  which  had  made  loyal  men  keenly 
suspicious  of  all  who  had  obtained  government  favors.  The 
stress  and  confusion  of  the  time,  and  the  rapid  changes  of  the 
political  kaleidoscope,  are  indicated  by  the  fact  that  the  occu- 
pants of  some  offices  were  changed  two  and  three  times  between 
1861  and  1865. 

In  making  appointments,  Lincoln  pursued  a  middle  course 
between  Folk's  independence  and  Pierce's  attempt  to  please  all 
factions.  He  took  pains  to  consult  every  one  who  had  any 
right  to  be  heard,  but  controlled  everything  with  a  loose  yet 
powerful  rein.2  He  had  the  faculty  of  pleasing  men  by  asking 
their  advice  even  if  he  did  not  take  it.  He  let  everything  that 
would  settle  itself  do  so,  provided  certain  general  conditions  were 
complied  with.  He  made  no  attempt  to  obtain  the  men  best 
fitted  to  perform  the  functions  of  the  various  offices,  except  in 
case  of  the  very  highest ;  for  minor  places  he  did  not  even  insist 
that  a  man  be  fit.  When  a  man  was  once  appointed,  Lincoln 
would  neither  remove  him  until  he  was  thoroughly  discredited, 
nor  promote  him ;  for  in  either  case  there  would  be  a  new 
office  to  fill.3  . 

Among  the  things  considered  in  conferring  office,  geography 

1  Fish,  in  American  Historical  Association,  Reports,  1899,  i.  82. 

2  See  the  correspondence  of  prominent  men  of  the  period,  passim.     He  regularly 
consulted  senators,  delegations,  governors.     He  pleased  Hamlin  very  much  by  asking 
him  to  name  the  New  England  member   of  the    cabinet,  but  in  the  end  merely 
inquired  which  of  four  men  the  New  England  delegation  preferred.      See  Weed, 
Autobiography,  614 ;  Lincoln  to  Hamlin,  December  24,  1860,  Hamlin,  Hamlin,  374. 

3  Tarbell,  Lincoln,  ii.  66,  418. 


LINCOLN.  I/I 

was  very  prominent  throughout  the  administration ;  but  the 
early  attempt  to  procure  a  balance  between  the  various  elements 
—  Whig,  Democratic,  Abolitionist,  and  Know-Nothing  —  that 
had  combined  to  make  up  the  Republican  party  was  abandoned 
as  time  went  on.  The  new  division  that  grew  up  between  the 
Radicals  and  the  Conservatives  was  treated  with  an  even  hand, 
a  policy  which  of  course  seemed  unequal  to  some  of  those  most 
interested.  One  of  Secretary  Chase's  correspondents  wrote  that 
there  was  "  war  from  the  White  House  "  upon  Chase's  friends. 
There  was  no  such  war.  Lincoln  wrote  to  an  over-zealous 
postmaster  the  best  letter  ever  written  on  the  subject  of  the 
participation  of  government  officials  in  party  politics.1  While 
offices  in  general  were  used  to  prevent,  and  not  to  encourage, 
faction  fights,  and  so  skilfully  used  that  the  end  was  often 
obtained,  minor  places  were  often  employed  to  please  powerful 
individuals ;  and  Lincoln  did  not  forget  himself  in  this  con- 
nection, but  appointed  relatives  and  friends  to  places  which 
might  profit  them  and  not  harm  the  country.2  In  general, 
Lincoln  used  his  patronage  —  which,  it  must  be  remembered, 
was  enormously  increased  by  the  war  —  for  the  purpose  of 
serving  the  country  by  solidifying  the  Republican  party.  While 
he  did  not  attempt  any  personal  aggrandizement,  he  yet  balked 
at  nothing  when  the  greater  object  was  in  view.  Charles  A. 
Dana  gives  an  incident  that  seems  authentic.  He  says  that 
Lincoln,  in  order  to  secure  the  admission  of  Nevada  as  a  state, 
-  upon  which,  as  he  thought,  hung  the  fate  of  the  thirteenth 
amendment,  —  authorized  the  offer  of  several  good  offices  to 
some  doubtful  congressmen  to  secure  their  votes.3 

Military  appointments  were  treated,  as  they  have  been  nearly 
always  in  time  of  war,  as  standing  somewhat  apart.  The  selec- 
tion of  volunteer  officers  was  largely  the  work  of  the  governors, 

1  Tarbell,  Lincoln,  ii.  400  ;  Welles,  Lincoln  and  Seward,  34  ;  to  Chase,  Octo- 
ber 30,  1863,  Chase  Manuscripts ;  Lincoln  to  M.  McMichael,  April  5,  1864,  Lincoln, 
Complete  Works,  ii.  558. 

2  Lincoln  to  A.  J.  Hamilton,  August  20,  1863,  Tarbell,  Lincoln,  ii.  378;   Ibid.  17, 
105-106,  340;   Lincoln  to  Chase,  October  26,  1863,  and  to  Seward,  March  6,  1865, 
Lincoln,  Complete  Works,  ii.  430,  658. 

8  C.  A.  Dana,  Reminiscences  of  Men  and  Events  of  the  Civil  War,  in  McClure's 
Magazine,  x.  564-565. 


172  THE  SPOILS  SYSTEM  TRIUMPHANT. 

but  Lincoln  took  care  that  they  should  not  appoint  Republicans 
only.1  It  is,  of  course,  unnecessary  to  point  out  that  this  separa- 
tion was  not  by  any  means  complete,  and  that  politics  interfered 
often  and  seriously  with  the  good  conduct  of  the  war.  If 
Lincoln  had  made  appointments  for  merit  only,  the  war  might 
have  been  shortened ;  on  the  other  hand,  he  might  not  have 
preserved  a  united  North  to  carry  on  the  war. 

Lincoln  showed  to  what  use  the  spoils  system  could  be  put 
by  a  statesman}  but  he  nipped  in  the  bud_a  further  development 
of  the  system,  which  was  threatened.  Politicans  began  to  ask 
why,  if  rotation  were  correct  doctrine,  and  a  man  should  hold 
office  only  four  years,  a  general  sweep  should  not  follow  the 
beginning  of  every  new  term,  even  if  a  president  succeeded  him- 
self. A  demand  gained  ground  that  Lincoln  should  entirely 
re-allot  the  offices  after  March  4,  1865  ;  and  Washington  was, 
as  usual,  filled  with  office-seekers  on  that  day?  Lincoln,  how- 
ever, was  unwilling  to  go  through  the  worry  and  labor  of  the 
task,  and  made  a  conclusive  announcement  that  the  administra- 
tion would  remain  unchanged  throughout.2  From  that  time  the 
popularity  of  rotation  declined.  The  tide  had  turned.3\ 

*  A.  T.  Rice,  Reminiscences  of  Abraham  Lincoln  by  Distinguished  Men  of  his 
Time,  140-141. 

2  F.  B.  Carpenter,  The  Inner  Life  of  Abraham  Lincoln,  276  ;  New  York  Tribune, 
March  4^7,  1865. 

8  For  fuller  treatment  of  Lincoln  and  the  patronage,  see  Tarbell,  Lincoln,  i.  423, 
ii  23  5  also  an  article  by  C.  R.  Fish  in  American  Historical  Review,  viii.  53-69. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

MACHINERY  OF  THE  SPOILS   SYSTEM. 

THE  civil  service  had  by  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  century 
become  so  extensive  that  the  careful  supervision  which  the  earlier 
presidents  exercised  became  impossible;  and,  as  appointments 
continued  to  be  made  by  personal  selection,  organization  and 
division  of  labor  ^became  more  and  more  necessary.  Naturally, 
this  organization  was  built  upon  such  foundations  as  existed,  and 
the  change  was  not  so  much  in  the  system  as  in  the  shifting  of 
the  balance  of  work  and  responsibility  from  the  cabinet  to  out- 
side forces. 

Members  of  Congress  had  from  the  beginning  been  influen- 
tial in  suggesting  names;    but  as  appointments  came  to  have 
greater  political  significance,  they  came  to  speak  with  greater 
authority  —  that  is,  if  they  belonged  to  the  party  in  power.     Dur- 
ing the  period  in  question,  minor  positions  in  the  various  con- 
(  gressional  districts  were  practically  in  the  gift  of  the  members, 
\as  they  are  to-day.1     If  some  city  of  more  than  usual  importance 

1  Riddle,  Recollections  of  War  Times,  24.  March  9,  1849,  Lincoln  wrote  to  the 
secretary  of  the  treasury :  "  Colonel  E.  D.  Baker  and  myself  are  the  only  Whig 
members  of  Congress  from  Illinois  —  I  of  the  Thirtieth,  and  he  of  the  Thirty-first. 
We  have  reason  to  think  the  Whigs  of  that  State  hold  us  responsible,  to  some 
extent,  for  the  appointments  which  may  be  made  of  our  citizens."  He  asked  to  be 
heard  when  such  a  one  was  to  be  appointed  or  when  an  office  was  to  be  filled  in 
that  state.  He  sent  various  recommendations  for  offices  which  were  in  his  district ; 
but  he  did  not  consider  that  he  held  them  in  absolute  gift,  for  he  made  himself  the 
medium  for  recommendations  which  he  did  not  favor.  When  the  functions  of  the 
office  vacant  or  to  be  vacated  were  restricted,  or  almost  restricted,  to  his  district,  he 
claimed  the  right  to  be  heard  independently  of  Colonel  Baker.  When  this  was  not 
the  case,  he  recognized  that  the  whole  delegation  —  in  this  case  only  two  in  all  — 
should  be  consulted.  In  regard  to  the  pension  agency,  he  wrote  that,  as  it  pertained 

173 


174  MACHINERY  OF  THE  SPOILS  SYSTEM. 

was  included  within  the  district,  the  advice  of  the  senators  from 
the  state  would  be  sought,  or,  at  least,  of  the  senator  particu- 
\larly  interested  in  the  section  in  question.1 

It  was  a  natural  practice  for  the  various  members' from  one 
state,  belonging  to  the  same  party,  to  get  together  and  talk  over 
the  situation ;  instances  have  been  cited  in  the  Continental  Con- 
gress, and  in  the  administrations  of  Washington  and  Jefferson 
and  of  most  subsequent  presidents.  Between  1845  and  1865 
the  practice  hardened  into  a  custom,  and  the  power  of  the  dele- 
gation became  almost  absolute.  At  the  beginning  of  Pierce's 
term,  the  Herald  said  that  Congress  showed  itself  willing  to 
/  relieve  the  president  of  all  trouble  in  regard  to  the  patronage, 
k  as  it  had  divided  up  into  committees  to  portion  it  out.  Lincoln 
said  that  he  could  not  overrule  the  Rhode  Island  delegation  in 
regard  to  the  Providence  post-office;  and  he  probably  made 
very  few  nominations  to  important  local  positions  without  the 
previous  consent  of  the  delegation,  or  at  least  of  the  senators.2 
The  influence  of  the  delegation  extended  beyond  the  local  offices. 
Owing  to  the  importance  of  geographical  considerations  in 
this  country,  each  state  is  quite  sure  to  have  a  share  of  the  gen- 
eral offices.  In  1853  the  Herald  announced  that  a  state  having 

to  the  whole  state,  Colonel  Baker  had  an  equal  right  with  himself  to  be  heard  con- 
cerning it;  but  that,  as  the  office  was  located  in  his  district,  he  did  not  think  it 
probable  that  any  one  would  wish  to  remove  from  a  distance  to  take  it,  and  therefore 
his  influence  should  be  greatest.  Lincoln,  Complete  Works,  i.  151-154.  On  the 
whole,  his  correspondence  indicates  that  a  peculiar  weight  was  at  that  time  attached 
to  names  suggested  by  members  of  Congress,  but  that  the  latter  did  not  dictate. 
See  New  York  Herald,  March  6,  n,  1853 ;  New  York  Tribune,  March  16,  1861. 

1  Riddle,  Recollections  of  War   Times,  24 ;   Lincoln  to  the  postmaster-general, 
March   12,  1861,  Tarbell,  Lincoln,  ii.  340.     Postmaster-general  Blair   (under   Lin- 
coln) said  that  he  accepted  the  recommendation  of  a  majority  of  the  responsible 
patrons  of  the  district  served  by  the  office ;   that  in  case  of  doubt  the  representative, 
if  an   administration  man,  was  consulted ;   and  that  the  senators  controlled  their 
home  offices.     United  States  Civil   Service   Commission,   i$th   Report,   1897-1898, 
£.  472. 

2  "  They  have  resolved  themselves  into  committees  to  parcel  out  the  patronage 
of  the  several  states,  and  avow  openly  that  the  president  must  make  the  nominations 
which  they  dictate"  {New  York  Herald,  March  u,  1853).     See  also  the  issues  of 
March  8  and  9,  and  the  Tribune  of  March  10 ;   Lincoln  to  Governor  Sprague,  May 
10,  1861,  Lincoln,  Complete  Works,  ii.  45.     On  his  policy,  see  also  Ibid.  23,  200;  to 
Chase,  April  u,  1861,  Chase  Manuscripts. 


DELEGATIONS  AND  LOCAL  FACTIONS. 

a  cabinet  officer  would  not  be  given  a  foreign  minister.1  It 
became  customary  to  assign  an  office  to  a  state,  and  allow  the 
delegation  to  select  the  particular  recipient  who  should  be 
chosen  for  the  honor ; 2  but  this  custom  was  not  as  firmly  fixed 
as  that  by  which  the  local  patronage  was  dispensed. 

Often  no  member  of  Congress  from  the  state  belonged  to  the 
administration  party,  or  there  might  be  local  factions  within  the 
party  hostile  to  the  congressional  delegation ;  and  in  such  cases 
other  means  of  information  had  to  be  sought.  The  older  method 
of  Washington  and  Jefferson,  who  were  accustomed  to  write  to 
some  man  of  family  or  local  standing,  had,  with  the  growth  and 
the  democratization  of  the  country,  come  to  be  less  practised ; 
but  to  some  extent  the  want  was  supplied  by  the  rise  of  the  boss. 
Thurlow  Weed,  for  instance,  was  always  ready  to  advise  about 
New  York  appointments,  and  generally  advised  well.3  Bosses, 
however,  were  as  yet  rare,  and  were  at  this  period  usually  in 
Congress.  The  various  New  York  factions  sent  delegates  to 
Washington,  if  they  had  no  official  prolocutor ; 4  and  this  exam- 
ple was  often  followed  by  other  localities,  even  though  the  prize 
was  less  valuable.  The  governors  sometimes  proffered,  and 
were  sometimes  asked  for,  advice ;  but  the  weight  attached  to  it 
varied  greatly  with  the  different  presidents.  Taylor  considered 
it  decisive  in  case  of  a  struggle  at  Washington,  while  Lincoln 
treated  it  rather  curtly  when  offered  gratuitously,  and  when  he 
asked  for  it  he  made  it  plain  that  it  was  advice  and  not  dicta- 
tion that  he  desired.5 

One  really  important  new  tendency  is  to  be  noted.  In  1841 
the  ward  caucuses  of  Whigs  in  New  York  City  assumed  the 

1  New  York  Herald,  March  17,  1853. 

2  Lincoln  to  Gillespie,  May  19,  1849,  Tarbell,  Lincoln,  ii.  299 ;  American  His- 
torical Review,  iii.  290. 

3  Weed,  Autobiography,  473.     He  describes  with  great  satisfaction  his  relation 
with  various  presidents.     Among  the  men  having  especial  influence  over  appoint- 
ments may  be  mentioned  Duff  Green,  Corwin,  Dix,  Crittenden,  Clay,  and  Benton. 

4  New  York  Herald,  March  9,  1853.     These  appointments  were  so  important  that 
men  from  all  over  the  country  claimed  a  voice  in  them. 

6  Seward  to  Weed,  March  24,  1849,  Seward,  Seward,  ii.  107;  Lincoln  to  Gov- 
ernor Sprague,  May  10,  1861,  Lincoln,  Complete  Works,  ii.  45  ;  to  Governor  Morton, 
June  28,  1862,  to  Governor  Pierpont,  October  16,  1862,  and  to  Governor  Tod, 
March  9,  1863,  Tarbell,  Lincoln,  ii.  347,  352,  361. 


176  MACHINERY  OF  THE  SPOILS  SYSTEM. 

right  to  dictate  minor  appointments,  and  in  1861  it  was  urged 
that  friction  and  bitterness  would  be  spared  if  postmasters  were 
to  be  elected  by  vote  of  the  Republicans  in  their  respective  dis- 
tricts. Lincoln  favored  this  latter  plan  in  at  least  one  particu- 
lar instance,  and  several  such  elections  were  held  and  their 
returns  duly  honored  by  the  appointing  powers. JV  This  scheme 
illustrates  how  far  the  distinction  between  elective  and  adminis- 
trative offices  had  been  lost.  The  germ  of  it  is  to  be  found 
as  far  back  as  Jefferson's  administration,  when  it  was  argued 
that  he  should  carry  out  the  proscription  which  the  people  had 
begun,  and  should  extend  it  to  the  offices  which  they  could  not 
directly  reach.  What  the  result  of  such  an  arrangement  would 
have  been  may  be  conjectured  from  the  experience  of  New 
York,  where  it  was  given  extensive  application  in  the  constitu- 
tions of  1821  and  1846,  and  where  it  led,  not  to  the  extinction  of 
the  spoils  system,  but  to  the  solidification  of  party  organization. 
The  president  and  cabinet  could  not  abdicate  all  their  respon- 
T  sibilities  ;  the  decision,  the  final  word,  rested  with  them.  Then, 
as  now,  the  fourth  assistant  postmaster-general  was  patronage 
officer  and  distributed  the  numerous  local  offices  in  that  large 
department.  Even  if  he  did  usually  follow  the  advice  of 
others,  he  was  a  man  of  power.  When,  as  so  often  happened, 
the  delegations  were  not  unanimous,2  and  when  the  local  powers 
were  not  satisfied  with  the  selections  of  congressmen,  the  ad- 
ministration had  to  award  judgment.  Few  members  of  the 
cabinet,  moreover,  were  content  to  be  absolute  nonentities : 
they  were  responsible  for  the  conduct  of  their  subordinates, 
and  thought  it  was  but  fair  that  they  should  have  some  share 
in  picking  them  out.  Many  of  them  were  men  of  political 
ambition,  and  desired  to  build  up  in  the  various  states  bodies 
of  supporters.  In  consequence,  there  was  often  friction  be- 
tween the  head  of  a  department  under  which  an  officer  was 
to  serve,  and  the  representatives  of  the  state  from  which  he 

1  New  York  Tribune,  March  13,  1861;  Lincoln  to  Stuart  Brown,  March  30,  1861, 
Tarbell,  Lincoln,  ii.  340-341  ;   Hollister,  Schuyler  Co/fax,  173  ;  United  States  Civil 
Service  Commission,  ijth  Report,  1897-1898,  472. 

2  Instances  are  numerous.     One  of  particular  interest  was  the  struggle   of  ex- 
Senator  and  then  Representative  Benton  with  the  majority  of  the  Missouri  delega- 
tion.    See  New  York  Tribune,  March  8,  1853. 


CABINET  AND  PRESIDENT.  177 

was  to  be  chosen  and  in  which  he  was  to  exercise  his  functions. 
To  govern  such  cases,  President  Pierce  laid  down  the  general 
rule,  that  every  nomination  must  be  approved  by  the  secretary 
of  the  proper  department ; 1  but  the  difficulty  was  inherent  in 
the  system  and  could  not  be  settled  by  rule.  No  minor 
question  vexed  Lincoln  more  than  that  of  the  adjustment  of 
these  rival  claims.  Secretary  Chase  was  insistent  on  his  rights, 
while  Seward  and  Weed  argued  that  they  were  best  acquainted 
with  the  needs  of  the  Republican  party  in  New  York  State, 
and  that,  if  they  agreed  with  the  senators,  further  consultation 
was  unnecessary.  Lincoln  adopted  the  same  rule  as  Pierce; 
but  the  disagreement  was  never  adjusted,  and  finally  a  contest 
of  this  kind  was  the  immediate  cause  of  the  withdrawal  of 
Chase  from  the  cabinet.2 

The  president  himself  had  great  potentialities  of  power ;  he 
determined  the  relative  influences  that  each  of  these  forces 
should  be  allowed  to  exercise,  and  if  he  was  a  strong  man, 
like  Lincoln,  he  could  lay  down  the  general  qualifications  for 
appointment.  The  number  of  men  actually  selected  by  him 
was  usually  small,  yet  each  separate  appointee  owed  to  him  his 
position.  In  the  end,  the  power  went  to  the  strong  man. 

To  take  our  history  as  a  whole,  Washington  probably  con- 
trolled appointments  more  fully  than  any  other  president ;  under 
Monroe  the  members  of  the  cabinet  possessed  their  greatest 
power,  and  under  Pierce  the  congressional  delegations  were 
most  dictatorial.  It  was  not  until  after  the  close  of  the  period 
covered  by  this  chapter  that  senatorial  courtesy  acquired  its 
preeminence. 

r~*  That  this  system  tended  to  bring  many  politicians  into  office 

1  is  obvious.     Military  service  ceased  to  be  so  often  rewarded 

Nrith  civil  position  as  formerly.     Pierce,  during  his  campaign,  had 

laid  much  emphasis  upon  his  career  in  the  Mexican  War,  and 

after  his  election  was  deluged  with  applications  from  his   old 

companions  in  arms ; 3  but,  in  general,  veterans  were  fewer  than 

1  New  York  Herald,  March  12,  1853.     At  this  time  the  machinery  of  distribution 
excited  much  interest  and  was  much  commented  on.     See  the  Herald  and  the  Trib- 
une of  March  and  April,  1853. 

2  Welles,  Lincoln  and  Seward,  71;  Hart,  Chase,  315-317. 

3  New  York  Herald,  March  8,  18,  1853. 


/ 


178  MACHINERY  OF  THE  SPOILS  SYSTEM. 

at  any  other  period  of  our  history,  and  consequently  played  a 
smaller  part  in  politics.  Among  those  who  had  rendered  politi- 
cal service,  the  newspaper  men  seem  to  have  received  fewer 
rewards  than  previously.  In  1845  the  franking  privilege  was 
restricted,  and  minor  post-offices  were  thereby  rendered  less 
profitable  to  local  editors  ;  while  the  men  who  controlled  great 
national  organs  could  not  afford  to  take  office.  In  fact,  after 
1  86  1,  Horace  Greeley  was  rather  a  dictator  of  appointments 
than  a  seeker  after  them  ;  and  though  Lincoln  once  offered 
James  Gordon  Bennett  a  foreign  mission  to  keep  him  in  good 
humor,  he  knew  beforehand  that  the  offer  would  not  be 
accepted.1  It  was  the  rise  of  these  great  metropolitan  journals 
that  caused  the  discontinuance  of  the  official  organ  at  Wash- 
ington. No  pensioned  press  at  the  capital  could  compete  with 
the  Tribune  and  the  Herald,  whose  able  correspondents  gave 
pictures  of  the  daily  working  of  the  government,  generally  as 
accurate  and  always  more  intimate  than  the  National  Intelligencer 
or  the  Union  had  ever  vouchsafed. 

The  pay  of  congressmen  continued  small  until  1856,  when 
it  was  raised  from  the  eight  dollars  a  day  and  mileage,  that 
had  held  for  so  long,  to  three  thousand  dollars  per  annum, 
also  with  mileage.  It  is  not  surprising  that  before  1856  mem- 
bers made  many  applications  for  office.  The  Herald  said  in 
1853:  "The  Louisiana  applicants  are  in  a  melancholy  way. 
Their  members  are  so  busy,  rumor  says,  in  grinding  their  own 
axes,  that  their  constituents  are  little  better  than  orphans."  It 
was,  moreover,  quite  the  customary  \hing  for  members  defeated 
for  reelection  to  receive,  sans  reproche,  some  offer  of  substantial 
consolation.  Thus  Lincoln  was  offered  the  governorship  of 
Oregon  by  Taylor.2 

Men  whose  only  occupation  was  politics  were  not,  even  in 
this  period,  very  numerous  ;  still  a  class  of  professional  politi- 
cians existed  and  received  many  posts.  Some  of  these  men 


1  Statutes  at  Large,  v.  734;   New   York  Observer,  April  26,  1845; 
Tribune,  March  n,  1853;  Connecticut  Courant,  March  21,  1857;  Lincoln,  Complete 
Works,  ii.  44,  653. 

2  New  York  Herald,  March  16,  21,  1853;  Boston  Daily  Advertiser,  March  17, 
1849;  Lincoln,  Works,  i.  159. 


THE  MEN  APPOINTED.  179 

were  notorious,  and  their  appointments  were  received  with 
great  disapprobation.  An  amusing  example  of  their  claims 
is  found  in  1857,  when  it  was  proposed  to  appoint  Count  Gu- 
rowski,  master  of  many  languages,  as  translator  to  the  state 
department ;  but  strong  opposition  developed  because  the  place 
was  demanded  for  a  Tammany  man  who  knew  several  Indian 
languages.1  The  politician  received  his  office,  not  only  as  a 
reward,  but  as  a  retaining  fee. 

From  the  beginning  of  our  government  there  has  been  com- 
plaint of  the  activity  of  office-holders ;  and  such  complaint  will 
probably  never  cease,  as  it  is  practically  impossible  to  draw  a 
working  distinction  between  the  proper  interest  of  the  citizen 
and  the  obligations  of  the  servant  of  the  government.  The 
Herald  (March  16,  1853)  said,  "The  Hard-Shells  repudiate 
with  scorn  the  doctrine  that  quiet  men  are  entitled  to  office,  for 
they  say  this  would  be  a  premium  for  inactivity,  desertion,  and 
hypocrisy,  which  would  strike  a  heavy  blow  and  a  sore  disap- 
pointment at  men  of  principle  and  action,  and  they  contend, 
would  prove  ruinous  to  the  party."  The  system  of  appoint- 
ment brought  into  the  leading  positions  men  prominent  in  local 
politics,  and  it  is  not  surprising  to  find  them  attending  national 
conventions  in  the  interest  of  the  leaders  who  secured  their 
preferment. 

Much  more  laborious  service  than  this  was  required,  how- 
ever. Thus  the  struggle  for  the  New  York  collectorship  was 
always  severe,  not  only  because  of  the  emoluments,  but  be- 
cause the  post  was  considered  to  carry  with  it  the  dictatorship 
of  New  York  City.  After  Pierce's  inauguration  the  Herald 
remarked,  "  Now  let  the  seven  or  eight  hundred  Whigs  in 
office  here  turn  their  attention  to  sweets  of  private  life."  These 
men  had  worked  under  the  direction  of  the  collector  for  the 
Whig  party,  and  their  successors  were  expected  to  work  for 
the  Democratic  organization.  The  investigation  of  Poindexter 
in  New  York  brought  out  the  fact  that  these  minor  officers  felt 
at  liberty  to-  leave  their  duties  for  several  days,""  without  permis- 
sion,.jto  attend  to  party  work.2  What  was  true  of  the  great 

1  New  York  Herald,  March  5,  1857.     This  may  have  been  a  joke. 

2  Ibid.  March  30,  1853,  March   14,  1857  j    Clay,  Private  Correspondence,  448- 


ISO  MACHINERY  OF  THE  SPOILS  SYSTEM. 

cities  was  true,  in  varying  degree,  of  smaller  ones.  Lincoln 
wrote  in  1849  tnat  tne  postmaster  at  Springfield,  Illinois,  had 
served  on  the  Democratic  central  committee  during  his  entire 
term,  and  had  identified  himself  with  local  politics  the  more 
effectively  because  he  enjoyed  a  not  very  burdensome  office, 
located  at  the  seat  of  the  state  government.1 
i—Assessment  of  official  salaries  for  party  purposes  appeared 
in  national  politics  simultaneously  with  the  spoils  system.  In 
1830  the  men  appointed  by  Jackson  to  offices  in  Boston  were 
asked  to  contribute,  not  indeed  to  a  campaign  fund,  but  to  pay, 
for  the  editor  of  the  Statesman,  the  debts  which  the  latter  had 
contracted  during  the  campaign.  The  attempt  was  not  entirely 
successful,  but  by  1840  a  regular  system  of  assessments  existed 
in  some  places.  In  New  York,  officials  in  the  custom-house 
were  all  assessed,  just  previous  to  the  various  elections,  for  sums 
differing  according  to  their  salaries.  No  distinct  threats  seem  to 
have  been  made ;  but  most  men  paid,  and  it  was  noticed  that 
those  who  did  not  generally  lost  favor.  A  clumsy  witticism 
of  the  Boston  Courier,  March  26,  1845,  illustrates  the  preva- 
lence of  the  practice :  "  A  strange  case  of  Hypochondria !  A 
disappointed  office-seeker  of  our  acquaintance  fancies  himself 
a  salary  of  $2000  a  year,  and  has  locked  himself  up  in  an  iron 
safe,  for  fear  of  being  used  up  by  assessments  for  party  pur- 
poses." Throughout  the  forties,  fifties,  and  sixties  this  unof- 
ficial taxation  was  an  accepted  rule.2 

Although  corruption  may  have  been  widespread,  actual  in- 
stances of  it  are  rarely  brought  to  light.  Lincoln  bought  votes  / 
with  offices,  and  Buchanan  was  accused  of  doing  so ;  but'  such 
bargains  are  seldom  capable  of  proof.  Fiscal  dishonesty  is  more 
tangible;  but  here  again  the  thieving  was  covered  by  a  gar- 
ment, though  a  scant  one,  of  legality,  and  since  the  investiga- 

450.  In  1857  Schell  removed  389  out  of  690  employees.  House  Documents, 
27  Cong.  2  sess.  vi.  No.  212 ;  House  Executive  Documents,  46  Cong.  3  sess.  No.  94, 
p.  II. 

1  To  the  postmaster-general,  April  7,  1849,  Lincoln,  Complete  Works,  i.  153. 

2  Derby,  Political  Reminiscences,  85,  97 ;   House  Documents,  27  Cong.  2  sess.  vi. 
No.  212.     A  San  Francisco  official,  as  the  story  goes,  was  assessed,  but  refused  to 
pay.     Lincoln  wrote  to  him  asking  for  his  reasons ;   he  gave  them  and  was  no  more 
bothered. 


SERVICE  REQUIRED.  l8l 

tions  which  were  made  during  this  period  were  purely  partisan,1 
it  is  impossible  to  distinguish  fraud  from  maladministration. 
Both  existed  and  both  cost  the  government  heavily,  but  the 
popular  interest  in  the  threatening  political  dangers  of  the 
patronage  and  in  the  suspected  dishonesty  of  the  service,  which 
had  characterized  the  period  from  1811  to  1840,  had  died  away, 
and  had  not  yet  been  succeeded  by  a  demand  for  efficiency. 
Every  one  knew  that  money  was  lost,  but  no  one  of  sufficient 
influence  troubled  himself  to  get  behind  the  mutual  recrimina- 
tions of  the  politicians  and  find  out  who  was  really  at  fault. 

While  this  apathy  accounts  in  part  for  the  lack  of  expressed 
dissatisfaction  at  the  conduct  of  the  government,  it  is  extremely 
probable  that  public  business  was  administered,  though  expen- 
sively, yet  much  better  than  one  would  imagine  from  a  descrip- 
tion of  the  spoils  system.  Jackson  was  partly  right  when  he 
said  that  the  duties  of  most  public  officers  were  not  hard :  the 
party  leaders  were  only  too  glad  to  multiply  the  offices  until  the 
duties  of  none  of,  the  inferior  positions  would  overtax  the  energy 
or  the  ability  of  the  most  commonplace  citizen.  Moreover,  the 
argument  of  American  adaptability  is  true,  though  hackneyed. 
Particularly  in  this  very  period  the  life  history  of  the  average 
citizen  showed  a  great  variety  of  occupations  pursued  with  fair 
success,  and  an  amazing  capacity  for  acquiring  a  simple  rule 
of  thumb  and  applying  it  with  ingenuity.  The  study  of  Van 
Buren's  administration  showed  us  that  high  ability  was  not 
lacking  when  required :  a  man  who  could  organize  a  party  for 
victory  could  administer  a  large  body  of  officials  with  vigor. 
The  recent  success  of  Mr.  Hanna  in  politics,  taken  in  conjunc- 
tion with  the  fortunes  honestly  accumulated  by  politicians  like 
Amos  Kendall,  illustrates  the  similarity  of  talent  required  by 
a  party  organizer  and  the  manager  of  a  great  administrative 
enterprise.  / 

Another  fact  that  should  not  be  lost  sight  of  is  that  rotation 
in  office  was  never  actually  practised.  First,  many  men  secured 
a  long  intermittent  term  of  service  by  coming  into  office  when- 

1  There  was  an  investigation  of  Fillmore's  conduct  of  the  patronage  {House 
Reports,  36  Cong.  I  sess.  v.  No.  648,  p.  5).  See  also  the  Galphin  investigation,  Ibid. 
1-835  >  Curtis,  Buchanan,  ii.  ch.  xii. ;  New  York  Herald,  March  9,  1853. 


182  MACHINERY  OF  THE  SPOILS  SYSTEM. 

ever  their  party  came  to  power,  even  though  they  were  removed 
by  the  other  party ;  secondly,  a  large  residuum,  often  composed 
of  those  performing  the  most  technical  duties,  were  always  left 
in  their  places,  by  whom  the  continuity  of  departmental  tradi- 
tion was  preserved;1  and  tl^iriUy,  instances  of  promotion,  even 
from  staff  to  presidential  positions,  are  found.2  It  would  be 
tedious  to  mention  even  the  more  conspicuous  of  these  men. 
The  most  prominent  was  William  Hunter,  who  served  in  the 
state  department  from  1829  to  1886.  The  well-known  case  of  the 
Fox  family,  which  has  held  the  consulship  at  Falmouth,  Eng- 
land, from  the  time  of  Washington  to  the  present  year  (1903), 
is  interesting  rather  than  important.3  John  Randolph  Clay 
occupied  with  honor  various  positions  in  the  diplomatic  service 
continuously  from  1830  to  i86i.4  It  often  happened  that  when  a 
politician  was  appointed  to  an  office,  as  a  collectorship,  he  found 
an  efficient  and  trained  deputy,  whom  he  retained  in  office 
under  him,  and  who  bore  on  his  shoulders  the  weight  of  ser- 
vice. The  result  was  a  double-headed  system,  —  a  working 
director,  representing  the  public  service  side  of  office-holding, 
and  a  political  director,  who  was  paid  for  being  a  good  servant 
of  his  party.6 

^>  Some  few  attempts  at  improvement  are  to  be  noted.  Between 
1851  and  1853  the  question  of  efficiency  was  discussed  in  two 
reports  to  the  Senate.  It  was  discovered  that  examinations  for 

1  See  Appendix  B.    See  above,  pp.  49,  90,  148 ;  for  other  cases,  National  Intel- 
ligencer, April  1 6,  1849,  and  New  York  Herald,  March  4,  16,  1853. 

2  See  New  York  Herald,  March  9,  1853.     The  New   York   Tribune,  March  II, 
1853,  says  :  "The  appointment  of  Peter  G.  Washington  to  be  the  Assistant  Secretary 
of  the  Treasury,  is  an  excellent  one.  .  .  .     He  has  served  a  long  lifetime  in  office 
here,  having  by  dint  of  excellent  sense  and  a  faithful  and  laborious  discharge  of  duties 
devolved  on  him,  raised  himself  step  by  step  from  a  clerkship  of  a  lowest  grade,  to  his 
late  position."     Elisha  Whittlesey  retained  his  position  of  first  comptroller  of  the 
treasury  from  1850  till  1857,  and  was  again  appointed  by  Lincoln  {Executive  Jour- 
nal,  viii.  109,  x.  293,  xi.  376).     See  also  Davis,  Rise  and  Pall  of  the  Confederate 
Government,  i.  24-25. 

8  New  York  Evening  Post,  March  3,  1902.  Charles  Forrester,  his  father  and  his 
son,  together  served  over  one  hundred  years  in  the  New  York  post-office  (D.  B. 
Eaton,  7#<?  "Spoils"  System,  76,  note). 

4  Livingston,  Portraits  of  Eminent  Americans,  \.  133;   also  Blue  Books  for  the 
period. 

5  New  York  Herald,  March  20,  1853. 


ATTEMPTS  AT  REFORM.  183 

candidates  had  been  tried  in  the  treasury  department,  and  that 
they  were  approved  by  all  the  members  of  the  cabinet  except 
Webster.  It  was  recommended  that  pass  examinations  be  held 
for  the  lowest  grades  of  clerkships,  and  that  all  vacancies  above 
these,  except  the  chief  clerkships,  be  filled  by  promotion.  In 
1853  pass  examinations  were  prescribed  by  law,  and  a  few 
years  later  the  system  was  reported  as  working  well.1  The 
character  of  the  examinations,  however,  depended  entirely  on 
the  discretion  of  the  department  head,  who  was  also  the  appoint- 
ing officer;  and  consequently  they  amounted  to  little.  In  1857 
Howell  Cobb,  secretary  of  the  treasury,  announced  that  his  ex- 
aminations would  be  strict,  and  that  he  would  remove  no  one 
except  for  cause.  It  is  perhaps  unjust  to  suggest  that  when  he 
added  to  the  customary  causes  of  removal,  the  buying  of  lottery 
tickets  and  the  frequenting  of  gaming  houses,  he  had  anything 
in  mind  other  than  the  establishment  of  moral  decorum  at 
Washington.2  Salmon  P.  Chase  also  announced  his  intention 
of  making  these  examinations  something  more  than  a  name; 
but  the  very  fact  of  these  special  announcements  shows  that 
as  a  rule  the  examinations  were  a  farce. 

In  1856  a  bill  was  enacted  providing  for  the  improvement  of 
the  consular  service  by  the  appointment  of  twenty-five  consular 
pupils.  They  were  to  pass  a  qualifying  examination,  and  those 
"  possessing  the  requisite  qualifications,  and  exhibiting  an  apti- 
tude for  the  consular  service,  who  have  been  faithful  in  the 
performance  of  their  consular  duties,  will,  from  time  to  time,  be 
recommended  to  the  president  for  promotion";  in  1857  this 
bill  was  repealed..  In  1864,  on  recommendation  of  the  secre- 
tary of  state  and  the  finance  committee  of  the  Senate,  Mr. 
Fessenden  urged  that  the  repealing  clause  be  repealed;  and 
after  a  debate  in  which  the  proposed  law  was  attacked  as  un- 
democratic, as  not  making  adequate  provision  for  promotion," 
and  as  unwise  on  the  ground  that  the  consuls  were  not  fit  to 
educate  pupils,  a  poor  fragment  of  the  former  act  was  finally 

1  Senate  Executive  Documents,  32  Cong.  I   sess.  ix.  No.  69 ;  32  Cong.  I  sess. 
No.  95  ;   Statutes  at  Large,  x.  21 1  ;  New  York  Herald,  April  2,  1853  j  House  Execu- 
tive Documents,  33  Cong.  2  sess.  ii.  No.  3,  pp.  97-98. 

2  New  York  Tribune,  March  10,  1857. 


184  MACHINERY  OF  THE  SPOILS  SYSTEM. 

passed.  This  provided  that  consular  clerks  should  be  appointed, 
—  not  more  than  thirteen  to  be  in  service  at  any  one  time,  — 
and  that  they  should  be  over  eighteen  years  of  age  and  should 
receive  not  more  than  a  thousand  dollars  a  year.  A  new  pro- 
vision was  added,  that  they  should  not  be  removed  except  for 
cause  stated  in  writing  and  submitted  to  Congress  at  the  session 
next  following.1 

*  These  petty  improvements  could  not  be  supposed  to  touch 
the  great  evils  of  the  spoils  system,  as  the  most  noxious  of  its 
effects  were  social.  The  government  service,  which  should  have 
set  the  example  of  stability  to  the  country  at  large,  was  con- 
ducted on  principles  radically  wrong.  Besides  this,  the  subtle 
attraction  that  public  offices  have  always  had  for  the  average 
American  brought  into  the  ranks  of  office-hunters  many  times 
the  number  that  could  find  places.  As  the  Herald  said :  "  If 
loss  of  time  be  taken  into  consideration,  and  loss  of  money,  it 
costs  him  [the  office-seeker]  probably  his  first  year's  salary  to 
obtain  office.  .  .  .  The  consequence  is,  that  many  of  these 
officials  cheat  the  public  by  various  frauds  and  impositions,  in 
order  to  indemnify  themselves  for  their  losses.  At  the  end  of 
four  years  they  are,  perhaps,  set  adrift  upon  the  world,  without 
any  calling  or  business  connection."  2 

The  result  was  that  a  large  class  of  persons  led  a  fluctuating 
existence.  <x*ftlany  were,  at  times,  reduced  to  such  an  extremity 
that  they  would  do  practically  anything  in  return  for  the  most  tri- 
fling recognition,  and  hence  constantly  tempted  the  not  unwilling 
party  leader  to  go  deeper  and  deeper  into  questionable  practices 
by  offering  themselves  as  fit  instruments.  The  effect  on  the  gen- 
eral public  was  twofold  :  people  were  led  to  regard  the  agents  of 
the  government  with  contempt  even  while  the  offices  proved 
alluring,  and  the  political  sense  became  somewhat  blunted/  The 
very  intelligent  Washington  correspondent  of  the  Tribune  com- 
plained :  "  The  '  spoils '  doctrine  is  ...  at  the  bottom  of  the 
Galphanizing  which  has  of  late  come  to  be  so  fashionable  as  to 
permit  each  current  instance  thereof  brought  to  light,  to  pass 

1  Statutes  at  Large,  xi.  55,  160 ;  Congressional  Globe,  38  Cong.  I  sess.  1115  if. ;  and 
Appendix,  181-182. 

2  New  York  Herald,  March  9,  1853,  also  March  n,  1857. 


SOCIAL  EFFECTS.  185 

out  of  popular  recollection  almost  without  receiving  a  second 
thought.  And,  further,  ...  it  threatens  to  bring  more  evils 
upon  us  than  any  dozen  others  of  the  many  elements  conspiring, 
as  it  were,  to  entirely  change  the  character  of  the  Government  of 
the  United  States."  l  /During  the  fifties  no  practicable  method 
of  reform  was  suggested,  and  during  the  Civil  War  the  very 
depths  of  the  spoils  system  were  sounded  in  the  conduct  of  the 
national  service  in  the  Southern  states.  Yet  in  1865  the  atten- 
tion turned  toward  England,  the  Sumner  and  Jenckes  bills,  and 
the  check  given  to  rotation  promised  a  new  and  better  era. 

1  New  York  Tribune,  March  15,  1853;  see  also  Nibs's  Register t  Ixiv.  351  (July 
29,  1813). 


CHAPTER   IX. 

A  STRUGGLE  FOR  THE   PATRONAGE. 
1865-1887. 

THE  more  effective  for  party  warfare  the  patronage  became, 
the  more  bitter  grew  the  struggle  for  its  control,  and  the 
more  persistently  did  the  contestants  resort  to  the  constitu- 
tion for  support.  That  the  administration  of  the  civil  service 
was  an  executive  function  could  scarcely  be  denied  ;  but  the 
constitution  left  open  the  question  how  this  power  was  to  be 
divided  between  the  two  branches  of  the  executive,  the  presi- 
dent and  the  Senate.  Instances  of  constant  minor  friction, 
occasioned  by  the  rejection  of  nominations,  have  been  given ; 
and  the  comprehensive  plans  of  1826  and  1836  for  limiting  the 
president,  while  due  primarily  to  partisan  opposition,  illustrate 
the  continued  jealousy  of  the  Senate.  Nor,  in  spite  of  the  de- 
feat of  these  proposals,  had  the  president's  prerogative  remained 
entirely  unscathed.  Madison  regarded  the  Four  Years'  Law  of 
1820  as  an  unconstitutional  encroachment:  if  Congress  could 
limit  the  term  to  four  years,  it  could  make  it  one  day,  and  ten- 
ure would  be  at  the  pleasure  of  Congress  and  not  of  the  presi- 
dent. As  a  matter  of  fact,  however,  the  result  of  the  limited 
term  had  been  to  increase  the  power  of  the  executive,  and  to 
all  intents  and  purposes  Lincoln  found  his  legal  relation  to  the 
civil  service  little  different  from  that  of  Washington. 

The  immense  expansion  of  presidential  power  during  the 
Civil  War  naturally  tended  to  heighten  the  Senate's  distrust, 
and  under  this  stress  it  put  its  views  more  effectually  upon 
record  than  during  the  eighty  years  preceding.  The  first  act 
creating  the  national  banking  system  in  1862  gave  the  comp- 

186 


JEALOUSY  OF  THE  EXECUTIVE.  187 

troller  of  the  currency  a  term  of  five  years,  during  which  he 
could  be  removed  only  by  and  with  the  advice  and  consent  of 
the  Senate.  How  far  this  was  an  intentional  reversal  of  the 
practice  urged  by  Madison  in  the  famous  debate  of  1789  and 
accepted  since  that  time,  it  is  impossible  to  say ;  but  evidently 
the  significance  of  the  change  was  not  realized  by  the  majority 
in  Congress,  for  in  the  amendatory  bank  bill  of  1864  the  pro- 
vision was  modified,  and  the  president  was  merely  called  upon 
to  state  to  the  Senate  the  causes  of  the  removal.1  In  1863, 
again,  a  clause  was  added  to  the  military  appropriation  bill 
forbidding  the  payment  of  money  to  men  appointed  during  the 
recess  of  the  Senate  "to  fill  a  vacancy  in  any  existing  office, 
which  vacancy  existed  while  the  Senate  was  in  session  and  is 
by  law  required  to  be  filled  by  and  with  the  advice  and  consent 
of  the  Senate,  until  such  appointee  shall  have  been  confirmed 
by  the  Senate."  2  In  the  light  of  these  provisions,  it  seems  not 
improbable  that  the  clause  of  the  act  of  1864  requiring  the 
president  to  submit  reasons  for  the  removal  of  consular  clerks3 
was  inserted  rather  from  a  desire  to  limit  the  power  of  the 
former  than  to  protect  the  latter,  particularly  as  it  was  not 
part  of  the  original  bill  of  1856.  This  manifest  jealousy  of  the 
overgrown  power  of  the  president  suggests  that,  even  if  Lincoln 
had  lived,  a  contest  would  have  been  inevitable ;  but  where 
there  would  have  been  discussion,  mutual  concessions,  and 
final  agreement  under  Lincoln,  there  was  war  under  Andrew 
Johnson. 

The  inauguration  of  the  new  president  in  1865  seemed  fairly 

1  Congressional  Globe,  37  Cong.  3  sess.  Appendix,  189  ;  38  Cong.  I  sess.  Appendix, 
169. 

2  Ibid.  37  Cong.  3  sess.  Appendix,  183-184.    The  following  provisions  point  in 
the  same  direction.     In  1843  it  was  provided  that  one  cadet  for  West  Point  should 
be  taken  from  each  congressional  district,  thus  suggesting  by  inference  that  each 
member  should  have  the  appointment  of  one.     In  1862  the  intention  was  made 
plainer,  —  that  the  "  number  allowed  at  the  Academy  "  (Annapolis)  should  be  "  two 
for  every  member,"  while  the  president  was  to  have  two  for  the  District  of  Columbia 
and  ten  "  at  large  "  and  three  to  be  selected  from  enlisted  boys.     It  was  not,  how- 
ever, until  1875  that  it  was  distinctly  stated  that  the  nomination  should  be  made  "  on 
the  recommendation  of   the  member"   (Eaton,   Civil  Service   in    Great    Britain, 
285). 

3  Congressional  Globe,  38  Cong.  I  sess.  1115,  and  Appendix,  182. 


1 88  STRUGGLE  FOR  PATRONAGE. 

propitious.  As  a  result  of  Lincoln's  wise  decision  to  make  no 
changes  at  the  beginning  of  his  second  term,  the  administrative 
machine  had  settled  down  with  the  prospect  of  running  on 
quietly  for  four  years.  Johnson  seemed  prepared  to  follow 
out  Lincoln's  policy.  The  calm  was,  however,  delusive.  It  is 
unnecessary  even  to  enumerate  the  causes  that  brought  about 
the  divergence  of  the  president  and  a  majority  of  the  Republi- 
cans in  Congress ;  for  our  purpose  it  is  sufficient  to  note  that, 
at  a  time  when  the  relations  between  the  two  branches  of 
the  executive  were  particularly  strained,  the  man  who  became 
president  was  utterly  devoid  of  tact,  opinionated  and  somewhat 
obstinate,  a  good  fighter  but  a  poor  leader. 

When  it  became  evident  that  a  struggle  for  supremacy  was 
to  ensue,  Johnson  began  to  strengthen  his  position.  Three 
resignations  allowed  him  to  reconstruct  his  cabinet  to  his  satis- 
faction, except  that  Stanton  remained  in  the  war  department. 
A.  W.  Randall,  the  new  postmaster-general,  became  the  or- 
ganizer of  the  president's  forces;1  and  through  the  year  1866 
various  conventions  were  held  in  which  the  presidential  pro- 
gramme was  enunciated.  The  most  important  was  that  at  Phila- 
delphia, in  August,  where  an  address  was  adopted  which  was 
intended  to  appeal  to  all  the  elements  opposed  to  the  congres- 
sional scheme  of  reconstruction,  and  which  invoked  the  watch- 
word "Union,"  so  potent  before  1860.  The  statement  that 
this  convention  was  composed  almost  wholly  of  office-holders 
and  office-seekers  does  not  seem  quite  justified :  no  greater 
proportion  of  its  members  is  found  in  the  Blue  Books  of  1867 
and  1869  than  is  usual  in  such  conventions;  but  after  adjourn- 
ment many  individuals  and  whole  delegations  visited  the  presi- 
dent, and  doubtless  the  patronage  was  one  of  the  topics  discussed 
at  these  conferences.2  Shortly  afterward,  the  laying  of  the 
corner-stone  of  the  Douglas  monument  in  Chicago  gave  Johnson 
the  opportunity  to  "  swing  round  the  circle."  In  his  speeches 
during  this  journey  he  freely  declared  his  intention  of  not  al- 
lowing his  enemies  to  enjoy  government  positions,  epitomizing 

1  Gorham,  Stanton,  ii.  311. 

2  Nation,  August  3,  27,  1866 ;  a  list  of  members  is  to  be  found  in  the  New  York 
Tribune,  August  14,  1866;  see  also  August  21,  1866. 


ANDREW  JOHNSON.  1 89 

his  views  at  St.  Louis  in  the  vigorous  assertion  that  he  would 
"kick  'em  out"  of  office.1 

The  president  intended  then  to  use  the  patronage  in  his 
struggle  with  Congress,  and  he  found  it  an  apt  and  powerful 
instrument.  Fear  of  removal  might  be  counted  on  to  keep 
some  Republicans  loyal  to  their  official  chief,  while  the  Demo- 
crats, who  constituted  the  bulk  of  his  supporters,  would  be  es- 
pecially pleased  to  get  back  to  the  pastures  from  which  they 
had  been  driven  five  years  previous.  Moreover,  no  president 
except  Lincoln  had  had  such  numerous  rewards  to  distribute. 
The  most  important  additions  to  the  list  of  presidential  officers 
were  the  364  internal  revenue  collectors  and  assessors ;  but  the 
subordinate  service  was  swelled  in  almost  every  department. 
Although  the  army  was  immediately  reduced,  its  reorgani- 
zation necessitated  the  appointment  of  about  two  thousand 
officers  for  the  regular  establishment.2 

The  actual  proscription  began  shortly  after  the  Philadelphia 
convention,  when  the  postmaster-general,  Randall,  is  said  to 
have  sent  out  a  " bread  and  butter"  circular,  demanding  that 
office-holders  support  the  policy  there  outlined.3  Resignations 
and  removals  were  daily  noted  in  the  press  from  this  time  on. 
Owing  to  the  chaotic  conditions  of  Johnson's  presidency,  it  is 
impossible  to  get  a  clear  idea  of  the  amount  of  change.  The 
executive  journal  of  the  Senate  records  903  removals ;  but 
some  senators  accused  the  president  of  sending  in  many  nomina- 
tions without  stating  that  the  cause  of  the  vacancy  was  removal, 
and  sometimes  from  the  same  place  two  or  three  removals 
were  made.  Moreover,  the  proscription  continued  throughout 
the  administration,  and  the  initial  sweep  was  not  particularly 
severe ;  an  official  report  gave  the  total  number  of  removals 
during  1866  at  only  466  out  of  a  possible  2934.*  There  were 
great  local  differences :  of  twelve  internal  revenue  officers  in 

1  See  Sumner  in  Congressional  Globe,  39  Cong.  2  sess.  542. 

2  Executive  Journal,  xiii.  11-19  (December  22,  1862);   Blue  Books,  1861,  1863, 
1865;   Elaine,  Twenty  Years  of  Congress,  ii.  124. 

8  New  York  Tribune,  August  21,  22,  1 866;  Congressional  Globe,  39  Cong. 
2  sess.  493. 

*  Fish,  in  American  Historical  Association,  Reports,  1899,  i.  83 ;  Congressional 
Globe,  39  Cong.  2  sess.  492,  1517. 


190  STRUGGLE  FOR  PATRONAGE. 

Wisconsin,  ten  were  changed;  in  Ohio,  nearly  all;  in  Indiana, 
only  about  one-half;  and  in  California,  only  one.  Removals 
could  not,  of  course,  be  made  very  rapidly  at  first,  as  time 
was  necessary  to  discover  who  were  the  friends  and  who 
the  enemies  of  the  president.  The  intention,  however,  was 
clear. 

It  was  natural  that  this  sweep,  although  not  so  extensive 
as  several  that  had  gone  before,  should  arouse  more  bitterness 
than  any  other;  and  the  anger  of  the  Republicans  was  seven 
times  heated  by  the  appointment  of  some  hated  Copperheads  to 
take  the  place  of  the  martyrs  who  had  been  decapitated.  The 
fact  that  the  important  military  appointments  in  the  South  were 
made  with  discretion  could  not  serve  to  mitigate  their  wrath ; 
and,  arrogant  in  the  strength  of  their  majorities  in  Congress, 
they  were  not  content  to  sit  idly  by  and  allow  the  president  to 
go  on  in  this  course  unchecked  ;  it  would  be  dangerous  to  per- 
mit him  to  build  up  a  party  of  his  own,  and  the  Republicans 
felt  bound  in  honor  to  protect  such  of  their  friends  as  were  still 
in  office.1 

The  position  of  the  president  was,  however,  firmly  based 
on  long-established  constitutional  interpretations,  while  the  part 
that  congressmen  played  in  allotting  appointments  rested  on 
custom  alone ;  probably  no  one  had  ever  realized  how  indepen- 
dent the  former  really  was  in  theory,  for  practice  had  always 
been  based  on  mutual  concession.  Never  before  had  a  strong, 
determined  president  faced  two  houses  of  Congress  opposed  to 
him  in  so  momentous  a  crisis ;  and  for  the  first  time  the  ques- 
tion of  their  respective  constitutional  powers  over  the  patronage 
became  one  of  widespread  interest.  In  order  to  make  the  suc- 
ceeding events  intelligible,  it  is  necessary  to  discuss  briefly  the 
constitutional  provisions  on  this  subject,  and  the  questions  that 
were  left  open.2 

1  New   York  Tribune,  August  14,  23,  25,  27,  September  27,  1 866.     It  was  the 
report  at  Washington  that  two  thousand  removals  were  made.     Congressional  Globe, 
39  Cong.  2  sess.  1041  ;  Nation,  May  i,  August  16,  September  I,  1866;  August  22, 
November  2,  1867  ;   January  2,  1868. 

2  This  brief  discussion  is  almost  entirely  from  Miss  Salmon's  Appointing  Power  of 
the  President,  and  the  debate  on  the  Tenure-of-Office  Act  of  1867  as  found  in  the 
Congressional  Globe. 


CURRENT  INTERPRETATIONS.  191 

'  Two  clauses  of  the  constitution  relate  to  the  president's 
authority  on  this  subject :  — 

"  He  shall  nominate,  and,  by  and  with  the  advice  and  consent 
of  the  Senate,  shall  appoint  ambassadors,  other  public  ministers 
and  consuls,  judges  of  the  Supreme  Court,  and  all  other  officers 
of  the  United  States,  whose  appointments  are  not  herein  other- 
wise provided  for,  and  which  shall  be  established  by  law.  But 
Congress  may  by  law  vest  the  appointment  of  such  inferior 
officers  as  they  think  proper  in  the  president  alone,  in  the 
courts  of  law,  or  in  the  heads  of  departments. 

"  The  president  shall  have  power  to  fill  up  all  vacancies  that 
may  happen  during  the  recess  of  the  Senate,  by  granting  com- 
\missions  which  shall  expire  at  the  end  of  their  next  session." 

Both  these  provisions  were  incomplete.  The  first  contained 
no  mention  of  removals,  an  omission  which  the  first  Congress, 
under  the  lead  of  Madison,  interpreted  as  meaning  that  the 
power  of  removal  was  one  of  the  general  executive  functions 
belonging  to  the  president  ex  ojficio.  This  construction  was 
maintained  to  the  time  of  Johnson,  but  not  without  severe  criti- 
cism from  those  who  believed  that  the  power  of  appointment 
carried  with  it  that  of  removal,  and  that  consequently  the  con- 
sent of  the  Senate  was  necessary  for  both  alike^This  opinion 
was  most  conspicuously  put  forward  in  the  great  debate  of  1836; 
but  it  was  held  both  before  and  after,  and  was  supported  by 
many  distinguished  thinkers  on  constitutional  law,  by  a  state- 
ment of  Hamilton  in  the  Federalist,  by  a  closely  analogous 
decision  of  the  Supreme  Court,  and,  on  the  testimony  of  Justice 
McLean,  by  the  opinion  of  Chief-justice  Marshall  and  the  court 
when  he  was  at  its  head.1  It  might,  then,  fairly  be  considered 
a  moot  point  in  1866,  although  seventy-seven  years  of  practice 
should  have  counted  heavily  in  favor  of  the  established  inter- 
pretation. 

The  significance  of  the  other  clause  depends  upon  the  mean- 
ing of  the  word  "  happen."  The  alternatives  were  most  clearly 
set  forth  by  Reverdy  Johnson,  who  described  the  sentence 
as  involving  an  ellipsis,  it  being  possible  to  make  it  read 

1  Congressional  Globe,  39  Cong.  2  sess.  434, 438,  440.  Federalist  (Ford  ed.),  511. 
The  case  is  that  of  ex-parte  Hennen,  13  Peters,  259. 


192  STRUGGLE  FOR  PATRONAGE. 

either  "  happen  to  exist "  or  "  happen  to  occur." 
were  taken,  the  provision  obviously  referred  merely  to  cases  in 
which  the  vacancy  was  one  newly  arising  during  the  recess  for 
which  the  appointment  was  to  be  made.  As  an  actual  fact,  the 
official  practice  had  been  to  take  the  other  interpretation,  and 
this  had  the  support  of  a  number  of  attorneys-general.1 
"  The  deductions  from  the  "  happen  to  exist"  reading  were 
far-reaching.  If  the  president  issued  a  commission  to  a  man 
for  a  certain  post,  the  appointee  would  under  any  circumstances 
be  secure  therein  until  the  end  of  the  next  session  of  Congress ; 
but  unless  the  president  had  sent  in  his  name  to  the  Senate  and 
that  body  had  confirmed  it,  his  tenure  would  cease  at  that  date. 
There  was,  however,  no  reason  why  the  president  should  not 
at  once  reappoint  him,  for,  when  his  commission  expired,  a 
vacancy  happened  "  to  exist."  There  was  no  easily  assignable 
legal  reason,  therefore,  why  the  president  might  not  neglect  to 
send  in  the  name  at  all,  and  with  a  little  trouble  completely 
obviate  the  necessity  of  consulting  the  Senate.  This  extreme 
possibility  was  a  theoretical  rather  than  a  practical  danger,  for 
not  even  Johnson  showed  an  inclination  to  push  his  power  to 
such  an  extreme  ;  2  but  it  furnished  a  good  argument  for  alarm- 
ist orators. 

The  Republican  counter  attack  was  first  directed  against  the 
president's  control  of  the  army  and  navy.  In  July,  1866,  a 
statute  provided  that  no  officer  in  the  military  or  naval  service 
should  "  in  time  of  peace  be  dismissed  from  service  except  upon 
and  in  pursuance  of  the  sentence  of  a  court-martial."3  In  the 
first  session  of  the  thirty-ninth  Congress,  a  bill  was  introduced 
into  the  House  for  the  purpose  of  reversing  the  current  inter- 
pretations of  the  constitutional  clauses  and  of  establishing  those 
favorable  to  the  Senate.  It  did  not,  however,  become  a  law. 
On  the  first  day  of  the  next  session,  Mr.  Williams  of  Oregon 
asked  leave  to  bring  into  the  Senate  a  similar  bill,  denominated 
a  bill  "  to  regulate  the  tenure  of  offices."  It  was  read  twice, 

1  Congressional  Globe,  39  Cong.  2  sess.  409,  410. 

2  Ibid.   39   Cong.   2   sess.  492.      He   did,   however,   frequently  reappoint  men 
rejected  by  the  Senate.     Ibid.  390 ;  also  39  Cong.  3  sess.  436. 

8  Ibid.  39  Cong.  I  sess.  Appendix,  338. 


THE  TENURE-OF-OFFICE  ACT.  193 

and   two   days  later  referred  to  the  joint  select  committee  on 
retrenchment.1  i ; 

The  bill,  which  became  the  Tenure-of-Office  Act  of  1867! 
as  reported  by  Mr.  Edmunds  from  this  committee, 'was  designed  r 
emphatically  to  assert  the  share  of  the  Senate  in  the  removing 
power.  }  The  first  clause  provided  that  all  officers  except  mem- 
bers of  the  cabinet,  duly  appointed  with  the  advice  and  consent 
of  the  Senate,  should  be  entitled  to  hold  their  offices  until  a 
successor  had  in  like  manner  been  appointed.  The  second 
contained  a  provision  that,  for  causes  which  should  seem  to  him 
to  be  sufficient,  the  president  might  suspend  any  officer  and 
appoint  a  temporary  successor ;  such  cases  should  be  reported 
to  the  Senate  within  twenty  days  after  the  meeting  of  Congress 
next  following ;  if  the  Senate  agreed  that  the  causes  warranted 
removal,  the  office  was  to  be  vacant,  and  a  nomination  could  be 
made ;  if  not,  the  old  incumbent  was  to  resume  his  functions. 
The  third  clause  represented  an  attempt  to  define  the  word 
"  happen  "  by  the  addition  of  the  words  "  by  death,  resignation, 
expiration  of  terms  of  office,  or  other  lawful  cause "  ;  that  is, 
the  president  was  not  to  have  power  to  fill  vacancies  caused  by 
removal ;  if  the  Senate  should  not,  in  its  next  session,  confirm  a 
successor  to  the  officer  who  died  or  resigned  or  lost  his  office  by 
the  expiration  of  his  commission,  the  office  was  to  remain  in 
abeyance,  and  its  functions  were  to  be  performed  by  whatever 
officer  could  lawfully  execute  them  in  case  of  accidental  vacancy. 
The  fourth  section  provided  that  the  act  should  not  be  construed 
to  extend  the  term  of  any  officer  which  was  already  limited  by 
law*, 

There  was  no  doubt  that  this  bill,  at  any  rate  in  its  main 
provisions,  would  pass  both  houses  of  Congress ;  yet  the  debate 
was  long  and  acrimonious,  and  requires  review.  The  primary 
constitutional  question  as  to  the  exercise  of  the  removing  power, 
which  was  involved  in  the  first  section,  was  discussed  with  great 
learning  by  Reverdy  Johnson  and  Williams  of  Oregon.3  The 
same  champions  led  the  discussion  of  the  second  and  third 
clauses  of  the  bill  in  a  debate  which  was  more  animated  and  less 

1  Congressional  Globe,  39  Cong.  2  sess.  17. 

2  Ibid.  39  Cong.  2  sess.  382.  8  Ibid.  39  Cong.  2  sess.  438,  440,  460,  461. 


IQ4  STRUGGLE  FOR  PATRONAGE. 

hackneyed.  Johnson  defended  the  existing  practice,  and  showed 
the  inconvenience  that  would  arise  if  the  president  could  fill 
only  vacancies  "  occurring,"  and  not  all  those  "  existing,"  during 
the  recess  ;  and  Hendricks  illustrated  this  point  by  showing  that 
the  bill  establishing  the  Freedmen's  Bureau  was  passed  early 
enough  to  prevent  the  vacancies  which  it  created  from  occurring 
in  the  recess  of  the  Senate,  but  too  late  to  be  filled  before  the 
Senate  adjourned.  He  disapproved  of  the  recommissioning  of 
men  rejected  by  the  Senate,  and  was  inclined  to  believe  it  un- 
constitutional ;  but  he  did  not  explain  how  the  contingency  was 
to  be  avoided.1  Williams  based  his  constitutional  interpretation 
on  two  leading  ideas :  "  One  is  that  this  filling  up  is  to  be  tem- 
porary ;  and  the  other  that  it  is  to  be  exercised  within  a  given  time. 
...  I  understand  this  clause  as  to  vacancies  ...  to  be  in- 
tended simply  to  bridge  over  that  space  of  time  which  may 
intervene  between  different  sessions  of  the  Senate." 

The  debate  naturally  wandered  from  constitutional  questions 
to  those  of  expediency.  Williams  of  Pennsylvania  said  of  the 
bill  in  the  House,  "  It  proposes  to  improve  the  rare  advantage 
of  the  dissociation  between  the  party  in  power  here  and  the 
President  of  its  own  choice,  for  the  correction  of  a  great  evil,  by 
a  surrender  and  dedication  of  the  spoil  which  that  party  may  be 
supposed  to  have  won,  upon  the  public  altar,  and  for  the  nation's 
benefit  through  all  coming  time."  It  would  have  been  some- 
what difficult  to  explain  the  precise  nature  of  this  sacrifice,  but 
the  idea  that  an  exceptional  occasion  was  to  be  used  for  per- 
manent gain  was  a  common  one  in  the  Republican  press.2 

It  was  Senator  Sumner,  in  fact,  who  was  the  first  to  admit 
the  real  cause  of  the  proposed  act.  "At  last,"  said  he,  "the 
country  is  opening  its  eyes  to  the  actual  condition  of  things. 
Already  it  sees  that  Andrew  Johnson,  who  came  to  supreme 
power  by  a  bloody  accident,  has  become  the  successor  of  Jeffer- 
son Davis  in  the  spirit  by  which  he  is  governed  and  in  the  mis- 
chief he  is  inflicting  on  his  country.  .  .  .  He  is  a  usurper,  who 
promising  to  be  a  Moses,  has  become  a  Pharaoh.  Do  you  ask 

1  Congressional  Globe,  39  Cong.  2  sess.  386-387,  409-410,  441.     See  also  report 
of  the  judiciary  committee  of  the  Senate,  1888.     Executive  Journal,  xxvi.  196-202. 

2  Congressional  Globe,  39  Cong.  2  sess.  18  ;  Nation,  February  7,  July  12,  1866. 


THE  DEBATE.  195 

for  evidence?  It  is  found  in  public  acts  which  are  beyond 
question.  It  is  already  written  in  the  history  of  our  country. 
And  now  in  the  maintainance  of  his  usurpation  he  has  employed 
the  power  of  removal  from  office.  Some,  who  would  not  become 
the  partisans  of  his  tyranny  he  has,  according  to  his  own 
language,  *  kicked  out.'  Others  are  left,  but  silenced  by  this 
menace.  .  .  .  Wherever  any  vacancy  occurs,  whether  in  the 
loyal  or  the  rebel  States,  it  is  filled  by  the  partisans  of  his 
usurpation.  Other  vacancies  are  created  to  provide  for  these 
partisans.  I  need  not  add  that  just  in  proportion  as  we  sanction 
such  nominations  or  fail  to  arrest  them,  according  to  the  measure 
of  our  power,  we  become  parties  to  his  usurpation." *  Up  to 
this  time  the  debate  had  been  conducted  with  decorum,  but 
from  now  on  speeches  became  more  and  more  violent  and 
partisan. 

Amendments  were  offered  from  time  to  time.  Some  were 
merely  with  intent  to  clarify  and  improve  the  bill,  as  that  of 
Sherman,  which  added  an  enforcement  clause.  He  pointed  out 
that  the  bill  passed  in  Lincoln's  time,  against  the  payment  of 
salaries  to  officers  appointed  in  certain  defined  ways,  had  not 
been  observed;  and,  at  his  suggestion,  very  heavy  penalties 
were  created  for  those  paying  or  receiving  salaries  for  services 
rendered  contrary  to  the  Tenure-of-Office  Bill.2  A  more  impor- 
tant amendment  was  that  introduced  by  Mr.  Van  Winkle,  fixing 
a  definite  term  of  four  years  for  all  presidential  offices  not 
heretofore  limited  by  law.  This  roused  Mr.  Johnson,  who  re- 
membered the  issues  of  the  almost  forgotten  past.  "  I  do  not 
know,"  said  he,  "  that  any  statute  ever  passed  has  created  more 
trouble  and  done  more  mischief  than  that  fixing  a  short  term  of 
office  for  these  several  appointees."  His  protest  did  not  strike 
a  responsive  chord,  and  the  amendment  seems  to  have  failed 
merely  because  the  managers  were  unwilling  to  encumber  the 
bill  with  miscellaneous  matter.3 

Sumner,  who,  throughout  the  debate  acted  as  chief  toreador 
in  baiting  the  presidential  bull,  skilfully  escaping  by  just  the 

1  Congressional  Globe,  39  Cong.  2  sess.  542. 

2  Ibid.  39  Cong.  2  sess.  390,  404,  405. 
8  Ibid.  39  Cong.  2  sess.  406. 


196  STRUGGLE  FOR  PATRONAGE. 

breadth  of  a  hair  from  being  caught  in  a  breach  of  senatorial 
privilege,  proposed  to  make  the  appointment  of  all  officers 
receiving  over  one  thousand  dollars  annual  salary  subject  to 
the  confirmation  of  the  Senate.  This  led  to  a  fierce  onslaught 
of  radical  oratory.  Sumner  acknowledged  that  it  would  increase 
the  labors  of  the  Senate  ;  but  he  would  not  have  them  shirk  their 
duty,  and  the  duty  of  the  hour  was  "  protection  to  the  loyal  and 
patriotic  citizen.  .  .  .  You  may  ask,"  he  added,  "protection 
against  whom  ?  I  answer  plainly,  protection  against  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States.  .  .  .  There  was  no  such  duty  on 
our  fathers  .  .  .  because  there  was  no  President  of  the  United 
States  who  had  become  the  enemy  of  his  country."  Never- 
theless, Fessenden  and  Edmunds  succeeded  in  convincing  the 
majority  that  the  Senate's  time  could  be  more  profitably  spent 
than  in  protecting  the  night  watchmen  of  New  York  and 
Boston.1 

By  far  the  most  important  amendment,  however,  was  that 
introduced  by  Mr.  Howe  when  the  bill  was  first  brought  in  by 
the  committee,  by  which  it  was  proposed  to  strike  out  the 
clause  excepting  the  cabinet  officers.  This,  like  Mr.  Sumner's 
amendment,  received  its  support  from  the  Republican  radicals, 
who  entirely  reprobated  the  theory  of  Edmunds  and  Reverdy 
Johnson  that  these  officers  should  be  the  confidential  advisers 
of  the  president.  So  little  conception  was  shown  of  the  nature 
of  our  government,  that  Mr.  Howe  compared  the  relations  of 
the  heads  of  departments  and  the  president  to  those  between  the 
king  and  the  ministers  in  England.  The  more  moderate  Republi- 
cans, voting  with  the  Democrats,  defeated  the  proposition  in  the 
Senate.  In  the  House  it  was  again  put  forward,  and  was  more 
ably  supported;  the  report  of  Mr.  Jenckes,  setting  forth  the 
patronage  which  the  various  secretaries  dispensed,  was  used 
with  much  effect;  and  this,  combined  with  the  desire  to  pro- 
tect Stanton  in  his  place  at  the  head  of  the  war  department, 
secured  the  passage  of  the  amendment,  though  by  a  narrow 
majority.  A  conference  committee  was  then  appointed  to  ad- 
just the  differences  between  the  Senate  and  the  House,  and  a 
compromise  was  agreed  upon,  to  the  effect  thatnhe  heads  of 

1  Congressional  Globe,  39  Cong.  2  sess.  470,  525-528,  543,  547. 


CABINET  MEMBERS.  197 

departments   should   hold   for  the   term   of   the   president  by 
whom  they  were  appointed,  and  one  month  thereafter,  subject 
to  removal  by  and  with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate.. 
The  bill  with  this  amendment  was  vetoed  by  the  president,  was 
passed  over  his  veto,  and  became  a  law  on  March  2,  I86/.1  # 

The  debate  as  a  whole  is  disappointing,  because  so  little  desire 
was  shown  to  improve  the  opportunity  presented  to  accomplish 
a  real  reform.  Few  senators  seemed  to  sympathize  with  Mr. 
Howe's  statement  that  he  found  no  special  fault  with  the  doc- 
trine, "  which,"  he  added,  "  I  believe  has  been  preached  only 
for  thirty  or  forty  years,  that  to  the  victor  belong  the  spoils ; 
but  the  victory  which  entitles  a  man  or  a  party  to  the  spoils  is 
a  victory  which  is  achieved  by  the  assent  of  the  American  peo- 
ple; it  is  not  a  victory  which  is  attained  by  desertion."  Yet, 
although  few  of  the  Republicans  defended  the  existing  system, 
and  although  they  occasionally  mentioned  reform  as  a  desirable 
object,  the  only  senator  whose  remarks  indicated  intelligent  con- 
sideration of  it  was  Mr.  Doolittle,  who  called  attention  to  ^the 
success  of  British-American  administration  of  Indian  affairs, 
and  drew  lessons  therefrom.  Some  senators  were,  of  course, 
conversant  with  Mr.  Jenckes's  reform  bill ;  but  they  seem  to 
have  been  little  influenced  by  its  principles.  The  only  object 
in  mind,  other  than  the  immediate  one  of  restraining  Andrew 
Johnson,  was  the  assertion  of  the  dignity  of  the  Senate2  and 
the  general  lessening  of  executive  powers.  Reverdy  Johnson, 
whose  speeches  and  discussions  were  by  far  the  ablest  through- 
out the  debate,  called  attention  to  the  fact  that  power  might  be 
abused  by  the  Senate  as  well  as  by  the  president;  but  this 
argument  did  not  appeal  to  the  senators  in  general.  The 
Tenure-of-Office  Bill  of  1867  marked  the  first  definite  success 
that  the  Senate  had  obtained  in  its  contest  with  the  president 
for  the  control  of  the  patronage;  it  was  a  partisan  measure, 
directed  against  a  particular  president. 

The  attitude  of  the  president  toward  the  new  act  was  a  ques- 
tion of  the  utmost  interest.  He  had  vetoed  it  in  an  able  message, 

1  Nation,  February  7,  1867  ;    Congressional  Globe,  39  Cong.  2  sess.  382-388,  938, 
969,  1514,  1964,  1977  ;   E.  C.  Mason,  Veto  Power,  §  28. 

2  Congressional  Globe,  39  Cong.  2  sess.  460,  524,  1040. 


198  STRUGGLE  FOR  PATRONAGE. 

in  which  he  claimed  that  it  was  unconstitutional ;  and,  now  that 
it  had  been  passed  over  his  veto,1  the  question  remained  whether 
he  would  accept  the  restrictions  imposed  or  would  disregard  the 
action  of  Congress.2  On  March  7  a  long  list  of  nominations 
was  sent  to  the  Senate,  among  which  was  one  that  might  have 
precipitated  the  crisis  if  either  side  had  so  desired.  A  certain 
man  was  nominated  in  place  of  another  "  to  be  removed  "  ;  the 
name  was  referred  to  a  committee,  but  was  withdrawn  by  the 
president  before  a  report  had  been  made.  Soon  after  a  man 
was  nominated  in  the  place  of  another  "to  be  removed  for 
inefficiency,"  and  the  Senate  evinced  its  satisfaction  with  the 
cause  expressed  by  confirming  the  nomination.3  Still,  the  presi- 
dent could  not  be  said  to  have  committed  himself  to  the  policy 
of  always  stating  a  cause. 

In  December,  1867,  the  judiciary  committee  reported  a  series 
of  resolutions  intended  to  regulate  the  activity  of  the  Senate 
under  the  new  law.  It  was  provided  that  the  president  and 
Senate  could  remove  an  officer  by  the  nomination  and  confirma- 
tion of  a  successor ;  that,  in  case  an  officer  were  suspended,  the 
Senate  might  consent  to  his  removal  by  confirming  the  nomina- 
tion of  another  to  his  position,  without  specifically  approving  or 
disapproving  the  cause  of  suspension ;  and  that  cases  of  sus- 
pension be  referred  to  the  committee  most  interested  in  the 
offices  involved.* 

While  the  Senate  was  thus  carefully  avoiding  the  issue,  but 
was  exercising  liberally  its  undoubted  power  of  rejecting  nomi- 
nations, the  president  was  preparing  to  force  the  question  into 
the  courts.  He  struck  directly  at  Stanton,  the  foremost  of  the 
men  whom  the  law  was  designed  to  protect,  asking  for  his  resig- 
nation on  May  5,  1867,  and,  on  his  refusal  to  resign,  suspending 
him  one  week  later.  Johnson,  in  his  notification  to  Stanton, 

1  C.  E.  Chadsey,  Struggle  between  President  Johnson  and  Congress  over  Recon- 
struction (Columbia  University,  Studies  in  History,  viii.  No.  i),  135. 

2  Nation,  October  17,  1867. 

8  Executive  Journal,  xv.  349,  366,  376  (March  7,  8,  1867);  465,  572  (March  18, 
28,  1867). 

*  Ibid.  xvi.  105  (December  13,  1867).  This  account  of  the  events  leading  up  to 
the  trial  of  President  Johnson  is  drawn  from  Professor  Dunning's  chapter  on  the 
trial  of  President  Johnson.  '  W.  A.  Dunning,  Essays  on  Reconstruction,  253-303. 


THE  CRISIS.  199 

made  no  reference  to  the  Tenure-of-Office  Act,  but  gave  as  his 
authority  the  power  vested  in  him  as  "  president  by  the  Consti- 
tution and  laws  of  the  United  States."  Stanton  protested  that 
no  legal  cause  of  removal,  or  of  suspension,  was  given ;  but  he 
yielded,  and  Grant  consented  to  act  in  his  place.  On  December 
12,  1867,  Johnson,  strictly  in  accord  with  the  provisions  of  the 
new  law,  but  still  with  no  reference  to  it,  reported  the  suspen- 
sion to  the  Senate.1  His  plan  seems  to  have  been  that,  if  the 
Senate  refused  to  concur  in  removing  Stanton,  Grant  should 
refuse  to  give  up  his  office,  and  Stanton  would  thus  be  forced 
to  appeal  to  the  courts.  This  plan  was  submitted  to  the  com- 
mander-in-chief,  who  approved  of  it  provisionally,  but  after  an 
examination  of  the  law  refused  to  perform  his  part  of  it.  Con- 
sequently Grant  remained  at  his  post  until  January  13,  1868, 
when  the  Senate  formally  refused  to  agree  to  the  removal  of 
Stanton ;  whereupon  Grant  wrote  to  the  latter  that,  by  virtue 
of  the  Tenure-of-Office  Act,  the  suspension  was  at  an  end,  and 
that  he  was  ready  to  hand  over  the  office.2 

On  February  21,  Johnson  announced  to  the  Senate  that  he 
had  removed  Stanton  and  appointed  General  Lorenzo  Thomas 
in  his  place  "ad  interim."  3  This  was  the  first  definite  announce- 
ment on  his  part  that  he  did  not  recognize  the  validity  of  the 
law  passed  nearly  a  year  before,  and  the  House  at  once  pro- 
ceeded to  impeach  him.  It  does  not  fall  within  the  purpose  of 
this  work  to  follow  the  progress  of  that  trial.  The  chief  point 
of  dispute  rested  on  the  interpretation  of  that  ambiguous  clause 
which  was  the  result  of  the  compromise  between  the  Senate  and 
the  House  on  the  question  whether  the  provisions  of  the  bill 
should  or  should  not  apply  to  cabinet  officers  J  and  the  defence 
held  that  Stanton  had  not  been  appointed  by  Johnson,  that  the 
latter  was  serving  a  term  of  his  own,  not  a  remnant  of  the  term 
of  Lincoln,  and  that  consequently  the  removal  was  not  in  viola- 
tion of  the  law.  This  position  was  held  by  just  enough  Repub- 
lican senators  to  prevent  the  accusers  of  the  president  from 
securing  the  two-thirds  majority  necessary  for  conviction  in  an 

1  Executive  Journal,  xvi.  95. 

2  Ibid.  130 ;  C.  M.  De  Witt,  Impeachment  of  Andrew  Johnson,  chs.  iii.  and  iv. 
8  Executive  Journal,  xvi.  170. 


200  STRUGGLE  FOR  PATRONAGE. 

impeachment  trial,  and,  to  the  disgust  of  most  of  the  Republicans, 
the  outcome  was  an  acquittal. 

The  crucial  vote  was  taken  on  May  26,  and  Stanton  at  once 
tendered  his  resignation  to  the  president.  The  latter  had  al- 
ready, on  April  23,  sent  in  the  nomination  of  General  Schofield 
as  secretary  of  war,  "in  place  of  E.  M.  Stanton,  removed." 
The  Republican  majority  could  not  overlook  this  assertion  of 
the  president's  right  to  remove,  nor  could  they,  now  that  they 
lacked  the  two-thirds  vote,  profitably  continue  the  contest ;  they, 
therefore,  on  May  28,  confirmed  the  appointment,  but  expressed 
their  opinion  that  the  secretary  of  war  had  not  been  "  legally 
removed,"  but  had  voluntarily  relinquished  his  post.1 

All  efforts  to  bring  the  matter  to  a  determination  had  now 
failed.  In  December,  1868,  the  president  recognized  the  law 
sufficiently  to  recommend  its  repeal;  but  practically  until  the 
end  of  his  term  the  president  administered  the  civil  service 
under  one  interpretation  of  the  constitution  and  the  Senate 
under  another.  Technically  the  president  fared  the  best,  for 
the  Senate  had  to  recognize  his  nominations  if  it  wished  to  take 
any  share  whatever  in  the  appointments,  and  in  practice  it 
often  assented  to  a  nomination  in  which  the  last  occupant  was 
mentioned  as  "removed"  or  "to  be  removed."2  In  fact,  the 
executive  journal  does  not  read  differently  from  the  journals  of 
previous  administrations.  The  Senate's  power  of  rejection,  how- 
ever, was  not  in  question,  and  consequently  it  could  throw  out 
nominations  to  its  heart's  content,  and  the  obstinate  pertinacity 
of  the  two  branches  of  the  appointing  power  led  to  many  pro- 
longed contests.3 

Congress  indulged,  too,  in  many  petty  annoyances.  Already, 
in  1867,  it  had  cut  down  the  contingent  fund  for  the  state  depart- 

1  Executive  Journal,  xvi.  236,  239. 

2  Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers  of  the  Presidents,  vi.  673  ;  Executive  Journal, 
xvi.  303,  306  (July  13,  1868);   319  (July  18,  1868). 

8  The  case  of  the  postmastership  at  Newburgh,  New  Jersey,  is  an  illustration. 
Johnson  renominated  J.  H.  Reeve,  whose  term  had  expired ;  Reeve  was  rejected, 
again  renominated,  and  again  rejected  (Executive  Journal  xv.  249,  328,  429,  451). 
Benjamin  H.  Mace  was  next  named  and  rejected  (Ibid.  699,  710).  A  Mr.  Lomas 
was  put  up  and  defeated  (Ibid.  714,  741).  The  president  once  more  brought  for- 
ward Mr.  Reeve,  who,  according  to  the  journal,  was  confirmed  (Ibid.  743,  758);  but 


THE  BILL   OF  1869.  2OI 

ment  from  $60,000  to  $30,000,  and  now  it  proposed  to  limit  the 
number  of  special  agents  who  could  be  appointed  by  the  several 
departments.  Sumner,  who  realized  the  needs  of  the  state 
department,  vigorously  opposed  this  action ;  Seward  furnished 
him  with  a  letter  showing  how  moderately  the  power  had  been 
used  during  the  existing  administration,  and  the  bill  failed. 
The  irritation  was  carried  so  far  that  the  Senate's  confirmation 
of  the  nomination  of  Reverdy  Johnson  as  minister  to  England 
could  be  referred  to  as  an  act  of  gracious  courtesy.1 

The  battle  was  over.  Both  sides  had  spent  their  ammunition, 
and  the  administration  went  out  amid  desultory  firing  along  the 
outposts. 

It  was  generally  considered  that  the  Tenure-of-Office  Act  was 
passed  as  an  emergency  measure,  and  would  be  repealed  as  soon 
as  the  Republicans  elected  a  president  of  their  own  faith.  Presi- 
dent Grant,  in  his  first  annual  message,  earnestly  recommended 
its  repeal.  Already  in  April,  1869,  however,  the  new  Congress 
had  expressed  its  approval  of  the  act  by  amending  it.  The 
first  two  sections  were  so  remodelled  as  to  allow  suspension  at 
the  discretion  of  the  president,  for  he  was  no  longer  required  to 
report  to  the  Senate  "  the  evidence  and  reasons  "  for  his  acts ; 
and  cabinet  members  were  placed  on  the  same  footing  as  other 
officers.2  On  the  other  hand,  in  order  to  prevent  the  president 
from  keeping  in  office  men  commissioned  during  the  recess,  he 
was  ordered  to  nominate  persons  for  all  vacancies  within  thirty 
days  after  the  commencement  of  each  session,  and,  in  case  of 
rejection,  to  send  in  another  name  as  soon  as  possible.  The 
enforcement  clauses  were  retained.  The  House  had  desired 
a  total  repeal,  but  the  Senate  had  stiffly  refused  to  yield  what 
it  had  gained,  and  its  subsequent  action  showed  that  it  had 
no  intention  to  yield  up  a  power  which  it  had  so  long  desired. 

either  the  record  is  defective  or  the  president  imagined  that  there  must  have  been  a 
rejection,  for  he  nominated  William  A.  Boyce  "  in  place  of  J.  H.  Reeve,  rejected  " 
(Ibid.  763).  Boyce  was  thrown  out  {Ibid.  766);  Lomas  was  now  tried  again,  and 
he  at  last  was  confirmed  (Ibid.  847). 

1  Congressional  Globe,  40  Cong.  2  sess.  845,  952,  1769;  Nation,  February  21, 
1867  ;  Nation,  June  18,  1868. 

2  December  6,  1869,  Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers  of  the  Presidents,  vii.  38; 
Statutes  at  Large,  xvi.  6-7  (ch.  x.). 


202  STRUGGLE  FOR  PATRONAGE. 

The  executive  journal  reflects  this  increased  interest  in  appoint- 
ments, and  the  tenacity  with  which  the  Senate  maintained  its 
position. 

In  March,  1869,  Senator  Edmunds  introduced  a  resolution  to 
the  effect  that  "  the  term  of  office  of  all  officers  affected  by  the 
act  regulating  the  tenure  of  certain  civil  offices  is  limited  by 
that  act  upon  the  pleasure  of  the  President  of  the  United  States 
in  the  appointment  of  others  to  said  offices  by  and  with  the 
advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate,"  and  that  "the  President  of 
the  United  States  may  rightfully,  under  and  in  the  spirit  of 
existing  laws,  nominate  to  the  Senate  persons  for  office  accord- 
ing to  his  discretion  and  independent  of  any  question  respecting 
the  conduct  or  capacity  of  any  incumbent."  This  failed  of 
approval,  as  did  also  a  resolution  of  contrary  intent  offered  by 
Senator  Trumbull  the  following  December,  "  That  in  case  of  a 
nomination  sent  to  the  Senate  in  place  of  an  officer  suspended 
by  the  President,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  committee  having  the 
nomination  in  charge  to  inquire  into  the  propriety  of  the  change 
proposed."  December  17,  1869,  a  resolution  was  proposed 
"that  in  the  consideration  of  nominations  and  other  subjects 
submitted  to  it  [the  Senate]  by  the  President,  ...  it  is  its 
right  to  be  furnished  with  all  papers  and  documents  relating 
to  such  matter  belonging  to  the  files  of  the  Executive  branch 
of  the  Government  or  any  Department  thereof."  This  resolu- 
tion also  failed,  and  for  it  was  substituted  a  respectful  request 
for  information  in  the  particular  case  then  under  discussion.1 

As  no  fixed  rules  were  adopted,  the  practice  of  the  Senate 
varied.  Usually,  nominations  in  the  place  of  officers  suspended 
were  confirmed  without  comment.  Sometimes  there  was  investi- 
gation, and  occasionally  evidence  was  printed  for  the  use  of  the 
Senate.  Often  this  was  in  answer  to  a  protest  on  the  part  of 
the  officer  suspended.2  The  result  was  nearly  always  an  ulti- 
mate approval  of  the  action  of  the  president.  So  regular  was 
this  action  that  in  1886  Senator  Hoar  said  that  no  suspended 
officer  had  ever  been  reappointed.  This  is  not  quite  correct: 
December  6,  1869,  President  Grant  sent  in  a  list  of  officers  of 

1  Executive  Journal,  xvii.  22,  313,  320,  323. 

2  Ibid.  xvii.  323,  365,  403 ;  xix.  250,  297 ;  xxi.  319,  439. 


FRICTION".  203 

the  Indian  department  "suspended  during  the  recess  of  the 
Senate,  pursuant  to  the  provisions  of  the  second  section  of  '  An 
act  to  amend  an  act  regulating  the  tenure  of  certain  civil  offices,' 
approved,  April  5,  1869,"  and  requesting  the  Senate  to  consent 
to  their  removal.  In  the  case  of  seven,  consent-  was  refused, 
and  when  they  had  served  out  their  terms  one  of  these  seven 
was  nominated  for  reappointment  and  was  confirmed.1  There 
was  constant  pressure  to  make  public  the  results  of  these  investi- 
gations, and  often  the  injunction  of  secrecy  was  removed.2  The 
main  motive  for  this  was  that  it  was  found  impossible  to  pre- 
serve absolute  secrecy,  and  that  as  a  result  garbled  reports  got 
abroad.  In  1871  it  was  voted  that  the  executive  journal  be 
printed  to  the  end  of  the  fortieth  Congress  (1869),  and  in  1901 
it  was  published  to  the  end  of  the  fifty-first  (1891).  In  1885  it 
was  voted  that  nominations  and  confirmations  be  daily  printed 
in  the  Record? 

There  was  constant  friction  between  the  Senate  and  the 
successive  presidents  over  minor  questions  of  form.  In  Decem- 
ber, 1870,  the  Senate  felt  it  necessary  to  declare  that  the  presi- 
dent could  restore  a  suspended  officer  without  consulting  it. 
In  1873  it  returned  as  not  "regular  "  the  nomination  of  Richard 
Busteed  to  a  judicial  position,  "to  take  effect  on  the  resigna- 
tion of  David  C.  Humphreys";  and  in  1874  it  returned  other 
nominations,  "  it  being  the  judgment  of  the  Senate  that  commis- 
sions ought  not  to  antedate  the  time  of  actual  appointment."  4 
A  very  annoying  practice  of  the  Senate  was  to  request  the 
return  of  its  resolutions  confirming  or  rejecting  nominations, 
in  order  that  it  might  reconsider  them.  December  19,  1872, 
the  chair  ruled  that  such  motion  was  out  of  order,  as  the 
Senate  had  completed  its  function,  and  could  not  reopen  the 
question  without  the  initiative  of  the  president.  The  latter, 
however,  usually  complied  with  such  requests,  or  sent  a  mes- 

1  Congressional  Record,  49  Cong.  2  sess.  140-141;  Executive  Journal,  xvii.  289- 
290,  545-546,  622,  682. 

2  Ibid.  xvii.  311  ;  xxv.  340. 

8  Ibid,  xxvii.  434, 461-462, 475-477»  487-488,  501-504, 507,  516-517,  588, 590, 598 ; 
xviii.  no;  xxv.  197.     See  also  back  of  title-page  of  each  volume. 
*  Ibid.  xvii.  594 ;   xviii.  396  ;  xix.  437. 


204  STRUGGLE  FOR  PATRONAGE. 

sage  stating  that  the  commissions  had  been  signed,  and  were 
therefore  beyond  his  power  of  recall.  In  some  cases  Grant 
ignored  the  requests,1  and  the  officers  in  question  continued  to 
serve. 

Under  Hayes  the  Senate  was  more  aggressive  than  under 
Grant,  and  December  n,  1877,  resolved  "that  the  President  be 
respectfully  requested  to  inform  the  Senate,  with  a  view  to  the 
transaction  of  its  executive  business,  whether  in  any  of  the 
instances  of  nominations  hitherto  sent  to  the  Senate,  stated 
to  be  for  appointment  in  place  of  officers  removed,  such  re- 
movals had  been  made  at  the  time  of  sending  such  nominations 
to  the  Senate."  The  president  was  able  to  reply,  January  14, 
1878,  "that  in  the  instances  referred  to  removals  had  not  been 
made  at  the  time  the  nominations  were  sent  to  the  Senate. 
The  form  used  for  such  nominations  was  one  found  to  have 
been  in  existence  and  heretofore  used  in  some  of  the  depart- 
ments, and  was  intended  to  inform  the  Senate  that  if  the  nomi- 
nations proposed  were  approved  it  would  operate  to  remove  an 
incumbent  whose  name  was  indicated."2  Such  nominations 
were  nearly  always  approved  by  the  Senate  simply  by  the 
confirmation  of  successors  to  the  persons  removed.3 

In  addition  to  this  constant  manifestation  of  interest  and 
assertion  of  minor  rights,  the  Senate  used  vigorously  through- 
out this  period  its  power  of  rejecting  nominations.  Under 
Grant  there  were  58  contested  cases,  of  which  9  resulted  in 
rejection;  under  Hayes  92  contests,  51  being  decided  against 
the  president;  in  Garfield's  short  administration  there  were  7 
contests  with  2  rejections ;  37  of  Arthur's  nominations  were 
contested,  8  successfully;  Cleveland  suffered  8  defeats  in  30 
contests.4  The  Senate  had  always  possessed  the  power  of  re- 
jection, and  had  at  times  used  it  freely,  but  never  before  so 
continuously  in  the  case  of  nominations  by  presidents  with 
whom  the  majority  were  on  friendly  terms.  To  be  sure,  some 

1  Executive  Journal,  xviii.  352,  386,  400;  xix.  460;  xx.  178;  xxi.  353;  xxii.  97. 

2  Ibid.  xxi.  169,  199. 

8  Exceptions,  see  p.  202  above ;  also  Executive  Journal,  xx.  375.  The  latter  was 
the  case  of  a  military  officer. 

4  Executive  Journal,  session  for  the  periods  mentioned. 


THE  POWER  OF  THE  SENATE.  2O$ 

of  these  rejections  reflect  special  hostility  to  Grant  and  Hayes ; 
but  on  the  whole  they  were  scattered  pretty  evenly,  and  indi- 
cate a  fixed  policy  of  aggression  rather  than  a  temporary  ex- 
pedient. In  the  same  way,  the  Senate  had  presumably  always 
had  the  power  to  ask  for  information  concerning  nominations, 
but  it  had  never  before  exercised  it  so  freely.  Particularly 
it  interested  itself  in  ascertaining  whether  appointments  were 
divided  evenly  among  the  several  states.  A  characteristic  reso- 
lution is  that  of  April  8,  1878,  "That  the  annexed  messages 
be  respectfully  returned  to  the  President  with  the  request  that 
the  Senate  be  informed  of  the  residence  of  the  nominee,  where 
that  fact  is  omitted,  and  whether  the  nomination  is  to  remove 
an  incumbent  where  that  statement  is  omitted." l 

These  are  outward  and  visible  signs  of  the  inward  political 
growth  of  a  new  power  of  the  Senate  —  the  attempt  of  the 
senators  by  combination  to  make  the  president  a  mere  clerk 
to  transmit  to  the  Senate  as  a  constitutional  body  nominations 
handed  to  him  unofficially  by  the  individual  senators.  A  crisis 
was  brought  about  in  the  spring  of  1881,  when  President  Gar- 
field  attempted  to  reward  some  of  his  New  York  supporters  at 
the  expense  of  the  friends  of  Senator  Conkling.  The  latter 
protested;  the  other  senator,  Platt,  joined  him,  as  did  Vice- 
president  Arthur,  Postmaster-general  James,  and  sixty  out  of 
eighty-one  Republican  assemblymen  of  New  York.  Garfield 
persisted  in  sending  the  most  offensive  of  the  nominations  — 
that  of  Mr.  Robertson  to  be  collector  —  to  the  Senate,  where- 
upon Conkling  and  Platt  resigned.  In  a  letter  to  Governor 
Cornell  they  stated  the  facts,  and  added  that  they  were  forced 
to  choose  between  "  plain  and  sworn  duty  "  and  "  disloyalty  to 
the  administration  which  they  had  helped  to  bring  in."  The 
letter  continued,  "  Although  party  service  may  be  fairly  con- 
sidered in  making  selections  of  public  officers,  it  can  hardly  be 
maintained  that  the  Senate  is  bound  to  remove,  without  cause, 
incumbents,  merely  to  make  places  for  those  whom  any  indi- 
vidual, even  the  President  or  a  member  of  the  Cabinet,  wishes 
to  repay  for  being  recreant  to  others  and  serviceable  to  him."  2 

1  Executive  Journal,  xxi.  287  ;  see  also  xvii.  187,  383,  and  xxi.  55. 

2  Nation,  May  19,  1881. 


206  STRUGGLE  FOR  PATRONAGE. 

This  action  on  the  part  of  the  New  York  senators  must 
be  regarded  as  an  attempt  to  enforce  the  doctrine  that  not  only 
could  the  Senate  control  appointments,  but  that  the  senators 
should  severally  control  those  for  their  respective  states  —  a  doc- 
trine which  may  be  considered  as  the  high- water  mark  of  the 
Senate's  claims.  Fortunately,  the  New  York  legislature  did 
not  support  this  theory,  and  Conkling  and  Platt  were  defeated 
for  reelection.  Nor  can  the  subsequent  election  of  the  latter 
be  regarded  as  in  any  way  a  vindication  of  the  principle  here 
set  forth ;  it  was  due  rather  to  changed  circumstances,  and  to 
his  own  great  skill.  The  Senate  itself  rejected  the  doctrine  put 
forward  by  unanimously  confirming  Robertson.1 

The  notoriety  of  this  incident  did  much  to  promote  interest 
in  the  repeal  of  the  Tenure-of -Office  Act.  This  had  been 
urged  by  Grant  and  Hayes,  and  a  bill  for  the  purpose  had 
been  passed  in  the  House  of  Representatives.2  In  April,  1884, 
President  Arthur  asked  the  Senate  to  consent  to  the  removal 
of  a  certain  officer,  whereupon  Senator  Hoar  proposed  a  reso- 
lution, "That  in  the  judgment  of  the  Senate  it  is  within  the 
constitutional  power  of  the  President  to  remove  the  officer 
named  in  his  message  if,  in  his  judgment,  the  public  interests 
require."  This  was  too  radical  a  departure,  and  Senator  Ed- 
munds's  resolution,  that  "  in  view  of  the  foregoing  message  the 
Senate  advise  and  consent  to  the  removal,"  was  passed;  but 
Senator  Hoar  succeeded  in  affixing  to  it  the  clause,  "  and  that 
the  Senate  does  not  hereby  express  an  opinion  as  to  the  con- 
stitutional relations  of  the  President  and  the  Senate  in  the 
matter  of  removal  from  office."3 

Senator  Hoar  did  not  lose  interest  in  the  matter,  and  did  not 
let  others  lose  it.  He  was  assisted  by  the  agitation  in  favor  of 
civil  service  reform  and  by  a  vigorously  worded  message  of  Presi- 
dent Cleveland  in  1886.  December  14,  1885,  he  introduced  a 
bill  to  repeal  the  Tenure-of-Office  Law,  which  was  referred  to  the 
judiciary  committee;  but  it  is  significant  that  in  the  House  a 

1  Nation,  June  23  ;  July  28,  1881. 

2  Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers  of  the  Presidents,  vii.  38,  605  ;    Congressional 
Record,  49  Cong.  2  sess.  113. 

8  Executive  Journal,  xxiv.  249,  254. 


REPEAL.  207 

corresponding  bill  was  given  to  the  committee  on  the  reform  of 
the  civil  service.  The  debate  in  the  House  was  unimportant, 
and  the  bill  passed  by  a  vote  of  172  to  6/.1  In  the  Senate  the 
discussion  was  more  keen.  Hoar,  in  his  introductory  remarks, 
said  that  he  did  not  suppose  there  were  ten  men  in  the  Senate 
who  objected  to  the  repeal.  The  next  day,  however,  Senator 
Edmunds  vigorously  defended  the  original  act.  He  ably  re- 
viewed the  constitutional  arguments,  and  dwelt  at  some  length 
on  the  danger  of  giving  the  patronage  into  the  hands  of  the 
president  alone ;  he  dwelt  upon  the  removals  then  being  so  rap- 
idly made  by  the  existing  administration,  and  on  the  necessity 
of  some  regulation  to  restrain  the  president ;  the  repeal  of  the 
Tenure-of-Office  Act,  he  declared,  would  be  a  step  backward 
in  civil  service  reform,  by  facilitating  removals.2  Hoar  replied 
in  a  speech  longer  than  his  first,  in  which  he  maintained  the 
unconstitutionality  of  the  act  of  1867,  pointed  out  (incorrectly) 
that  no  suspended  officer  had  ever  been  reappointed,  that  in  all 
encounters  with  the  executive  the  Senate  had  been  worsted,  and 
that  the  prestige  of  the  latter  could  not  fail  to  suffer  from  the 
attempt  to  control  the  president.  He  added,  that  the  first  step 
in  civii  service  reform  was  to  impose  the  responsibility  of  it  on 
the  president.3 

The  repealing  bill  finally  passed  the  Senate  by  a  vote  of  32 
to  22 ;  perhaps  the  speech  of  Senator  Edmunds  had  given  the 
question  a  partisan  cast,  for  the  negative  vote  was  composed  of 
Republicans,  while  Hoar  and  Ingalls  were  the  only  prominent 
members  of  that  party  to  vote  in  the  affirmative.  As  the  Sen- 
ate bill  was  not  amended  in  the  House,  it  was  forwarded  to  the 
president  as  soon  as  passed  by  the  latter  body,  and  on  the  same 
day  he  approved  it.4  Thus  the  original  interpretation  of  Madi- 
son was  allowed  to  revive,  and  responsibility  was  once  more 

1  Richardson,  Messages,  viii.  380-381  ;  Senate  Journal,  49  Cong.  I  sess.  i.  No.  83  ; 
House  Reports,  49  Cong.  2  sess.  i.  No.  3539  j  House  Journal,  49  Cong.  2  sess.  834 
(March  3,  1887);  Congressional  Record,  49  Cong.  2  sess.  2700.  The  figures  are 
taken  from  the  Record,  which  is  evidently  corrected.  Eighty  did  not  vote. 

z  Congressional  Record,  49  Cong.  2  sess.  113,  136-140. 

8  Ibid.  140-141. 

*  Senate  Journal,  49  Cong.  2  sess.  84,  569,  603  (December  17,  1886).  Statutes 
at  Large,  xxiv.  500. 


208  STRUGGLE  FOR  PATRONAGE. 

concentrated.  Yet,  while  the  Senate  resumed  the  legal  position 
it  had  held  previous  to  1867,  the  history  of  the  intervening 
years  could  not  be  forgotten ;  its  prestige  was  too  firmly  fixed 
to  depend  on  a  single  act,  and  the  senators  unofficially  and  by 
"  courtesy  "  have  continued  to  this  day  the  main  dispensers  of 
the  patronage. 


CHAPTER  X. 

PERIOD  OF  CIVIL   SERVICE  REFORM. 
1865-1901. 

Two  fundamental  errors  had  characterized  all  important  plans 
devised  in  the  United  States  for  the  reform  of  the  civil  service 
prior  to  1 860 :  first,  they  aimed  rather  to  hinder  removals  than 
to  control  appointments ;  and,  secondly,  they  tended  to  shift 
the  power  from  the  shoulders  of  the  president  to  the  Senate, 
and  by  dividing  the  burden  to  do  away  with  all  sense  of  personal 
responsibility.  There  had  been,  to  be  sure,  some  suggestions 
that  did  not  share  -these  errors,  —  Noah  Webster,  for  example, 
had  suggested  to  Jefferson  that  he  make  local  appointments 
according  to  the  advice  of  the  judges  and  selectmen  of  the 
neighborhood,1  and  pass-examinations  were  introduced  in  1853 ; 
but  Webster's  scheme  was  not  adopted,  and  pass-examinations 
proved  but  the  merest  palliative,  so  that  the  history  of  effective 
reform  begins  after  the  Civil  War. 

In  taking  up  this  history,  moreover,  we  have  to  break  the 

continuous   course  of  development,  the  steady  progress  from 

cause  to  effect,  which  we  have  been  studying;   for  the  first 

practicable  plan  of  improvement  was  not  the  result  of  internal 

evolution,  but  was  an  instance  of  what  Professor  Lamprecht 

V  would  call  "reception."     A  really  comprehensive  story  of  the 

ycivil  service  reform  movement  should  be,  not  national,  but  inter- 

<rnational ;  it  was  not  so  much  a  local  peculiarity  as  a  manifesta- 

\ion  of  a  stage  of  national  growth.2     England  was  ready  for  the 

1  Webster  to  Jefferson,  February  20,  1809,  Good  Government,  October  15,  1894. 

2  Note  the  introduction  of  appointment  by  competitive  examination  into  Canada 
in  1882,  Victoria  1883,  United  States  1883,  New  York  1883,  Massachusetts  1884. 

P  209 


210  PERIOD   OF  CIVIL  SERVICE  REFORM. 

\  change  before  the  United  States,  and  attacked  and  solved  the 
Xproblem,  while  we  profited  by  her  experience.     A  good  illustra- 
tion of  the  non- American  origin  of  the  system  finally  adopted  is 
the  fact  that  its  expansion  has  been  from  the  national  govern- 
ment to  the  states,  and  not,  as  is  the  case  of  nearly  all  native 
reforms,  from  state  experiment  to  national    application.     Yet, 
j  though  the  progress  of  reform  was  accelerated  and  its  form  in 
part  determined  by  the  English  movement,  it  would  not  have 
obtained  so  sudden  and  so  substantial  a  victory  in  America  if 
conditions  had  not  been  ripe  for  its  success. 

The  bloated  civil  list,  and  the  unusual  irregularities  produced 
by  the  Civil  War,  for  the  first  time  attracted  serious  attention 
to  the  problems  of  administration;  and  though  the  majority  of 
congressmen  still  held  to  the  plans  of  1826  and  1836,  and  multi- 
plied restrictions  upon  the  power  of  the  president,  some  men  of 
influence  began  to  cast  about  for  new  remedies.  It  was  natural 
at  this  time,  when  foreign  travel  had  so  greatly  increased,  and  so 
many  Americans  were  acquainted  with  the  excellences  of  the  pub- 
lic service  in  many  countries  of  Europe,  that  the  systems  which 
had  succeeded  there  should  be  investigated  for  our  behoof ;  and 
in  1863  Secretary  of  State  Seward  requested  John  Bigelow, 
consul-general  at  Paris,  to  report  on  French  methods  of  collect- 
ing the  customs.  Mr.  Bigelow's  reply  described  and  warmly 
recommended  a  system  of  appointment  by  competitive  examina- 
tions ;  but  it  led  to  no  immediate  result,  unless  it  be  that  it 
stirred  Charles  Sumner  to  introduce,  in  1864,  his  bill,  "to  pro-^ 
vide  for  the  greater  efficiency  of  the  civil  service."  It  is  more 
probable,  however,  that  Sumner's  action  was  taken  indepen-h 
dently,  and  was  based  upon  knowledge  of  English  conditions  j 
and  correspondence  with  his  many  English  friends.  His  bill 
provided  for  a  board  of  examiners,  appointment  by  competitive 
examination,  promotion  by  seniority,  and  removal  for  good  cause 
only ;  it  received  some  favorable  comment  from  the  press,  but 
was  dropped  without  action.1 

The  first  man  to  grapple  with  the  question  of  administrative 
reform  in  a  thoroughly  practical  manner,  and  to  give  to  it  the 
continued  and  single-minded  devotion  that  so  complex  and  vital  a 

1  Jenckes,  Report,  Appendix  K,  p.  176;  Sumner,  Works,  viii.  452-457. 


THE  JENCKES  BILL.  2 1 1 

problem  demanded,  was  Thomas  Allen  Jenckes  of  Rhode  Island. 
A  lawyer  of  marked  ability,  a  man  of  wealth  and  belonging  to 
a  family  of  much  local  consideration,  he  assumed  a  position  of 
importance  from  his  first  entrance  into  the  House  of  Represen- 
tatives in  1863.  x  His  attention  seems  to  have  been  at  once 
attracted  to  the  conditions  of  the  civil  service;  and  finally,  as 
member  of  the  retrenchment  committee,  he  made  the  subject 
peculiarly  his  own.  He  spared  no  effort  in  making  a  thorough 
"study  of  the  problem,  and  entered  into  correspondence  with  Siri 
Charles  E.  Trevelyan  and  Sir  Stafford  H.  Northcote,  who  had/ 
played  an  important  part  in  the  English  reform  movement.! 
On  December  20,  1865,  he  introduced  his  first  bill.  It  shared 
\  the  fate  of  Sumner's  ;  its  novelty  was  too  great  to  allow  of 
speedy  acceptance,  and  many  other  things  demanded  attention. 

The  matter  was  not  dropped,  however;  and  in  July,  1866,  a  i 
concurrent  resolution  charged  the  joint  select  committee  on 
retrenchment  to  examine  into  the  "  expediency  of  so  amending 
the  laws  under  which  appointments  to  the  public  service  are 
now  made  as  to  provide  for  the  selection  of  subordinate  officers 
after  due  examination  by  proper  boards ;  their  continuance  in 
office  during  specified  terms,  unless  dismissed  upon  charges 
preferred  and  sustained  before  tribunals  designated  for  that 
purpose;  and  for  withdrawing  the  public  service  from  being 
used  as  an  instrument  of  political  or  party  patronage."  The 
committee  was.  enlarged  in  1867;  and  on  May  25,  1868,  Mrry 
Jenckes,  for  the  subcommittee  on  civil  service,  presented  am/' 
elaborate  report,  which  may  be  considered  as  the  effective  starti 
ing-point  of  reform  in  this  country.1  It  contained  a  thorough 
discussion  of  the  existing  service,  careful  summaries  of  the 
systems  employed  in  China,  Prussia,  France,  and  especially 
England,  and  to  it  there  was  appended  a  bill  intended  to  adapt 
the  best  points  in  these  systems  to  American  conditions. 

In  general,  Jenckes's  suggestions  were  not  very  different  from 
those  of  Sumner,  but  the  plan  was  more  elaborately  worked  out. 

1  House  Reports,  40  Cong.  2  sess.  ii.  No.  47.  Also  printed  separately.  The  com- 
mittee consisted  of  Edmunds,  Williams,  Patterson,  and  Buckalew  from  the  Senate  ; 
and  Van  Wyck,  Randall,  Walker,  Halsey,  Jenckes,  Benjamin,  and  Benton  from  the 
House. 


212  PERIOD   OF  CIVIL  SERVICE  REFORM. 

The  most  strikingly  novel  feature  was  the  proposal  to  furnish 
employment  for  the  vice-president  by  making  him  the  head  of  a 
new  department  —  that  of  the  civil  service.  More  pertinent  sug- 
gestions were  that  there  be  periods  of  probation  and  regular 
promotions,  and  that  the  commissioners  be  authorized  to  hold 
examinations,  not  only  for  the  inferior  officers,  but  even  for 
those  of  the  presidential  class  if  so  requested  by  the  Senate. 
Mr.  Jenckes  urged  that  his  bill  would  throw  the  service  open  to 
every  citizen,  and  that  it  was  needed  to  relieve  the  president 
and  heads  of  departments  from  pressure  for  office.  It  received 
some  attention  from  Congress  and  some  from  the  public ;  but 
it  must  be  acknowledged  that  its  novelty  and  the  sweeping 
nature  of  the  change  suggested  made  defeat  inevitable.  It  is 
rather  surprising  that  the  leading  vote  on  the  subject  was  as 
close  as  72  to  66. 1 

'  Although  Congress  refused  to  act  on  the  subject,  agitation 
was  persistent,  and,  while  not  perhaps  very  widespread,  was 
powerful  in  the  unselfish  devotion  of  such  men  as  George 
William  Curtis  and  Carl  Schurz.  The  report  of  1868  made  a 
good  basis  for  argument;  and  occasional  words  of  approval, 
from  the  few  officials  who  made  the  pass-examinations  count 
for  something,  freshly  furnished  the  arsenal  of  the  reformer.2 
Still  victory  was  afar  off,  and  it  would  have  been  long  before 
the  proposal  received  a  trial  had  it  not  found  an  advocate  in 
General  Grant. 

Between  November,  1868,  and  March,  1869,  the  attitude  of 
the  president  elect  on  this,  as  on  other  subjects,  was  eagerly 
canvassed,  and  before  his  inauguration  he  had  expressed  him- 
self in  favor  of  the  suggested  reform.3  He  not  only  favored  it, 
but  in  his  second  annual  message  pressed  upon  Congress  the 
advisability  of  a  law  which  would  "  govern,  not  the  tenure,  but 
the  manner  of  making  all  appointments."  Thus  adjured, 
Congress  devoted  itself  assiduously  to  the  civil  service ;  in  fact, 

1  This  vote  was  on  Jenckes's  earlier  bill,  February  6,  1867.     Congressional  Globe, 
39  Cong.  2  sess.  1036 ;  40  Cong.  3  sess.  266,  269. 

2  Jenckes,  Report,  19,  and  Appendix  L ;  Secretary  of  the  Interior,  Annual  Reports, 
1870;  Senate  Reports,  47  Cong,  i  sess.  iii.  No.  576;  Nation,  December  10,  1868. 

8  Nation,  December  3,  1868,  February  16,  1869. 


GRANT  AND   CURTIS.  21$ 

from  that  time  on,  only  the  session  of  1878-1879  has  passed 
without  formal  discussion  of  the  question.  Suggestions  were 
numerous.  Senator  Trumbull  proposed  that  any  member  of 
Congress  or  territorial  delegate  who  recommended  any  one  for 
office  without  having  received  a  written  request  from  the  execu- 
tive should  be  fined  one  thousand  dollars,  while  Senators  Wilson 
and  Schurz  introduced  bills;  but  the  majority  seemed  disin- 
clined to  take  action.  It  was  only  by  a  rider,  attached  at  the 
last  moment  to  the  appropriation  bill,  that  provision  was  made 
for  carrying  out  the  president's  wishes.1 

The  effect  of  this  legislation  was  to  leave  everything  to  the 
president's  discretion.  He  was  "  to  prescribe  such  rules  and 
regulations  for  the  admission  of  persons  into  the  civil  service 
of  the  United  States  as  will  best  promote  the  efficiency  thereof, 
and  ...  to  employ  suitable  persons  to  conduct  said  inquiries  "  ; 
twenty-five  thousand  dollars  were  appropriated  to  pay  for  the 
services  required.  Grant  prepared  to  make  the  most  of  the  oppor- 
tunity :  he  appointed  an  advisory  board  of  seven,  with  George. 
William  Curtis  as  chairman,  to  report  on  the  measures  to  be 
adopted.2  Its  first  report,  presented  December  18,  1871,  was 
based  largely  on  that  of  Mr.  Jenckes  ;  but  it  omitted  the  sugges- 
tion of  employing  the  vice-president,  and  made  one  important 
advance  by  advising  that  no  attempt  be  made  to  control  the 
president's  power  of  removal,  thus  completely  separating  the 
reform  movement  from  the  Senate's  struggle  for  supremacy. 
On  April  16,  1872,  the  rules  thus  formulated  were  applied  to  the 
departments  at  Washington  and  to  the  federal  offices  in  New 
York,  and  a  sincere  attempt  was  made  to  give  the  new  system 
a  fair  trial./  President  Grant,  however,  found  it  impossible  to 
live  up  to  the  standard  set  for  him  by  his  new  advisers,  and  an 
offensive  appointment  which  he  made  in  New  York  led  to  the 
resignation  of  Curtis.3 

Congress  vacillated  in    its   attitude   towards   the 


1  Congressional  Globe,  41  Cong.  2  sess.  17  ;   3  sess.  59,  594-595,  1935-1936. 

2  Gary,  Curtis,  216.     The   other  members  were  A.  G.  Cattell,  J.  Medill,  D.  A. 
Walker,  E.  B.  Elliott,  J.  H.  Blackfan,  and  D.  C.  Cox. 

8  Congressional  Globe,  41  Cong.  3  sess.  217,  225  ;    Lucy  M.  Salmon,  Appointing 
Power  of  the  President,  96-97. 


214  PERIOD   OF  CIVIL  SERVICE  REFORM. 

new  plan.  It  is  probable  that  the  provision  for  the  advisory 
board  owed  its  passage  solely  to  the  fact  that  it  was  attached  to 
the  general  appropriation  bill  so  late  in  the  session  that  the  effort 
to  eliminate  it  would  endanger  the  whole  measure.  At  any  rate, 
after  two  years  the  absolutely  essential  appropriation  was  cut 
off.  President  Grant  continued  his  efforts,  and  constantly 
presented  the  matter  to  Congress,  at  last  announcing  on 
December  7,  1874:  "If  Congress  adjourns  without  positive 
legislation  on  the  subject  of  '  civil  service  reform '  I  will  regard 
such  action  as  a  disapproval  of  the  system,  and  will  abandon  it, 
except  so  far  as  to  require  examinations  for  certain  appointees, 
to  determine  their  fitness.  Competitive  examinations  will  be 
abandoned."  Congress  paid  no  heed  to  this  appeal.  Yet  in 
the  same  year  it  recognized  the  rules  by  placing  under  them 
certain  clerks  in  the  office  of  the  secretary  of  war,  and  the 
passage  of  a  law  prohibiting  the  assessment  of  the  salaries 
of  government  employees  for  political  purposes  showed  the 
persistence  of  a  desire  to  withdraw  the  service,  in  some  meas- 
ure at  least,  from  politics.1 

No  one  unfamiliar  with  the  Washington  atmosphere  can  real- 
ize how  difficult  it  is  for  the  president  to  administer  the  civil  ser- 
vice with  an  eye  single  to  merit,  or  how  innocent  are  some  acts 
which  appear  blameworthy  on  the  surface;  reformers,  more- 
over, are  always  peculiarly  suspicious,  and  Grant  was  lamen- 
tably unfortunate  in  appointing  some  unworthy  men  to  office.2 
It  is  not  surprising,  therefore,  that  many  of  the  most  active 
supporters  of  civil  service  reform  were  found  in  the  ranks  of 
the  Liberal  Republicans,  through  whom  the  principle  found  its 
first  expression  in  a  national  party  platform  in  the  following 
\J  plank:  "The  civil  service  of  the  government  has  become  a 
mere  instrument  of  partisan  tyranny  and  personal  ambition, 
and  an  object  of  selfish  greed.  It  is  a  scandal  and  reproach 
upon  free  institutions,  and  breeds  a  demoralization  dangerous 

1  Congressional  Globe,  40  Cong.  3  sess.  262 ;  42  Cong.  2  sess.  453 ;  42  Cong. 
3  sess.  195  ;   Senate  Reports,  47  Cong.   I  sess.  iii.  No.  576,  p.  v  ;   Richardson,  Mes- 
sages, gives  the  rules  promulgated  from  time  to  time  ;   Statutes  at  Large,  xix.  143,  and 
43  Cong.  I  sess.  ch.  328  ;   Eaton,  Civil  Service  in  Great  Britain,  Appendix  C. 

2  John  Jay,  North  American  Review,  cxxvii.  273-287,  gives  a  reformer's  view  of 
Grant. 


REFORM  IN  PARTY  PLATFORMS.  21$ 

to  the  perpetuity  of  republican  government.  We  therefore 
regard  a  thorough  reform  of  the  civil  service  as  one  of  the 
most  pressing  necessities  of  the  hour;  that  honesty,  capacity, 
and  fidelity  constitute  the  only  valid  claims  to  public  employ- 
ment; that  the  offices  of  the  government  cease  to  be  a  matter 
of  arbitrary  favoritism  and  patronage  and  that  public  station 
shall  become  again  a  post  of  honor.  To  this  end  it  is  impera- 
tively required  that  no  President  shall  be  a  candidate  for  re-elec- 
tion." The  regular  Republican  convention  of  1872  adopted  a 
somewhat  similar  plank,  but  disclaimed  any  idea  of  "  creating 
a  life-tenure  of  office."  l  The  merit  system  may  therefore  be 
said  to  have  been  formally  introduced  into  practical  politics 
in  1872^ 

i  Again,  in  1876,  the  programme  of  the  leading  parties  included 
tpis  reform.  The  Democrats  called  vaguely  for  reform  in  gen- 
eral; the  Prohibitionists  proposed  to  effect  it  by  the  elec- 
tion "  of  all  civil  officers,  so  far  as  practicable,  by  the  direct 
vote  of  the  people " ;  but  the  Republican  candidate,  Hayes, 
who  in  his  letter  of  acceptance  spoke  of  it  as  of  "  paramount 
necessity,"  was  the  special  favorite  of  the  reformers.  So  im- 
portant did  William  Cullen  Bryant  regard  the  issue  that  he 
refused  the  nomination  of  elector  on  the  Tilden  ticket  because 
Tilden  had  not  definitely  pledged  himself  to  forego  a  general 
sweep  should  he  be  elected.2 

President  Hayes  devoted  two  paragraphs  of  his  inaugural  to 
the  civil  service,  and  in  his  first  annual  message  called  atten- 
tion to  the  fact  that  the  commission  appointed  by  Grant  still 
\existed,  but  was  paralyzed  because  of  lack  of  money.     He  said 
mat  he  had  already  done  something  in  the  way  of  reform,  but 
could  accomplish  nothing  really  noteworthy  without  the  active 
support  of  Congress.     The  new  Republican  administration  was 
/therefore  fully  committed  to  reform,  and  the  president  exerted 
/  himself  to  fulfil  this  pledge.     The  appointment  of  Carl  Schurz 
Las  secretary  of  the  interiof^the  commissioning  of  Dorman  B. 
Eaton  to  write  a  history  of  the  civil  service  reform  movement 

1  Stanwood,  History  of  the  Presidency,   343,  347 ;    Elaine,    Twenty    Years  of 
Congress,  ii.  522. 

2  Bigelow,  Tilden,  i.  301-303  ;   Stanwood,  History  of  the  Presidency,  365,  375. 


2l6  PERIOD  OF  CIVIL  SERVICE  REFORM. 

in  Great  Britain,  and  the  strict  enforcement  of  the  law  against 
assessments l  —  all  showed  his  favorable  attitude. 

It  was  in  New  York,  however,  that  reform  was  most  earnestly 
demanded,  and  there  also  the  most  vigorous  resistance  was  to 
be  expected,  for  it  was  the  home  alike  of  the  most  active  of 
the  innovators  and  of  the  most  odious  of  the  bosses.  As  a 
preliminary  to  action,  the  president  appointed  a  committee, 
headed  by  John  Jay,  to  investigate  the  custom-house.VrThis 
committee  recommended  that  one-fifth  of  the  employees  Be  dis- 
missed, whereby  three  hundred  thousand  dollars  a  year  would 
be  saved ;  but  in  order  to  carry  out  the  proposed  reforms  it 
was  felt  necessary  to  remove  also  the  incumbent  collector, 
Chester  A.  Arthur,  and  the  naval  officer,  Alonzo  B.  Cornell. 
These  men  were  supporters  of  Roscoe  Conkling ;  and  their 
removal  enraged  him  beyond  measure,  and  confirmed  his  op- 
position to  the  plans  of  the  reformers.  In  the  New  York 
state  convention  he  fell  upon  George  William  Curtis  with  the 
full  force  of  his  vituperative  eloquence,  and  in  the  United 
States  Senate  he  delayed  the  new  nominations  for  the  posts 
thus  vacated.  Confirmation  came  at  last;  and  in  1879  com- 
petitive examinations  were  made  the  basis  for  appointments  in 
the  New  York  custom-house,  under  the  rules  drawn  up  by  the 
new  naval  officer,  the  well-known  reformer,  Silas  W.  Burt.  In 
1880  the  system  was  applied  to  the  New  York  post-office,  and 
the  administration  could  congratulate  itself  on  having  taken  some 
definite  steps  in  advance.2 

Congress   was   not   disposed   to   do   its   share  in  the   work. 

Although    the   president    continually   called    attention    to   the 

matter,    and    gave    assurance    that   such    short,    unsatisfactory 

I    trials  as  the  new  system  had  had  proved  its  value,  he  was  un- 

\able  to  secure  any  legislation  to  enable  him  to  extend  it  or 

make   it   permanent.      The   House    of   Representatives   made 

General   Butler   chairman   of   the   committee   on   civil   service 

1  Richardson,  Messages,  vii.  444-445,  466,  561-567 ;   Executive  Journal,  xxi.  4, 
450 ;   Lambert,  Progress  of  Civil  Service  Reform  in  the  United  States,  14. 

2  United  States  Civil  Service  Commission,  I5th  Report  (1897-1898),  464;   Rich- 
ardson, Messages,  vii.  450;   Executive  Journal,  xxi.  171,455,  488,  502-503;   Gary, 

-j     Curtis,  257;   Lambert,  Progress  of  Civil  Service  Reform  in  the  United  States,  9; 
Eaton,  Civil  Service  in  Great  Britain,  pp.  x,  447. 


THE  REFORM  MOVEMENT.  2 1/ 

reform,  and  in  the  Senate  the  president's  nominations  were  fre- 
quently opposed.1  President  Hayes  was  held  partly  responsible 
for  this  inaction :  his  nominations  were  not  all  satisfactory  to 
the  reformers,  and  he  ended  his  administration  unpopular  with 
many  politicians  of  his  party  because  of  what  he  had  done,  and 
with  the  reformers  because  of  what  he  had  failed  to  do.2 

Meantime,  outside  of  Congress  and  government  circles,  the 
agitation  for  reform  was  active  and  was  gaining  the  public  ear. 
The  first  volume  of  Poolers  Index,  brought  out  in  1882,  mentions 
about  one  hundred  articles  discussing  some  phase  of  the  civil 
service  problem.  In  May,  1877,  the  New  York  Civil  Service 
Reform  Association  was  formed,  and  in  1880  it  claimed  583 
members  representing  33  states  and  territories.,.  Other  societies 
sprang  up  in  Boston,  Philadelphia,  Milwaukee,  San  Francisco, 
and  elsewhere;  and  in  August,  1881,  a  "National  League"  was 
formed  at  Newport,  with  George  William  Curtis  as  president. 
This  was  followed  by  the  organization  of  state  societies,3  and 
the  movement  was  brought  to  the  fighting  stage.  It  is  not  by 
any  means  probable  that  the  number  of  active  reformers  was 
so  great  as  the  number  of  their  publications  would  lead  one  to 
think ;  but  many  of  them  were  men  highly  educated  and  of 
literary  tastes,  and  one  such  man  wrote  for  ten.  Nevertheless 
there  was  a  widespread  feeling  of  tolerant  approval,  and  hopes 
rose  high  when  James  A.  Garfield,  known  since  1870  as  a  friend 
of  reform,  was  elected  president  on  a  platform  which  called 
for^chaflge  "thorough,  radical,  and  complete." 

Garfield,  however,  found  Congress  still  unwilling  to  commit 
itself  to  the  measures  he  desired,  and  he  died  without  having 
been  able  to  bring  about  any  change  in  the  legal  condition  of 
the  service.  His  successor,  Chester  Alan  Arthur,  was  reputed 
to  be  a  thorough  spoilsman ;  he  owed  his  nomination  for  the 
vice-presidency  solely  to  the  influence  of  Conkling,  and  the 
reformers  felt  that  all  was  lost.  It  is  evident,  however,  that 

1  Richardson,  Messages,  vii.  603-605  ;   Massachusetts  Reform  Club,  Report,  1 888  ; 
John  Jay,  North  American  Review,  cxxvii.  273. 

2  E.  Gary,  The  Administration  and  Civil  Service  Reform  {International  Review, 
vi.  227-233) ;   Congressional  Record,  47  Cong.  2  sess.  246. 

8  Lambert,  Progress  of  Civil  Service  Reform  in  the  United  States,  10, 


218  PERIOD   OF  CIVIL  SERVICE  REFORM. 

Arthur's  reputation  was  worse  than  facts  would  justify ;  more- 
over, President  Arthur  proved  to  be  a  very  much  stronger  man 
than  Collector  Arthur.  He  did  not,  indeed,  fully  recommend 
the  system  of  competitive  examinations ;  he  pointed  out  that 
there  were,  and  must  always  be,  some  differences  between  the 
English  conditions  and  our  own,  and  that  these  might  make 
differences  of  system  necessary.  He  expressed,  however,  his 
willingness  to  execute  whatever  law  Congress  should  see  fit  to 
pass.1 

With  the  executive  less  favorable  to  the  competitive  system 
than  it  had  been  for  thirteen  years,  its  supporters  pressed  it 
with  more  vigor  than  ever  before  in  the  second  session  of  the 
forty-seventh  Congress.  The  tragic  incident  of  the  death  of 
Garfield  at  the  hands  of  a  disappointed  office-seeker  deeply 
affected  public  sentiment;  and  the  fall  elections  of  1882 
frightened  the  Republican  leaders,  particularly  as  in  several 
cases  the  determining  factor  seemed  to  be  the  question  of  civil 
service  reform.2  Therefore  the  bill  drawn  up  by  Dorman  B. 
Eaton  and  presented  by  George  H.  Pendleton,  chairman  of  the 
Senate  committee  on  civil  service  reform,  was  urged  with  good 
hope  of  success. 

The  debate  on  this  measure  was  entirely  unworthy  of  the 
occasion,  hardly  touching  any  of  the  serious  considerations  in- 
volved ;  and  in  this  fact  as  well  as  in  its  subject-matter  it  was 
characteristic  of  nearly  all  congressional  discussions  of  the  civil 
service.  The  larger  part  of  the  time  was  taken  up  in  making 
predictions  as  to  the  effect  of  the  bill  on  the  two  parties,  and 
in  arguments  based  thereon.  Senator  Vest  said  that  what  was 
needed  was  not  legislation,  but  a  change  of  administration. 
Senator  Miller  pointed  out  that,  whatever  was  true  of  the 
Republicans,  the  Democratic  party  would  survive  without  patron- 
age.3 Throughout  the  debate  Jefferson  was  paraded,  now  on 
one  side,  now  on  the  other,  as  the  founder  of  the  spoils  system, 

1  December  6,  1881,  Richardson,  Messages,  viii.  n,  60. 

2  Debate  on  Civil  Service  Reform  before  the  Seventh   Congress  of  the  Protestant 
Episcopal  Church,  11-12,  19  ;  Lambert,  Progress  of  Civil  Service  Reform  in  the 
United  States,  16-18  ;  Letters  to  Candidates  (New  York,  1882) ;  Congressional  Record, 
47  Cong.  2  sess.  204,  280-281. 

3  Congressional  Record,  47  Cong.  2  sess.  283,  463-464. 


fTY    fl 

THE  DEBATE.  219 

and  as  demanding  of  applicants  only  honesty,  capacity,  and 
faithfulness  to  the  constitution. 

Senator  Pendleton  said  that  arguments  in  favor  of  his  bill 
need  not  be  presented,  that  the  question  was  fully  before  the 
country.  He  confined  his  speech  mainly  to  showing  that  there 
were  good  American  facts  to  support  the  plan ;  that  it  was  no 
longer  an  experiment ;  that  within  the  last  fifteen  years  it  had 
become  very  common  for  congressmen  to  select  their  appointees 
for  West  Point  and  Annapolis  by  competition,  and  that  the  re- 
sults were  good ;  that  since  the  introduction  of  the  system  into 
the  New  York  post-office  the  volume  of  business  had  increased 
several  times  over,  while  the  cost  had  grown  but  two  per  cent. 

The  best  speech  in  favor  of  the  bill  was  that  of  Senator  War- 
ner Miller  of  New  York.  He  illustrated  existing  conditions  by 
the  case  of  the  railroad  mail  service,  in  which  men  secured 
appointment  through  political  influence.  They  were  obliged  to 
serve  a  six  months'  term  of  probation,  and  at  the  end  of  it  from 
,  a  third  to  a  half  of  them  were  dropped,  only  those  who  were 
efficient  being  retained.  The  result,  he  said,  was  a  good  service, 
but  the  loss  in  trying  inefficient  men  made  it  an  extremely 
expensive  one.  He  further  urged  the  necessity  of  reducing 
the  pressure  for  office  upon  the  president  and  members  of 
Congress.  This  point  seemed  to  influence  many,  and  Senator 
Hawley  described  how  difficult  it  was,  for  men  who  had  the 
power  to  aid,  to  refuse  worthy  but  inefficient  persons.  The 
advocates  of  reform  had  to  devote  some  attention  to  the  ques- 
tion of  the  necessity  of  a  bill  at  all.  Did  not  the  president 
have  all-sufficient  power  to  reform  the  service  without  the  aid  of 
Congress  ?  In  the  previous  session  of  this  same  Congress  a  bill 
had  actually  passed  the  House,  appropriating  fifteen  thousand 
dollars  to  enable  the  president  to  enforce  the  clause  adopted  in 
1871.  Would  not  such  action  suffice?  It  was,  however,  very 
generally  felt  that  this  was  a  matter  in  which  the  legislature  was 
in  duty  bound  to  guide  the  executive ; l  and  it  was  evident  to  all 
that,  without  the  support  of  Congress,  no  president  could  success- 
fully make  so  bold  an  innovation. 

1  Congressional  Record,  47  Cong.  I  sess.  5704,  6016 ;  2  sess.  204-208,  241,  284, 
316,  318  ;  Congressional  Globe,  41  Cong.  3  sess.  1936. 


220  PERIOD   OF  CIVIL  SERVICE  REFORM. 

The  general  attitude  of  the  opposition  was  scoffing,  as  it  usu- 
ally is  in  such  debates.  "Sunset"  Cox,  in  1878,  delivered  the 
best  comic  speech  on  the  subject,  with  allusions  to  the  Chinese 
origin  of  the  system ;  but  the  supposedly  unsophisticated  char- 
acter of  the  reformers  is  always  amusing,  and  the  examination 
questions  can  always  be  so  dovetailed  together  as  to  bring  a 
laugh.  Mr.  Horr  said  that  they  were  all  humbug,  and  that  he 
would  prefer  draw-poker  or  tossing  coppers.  Equally  numerous 
were  the  objections  to  the  new  system  on  the  ground  that  it  was 
not  an  American  product  —  was  monarchical.  Senator  Brown 
expected  that  the  officers  of  government  would  become  a  "  prae- 
torian guard,"  and  Senator  Carpenter  that  they  would  become 
a  fixed  aristocratic  class.1 

Many  counter  suggestions  were  made  :  that  what  was  needed 
.was  the  weeding-out  of  incompetents;  that  preference  in  ap- 
pointments should  be  given  to  candidates  belonging  to  the  party 
having  the  smallest  number  of  members  in  government  service 
.(the  plan,  of  course,  of  a  Democrat);  that  entrance  by  examina- 
tion should  not  be  confined  to  the  lowest  grades ;  that  examina- 
tions should  be  strictly  confined  to  matters  directly  relating  to 
the  duties  of  the  offices  to  be  filled ;  that  under  the  new  rules 
those  in  office  should  be  forced  to  compete  on  equal  terms  with 
other  citizens.2  The  whole  system  was  criticised  as  cumbrous ; 
it  was  argued  that  the  commissioners  had  too  great  power ; 
some  members  found  the  whole  bill  unconstitutional,  and  could 
quote  an  opinion  of  Attorney-general  Akerman  to  that  effect; 
while  Senator  Ingalls  was  angry  because  it  had  not  been  devised 
by  Congress,  but  had  been  forced  upon  it  by  a  body  of  men 
"exceedingly  holy  and  wise."3 

The  most  serious  discussion  was  over  the  power  of  removal : 
many  who  favored  the  proposed  bill  as  a  whole  did  not  believe, 
that  it  would  prove  sufficient  simply  to  regulate  appointments. 
'John  Sherman  said  that  if  removals  were  not  mentioned,  Hamlet 

1  Senate  Documents,  55  Cong.  2  sess.  i.  No.  24  ;    Congressional  Globe,  42  Cong. 
2  sess.  453  ff. ;  42  Cong.  3  sess.  195  ;    Congressional  Record,  47  Cong.  I  sess.  6014  ; 
2  sess.  207,  277. 

2  Congressional  Record,  47  Cong.  2  sess.  465,  600,  471,  247-248. 

8  Congressional  Globe,  42  Cong.  2  sess.  453-456  ;  Congressional  Record,  47  Cong. 
2  sess.  354,  357~36o,  463. 


THE  ACT.  221 

would  be  left  out;  Senator  Ingalls  desired  fixed  terms  during 
which  removal  should  be  made  only  for  cause  ;  and  an  elaborate 
list  of  legal  causes  was  drawn  up  and  a  method  of  procedure 
arranged.  In  the  end,  however,  this  executive  function  was 
left  untouched.1 

In  the  Senate  the  bill  passed  38  to  5,  33  being  absent ;  in 
/^the  House,  where  there  was  practically  no  debate,  there  were 
\I55  for  it  and  47  against  it,  87  not  voting.  The  president 

[approved,  and  the  measure   became  a  law,  January  16,  1883.. 

\^t  provided  for  three  commissioners  to  be  appointed  by  and 
with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate,  for  a  chief  examiner, 
state  boards  of  examiners,  and  minor  officers.  The  commis- 
sioners were  to  aid  the  president  in  preparing  rules  to  carry 
out  the  provisions  of  the  law,  which  called  for  the  classification 
of  clerks  and  for  open  competitive  examinations  of  a  practical 
nature ;  if  there  were  no  competition,  the  commission  should 
arrange  for  a  non-competitive  examination.  The  rules  were  to 
exclude  drunkards  from  the  service,  and  were  not  to  admit 
more  than  two  members  of  a  single  family ;  they  were  to  give 
veterans  the  preference  accorded  them  by  previous  laws,  to 
provide  for  a  fair  apportionment  of  the  positions  at  Washington 
between  citizens  of  the  various  states  and  the  District  of  Colum- 
bia. They  were  not  to  apply  to  laborers.  Applicants  were  to 
bring  no  recommendation  except  as  to  character  and  residence ; 
those  selected  were  to  serve  a  six  months'  period  of  probation, 
and  were  to  be  under  no  obligation  to  contribute  to  any  political 
fund  ;  while  all  officers  were  forbidden,  under  heavy  penalty,  to 
solicit  or  receive  any  such  contributions.  These  rules  were  to 
apply  to  the  departments  at  Washington,  and  to  custom-houses 
and  post-offices  with  more  than  fifty  employees.  The  commis- 
sion was  to  keep  records,  to  investigate  cases  in  which  the  rules 
were  supposed  to  be  violated,  and  to  make  an  annual  report  to 
the  president,  which  was  to  be  submitted  to  Congress.2  The 
president  could  extend  these  rules  to  other  parts  of  the  service 
at  his  discretion,  and  could  provide  for  exemption  from  them. 

1  Congressional  Record,  210,  354,  227.     The  Tenure-of-Office  Act,  which  was  still 
in  force,  applied  only  to  presidential  officers. 

2  Statutes  at  Large,  xxii.  403-407. 


222  PERIOD   OF  CIVIL  SERVICE  REFORM. 

President  Arthur  appointed  an  efficient  commission,  with 
Dorman  B.  Eaton  as  president ;  good  rules  were  drawn  up  ; 
and  February  n,  1885,  the  president,  who  had  doubted  the 
expediency  of  the  innovation,  reported  that  it  was  a  success,1 
while  he  was  himself  commended  for  his  administration  of  a 
law  which  was  not  of  his  choice. 

In  the  campaign  of  1884  the  Republican,  Democratic,  and 
Prohibitionist  parties  all  declared  themselves  in  favor  of  the 
new  law.  The  Republican  party  claimed  the  credit  for  its 
enactment ;  and  their  candidate  for  president,  James  G.  Elaine, 
in  his  letter  of  acceptance,  expressed  a  desire  to  see  its  provi- 
sions extended.2  Grover  Cleveland,  the  Democratic  candidate, 
was  regarded  as  the  most  thorough  reformer,  however ;  and  his 
election  was  largely  due  to  the  support  of  those  enthusiastic 
young  Mugwumps  who  cared  more  for  good  government  than 
for  party  allegiance,  and  who  left  the  party  of  their  fathers 
because  they  doubted  the  good  faith  of  its  leader.  After  tariff 
/  revision,  the  reform  of  the  civil  service  was  the  chief  issue  of 
the  campaign. 

The  position  of  the  new  president  was  undoubtedly  a  difficult 
one.  For  twenty-four  years  the  opposing  party  had  been  in 
power ;  and  even  the  reformers  acknowledged  that  it  would  be 
proper  to  bring  about  some  approximation  of  equality  between 
the  parties,  and  were  willing  to  agree  with  Cleveland  that  some 
men  in  office  had  "forfeited  all  just  claim  to  retention."  3  Yet 
when  ninety  per  cent  of  the  presidential  officers  were  removed 
within  sixteen  months,  and  sixty-eight  per  cent  of  the  unclassi- 
fied employees  of  the  interior  department,  besides  the  almost 
complete  sweeping  away  of  the  fourth-class  postmasters,  many 
of  the  president's  independent  supporters  began  to  cry  out  and 
to  accuse  him  of  breaking  pledges.  The  civil  service  rules 
were  very  well  observed,  only  six  and  a  half  per  cent  of  the 
department  officials  being  removed  in  sixteen  months ; 4  but  the 

1  Richardson,  Messages,  viii.  276. 

2  Stan  wood,  History  of  the  Presidency,  430-444 ;  Civil  Service  Record,  June,  1884. 
8  Civil  Service  Reformer,  April,  1887 ;  Cleveland  to  Curtis,  Ibid.  August,  1885. 

4  H.  C.  Lea,  Mr.  Cleveland  and  Civil  Service  Reform.  Independent,  October  8, 
1888;  Wood,  in  National  Civil  Service  Reform  League,  Proceedings,  1888,  p.  66. 


CLEVELAND^  FIRST  ADMINISTRATION'.  223 

restrictions  as  yet  applied  to  but  a  small  proportion  of  the  ser- 
vice, and  the  remainder  was  large  enough  to  give  rise  to  many 
old-fashioned  squabbles  over  the  patronage,  which  still  further 
estranged  the  reforming  element.1  Yet  the  fact  that  the  presi- 
dent, whether  willing  or  unwilling,  yielded  to  the  pressure  for 
a  general  sweep,  did  not  mean  that  he  had  lost  interest  in 
the  work  of  the  Civil  Service  Commission.  He  was  in  constant 
communication  with  its  members,  made  suggestions  for  the 
strengthening  of  the  rules,  and  from  time  to  time  considerably 
eVtended  the  number  of  offices  to  which  they  should  apply, 
finally  including  within  them,  at  the  end  of  his  term,  the  railroad 
mail  svvice. 

"President  Harrison  was  inaugurated  before  this  new  order 
went  into  effect,  and  one  of  the  greatest  political  weaknesses  of 
the , new  system  at  once  became  apparent.  The  fact  that,  when 
the  civil  service  rules  are  extended  to  a  new  class  of  offices,  the 
incumbents  are  included  within  their  protection  without  having 
to  undergo  the  trial  of  an  examination,  has  made  it  easier  for* 
presidents  —  has  perhaps  even  tempted  those  who  were  retiring 

—  to  extend  the  classification  and  protect:  their  party  friends. 
When,  however,  the  opposite  party  comes  to  power  and  finds 
its  opponents  securely  lodged  in  offices  which  but  just  now 
were  patronage  and  from  which  its  own  members  may  have 
been  but  recently  expelled,  a  severe  strain  is  put  upon  the  belief 
in  the  morality  of  civil  service  reform  ;  it  seems  like  saying 
that  to  the  vanquished  belong  the  spoils.  It  is  not  surpris- 
ing, therefore,  that  the  order  for  enforcing  the  railway  mail  ex- 
tension was  postponed  from  time  to  time  until,  in  fact,  more 
removals  had  been  made  in  this  branch  of  the  service  than 
throughout  President  Cleveland's  term,2  and  few,  if  any,  Demo- 
crats remained  to  be  protected. 

In  general  there  was  a  loud  cry  from  Republicans  for  offices. 
One  newspaper  appeared  with  the  headlines,  "  Hundreds  of 
Offices,"  "  Places  to  Suit  all  Classes,"  "  Take  your  Choice."  In 
both  Senate  and  House  a  committee  was  appointed  to  investigate 

1  Civil  Service  Reformer,  April,  1886,  April,  1887. 

2  Richardson,  Messages,  ix.  53 ;   Congressional  Record,  51  Cong.  I  sess.  House  Bill 
No.  3722  ;  Civil  Service  Reformer,  April,  1890. 


224  PERIOD   OF  CIVIL  SERVICE  REFORM. 

the  Civil  Service  Commission ;  and,  though  it  found  nothing  to 
.discredit  that  body,  it  did  find  enough  instances  of  removals  to 
(^furnish  a  good  tu  quoque  argument  for  the  spoilsmen.  Clark- 
son  alfpatronage  officer  of  the  post-office  revived  the  old  argu- 
ment of  rotation  in  office,  dismissing  201  postmasters  "  upon 
expiration  of  four  years'  service,  and  second  commission  not 
,  yet  expired."  By  April,  1890,  35,800  removals  had  been  made, 
about  15,000  more  than  in  the  previous  administration;  while 
the  reformers  had  been  alienated  by  the  displacement  of  Silas 
Burt  from  the  position  in  the  New  York  custom-house  which  he 
had  so  long  and  honorably  filled,  and  by  the  president's  refusal 
to  extend  the  rules  to  the  census  bureau  of  I89O.1 
I  Although  this  broad  sweep  seemed  a  step  backward  in  the 

I  progress   of    reform,    President   Harrison   announced   that   he 
would   firmly  maintain  the  rules  within   their  limits ;    and  the 

<apjx>intment  of   Theodore  Roosevelt  as  civil   service   commis- 
sioner, and  soon  as  chairman  of  the  commission,  was  a  guarantee 

_o_f   his  good  faith.      The  annual  reports  at  once  revealed  the 

jpjresence  of  a  new  vigor  and  administrative  power,  and  of  a  mind 
appreciative  at  once  of  ideal  ends  and  practical  possibilities. 

I  The  president  himself  was  responsible  for  an  important  in- 
npvation  in  the  rules,  —  that  of  providing  for  the  keeping  of 
efficiency  records  to  be  used  in  making  promotions.  It  had 
been  felt  for  some  time  that  it  was  not  well  to  rely  entirely 
upon  examinations  in  raising  men  from  one  class  to  another; 
the  difficulty  was  to  get  a  judgment  and  exclude  favoritism. 
In  his  first  annual  message,  President  Harrison  expressed  his 
belief  that  some  record  of  efficiency  could  be  devised,  and  in 
1891  announced  that  such  a  system  had  been  established.  As 
this  was  finally  arranged,  each  officer  was  to  receive  a  sepa- 
rate mark  for  attendance,  industry,  thoroughness,  and  general 
ability.2 

In   addition   to   this   contribution   to   the   system   itself,  the 
Harrison  administration  saw  the  extension  of  the  rules  over 

1  Civil  Service  Reformer,  1888  to  \^\, passim  ;  House  Reports,  51  Cong.  I  sess. 
vii.  No.  2445. 

2  Richardson,  Messages,  ix.  52-54,  179-180,  207,  513;   Good  Government,  July  15, 
1893,  November  15,  1895. 


HARRISON'.  22$ 

the  Indian  service,  in  which,  perhaps,  reform  was  more  needed  t 
than  anywhere  else.  Important  also  was  the  action  of  Secre- 
tary Tracy  in  applying  to  the  navy  yards  rules  for  the  registra- 
tion of  laborers,  which  had  been  devised  in  Massachusetts  and 
had  there  proved  satisfactory  in  improving  the  lower  branches 
of  the  service  and  keeping  them  out  of  politics.  So  successful 
did  this  plan  prove  that  it  was  extended  by  President  Cleveland, 
in  his  second  term,  to  many  other  departments,  and  became  an 
established  part  of  the  system.  Another  order  of  Secretary 
Tracy,  which  forbade  the  employment  of  extra  men  in  the  navy 
yards  during  the  sixty  days  before  elections,  put  a  stop  to  a 
long-established  and  convenient  method  of  vote-buying.1 

The  second  administration  of  Grover  Cleveland  brought 
mingled  gall  and  sweetness  to  the  believers  in  the  non-political 
civil  service.  Congress  was  more  eager  for  spoils  than  the 
government  was  to  give  them ;  and  an  investigation  into  the 
legislative,  executive,  and  judicial  appropriations  resulted  in  a 
reduction  of  force  which  gave  opportunity  for  partisan  manipu- 
lation. Throughout  the  term,  however,  order  followed  order, 
extending  the  service  by  providing  for  the  classification  of  light- 
iouse^  keepers^^r  the  clerical  force  in  the  pension  agency, 
ind  culminatin^ri  the  regulation  of  May  6,  1896,  which  simpli- 
ied  and  improved  the  whole  system,  and  added  29,399  officers 
the  list  of  those  under  the  commission,  making  a  total  of 
185,000  out  of  a  service  of  about  205, ooo.2  Each  of  these 
extensions' was  hailed  by  most  of  the  reformers  with  an  enthu- 
siasm tempered  solely  by  a  desire  for  more ;  but  they  might 
well  have  been  disturbed  by  the  fear  that  the  Republicans,  find- 
ing so  many  Democrats  protected  by  the  civil  service  fence, 
would  attack  the  system  itself.  President  Cleveland  must, 
indeed,  be  accused  of  a  grievous  lack  of  tact,  if  not  of  a  dis- 
tinct discourtesy,  when,  as  late  as  January  12,  1897,  he  placed 
under  the  rules  the  employees  of  the  president's  office.  Jeffer- 

1  Richardson,  Messages,  ix.  176-178;  C.  T.  Russell,  Address  to  the  National  Civil 
Service  Reform  League,  16-20;    Good  Government,  1896-1897,  pa ssim. 

2  Richardson,  Messages,  ix.  614 ;  House  Reports,  52  Cong.  2  sess.  ii.  No.  2359 ; 
Massachusetts  Reform  Club,  Report,  1898;   Good  Government,  July  15,  1894,  August 
15,  1895. 

Q 


226  PERIOD   OF  CIVIL  SERVICE  REFORM. 

son's  doctrine  in  1801,  that  the  president  should  make  no 
appointments  after  the  election  of  his  successor,  is,  of  course, 
frivolous ;  but  definitely  to  bind  upon  the  incoming  executive  a 
corps  of  clerks,  with  whom  he  must  come  into  personal  contact, 
is  to  invite  rebuff. 

When  William  McKinley  became  president  of  the  United 
State,  as  a  band  of  the  faithful  declared,  "  by  the  grace  of  God 
and  the  efforts  of  the  workers  and  zealous  friends  of  the  Repub- 
lican party,"  an  unusual  number  of  the  latter  accompanied  him 
f  to  Washington  in  the  hope  of  office.  It  would  seem  that  never 
jHbefore,  since  the  establishment  of  the  new  system  in  1883,  had 
it  been  subjected  to  such  a  strain ;  never  before,  indeed,  had  it 
kept  so  many  choice  places  from  the  grasp  of  the  politician. 
One  Republican  member  of  the  House,  in  his  eagerness,  moved 
that  all  orders  of  the  president  between  March  4,  1893,  and 
March  4,  1897,  be  revoked;  but  the  administration  controlled 
the  situation  for  the  moment,  and  was  not  to  be  hurried.  The 
unclassified  service  afforded  some  vent ;  and  a  rule  promul- 
gated by  President  Harrison,  to  the  effect  that  a  veteran  dis- 
missed from  the  classified  service  could  be  at  any  time  reinstated 
without  examination,  afforded  ground  for  a  considerable  number 
of  changes.1 

President  McKinley,  in  his  first  annual  message,  affirmed 
that  the  system  of  competitive  examination  had  been  approved 
by  the  people,  and  that  it  would  be  his  endeavor  to  "  uphold 
and  extend"  it;  that  changes  were  needed,  however,  and  that 
some  places  should  be  exempted.  This  led  to  a  Senate  inves- 
tigation, and  on  May  9,  1898,  a  report  was  brought  in  which 
stated  that  the  classification  was  too  extensive,  and  recommended 
certain  specific  reductions,  amounting  in  all  to  about  10,000;  a 
minority  reported  in  favor  of  about  3000  exceptions,  and  a 
second  minority  made  no  specific  recommendations.  Action 
was  long  delayed ;  the  Spanish  War  served  for  a  time  to  relieve 
the  pressure  for  office  by  affording  opportunity  for  temporary 
appointments,  and  itself  absorbed  the  attention  of  the  govern- 
ment. Its  close,  however,  brought  increased  pressure.  Effort 

1  Congressional  Record,  55  Cong.  I  sess.  House  Resolution  No.  46 ;  Good  Govern- 
ment,  December  15,  1897,  to  July  15,  1899,  passim. 


A  STEP  BACKWARD.  22? 

was  made  to  provide  permanently  for  the  men  temporarily 
appointed;  and  finally,  on  April  29,  1899,  the  long-impending 
action  was  taken.  A  presidential  order  was  issued  by  which 
3693  places  were  removed  from  the  classified  service,  6414 
transferred  from  the  charge  of  the  commissioners  to  that  of  the 

xxsecretary   of    war,    and    1000   temporary   appointments   made 
regular.     It  also  removed  some  of  the  restrictions  on  transfers  * 

I   and  reinstatements.1 

As  the  first  important  retrograde  step  taken  by  any  president  •  j 
since  the  inauguration  of  the  system,  it  naturally  was  violently 
attacked.  The  best-informed  assailant  was  Mr.  McAnery,  sec- 
retary of  the  National  Civil  Service  Reform  League,  against 
whose  attack  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  Gage  undertook  to  de- 
fend the  administration  in  the  columns  of  Good  Government. 
The  secretary  of  the  League  undoubtedly  had  the  best  of  the 
controversy,  as  a  controversy.  President  McKinley  himself,  in 
his  second  annual  message,  made  a  brief  defence  of  his  action. 
"  The  principal  purpose  of  the  order,"  said  he,  "  was  to  exempt 
from  competitive  examination  certain  places  involving  fiduciary 
responsibilities  or  duties  of  a  strictly  confidential,  scientific,  or 
executive  character  which  it  was  thought  might  better  be  filled 
either  by  non-competitive  examination^  or  in  the  discretion  of 
the  appointing  officer."  This  is  doubtless  true  of  many  places ; 
indeed,  President  Cleveland,  at  the  time  he  made  his  blanket 
order  of  May  6,  1896,  had  stated  to  the  commissioners  that 
modifications  would  be  necessary.2 

It  appears,  however,  that  undue  elasticity  was  allowed. 
Among  the  officers  exempted  were  deputy  collectors  of  customs, 
who  could  be  appointed  in  great  numbers,  and  many  of  whom 
were  employed  for  mere  clerical  work.3  The  transfer  to  the 
regular  list  of  those  holding  under  temporary  appointments  was 
defended  on  the  ground  that  the  men  had  served  long  enough 
to  demonstrate  their  fitness ;  and  they  have  in  fact  proved 

1  House  Documents,  55  Cong.  2  sess.  i.  No.  I,  pp.  xxxiii-xxxiv ;   Senate  Reports, 
55  Cong.  2  sess.  No.  659  ;    Good  Government,  December  15,  1898 ;  July  15,  1899. 

2  House  Documents,  56  Cong.  I  sess.  i.  No.  I,  pp.  Iviii-lix;  United  States  Civil 
Service  Commission,  i^th  Report  (1897-1898),  77-83. 

3  Commission,  ijth  Report  (1899-1900),  17. 


228  PERIOD   OF  CIVIL  SERVICE  REFORM. 

entirely  satisfactory.  Yet  it  is  evident  that  such  a  precedent 
is  dangerous  to  the  competitive  system  as  a  system ;  and  it 
appears  that  these  appointments  need  never  have  been  made 
in  the  first  place,  as  the  commission,  even  in  the  short  time 
available,  could  have  furnished  all  the  clerks  required,  if  it  had 
been  askedj1  Another  disappointment  to  the  advocates  of  a 
mechanical  system  of  selection  was  the  fact  that  the  census 
bureau  for  1900  was  not  included  within  the  rules,  appoint- 
ments being  left  to  the  director  of  the  census,  with  the  tacit 
understanding  that  he  would  leave  them  to  the  members  of 
Congress.2  On  the  whole,  it  would  seem  that,  while  some  ex- 
emptions were  advisable,  the  order  of  May  29,  1899,  went 
\f arther  than  was  required  —  farther  than  was  best  for  the  health 
of  the  system. 

The  administration  did  not  pass,  however,  without  signs  of 
a  better  mind.  A  presidential  order  established  the  rule  that 
removals  should  not  be  made  from  the  classified  service  unless 
written  charges  were  filed,  and  that  the  officer  to  be  dismissed 
should  have  an  opportunity  to  answer  them.  The  Taft  Com- 
mission, moreover,  provided  a  merit  system  for  the  Philippines ; 
and  Porto  Rico,  although  left  unsupplied  by  Congress,  was 
encouraged  to  establish  one  for  herself.3 

1  F.  A.  Vanderlip,  Scribner's  Magazine,  xxxiii.  400-410 ;   Good  Government,  July 
15,  1899. 

2  Congressional  Record,  55  Cong.  3  sess.  419. 

8  United  States  Civil  Service  Commission,  i8th  Report  (1900-1901),  8,  28-29; 
J.  H.  Hollander,  Forum,  xxxiii.  77-84. 


CHAPTER   XI. 

PRESENT   STATUS   OF  THE   CIVIL  SERVICE 
V10VEMEKI1. 


ALTHOUGH  the  system  of  competitive  examinations  was  begun 
so  late  in  the  nineteenth  century,  the  beginning  of  the  twentieth 
found  it  well  established.  The  annual  report  of  tjie  Civil  Ser- 
vice Commission  for  1899-1900  showed  90,000  classified  posi- 
tions, and  100,000  unclassified,  in  the  national  service;  but  the 
salaries  of  the  first  amounted  to  about  $75,000,000,  while  those 
of  the  latter  amounted  to  only  about  $30,000,000.  From  1883 
to  1900,  78,791  officials  had  been  appointed  because  of  their 
standing  in  examinations.  In  the  year  1900,  34,437  took  the 
examinations  offered,  22,985  received  pass  marks,  and  9889 
were  appointed  to  some  position.  The  appointing  officers 
showed  a  growing  tendency  to  select,  from  the  three  candi- 
dates certified  to  them  by  the  commission  as  eligible,  the  one 
whose  mark  was  highest  ;  in  about  three-fourths  of  the  cases 
this  was  done.  That  the  extension  of  the  system  has  not  reached 
its  limit  is  indicated  by  the  inclusion  of  the  rural  delivery  system 
within  the  rules  in  the  year  1903.  l 

,  In  the  meantime,  some  states  and  cities  followed  the  lead 
of  the  national  government.  New  York,  where  the  first  reform 
association  was  formed,  adopted,  in  1883,  a  statute  resembling 
that  of  the  nation  ;  Massachusetts,  prolific  of  reform  literature, 
followed  in  1884;  then,  after  an  interval,  the  system  received 
some  degree  of  recognition  from  Illinois,  Wisconsin,  and  Indiana 
in  1895,  from  Louisiana  in  1896,  and  from  Connecticut  in  1897. 
Various  cities  forestalled  the  action  of  their  state  legislature  — 
as  Philadelphia  in  1885  and  Denver  in  1896;  while  in  many 

1  Congressional  Record,  57  Cong,  i  sess.  1833. 
229 


230  PRESENT  STATUS  OF  THE  MOVEMENT. 

other  places  the  efforts,  though  unsuccessful  as  yet,  have  been 
persistent.1 

The  two  most  notable  exceptions  to  the  national  classifica- 
tion at  present  are  the  fourth-class  postmasters  and  the  con- 
sular service.  For  fifteen  years  efforts  have  been  continuous 
to  apply  the  merit  system  to  the  first  of  these.  March  3, 
1890,  Henry  Cabot  Lodge,  then  a  member  of  the  House  of 
Representatives,  introduced  a  bill  to  bring  about  this  result; 
this  was  followed  by  one  prepared  by  Sherman  Hoar  of  Massa- 
chusetts ;  and  the  question  was  presented  to  Congress  t>y 
President  Cleveland  in  his  message  of  December  7,  1896.  No 
action  has  yet  been  taken,  however,  except  that  some  minor 
post-offices  have  been  consolidated  with  larger  ones,  and  thereby 
brought  within  the  civil  service  rules.2 

The  effort  to  provide  for  a  trained  consulate,  as  has  been 
shown,  dates  farther  back  than  the  movement  for  competitive 
examinations.  The  small  force  of  thirteen  consular  clerks  has 
been  long  in  existence,  but  has  had  no  perceptible  influence  on 
the  service.  Nearly  every  Congress  for  fifteen  years  has  had 
before  it  some  measure  intended  to  provide  for  a  comprehensive 
reorganization ;  and  in  this  movement,  as  in  that  to  take  the 
fourth-class  postmasters  out  of  politics,  Senator  Lodge  has 
taken  the  lead.  Unlike  the  interest  in  the  latter  agitation,  how- 
ever, that  in  the  consular  service  has  grown  in  the  last  few 
years,  owing  to  our  increased  foreign  trade  and  imperialistic 
proclivities.  In  1900  the  Cleveland  chamber  of  commerce 
drew  up  a  particularly  good  bill,  which  was  presented  to  the 
House  by  Mr.  Burton  of  that  city.  Action  having  been 
earnestly  recommended  by  President  Roosevelt,  the  matter  was 
much  debated  in  the  first  session  of  the  fifty-seventh  Congress ; 
and,  although  nothing  was  decided,  it  may  be  said,  in  the  con- 
gressional phraseology,  to  have  been  "  passed  over  without 
prejudice."3 

1  United  States  Civil  Service  Commission,  ijth  Report  (1897-1898),  492. 

2  Congressional  Record,  51  Cong.  I  sess.  House  Bill  No.  7707;   Cambridge  Civil 
Service  Reform  Association,  Report,  1891-1892;    Richardson,  Messages,  ix.    740; 
Good  Government,  January  15,  1896. 

3  Congressional  Record,  57  Cong.  I  sess.  75,  249,  415,  1991,  2496. 


THE  CONSULAR  SERVICE. 

Meantime  something  had  been  done  by  the  executive.  Presi- 
dent Cleveland  issued  rules  classifying  candidates,  and  provid- 
ing for  examinations,  promotions,  and  the  reinstatement  of 
former  consuls  in  preference  to  new  appointments.  In  March, 
1896,  it  was  reported  that  since  September  20,  1895,  four  had 
been  promoted,  four  reinstated,  four  had  passed  examinations,1 
and  four  had  been  rejected.  President  McKinley  announced 
that  this  system  would  be  continued.  In  July,  1899,  it  was 
stated  that,  of  112  candidates  examined,  in  passed;1  but  who 
can  say  whether  this  indicates  that  the  original  selections  were 
particularly  excellent,  or  that  the  examinations  had  been  de- 
vitalized ? 

Besides  the  attempts  to  extend  the  civil  service  rules,  there 
have  been  efforts  to  make  them  more  effective.  July  8,  1886, 
the  Civil  Service  Commission  gave  its  opinion  that,  according 
to  the  laws  and  regulations  governing  the  service,  removals 
could  legally  be  made  for  any  reason  except  refusal  to  make 
political  contributions,  to  do  party  service,  or  to  submit  to  politi- 
cal dictation ;  but  that  as  the  reason  for  removal  need  not  be 
stated,  they  could  practically  be  made  for  any  reason  whatever. 
Now,  in  the  beginning,  the  reformers  were  generally  supporters 
of  the  prerogatives  of  the  executive,  and  were  disinclined  to 
hamper  the  president's  use  of  the  removing  power.2  It  was 
argued  that  if  political  appointments  were  impossible,  there 
could  no  longer  be  any  temptation  to  remove  men  without 
cause ;  and  this  view  seemed  justified  to  a  great  extent,  when 
it  was  seen  that  in  Cleveland's  first  administration  the'  removals 
from  the  classified  service  amounted  to  only  six  and  one-half 
per  cent.  Yet  in  the  course  of  time,  sentiment  has  grown  to 
favor  some  regulation  of  the  president's  prerogative.  Legisla- 
tion has  not  yet  been  effective,3  but  the  difficulty  has  been  in 
great  measure  relieved  by  the  above-mentioned  order  of  Presi- 
dent McKinley,  requiring  written  charges  to  be  filed,  and  giving 

1  Richardson,  Messages,  ix.  722;   Good  Government,  March  15,  1896;  March  15, 
1899  ;  July  15,  1899. 

2  Civil  Service  Reformer,  April,  1886;   Gary,  Curtis,  199-203. 

8  Good  Government,  April  15,  1895;  Civil  Service  Reformer,  January,  1887; 
Congressional  Record,  50  Cong.  I  sess.  House  Bill  No.  1628. 


232  PRESENT  STATUS  OF  THE  MOVEMENT. 

the  officer  the  right  to  answer.  The  executive  itself  has  pro- 
vided a  definite  rule  for  its  own  conduct. 

Many  suggestions  for  minor  improvements  have  been  made 
from  time  to  time.  The  proceedings  of  the  National  League 
are  filled  with  them ;  and  every  session  of  Congress  sees  bills 
introduced  to  prevent  drunkenness,  to  prevent  congressmen  from 
making  recommendations,  to  regulate  applications  for  office  in 
the  unclassified  service,1  and  for  similar  purposes,  all  indicating 
a  healthy  interest  in  the  subject. 

For  thirty  years  the  system  of  appointment  by  competitive 
examination  has  been  on  trial  in  America,  and  for  twenty  years 
it  has  been  recognized  by  Congress  and  operated  by  an  execu- 
tive on  the  whole  favorable.  It  is  time,  then,  to  form  some 
idea  of  its  success,  and  to  say  something  definite  as  to  the 
changes  it  has  wrought.  In  making  such  an  estimate,  it  should 
be  borne  in  mind  that  the  advocates  of  the  system  had  two 
objects  in  view:  while  they  differed  from  previous  reformers 
in  earnestly  desiring  to  improve  the  service,  —  making  that,  in 
fact,  their  first  object,  —  they  were  as  anxious  as  their  predeces- 
sors of  1836  to  purify  political  conditions,  and  believed  that  the 
competitive  system  was  admirably  fitted  to  that  end  also. 

Of  the  effect  of  the  system  on  the  service,  details  and  statis- 
tics may  be  found  in  abundance  in  the  Civil  Service  Commis- 
sion reports,  of  which  the  fifteenth  is  particularly  valuable,  as 
it  contains  a  general  summary  of  results.  In  this  summary  it 
is  estimated  that  two  million  dollars  a  year  is  saved  in  the  col- 
» lection  of  the  customs  by-  the  merit  system,  and  that  the  saving 
ithrough  the  whole  service  is  ten  per  cent  of  the  salaries.  Such 
definite  statements,  however,  lack  a  firm  basis.  Efficiency 
cannot  be  reckoned  in  figures;  and  it  is  certainly  improper 
•to  attribute  to  competitive  examinations  or  to  the  Civil  Service 
Commission  all  the  improvements  made  since  1883.  It  is 
altogether  likely  that,  under  any  circumstances,  the  service 
would  have  improved  in  the  last  twenty  years.  Much  more 
convincing,  therefore,  than  statistical  expositions  of  benefits  is 
the  general  testimony  of  the  most  trusted  executive  officers  as 

1  Massachusetts  Reform  Club,  Report,  1895;  an<^  Congressional  Record  Index, 
Civil  Service, 


IMPROVEMENT  IN  ADMINISTRATION.  233 

to  the  change  for  the  better ;  and  the  more  efficient  work  that 
these  men  have   been  able   to  do,  because  relieved   in   large- 
measure  of   importunities  for   office,  must  be   counted  among 
the  most  important  of  the  gains. 

There  are  other  facts  which  statistics  do  not  show.  One  is 
that,  under  the  new  conditions,  an  entirely  different  class  oft 
men  is  attracted  into  the  service.  Under  the  old  lack  of  system, 
any  position  might  lead  anywhere,  and  that  quickly ;  removal 
was  constantly  impending  ;  government  service  was  speculative, 
and  because  of  the  opportunities  it  afforded  attracted  clever, 
sometimes  brilliant,  men.  Now  it  offers,  in  the  main,  the  ad- 
vantage of  steady,  light  employment, at  a  moderate  remuneration 
and  attracts  the  steady-going  and  unimaginative.  Govern- 
ment service,  moreover,  in  this  country,  is  not  held  to  be  a 
badge  of  honor,  as  it  is  in  Germany  and  France,  and,  to  a 
degree,  in  England ;  it  will  never  form  the  basis  of  a  bourgeois 
aristocracy,  and  hence  will  attract  of  the  steady-going  only 
those  who  have  no  better  financial  opportunities.  The  ques- 
tion as  to  which  of  these  two  classes  it  is  most  desirable  to 
secure  is  one  of  time  and  circumstances.  During  the  middle  of 
the  century,  when  the  American  rotated  in  other  professions, 
it  was  natural  that  he  should  rotate  in  office,  and  rotation  and 
the  spoils  system  probably  secured,  in  most  parts  of  the  coun- 
try, a  better  corps  of  civil  servants  than  the  present  system 
would  have  done.  To-day  our  general  mode  of  life  is  more 
stable,  and  it  is  therefore  natural  that  the  government  service 
should  become  more  so ;  the  class  that  is  willing  to  settle  down 
permanently  to  the  prospect  of  a  small  but  steady  income,  and 
a  respectable  but  not  distinguished  station,  is  increasing.  It 
must  be  acknowledged,  however,  that  as  yet  the  ordinary 
positions  of  the  civil  service  —  those  offering  no  special  induce- 
ments for  research  or  travel  —  do  not  tempt  as  able  young  men 
as  business  opportunities  of  equal  grade.  It  seems,  also,  that 
the  examinations  are  so  managed,  doubtless  partly  in  deference 
to  public  sentiment,  that  men  of  higher  education  are  not  en- 
couraged to  enter.  In  1891, 62T9¥  per  cent  of  those  who  took  the 
examinations  on  the  basis  of  a  common-school  education  passed, 
77i3o"  Per  cent  °f  those  who  had  been  through  high  school,  and 


234  PRESENT  STATUS  OF  THE  MOVEMENT. 

only  67^  per  cent  of  the  college  men.1  Of  course  many  of  the 
college  men  took  more  difficult  technical  examinations,  yet  the 
figures  seem  to  indicate  that  many  of  the  college-bred  men 
who  applied  were  of  inferior  capacity.  Certainly  an  infusion  of 
college  men  would  benefit  the  service. 

Until  men  of  more  ability  are  attracted  by  the  examinations 
that  give  entrance  to  the  civil  service,  the  system  of  mechanical 
promotion  cannot  be  extended  up  through  the  service  to  posi- 
tions requiring  executive  power  and  independent  judgment; 
though  if  such  positions  were  included  within  the  system,  that 
fact  of  itself  would  of  course  afford  an  inducement  to  enter  the 
lower  grades  which  does  not  now  exist.  We  may  well  doubt, 
however,  whether,  while  business  continues  to  hold  out  such 
opportunities  as  at  present,  the  permanent  civil  service  will  be 
able  to  draw  in  many  men  fitted  for  the  highest  posts.2 

When  we  turn  to  the  political  results  of  the  competitive 
selection  of  candidates,  it  is  necessary  to  keep  in  mind  the 
causa  eundi  of  the  spoils  system  —  the  fact  that  it  came  into 
being  to  supply  a  means  of  supporting  political  organization, 
that  its  essence  lies  in  making  the  offices  the  campaign  fund 
of  the  different  parties.  The  first  point  to  be  considered  is 
whether  it  has  taken  the  offices  out  of  this  category  —  whether 
promises  of  office  count  less  in  party  warfare,  and  whether 
officers  are  less  active  party  workers,  than  previously.  The 
mere  fact  that  appointment  to  so  many  offices  has  been  taken 
from  the  discretion  of  the  executive  means  that  so  many  the 
fewer  friends  can  be  rewarded.  The  successive  reports  of  the 
Civil  Service  Commission  show  that,  although  every  campaign 
brings  to  light  new  methods  of  circumventing  the  law,  assess- 
ments are  really  becoming  much  less  common  ;3  and  also  that 

1  Good  Government,  November   15,   1892  ;    Civil   Service  Reformer,  February, 
1891. 

2  H.  T.  Newcomb,  Forum,  xx.  120-128;   Benjamin  Kidd,  Nineteenth  Century,  xx. 
491-502  ;   F.  A.  Vanderlip,  Scribner's  Magazine,  xxxiii.  404. 

3  An  act  of  June  30,  1868,  forbade  any  officer  of  the  government  to  pay  money 
for  political  purposes  to  a  workman  in  the  navy  yards.     A  law  of  August  15,  1876, 
forbade  any  officer  or  employee  of  the  United  States,  not  appointed  with  the  advice 
and  consent  of  the  Senate,  to  give  to,  or  receive  from,  any  other  such  officer  or 
employee  any  money  for  political  purposes.     In  1886  the  commission  recommended 
that  every  one  be  forbidden  to  solicit  such  contributions. 


POLITICAL  RESULTS.  235 

other  forms  of  political  activity  diminish,  in  spite  of  an  evident 
itching  on  the  part  of  public  officers  to  take  the  lead  in  party 
management.  It  is  noticed,  however,  that  as  the  number  of 
places  disposable  has  become  smaller,  the  pressure  for  them  has 
increased ;  that  the  desire  for  this  particular  method  of  pay- 
ment for  political  service  has  not  diminished  as  rapidly  as  civil 
service  reform  has  advanced ;  and  the  tremendous  stress 
brought  upon  the  McKinley  administration  indicates  that  civil 
service  reform  will  not  find  its  -further  advancement  along  a 
pleasant  path. 

Whether  a  further  withdrawal  of  the  offices  from  politics  will 
prove  to  be  possible,  depends  upon  circumstances.  Practically 
we  may  omit  the  supposition  that  a  modern  democracy  could 
exist  without  parties ;  it  may  be  possible,  but  it  is  a  condition 
which  lies  far  in  the  future.  Under  existing  conditions  the 
possibility  of  a  complete  civil  service  reform,  as  generally  under- 
stood, depends  upon  whether  qur_rj»arties  can  be  convinced  that 
they  can  exist  wjthnpt  their  present  elaborafe^organizations,  or. 
can  maintain  these  organizations  without  the  cohesive  power  of 
the  public  offices.1  If  the  organizations  are  maintained,  reform 
is  impossible,  unless  a  substitute  is  found  for  the  spoils  system. 
If  the  substitute  be  money,  the  change  is  a  bad  one ;  if  it  be  ar- 
gument and  the  devotion  of  earnest  men,  it  is  good ;  if  it  be  the 
drawing  of  rich  men  into  politics  and  an  approximation  of  the 
English  aristocratic  system,  there  may  be  two  opinions  as  to  its 
value ;  or  there  might  be  a  simplification  of  political  machinery, 
as  by  the  introduction  of  primary  elections.  All  these  tenden- 
cies are  observable,  and  civil  service  reform  is  to  be  studied  in 
connection  with  them  and  with  all  other  political  reform  move- 
ments. Eternal  vigilance,  and  not  merely  the  mechanical  selec- 
tion of  public  officers,  is  the  price  of  liberty. 

A  troublesome  minor  question  in  this  connection  is  how  far  the  \ 
servants  of  the  state  may  be  allowed  to  indulge  in  politics.     As 
has  been  pointed  out,  and  as  every  man  in  middle  life  knows,  the 
activity  of  office-holders  is  much  less  than  it  once  was  ;  but  what 
are  the  proper  limits  ?    Present  public  sentiment  in  America  would 

1  Gamaliel    Bradford   discusses  this  question  in   an  interesting  article  on  "The 
Progress  of  Civil  Service  Reform"  in  the  International  Review  for  September,  1882. 


236  PRESENT  STATUS  OF  THE  MOVEMENT. 

not  countenance  any  effort  to  gag  the  civil  service  ;  and  we  cer- 
tainly do  not  wish  the  public  employees  to  constitute  a  separate 
political  body  as  they  come  very  near  doing  in  Australia.  Some 
reformers  have  of  late  been  taking  very  advanced  ground ;  Post- 
master-general Heath  has  been  criticised  for  allowing  partici- 
pation in  caucuses  and  conventions,1  and  Commissioner  Foulke 
for  his  circular  of  1902,  which  argued  that  it  was  not  a  violation 
of  the  spirit  of  the  law  for  members  of  the  cabinet  to  take  part 
in  a  political  campaign. 

'  Such  extreme  criticisms  injure  a  good  cause.  The  ideal  con- 
dition, doubtless,  is  that  all  citizens  should  participate  alike  in 
politics ;  but  it  is  also  true  that,  in  order  to  discourage  officials 
from  taking  that  undue  interest  in  politics  to  which  they  have 
been  accustomed  in  times  past,  special  repression  will  be  long 
necessary.  It  should,  however,  be  recognized  that  the  influence 
which  a  collector  of  customs  exerts  over  his  subordinates  and  that 
by  which  a  manufacturer  controls  his  employees,  are  closely  akin. 
Here  again  it  is  a  broad,  general  problem  that  is  to  be  solved. 

One  interesting  result  of  the  law  of  1883  nas  been  the  more 
equal  sharing  of  positions  between  the  different  state.s  and 
parties.  As  a  result  of  the  long  Republican  dominance,  the 
Southern  states  had  a  comparatively  small  number  of  citizens  in  j 
the  departments  at  Washington,  and  an  undue  proportion  of 
these  consisted  of  negroes,  because  of  the  political  proclivities 
of  the  latter.  At  present  there  are  no  glaring  inequalities; 
and  white  Democrats  from  the  South  are  more  numerous,  while 
the  negroes  from  the  North  have  increased.2  Thus  a  result 
always  aimed  at,  and  especially  desirable  in  a  federal  republic, 
has  been  brought  about.  It  is  a  very  valuble  thing  to  have  at 
the  capital  a  large  number  of  representatives  of  the  different 
sections ;  it  creates  a  national  atmosphere,  and  probably  exerts 
an  unconscious  influence  of  a  most  beneficial  character  on  Con- 
gress. The  reflex  influence  on  the  states  is,  of  course,  not  so 
great  as  in  the  days  of  rotation.  Then  the  great  numbers  of 
men  with  four  years  of  Washington  experience  and  fresh  from 

1  Massachusetts  Reform  Club,  Report,  1898,  p.  II. 

2  United  States  Civil  Service  Commission,  ifth  Report,  1899-190x3,  pp.  405-465; 
T.  Roosevelt,  Atlantic  Monthly,  Ixvii.  252-257  ;  Civil  Service  Record,  April,  1891. 


INTERNAL  DANGERS.  237 

contact  with  their  fellow-citizens  from  far  away,  who  scattered 
broadcast  over  the  land,  must  have  carried  with  them  much 
information  that  was  useful  to  their  friends,  and  that  probably 
strengthened  the  bonds  of  union,  which  in  those  days  so  much 
needed  strengthening.  With  our  present  facilities  of  travel,  and 
our  strong  national  spirit,  this  function  may  well  be  dispensed 
with ;  but  it  can  never  cease  to  be  important  to  have  at  Wash- 
ington a  population  drawn  in  proper  proportion  from  all  the 
states,  centring  there  ties  of  family  interest,  and  prepared  to 
furnish  knowledge  of  local  conditions. 

Having  examined  the  advantages  and  disadvantages  of  the 
existing  civil  service  system,  we  must  briefly  consider  its  ele- 
ments of  stability,  and  first  the  points  of  attack,  internal  and 
external.  It  is  not  the  purpose  of  this  study  to  detail  minutely 
the  workings  of  the  system,  —  the  reports  of  the  Civil  Service 
Commission  are  too  candid  and  too  easily  available  to  make 
that  necessary,  —  but  certain  plausible  methods  of  evading  re- 
strictions must  be  mentioned.  One  of  the  most  dangerous  is 
reinstatement.  It  seems  just  that,  if  a  man  be  dismissed  with- 
out just  cause  or  because  of  a  reduction  in  force,  he  should 
be  readmitted  without  having  to  run  the  gantlet  as  a  novice. 
When,  however,  one  recalls  the  conditions  in  the  forties  and 
fifties,  it  becomes  obvious  that,  if  this  practice  were  freely 
allowed,  rotation  would  be  again  introduced,  each  party  turning 
out  its  opponents  and  reinstating  the  martyrs  of  its  own  faith. 
There  would  be  two  sets  of  men,  —  one  in  office,  and  the  other 
working  to  obtain  it  by  a  party  success.  The  civil  service  rules 
formerly  allowed  reinstatement  within  one  year  of  dismissal, 
but  not  thereafter.  President  Harrison,  as  has  been  shown, 
provided  that  veterans  might  be  taken  back  without  regard 
to  time.  President  McKinley,  in  his  order  of  April  26,  1899, 
extended  this  provision  to  all  officers  in  the  classified  service, 
with  the  restriction  that  those  separated  from  the  government 
for  more  than  twelve  months  should  take  a  pass-examination. 
The  Civil  Service  Commission,  in  its  seventeenth  report,  ear- 
nestly recommends  that  the  former  rule  be  reestablished.1 

1  House  Miscellaneous  Documents,  52  Cong.  2  sess.  i.  No.  93 ;  Congressional 
Record,  55  Cong.  I  sess.  721,  747,  793. 


238  PRESENT  STATUS  OF  THE  MOVEMENT. 

Transfers  form  another  vexing  problem.  Constant  attempts 
are  made  to  obtain  permission  for  men  to  be  transferred  from 
the  unclassified  service  to  positions  included  under  the  rules. 
The  commission  has  recently  recommended  stricter  regulations,1 
and  has  thus  far  been  able  to  prevent  any  serious  encroach- 
ments. Another  method  of  evasion  is  illustrated  by  the  aboli- 
tion of  the  office  of  superintendent  of  the  binding  division, 
carrying  a  salary  of  nineteen  hundred  dollars,  and  the  establish- 
ment of  a  chief  of  the  division  at  the  same  salary.  A  new  man 
was  of  course  appointed.2  Thus  far  the  enforcement  of  the 
law  has  been  practically  always  in  the  hands  of  friends.  If  it 
fell  into  those  of  its  enemies,  it  could  probably  be  much  relaxed 
without  any  great  surface  changes ;  in  fact,  the  conditions  in 
some  of  our  states  and  cities  show  that  the  working  of  the  law 
depends  almost  entirely  upon  the  animus  of  the  controlling 
political  forces. 

A  well-known  American  statesman  once  said,  —  of  course 
in  private,  apropos  of  a  pension  bill,  that  the  fact  was  that 
the  grand  army  of  the  republic  saved  the  country,  and  now  it 
wanted  it.  It  has  been  shown,  from  time  to  time,  that  military 
service  has  been  thought  to  entitle  a  man  to  civil  office.  This 
sentiment  was  naturally  strengthened  by  the  Civil  War ;  Lin- 
coln felt  it,  and  in  1865  it  was  provided  by  law  that  soldiers 
discharged  "by  reason  of  disability  resulting  from  wounds  or 
sickness  incurred  in  the  line  of  duty"  should  "be  preferred 
for  appointments  to  civil  offices,  provided  they  are  found  to 
possess  the  business  capacity  necessary."  In  1876  they  were 
given  preference  when  reductions  in  force  were  to  be  made.3 
There  is  a  certain  justice  in  such  provisions,  and  civil  service 
reformers  have  been  somewhat  chary  of  opposing  them ;  but 
since  1883  there  has  been  a  constant  effort  to  extend  their 
scope,  and  an  equally  steady  effort  to  prevent  this  extension. 
The  division  has  tended  to  lie  between  those  favorable  and 
those  unfavorable  to  civil  service  reform. 

1  ijth  Report,  16  ;    Congressional  Record,  54  Cong.  I  sess.  Senate  Bill  No.  2563. 

2  Good  Government,  September  15,  1894. 

8  Senate  Reports,  38  Cong.  2  sess.  i.  No.  122  ;  Revised  Statutes,  §  1754  ;  Statutes 
at  Large,  xix.  143. 


THE  SPOILS  OF  WAR.  239 

Congress  has  been  flooded  with  bills  to  make  the  road  to 
office  easy  for  the  soldier :  in  one  session  four  such  bills  were 
presented  to  the  Senate  and  thirteen  to  the  House.  Reports 
have  been  called  for,  chiefly  by  the  Senate,  to  show  how  far 
the  preference  already  provided  for  is  observed.  Bills  have 
passed  the  Senate  to  extend  the  preference  to  all  soldiers 
honorably  discharged;  bills  have  been  introduced  to  extend 
it  to  Confederates.1  Just  when  such  measures  were  becoming 
less  dangerous  because  of  the  age  of  the  veterans  of  the  great 
conflict,  the  Spanish  War  brought  new  candidates  for  recogni- 
tion, and  renewed  interest  in  war  and  warriors,  and  since  then 
new  floods  of  measures  have  been  presented.  President  Mc- 
Kinley,  without  waiting  for  legislation,  properly  extended  to 
our  new  veterans  the  privileges  of  the  old ;  but  preference  is 
still  restricted  to  the  wounded  and  sick,  and  in  the  classified 
service  of  course  applies  only  to  those  who  receive  a  pass 
mark.2  The  inclusion  of  all  those  honorably  discharged  would 
be  most  unwise,  at  a  time  when  three  hundred  thousand  young 
veterans  have  just  come  into  existence;  but  the  agitation  will 
undoubtedly  continue  while  there  are  men  in  Congress  whose 
sympathy  for  the  soldier,  and  appreciation  of  the  soldier  vote, 
is  stronger  than  their  desire  for  civil  service  reform.3  In  the 
past  the  South  has  on  obvious  grounds  consistently  opposed 
such  legislation  ;  but  her  position  can  no  longer  be  predicted, 
as  she  now  has  Spanish  War  veterans  of  her  own  who  might 
profit  by  the  privileges  to  be  granted.  The  problem  is  thus 
an  open  one. 

Not  all  the  dangers  of  the  present  system  are  internal :  from 
the  very  first  direct  attack  has  not  been  lacking.  The  session 
of  Congress  next  after  the  passage  of  the  law  of  1883  saw  two 

1  Senate  Reports,  47  Cong.  I  sess.  iv.  No.  780  ;  House  Reports,  52  Cong.  I  sess. 
vii.  No.  1925  ;    Congressional  Record,  50  Cong.  I  sess.  Senate  Bill  2443  ;   51  Cong. 
I  sess.  ;   55  Cong.  2  sess.  718,  4275  ;  56  Cong,  i  sess.  5612. 

2  United  States  Civil  Service  Commission,  ijth  Report  (1897-1898),  34 ;    Civil 
Service  Record,  November,   1885. 

8  The  same  movement  has  been  going  on  in  the  states,  notably  in  Massachusetts. 
See  Civil  Service  Record,  July,  1887,  March,  1888,  February,  1889  ;  Good  Govern- 
ment, December  15,  1895  ;  May  15,  1896;  New  York  Civil  Service  Reform  Asso- 
ciation, Reports,  1886,  1887. 


240  PRESENT  STATUS  OF  THE  MOVEMENT. 

bills  to  repeal  it,  and  three  or  four  such  bills  have  been  intro- 
duced in  every  succeeding  Congress.  These  bills  for  repeal 
are  seldom  debated,  being  reported  adversely  by  the  civil  ser- 
vice reform  committee  of  the  House,  or  the  civil  service  and 
retrenchment  committee  of  the  Senate;  but  every  Congress 
witnesses  a  debate  over  the  appropriation  for  the  expenses  of 
the  commission.  It  was  the  intention  of  the  framers  of  the  law 
that  these  expenses  should  be  made  a  permanent  charge ;  but 
precedent  was  lacking  for  such  a  course,  and  thus  the  entire 
system  is  in  constant  danger  of  being  impaired,  if  not  destroyed, 
by  a  hostile  vote.  Nevertheless,  supplies  have  not  failed,  and 
have  grown  increasingly  liberal. 

The  debates  on  these  appropriations  are  not  usually  very 
edifying.  Epithets  are  freely  hurled :  the  Civil  Service  Com- 
mission has  been  called  a  "  Republican,  Pecksniffian,  political 
machine " ;  the  reformers,  "  eunuchs  and  sissiri  of  American 
politics,  canting  prelates  and  Pharisees  " ;  while  the  system  has 
been  described  as  "  conceived  in  iniquity  and  born  of  hypocrisy 
.  .  .,  administered  infamously,  and  sustained  by  cowardice  and 
demagogy."  Mr.  Eaton  was  attacked  because  in  a  bill  of  ex- 
penses were  included  thirty  cents  for  lemonade  and  a  dollar 
for  supper,  gin,  and  ale ;  another  commissioner  for  expending 
forty  cents  for  "porter,"  but  apprehension  was  relieved  when 
it  proved  to  be  a  Pullman  car  porter.  By  saner  critics  the 
system  is  said  to  disregard  a  man's  moral  character,  or  to  allow 
no  chance  to  size  a  man  up.1 

Mr.  Bailey  of  Texas  touched  a  politically  weak  point  when 
he  said,  "  If  the  civil  service  law  continues  on  the  statute  books 
of  the  United  States  for  twenty  years  it  will  be  followed  by  a 
civil  pension  list,  and  that  itself  is  objection  enough  to  the 
system."  General  Grosvenor  also,  prompt  to  see  the  un- 
popularity of  civil  pensions,  has  insisted  that  under  present 
conditions  humanity  demands  them.  This,  indeed,  seems  to  be 
one  of  the  rocks  threatening  the  progress  of  the  movement. 
Now,  as  before  1830,  the  tendency  is  for  clerks  to  remain  in 

1  Good  Government,  June  15,  1894;  Massachusetts  Reform  Club,  Report,  1893; 
Civil  Service  Reformer,  August,  1885,  June,  1890;  Congressional  Record,  55  Cong. 
3  sess.  459. 


7hE  OLD  AGE  PROBLEM.  241 

office  to  extreme  old  age ;  and  the  question  arises  as  to  how 
long  they  can  be  retained  without  detriment  to  the  service,  and 
whether  it  is  just  to  dismiss  them  without  providing  for  their 
last  days.  Of  late  this  problem  has  been  attracting  much 
attention.  Bills  have  been  introduced  fixing  an  age  limit  for 
retirement,  providing  for  insurance  systems,  for  civil  pen- 
sions, and  for  the  payment  of  a  lump  sum  on  retirement. 
Secretary  Gage  formulated  a  plan  for  an  "  honor  roll,"  in  which 
the  names  of  clerks  who  had  passed  seventy  were  to  be  in- 
cluded ;  they  were  to  be  retained  in  the  service,  but  their 
salaries  were  to  be  reduced  to  a  nine-hundred-dollar  basis. 
The  scheme  was  not  popular  and  has  never  been  put  completely 
into  operation.  Among  the  clerks  themselves  there  have  been 
attempts  to  form  insurance  arrangements ; 1  but  as  yet  none  of 
these  schemes  have  seemed  to  offer  inducements  superior  to 
those  of  the  regular  companies. 

It  may  seem  inconsistent  that  a  government  so  profuse  with 
its  military  pensions  should  not  grant  them  to  the  civil  service. 
It  is  probably  true,  moreover,  that  in  the  long  run  a  civil  service 
pension  system  properly  related  to  salaries  would  not  cost  the 
government  one  cent;  for,  when  pensions  are  not  given,  pay 
must  be  high  enough  to  allow  of  individual  saving.  Still,  it 
cannot  be  denied  that  such  a  provision  would  be  unpopular,  and 
would  indeed  denote  a  change  in  the  spirit  of  American  institu- 
tions, which  have  been  so  strongly  individualistic  and  so  insist- 
ent that  each  man  should  take  care  of  himself.2  On  the  other 
hand,  American  individualism  is  being  modified ;  and  if  many 
private  corporations  follow  the  example  of  the  Pennsylvania 
Railroad,  of  Harvard  University,  and  of  other  employers,  the 
idea  of  pensions  for  the  servants  of  the  government  will  become 
less  strange,  and  therefore  less  unpopular. 

Many  attempts,  more  or   less   avowed,  have   been  made   to 

1  National  Civil  Service  Reform  League,  Proceedings,  1895,  PP-  76-80  ;  G.  B.  Ratim, 
in  North  American  Review,  cxxxvi.  492-493  ;   F.  A.  Vanderlip,  in  Scribner>s  Maga- 
zine, xxxiii.  403  ;    Civil  Service  Record,  June,  1891. 

2  The  argument  that  a  pension  system  would  reduce  the  number  of  removals  has 
ceased  to  be  of  significance,  owing  to  the  recent  orders  forbidding  removal  except 
on  written  charges.      Australian  experience  would  seem  to  prove  that  the  system 
would  not  be  efficacious  for  this  object  under  any  circumstances. 


242.  PRESENT  STATUS  OF  THE  MOVEMENT. 

cripple  the  merit  system  before  destroying  it ;  for  instance,  bills 
have  been  introduced  to  allow  the  appointing  officers  to  choose 
any  applicant  who  has  passed  the  examination,  "to  improve 
the  civil  service  by  affording  advancement  to  those  in  the  classi- 
fied service  who  have  been  denied  advancement  through  circum- 
stances beyond  their  control,"  to  suspend  the  law  during  the  first 
year  of  every  presidential  term.  Perhaps  the  most  notable 
effort  of  this  kind  was  that  to  place  the  employees  of  the  bureau 
of  the  twelfth  census,  who  had  been  appointed  on  pass-examina- 
tions, within  the  pale  of  the  classified  service.  Senator  Lodge 
pointed  out  that  this  would  carry  over,  and  place  ahead  of  the 
highest  eligibles,  a  thousand  or  twelve  hundred  names.  An 
amendment  was  of  course  offered,  giving  a  preference  to  those 
of  them  who  had  been  soldiers  in  any  of  our  wars,  or  who  were 
the  widows  of  soldiers.  After  a  long  debate  it  was  arranged  by 
a  conference  committee  that  the  employees  of  the  bureau  should 
be  admitted  to  the  classified  service,  but  should  be  eligible  only 
to  appointment  in  the  new  permanent  census  bureau ;  the  prefer- 
ence for  soldiers  was  retained.1 

It  is  not  to  be  supposed  that  the  assailants  of  the  present 
system  are  without  a  programme  of  their  own.  For  a  long  time 
they  seemed  to  be  so,  but  of  late  a  clearer  idea  may  be  obtained 
of  what  they  desire  beyond  a  return  to  the  old  lack  of  system. 
One  idea  that  crops  out  continually  is  that  of  the  New  York 
constitution  of  1820  —  to  extend  the  elective  system  to  the 
minor  offices.  This  is  generally  urged  in  regard  to  post- 
masters ;  but  one  bill  has  also  been  introduced  providing  that 
the  various  states  and  territories  elect  definite  quotas  and  send 
them  to  Washington  to  work  in  the  departments.  More  repre- 
sentative, however,  is  the  plan  which  General  Grosvenor  of  Ohio, 
who  has  made  himself  the  leader  in  attacks  on  the  merit  system, 
set  forth  in  an  elaborate  speech  printed  in  the  appendix  to  the 
Congressional  Record  for  the  first  session  of  the  fifty-fifth  Con- 
gress. This  is  a  careful  and  deliberate  assault  on  existing 
methods,  supplemented  by  suggestions  as  to  what  he  thinks 
would  prove  better.  He  would  divide  the  service  into  three 

1  Congressional  Record,  50  Cong.  2  sess.  Senate  Bill  No.  3927  ;  52  Cong.  2  sess. 
House  Bill  No.  1024  ;  54  Cong.  I  sess.  445  ;  57  Cong.  I  sess.  1770,  1839,  2395. 


AN  ATTACK  IN  THE  OPEN.  243 

classes,  —  the  executive,  advising,  and  administrative  class,  the 
executing  or  clerical  class,  and  the  workman  class.  He  would 
have  a  limited  term  and  a  strict  pass-examination,  would  have 
each  appointee  recommended  by  his  representative  as  a  friend 
of  the  government,  and  would  have  congressional  districts 
equally  represented.  He  considers  that  congressmen  shirk 
their  duties  at  present.  In  other  words,  he  would  turn  the 
appointing  power  over  to  legislators.  At  bottom,  the  present 
attack  on  the  merit  system  is,  in  large  part,  a  reappearance  of 
the  old  jealousy  of  the  executive  so  many  times  illustrated  in 
the  history  of  the  patronage.1 

What  has  enabled  civil  service  reform  to  progress,  unpopular 
as  it  has  been  because  of  its  foreign  origin,  and  interfering,  as 
it  has  done,  with  our  established  political  institutions  ?  Why 
have  not  the  congressmen,  who  have  been  deprived  of  the 
means  of  sustaining  their  political  machines,  and  more  than 
half  of  whom  are  probably  hostile  to  the  system,  risen  in  suc- 
cessful revolt  ?  These  questions  seem  more  difficult  of  answer 
if  we  consider  the  character  of  its  advocates.  In  list  after  list 
of  the  members  of  civil  service  reform  associations,  not  a  name 
can  be  found  that  does  not  suggest  to  one  acquainted  with  the 
nomenclature  of  the  various  localities,  education,  wealth,  or 
social  position ;  the  very  list  of  such  societies  existing  in  1892 
shows  that  centres  of  learning  and  wealth,  and  not  of  popula- 
tion, are  represented.  Addresses  are  occasionally  made  to 
workmen,  pointing  out  the  value  of  the  reform  to  them ;  but 
the  platforms  of  labor  parties  do  not  testify  to  their  interest  in 
it.  In  the  main,  it  has  been  an  agitation  carried  on  by  a 
comparatively  small,  educated  class. 

One  great  source  of  success  has  been  the  non-partisan  char- 
acter of  the  movement,  at  the  same  time  that  it  has  not  been 
unpartisan.  The  bill  was  introduced  by  a  Democratic  senator, 
and  passed  by  a  Republican  Congress ;  its  supporters  have 
come  from  both  parties,  and  in  the  commission  both  parties 

1  Congressional  Record,  47  Cong.  I  sess.  5707  ;  49  Cong.  2  sess.  House  Bill  No. 
10,209  >  53  Cong.  I  sess.  House  Bill  No.  246,  and  Appendix,  419-445  ;  Good  Govern- 
ment, April  15,  1893  5  Interview  with  Senator  Wellington,  Boston  Herald,  August  I, 
1902. 


244  PRESENT  STATUS  OF  THE  MOVEMENT. 

have  been  represented  by  stalwart  supporters,  by  men  like 
Theodore  Roosevelt  and  Governor  Thompson  of  South  Caro- 
lina, whose  honest  partisanship  could  not  be  mistrusted.  This 
fortunate  condition  was  seriously  threatened  when,  in  1896  and 
1900,  the  national  platform  of  the  Democratic  party  condemned 
the  movement.  Many  advocates  of  reform  were  still  in  the 
Democratic  ranks  however,  and  the  platform  of  1904  once 
more  pledged  the  party  to  the  support  of  the  reform  measures 
undertaken  by  the  government,  and  has  thus  prevented  them 
from  becoming  an  issue  between  the  parties.  As  a  result  of 
this  appeal  to  both  parties,  the  progress  of  reform  has  received 
no  serious  check  through  the  mutations  of  party  fortunes.  It 
has  had  constantly  that  support  from  the  several  presidents  and 
from  most  of  the  heads  of  departments,  which  is  a  necessary 
condition  of  its  success.  This  has  given  an  unusual  opportu- 
nity to  test  its  value  and  demonstrate  its  merits  to  the  public. 

Another  element  of  strength  has  been  the  publicity  and  can- 
dor which  has  characterized  the  movement  from  its  initiation. 
The  reformers  have  proceeded  straightforwardly  in  the  belief 
that,  if  the  people  saw  what  the  system  they  proposed  was,  and 
how  it  worked,  they  would  support  it.  By  that  truly  democratic 
method  they  have  taken  the  sting  out  of  the  gibes  directed  at 
the  system  as  aristocratic,  and  have  demonstrated  that  what  the 
people  can  see  and  touch  and  find  good  they  will  have. 

Not,  however,  to  the  members  of  civil  service  reform  associa- 
tions can  we  attribute  the  whole  or  the  greater  influence  in 
bringing  about  the  result,  any  more  than  we  can  attribute  to 
the  abolitionists  the  abolition  of  slavery.  The  civil  service  will 
ever  assimilate  itself  to  surrounding  conditions.  Before  1828 
it  tended  to  be  staid  and  aristocratic.  At  that  date  tendencies 
which  had  long  been  gaining  strength  obtained  the  mastery ; 
and  the  civil  service  shared  in  the  blatant  democracy,  the  daz- 
zling confidence  in  results  to  be  obtained,  the  lofty  carelessness 
as  to  the  methods  of  obtaining  them,  and  all  the  other  charac- 
teristics of  the  ruling  class  in  the  United  States  between  1830 
and  1870.  Since  that  time  there  has  been  a  growing  civic  con- 
sciousness, an  appreciation  of  the  serious  duties  of  citizenship, 
which  has  furnished  the  energy  to  start  numerous  reforms  on 


THE  STRENGTH  OF  REFORM.  24$ 

the  road  to  ultimate  adoption.  Most  significant,  however,  are 
the  two  facts  that  the  balance  of  power  has  for  some  time  been 
held  by  the  business  class,  and  that  business  methods  have, 
since  the  crisis  of  1873,  become  more  careful  and  systematic. 
To  call  competitive  examinations  businesslike  in  1850  would 
have  been  absurd;  yet  that  has  been  constantly  and  increas- 
ingly the  most  effective  argument  in  favor  of  the  system.  As 
long  as  the  controlling  element  in  the  country  manage  their 
private  affairs  in  a  careful,  systematic  manner,  we  may  expect 
the  government  to  conduct  its  business  on  approximately  the 
same  principles. 


APPENDICES. 


APPENDIX   A. 

TRANSFER  OF    OFFICERS   (1789-1791). 

TABLE  I. 
OFFICERS  OF  THE  CONFEDERATION. 

Old  Position.  New  Position. 

SuperintendentofForeign|JohnJay  Chief  Justice. 

Atfciirs ) 

Minister  to  France      .     .     Thomas  Jefferson      .  .     Secretary  of  State. 

Commissioner  of  Treasury  )  0 

'  >  Samuel  Osgood    .     .  .    Postmaster-general. 

Secretary  at  War    .     .     .     Henry  Knox    ....     Secretary  of  War. 

Governor    of    Northwest )  .    ,       ct  pi  •  5  Governor  of  Northwest 

Territory >  '  \      Territory. 

Secretary    of    Northwest )  ,_  (  Secretary  of  Northwest 

£  Wmthrop  Sargent    .  .  4      _      . 

Territory }  \      Territory. 

Judge  of  Northwest  Ter-  )  _  (  Judge     of     Northwest 

[•  Samuel  Holden  Parsons  ]J   _8    . 

ntory >  (      Territory. 

Judge  of  Northwest  Ter-  )  T  (  Judge     of     Northwest 

[  John  Cleves  Symmes  .  •]  J  _r    .. 

ntory >  J  (      Territory. 

Continental   Loan  Officer  )  T  ,     TT  TT     ,.  (  Commissioner  of  Loans 

......                          >- John  H.  Hopkins      .  .  J      ,     __.     .  . 

in  Virginia      ....)'  (      for  V  irginia. 

Assistant     Secretary     of  )  _  ( Place  in  State  Depart- 

>•  Roger  Alden   .     .     .  .  J 

Congress >  {     ment. 


TABLE  II. 
STATE  CUSTOMS  OFFICES  (1789-1791). 

COLLECTORS. 

Number  of  national  offices 67 

State  collectors  or  equivalents  made  federal  collectors      .        .        .        .27 

247 


248  APPENDIX  B. 

State  collectors  appointed  to  lower  offices         ......      4 

State  collectors  not  appointed  to  any  customs  office          ....       8 

New  offices,  or  no  data .28 

NAVAL  OFFICERS. 

Number  of  national  offices       .         .         .        .         .         .        .        .  13 

State  naval  officers  made  federal  naval  officers          .....      3 

State  collectors  appointed 2 

State  naval  officer  not  appointed  to  any  customs  office  I 

New  offices,  or  no  data 7  (or  9) 

SURVEYORS. 

Number  of  national  offices .        -56 

State  surveyors  or  searchers  made  federal  surveyors          .         .         .         .12 

State  collectors  appointed 2 

State  surveyors  not  appointed  to  any  customs  office  ....  6 
New  offices,  or  no  data 36  (or  38) 

TOTAL. 

Whole  number  of  offices  at  beginning  of  federal  government  .  .  .136 
State  officers  appointed  to  corresponding  federal  positions  .  .  .42 
State  officers  appointed  to  some  other  customs  place  .  .  .  .46 
State  officers  not  appointed  to  any  customs  place  .  .  .  .  15 

New  offices,  or  no  data 75 


APPENDIX   B. 

NUMBERS   OF   HOLD-OVER  OFFICIALS  (1801-1897). 

It  is  obvious  that  very  little  indication  of  the  actual  tenure  of  office  can  be 
given  by  tables  of  the  number  of  removals  only ;  for  frequent  removals  from 
a  few  offices  make  the  same  totals  as  removals  distributed  over  the  whole 
service  at  rarer  intervals.  These  tables  illustrate  the  fact  that  rotation  was 
never  complete,  and  that  there  was  in  the  service  a  constant  residuum  of 
trained  men. 

The  total  number  of  employees  in  a  given  office,  at  a  specified  date,  has  been 
taken.  This  total  is  indicated  in  heavy  type  and  the  date  is  at  the  head  of  the 
column.  The  history  of  each  of  these  corps  is  given  in  a  separate  line,  the 
number  of  officers  remaining  at  the  several  dates  being  given  in  the  column 
at  the  head  of  which  the  date  appears. 


NUMBERS  OF  HOLD-OVER   OFFICIALS  (1801-1897).     249 


I.   SUBORDINATES  OF  THE  FIRST  AUDITOR  OF  THE  TREASURY. 

This  table  and  table  II.  indicate  the  movement  of  officials  in  the  departments 
at  Washington. 


1817 

1828 

1830 

1839 

1841 

1849 

1861 

1867 

1879 

1889 

1893 

1897 

15 

9 

9 

5 

4 

I 

30 

12 

4 

4 

3 

I 

13 

8 

5 

II.   SUBORDINATES  OF  SECRETARY  OF  WAR. 


1817 

1828 

1830 

1839 

1841 

1849 

1859 

1861 

1867 

1879 

1889 

1897 

20 

61 

5 

42 

4 

I 

2 

I8 

2 

I 

25 

6* 

17 

7 

4 

11 

5 

65 

III.   DISTRICT  ATTORNEYS. 

This  table  and  tables  IV.,  V.,  and  VI.  illustrate  the  tenure  of  officers  of  the 
presidential  class. 


1801 

1817 

1828 

1830 

1839 

1841 

1849 

1857 

1861 

1867 

1871 

1881 

1887 

22 

4 

2 

I 

76 

2 

6 

39 

8 

I 

66 

2 

26 

4 

2 

37 

41 

1  In  addition,  there  are  apparently  three  cases  in  which  a  son  or  some  other  rela- 
tive succeeded  to  the  position. 

2  All  of  the  four  had  been  promoted,  one  being  made  commissioner  of  pensions, 
which  office  he  retained  until  1849. 

8  Apparently  this  survivor  was  succeeded  by  his  son. 
4  Of  the  six  five  had  been  promoted,  one  degraded. 
6  In  addition,  a  son  apparently  succeeded  his  father. 


250 


APPENDIX  B. 


IV.  DISTRICT  MARSHALS. 


1801 

1817 

1828 

1830 

1839 

1841 

1849 

1857 

1861 

1867 

1871 

1881 

1887 

1893 

23 

2 

9 

7 

I 

42 

3 

2 

57 

8 

o 

68 

4 

I 

23 

36 

8 

V.   COLLECTORS  OF  CUSTOMS  IN  NEW  YORK  STATE. 

This  table  and  table  VI.  afford  a  comparison  of  the  relative  permanency  of 
office  in  North  and  South. 


1817 

1828 

1830 

1839 

1841 

1859 

1861 

1867 

1879 

1887 

10 

I1 

2 

4 

0 

11 

0 

2 

14 

0 

10 

11 

VI.  COLLECTORS  OF  CUSTOMS  IN  VIRGINIA. 


1817 

1828 

1830 

1839 

1841 

1849 

1859 

1861 

12 

21 

2 

2 

I 

I 

9 

I2 

8 

8 

2 

I 

10 

1  In  addition,  a  son  apparently  succeeded  his  father. 

2  Only  office  filled  (Alexandria). 


NUMBER   OF  HOLD-OVER   OFFICIALS,  1801-1897.        251 


2 


CM 


vo 


s 


S 


s 


VIII.   CUSTOM-HOUSES  AT  BOSTON  AND  CHARLESTON. 
(PRESIDENTIAL  AND  ALL  OTHER  OFFICIALS.) 


1823 

1829 

1839 

1841 

1849 

1859 

1861 

Boston    .     .     . 
Charleston   .     . 
Boston    .     .     . 
Charleston  .     . 

94 

261 

4 

3 

I2 

2 

40 

,38 

84 

5 

5 

98 

15 

ii 

3 

16 

9 

6 

5 

2 

252 


APPENDICES  C  AND  D. 


APPENDIX    C. 

REMOVALS   UNDER  TYLER  AFTER  WEBSTER'S 
RESIGNATION. 


Removals 
mentioned. 

Name  of  last 
occupant, 
but  not  cause 
of  vacancy. 

Failure 
to 
reappoint. 

Appointment 
vice  non- 
acting 
appointee. 

Total. 

Ministers                   ... 

I 

I 

Charge's  d'affaires     . 

3 

3 

Secretaries  of  legation  . 

i 

i 

Consuls 

17 

j 

18 

*/ 

Attorneys 

. 

Marshals    

I  C 

J  C 

*  j 

*  J 

Collectors  

28 

I 

2Q 

Surveyors  

18 

I 

I 

2O 

Naval  officers      .... 

2 

I 

3 

Appraisers      

3 

3 

General  land  officers     .     . 

2 

2 

Surveyors  of  land    .     .     . 

I 

I 

Registers  of  land  offices    . 

7 

2 

9 

Receivers  of  public  money 

9 

I 

10 

Governors  of  territories 

2 

2 

Secretaries  of  territories   . 

2 

2 

Indian  agents     .... 

4 

I 

5 

Mint  officials  

2 

2 

Postmasters    

21 

21 

Special  commissioners 

2 

2 

Total  

IAA 

2 

8 

I 

ICC 

Military  and  naval  .     .     . 

10 

10 

Grand  total  .... 

154 

2 

8 

I 

165 

APPENDIX  D. 

LIST  OF   AUTHORITIES. 

Most  books  on  United  States  history  contain  some  reference  to  the  patron- 
age ;  and  during  the  last  thirty  years  we  have  been  so  well  supplied  with 
indexes  to  periodical  literature  that  it  has  seemed  superfluous  to  reprint  here 
the  titles  of  the  hundreds  of  articles  which,  -while  they  have  contributed  to  the 
general  conclusions  of  this  monograph,  have  not  been  cited  or  used  in  its 
contents.  It  has  been  thought  best,  therefore,  to  confine  this  bibliography 


BIBLIOGRAPHIES.  253 

to  those  works  which  contain  special  information  or  which  show  some  special 
excellency  of  treatment. 

The  greater  part  of  the  research  for  this  volume  was  made  in  the  Harvard 
College  Library,  which,  valuable  for  the  whole  field,  contains  a  particularly 
important  collection  of  pamphlets  on  civil  service  reform.  The  library  of 
the  Harvard  Law  School  is  extremely  rich  in  early  editions  of  state  laws. 
The  American  Antiquarian  Society,  at  Worcester,  possesses  a  very  valuable 
collection  of  early  newspapers;  and  the  Wisconsin  Historical  Society  has 
many  rare  tracts  on  early  politics  and  much  unique  material  on  western  his- 
tory. The  Chase  manuscripts,  to  which  reference  is  made  in  the  footnotes,  were 
in  the  possession  of  Professor  Albert  Bushnell  Hart  when  I  made  use  of  them ; 
they  are  now  in  the  Library  of  Congress,  and  portions  of  them  have  been 
published  by  the  American  Historical  Society  in  its  report  for  1902.  The 
Foster  manuscripts,  in  the  possession  of  the  Rhode  Island  Historical  Society, 
are  very  instructive,  though  they  are  seldom  mentioned  in  the  footnotes  :  a  few 
of  them  have  recently  been  published  in  volume  viii.  of  the  Publications  of  the 
Society,  under  the  editorship  of  J.  Franklin  Jameson.  The  kindness  of  Mrs. 
John  R.  Bartlett  secured  access  to  certain  papers  of  the  Hon.  Thomas  A. 
Jenckes  of  Rhode  Island;  and  through  Dr.  U.  B.  Phillips  was  secured  the 
use  of  some  significant  letters  of  William  H.  Crawford  of  Georgia. 

The  letters  of  application  and  of  recommendation  to  office  under  the 
national  government  are  in  the  keeping  of  the  bureaus  of  appointments  in  the 
several  departments.  In  the  treasury  department  there  is  an  elaborate  system 
of  filing  for  all  current  appointments,  but  those  which  are  obsolete  are  rele- 
gated to  the  cellar;  all  matter  relating  to  appointments  in  this  department 
previous  to  the  twenties  was  destroyed  by  fire.  The  state  department  has 
preserved  its  records  from  the  foundation  of  the  government,  and  has  them 
all  on  file  for  reference.  Mr.  Gaillard  Hunt  made  use  of  this  material  in 
writing  his  articles  on  office-seeking,  and  he  has  also  prepared  a  calendar  of 
all  the  material  for  the  administration  of  Washington.  These  letters,  how- 
ever, are  regarded  as  confidential  and  are  not  open  to  general  use. 

While  this  monograph  was  going  through  the  press  there  appeared  the 
Guide  to  the  Archives  of  the  Government  of  the  United  States  in  Washington, 
by  Van  Tyne  and  Leland,  for  the  Carnegie  Institution,  in  which  the  records  of 
appointments  and  removals  receive  due  attention. 


BIBLIOGRAPHIES. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY  for  the  students  of  Civil  Service  Reform,  recommended  by 
the  Executive  Committee  of  the  Woman's  Auxiliary  to  the  Civil  Service 
Reform  Association,  1899. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY  of  Civil  Service  Reform  and  Related  Subjects.  New  York, 
1900. 

FOSTER,  W.  E.  References  to  the  History  of  Presidential  Administrations. 
New  York,  1885. 


254  APPENDIX  D. 

HART,  ALBERT  BUSHNELL.  Handbook  of  the  History,  Diplomacy,  and 
Government  of  the  United  States  (§§  21,  101,  108).  Cambridge,  1901. 

SALMON,  LUCY  M.  Syllabus  for  the  Study  of  the  History  of  Civil  Service 
Reform.  Published  for  the  Massachusetts  State  Federation  of  Women's 
Clubs,  1903. 

GENERAL  WORKS. 

Every  book  covering  the  general  history  of  the  United  States  for  any  period 
subsequent  to  1789  contains  some  reference  to  the  history  of  the  civil  service. 
Those  which  contain  the  best  accounts  are  Henry  Adams's  History  of  the  Ad- 
ministrations of  Jefferson  and  Madison  ;  J.  F.  Rhodes's  History  of  the  United 
States  from  the  Compromise  of  1830 ;  and  Herman  Van  Hoist's  The  Constitu- 
tional and  Political  History  of  the  United  States. 


SPECIAL  WORKS   ON   THE  HISTORY  OF  THE  CIVIL  SERVICE 
AND   THE   PATRONAGE. 

BECKER,  CARL.  Nominations  in  Colonial  New  York.  American  Histori- 
cal Review,  vi.  260-275.  New  York,  etc.,  January,  1901. 

CATTERALL,  R.  C.  H.  The  Second  Bank  of  the  United  States.  Chicago, 
1903. 

CHADSEY,  C.  E.  The  Struggle  between  President  Johnson  and  Congress 
over  Reconstruction.  Columbia  University,  Studies  in  History,  viii.  No.  I, 
pp.  1-142.  New  York,  1896. 

DE  WITT,  D.  M.  The  Impeachment  and  Trial  of  Andrew  Johnson.  New 
York,  1903. 

DUNNING,  W.  A.  Essays  on  the  Civil  War  and  Reconstruction,  and  re- 
lated topics.  New  York,  etc.,  1898. 

EATON,  D.  B.  Civil  Service  in  Great  Britain,  a  History  of  Abuses  and 
Reforms  and  their  Bearing  upon  American  Politics.  New  York,  1880.  The 
result  of  an  investigation  begun  at  the  request  of  President  Hayes,  June  25, 

1877- 

FISH,  C.  R.  Lincoln  and  the  Patronage.  American  Historical  Review, 
viii.  53-69.  New  York,  etc.,  October,  1902. 

FISH,  C.  R.  Removal  of  Officials  by  the  President  of  the  United  States. 
American  Historical  Association,  Report,  1899,  i.  67-86.  Washington,  1900. 

HUNT,  GAILLARD.     Calendar  of  Applications  and  Recommendations  for 
Office  during  the  Presidency  of  George  Washington.     Washington,  1901. 
2     HUNT,  GAILLARD.     Office-seeking  during  Washington's  Administration. 
American  Historical  Review,  i.  270-283.     New  York,  etc..  January,  1896. 

HUNT,  GAILLARD.  Office-seeking  during  the  Administration  of  John 
Adams.  American  Historical  Review,  ii.  241-261.  New  York,  etc.,  Janu- 
ary, 1897. 

HUNT,  GAILLARD.  Office-seeking  during  Jefferson's  Administration. 
American  Historical  Review,  iii.  270-291.  New  York,  etc.,  January,  1898. — 


TECHNICAL    WORKS  ON  THE  CIVIL  SERVICE.        255 

The  material  for  these  three  articles  is  drawn  from  the  files  of  the  state  depart- 
ment at  Washington,  and  many  letters,  heretofore  unprinted  and  at  present 
inaccessible  to  the  student,  are  given  in  full. 

HUNT,  GAILLARD.  Office-seeking  during  Washington's  Administration. 
American  Historical  Review,  i.  270-283.  New  York,  etc.,  January,  1896. 

JOHNSON,  E.  R.  The  Early  History  of  the  United  States  Consular  Ser- 
vice, 1776-1792.  Political  Science  Quarterly,  xiii.  19-40.  New  York,  etc., 
March,  1898. 

LAWTON,  G.  W.  The  American  Caucus  System :  its  Origin,  Purpose,  and 
Utility.  New  York,  etc.,  1885. 

LUETSCHER,  G.  D.  Early  Political  Machinery  in  the  United  States.  Phil- 
adelphia, 1903. 

MERRIAM,  J.  M.  Jefferson's  Use  of  the  Executive  Patronage  (abstract). 
American  Historical  Association,  Papers,  ii.  No.  i,  pp.  47-52.  New  York, 
etc.,  1887.  Contains  valuable  statistics. 

SALMON,  LUCY  M.  History  of  the  Appointing  Power  of  the  President. 
American  Historical  Association,  Papers,  i.  No.  5.  New  York,  etc.,  1886. 

TYLER,  L.  G.  Parties  and  Patronage  in  the  United  States.  New  York, 
etc.,  1891.  —  An  attempt  to  vindicate  President  Tyler's  administration  of  the 
patronage. 

WHITE,  W.  H.  History  of  Civil  Service  Reform.  Brookline,  Massachu- 
setts, 1883. 

TECHNICAL  WORKS  ON  THE  CIVIL  SERVICE. 

AMERICAN  CALENDAR  (The),  or  United  States  Register.  Philadelphia, 
1794,  1796,  1798. 

BOWKER,  R.  R.  Civil  Service  Examinations,  being  Question  Papers  with 
Actual  Answers  of  Successful  and  Unsuccessful  Candidates.  New  York,  1886. 

COMSTOCK,  J.  M.  The  Civil  Service  of  the  United  States ;  also  a  descrip- 
tion of  the  Civil  Service  of  the  States  of  New  York  and  Massachusetts,  and 
their  Municipalities.  New  York,  1885. 

CRAWLEY,  W.  J.  C.  Handbook  of  Competitive  Examinations  for  Admis- 
sion to  every  Department  of  her  Majesty's  Service. 

DE  LAND,  T.  L.  Tables  showing  the  Number  of  Positions  in  the  Execu- 
tive Civil  Service  of  the  United  States,  classified  and  unclassified,  on  June 
30,  1896.  Washington,  1897. 

EWALD,  A.  C.  The  Complete  Guide  to  the  Home  Civil  Service.  I7th 
edition.  London,  1881. 

METERIE-LARREY.     Les  Emplois  Publics.    Paris,  1 88 1. 

MOSHER,  R.  B.  Executive  Register  of  the  United  States,  1789-1902. 
Baltimore,  1903.  —  A  complete  list  of  the  heads  of  the  executive  departments 
from  the  beginning  of  the  government. 

NATIONAL  CALENDAR  (The).  Published  by  Peter  Force  annually.  Wash- 
ington, 1820-1836. 


256  APPENDIX  D. 

SAVILLE,  STANLEY.    The  Civil  Service  Coach.    The  Civil  Service  Series. 
London,  1881. 


BIOGRAPHIES  AND  WORKS  OF  STATESMEN  WHICH  CONTAIN 
SOURCE   MATERIAL. 

The  works  and  reminiscences  of  almost  all  the  statesmen  and  prominent 
men  of  the  period  contain  some  material.  In  the  same  way  the  lives  of  nearly 
all  statesmen,  and  many  of  those  of  other  men,  discuss  some  one  phase  of  the 
subject,  some  another ;  some  at  length,  some  slightly.  Among  the  best  are 
those  in  the  Statesmen  Series,  especially  those  by  A.  B.  Hart  and  H.  C. 
Lodge. 

ADAMS,  HENRY.     Life  of  Albert  Gallatin.     Philadelphia,  1879. 

ADAMS,  JOHN.  Works,  with  a  Life  of  the  Author.  Edited  by  C.  F. 
Adams.  10  vols.  Boston,  1854-1856. 

ADAMS,  JOHN  QUINCY.  Memoirs,  comprising  parts  of  his  Diary  from 
1795  to  1848.  12  vols.  Philadelphia,  1874-1877.  —  The  Index  does  not  ade- 
quately open  up  these  volumes  for  this  subject.  At  the  times  when  Adams 
was  secretary  of  state  and  president  almost  every  page  contains  some  material. 
At  later  periods  there  is  less,  but  still  enough  to  repay  a  page  by  page 
examination. 

BENTON,  T.  H.  Thirty  Years'  View ;  a  History  of  the  Working  of  the 
American  Government  for  Thirty  Years  from  1820  to  1850.  New  York,  1854- 
1856.  —  Particularly  valuable  for  the  administrations  of  Jackson  and  Polk. 

CALHOUN,  J.  C.  Correspondence.  Edited  by  J.  F.  Jameson.  American 
Historical  Association,  Report,  1899,  ii.  Washington,  1900.  —  Somewhat  scat- 
tered material,  particularly  valuable  for  the  Tyler  administration.  Calhoun's 
works  contain  only  his  speech  of  1855,  which  is  chiefly  constitutional.  The 
most  important  Calhoun  material  is  in  Edwards's  History  of  Illinois. 

CARPENTER,  F.  B.  Six  Months  at  the  White  House  with  Abraham 
Lincoln.  New  York,  1865.  (The  24th  edition,  1867,  is  entitled  "Inner 
Life  of  Abraham  Lincoln.")  —  Contains  the  best  anecdotes  of  Lincoln  and  the 
patronage. 

CARY,  EDWARD.  George  William  Curtis.  (American  Men  of  Letters 
Series.)  Boston,  etc.,  1894.  —  Contains  a  good  account  of  the  beginnings  of 
the  reform  movement. 

CLAY,  HENRY.  Private  Correspondence.  Edited  by  Calvin  Colton. 
Boston,  1856.  —  Valuable  for  beginnings  of  the  administrations  from  1816  to 
1850.  Clay's  Works  contain  nothing  on  this  subject  that  is  not  in  the 
congressional  publications. 

CURTIS,  G.  T.  Life  of  James  Buchanan.  2  vols.  New  York,  1883. — 
Invaluable  for  administrations  of  Polk  and  Buchanan;  also  on  rotation. 

CURTIS,  G.  W.  Orations  and  Addresses.  Edited  by  Charles  Eliot 
Norton.  3  vols.  New  York,  1894. 


WORKS   WHICH  CONTAIN  SOURCE  MATERIAL.       257 

DALLAS,  G.  M.  Life  and  Writings  of  Alexander  James  Dallas.  Phila- 
delphia, 1871.  —  Intimate  correspondence  with  Madison  while  Dallas  was 
secretary  of  the  treasury. 

DAVIS,  M.  L.  Memoirs  of  Aaron  Burr.  2  vols.  New  York,  1836-1837. 
—  Correspondence  is  valuable  about  1801. 

EDWARDS,  NINIAN.  The  Edwards  Papers,  being  portions  of  a  collection 
of  the  Letters,  Papers,  and  Manuscripts  of  Ninian  Edwards.  Edited  by  E.  B. 
Washburne.  Chicago  Historical  Society,  Collections,  iii.  Chicago,  1884. — 
Illinois  politics  and  Illinois  relations  of  national  statesmen,  particularly  valu- 
able because  of  the  letters  of  Duff  Green. 

EDWARDS,  N.  W.  History  of  Illinois  from  1778  to  1833,  and  Life  and 
Times  of  Ninian  Edwards.  Springfield,  1870. 

GALLATIN,  ALBERT.  Writings.  Edited  by  Henry  Adams.  3  vols.  Phila- 
delphia, 1879.  —  Invaluable  for  the  intimate  and  constant  correspondence  with 
Jefferson,  1800-1812. 

GIBBS,  GEORGE.  Memoirs  of  the  Administrations  of  Washington  and 
John  Adams.  2  vols.  New  York,  1846.  —  Intimate  correspondence  between 
Oliver  Wolcott  and  officials  and  distinguished  men,  1789-1800. 

HAMILTON,  J.  A.  Reminiscences;  or  Men  and  Events  at  Home  and 
Abroad.  New  York,  1869.  —  The  inaccurate  and  prejudiced  memoirs  of  a  man 
who  was  very  well  acquainted  with  the  Jackson  and  Van  Buren  administra- 
tions. 

HIGGINSON,  STEPHEN.  Letters,  1783-1804.  American  Historical  Asso- 
ciation, Report,  1896,  i.  704-841.  Washington,  1897. — Valuable  for  the 
whole  period  of  federalist  control. 

HUNT,  C.  H.  Life  of  Edward  Livingston;  with  introduction  by  George 
Bancroft.  New  York,  1864. — Interesting  correspondence  during  the  period 
for  which  he  was  secretary  of  state. 

JEFFERSON,  THOMAS.  The  Jefferson  Papers.  Massachusetts  Historical 
Society,  Collections,  7th  series,  i.  Boston,  1900.  — Much  on  the  patronage. 

JEFFERSON,  THOMAS.  Writings.  Edited  by  P.  L.  Ford.  10  vols. 
New  York,  1892-1899.— Valuable  from  1789  to  1826,  particularly  1789-1795 
and  1801-1809. 

JEFFERSON,  THOMAS.  Writings.  Edited  by  H.  A.  Washington.  9  vols. 
Washington,  1853-1854. 

KENDALL,  AMOS.  Autobiography.  Edited  by  William  Stickney.  Boston, 
! 872.  —  Invaluable  for  Jackson's  administrations. 

KING,  C.  R.  The  Life  and  Correspondence  of  Rufus  King.  6  vols. 
New  York,  1894-1900. —  Valuable  material  from  1789  to  1825. 

LINCOLN,  ABRAHAM.  Complete  Works.  Edited  by  J.  G.  Nicolay  and 
John  Hay.  2  vols.  New  York,  1894.  —Valuable  about  1849  and  very  rich 
from  1858  to  1865. 

MACKENZIE,  W.  L.  The  Life  and  Times  of  Martin  Van  Buren,  etc.  Bos- 
ton, 1846. 

MACKENZIE,  W.  L.    The  Lives  and  Opinions  of  B.  F.  Butler  and  Jesse 


258  APPENDIX  D. 

Hoyt,  etc.  Boston,  1845.  —  Throws  a  lurid,  though  untrustworthy,  light  on 
New  York  and  national  politics  under  Jackson  and  Van  Buren. 

MADISON,  JAMES.  Letters  and  Other  Writings.  By  order  of  Congress. 
4  vols.  New  York,  1884. 

MADISON,  JAMES.  Papers.  Edited  by  Henry  D.  Gilpin.  3  vols.  Wash- 
ington, 1840. 

MORRIS,  GOUVERNEUR.  Diary  and  Letters.  Edited  by  Anne  Gary 
Morris.  2  vols.  New  York,  1888.  —  Useful  from  1789  to  1803. 

PARTON,  JAMES.  Life  of  Andrew  Jackson.  3  vols.  New  York,  1860.  — 
Contains  much  source  material  of  varying  value. 

QUINCY,  EDMUND.  Life  of  Josiah  Quincy.  Boston,  1867. — Valuable  for 
reform  efforts  of  1811. 

QUINCY,  JOSIAH.  Memoir  of  the  Life  of  John  Quincy  Adams.  Boston, 
1858.  —  Special  information  on  the  opening  of  J.  Q.  Adams's  administration. 

RAVENEL,  MRS.  ST.  JULIEN.  Life  and  Times  of  William  Lowndes  of 
South  Carolina,  1782-1822.  Boston,  etc.,  1901.  —  Valuable  about  1812. 

SEATON,  W.  W.  William  Winston  Seaton  of  the  "  National  Intelligencer  " : 
a  Biographical  Sketch  [by  his  son].  Boston,  1871.  —  Valuable  letters  from 
1809  to  1860,  particularly  for  Adams's  administration. 

SEWARD,  F.  W.  William  H.  Seward.  3  vols.  (i.  Autobiography,  1831- 
1846 ;  ii.-iii.  Seward  at  Washington,  1846-1872.)  New  York,  1890.  —  Particu- 
larly valuable  for  Taylor's  administration. 

SHEPARD,  E.  M.  Martin  Van  Buren.  (American  Statesmen  Series.)  New 
York,  1888.  —  One  of  the  best  secondary  accounts  of  the  spoils  system. 

SUMNER,  W.  G.  Andrew  Jackson  as  a  Public  Man.  (American  Statesmen 
Series)  Boston,  etc.,  1882. —  A  good  account  of  the  origin  of  the  spoils  system, 
but  not  so  good  as  that  in  Shepard's  Van  Buren. 

/TARBELL,  IDA  M.  Life  of  Abraham  Lincoln.  2  vols.  New  York,  1900. 
—  Contains  invaluable  source  material  for  Lincoln's  administration. 

TYLER,  L.  G.  The  Letters  and  Times  of  the  Tylers.  3  vols.  Richmond, 
1884-1896. 

WASHINGTON,  GEORGE.  Writings.  Edited  by  W.  C.  Ford.  14  vols. 
New  York,  1889-1893.  —  Full  of  details  of  the  patronage;  notes  valuable. 

WASHINGTON,  GEORGE.  Writings.  Edited  by  Jared  Sparks.  12  vols. 
Boston,  1837. 

WEBB,  S.  B.  Correspondence  and  Journals,  1772-1806.  Edited  by 
W.  C.  Ford.  3  vols.  New  York,  1893-1894.  — Valuable  correspondence 
relating  to  Washington's  administration  and  to  Georgia  and  New  York 
politics. 

WEBSTER,  DANIEL.  Letters.  Edited  by  C.  H.  Van  Tyne.  New  York, 
1902. 

WEBSTER,  DANIEL.  Private  Correspondence.  Edited  by  Fletcher  Web- 
ster. 2  vols.  Boston,  1857.  —  Particularly  valuable  for  Adams's  administration. 

WEED,  THURLOW.  Autobiography.  Edited  by  Harriet  A.  Weed.  Bos- 
ton, 1884.  — Very  valuable  for  period  1848-1870. 


PAMPHLETS,  ETC.  259 

WELLES,  GIDEON,  Lincoln  and  Seward.  New  York,  1874.  —  Very  impor- 
tant account  of  a  cabinet  meeting  in  1861. 

PAMPHLETS   AND   OTHER  CONTEMPORARY   DISCUSSION. 

ADAMS,  CHARLES  FRANCIS.  An  Appeal  from  the  New  to  the  Old  Whigs 
in  consequence  of  the  Senate's  course,  and  particularly  Mr.  Webster's  Speech 
upon  the  Executive  Patronage  Bill.  Boston,  1835. 

ADAMS,  JOHN,  and  CUNNINGHAM,  WILLIAM.  Correspondence  between  the 
Hon.  John  Adams,  late  President  of  the  United  States,  and  the  late  William 
Cunningham,  Esq.,  beginning  in  1803,  and  ending  in  1812.  Boston,  1823. 
—  Chiefly  important  for  the  dismissal  of  Pickering. 

ADDRESS  of  the  State  Committee  of  Republicans,  appointed  to  correspond 
with  the  Committees  of  the  Several  Counties  of  the  State  of  Pennsylvania  on 
the  Concerns  of  the  Election  of  1802.  Printed  by  William  Duane.  [Phila- 
delphia], 1802. 

ADDRESS  to  the  People  of  the  American  States  who  Choose  Electors  .  .  . 
to  which  is  added  a  short  sketch  of  the  Biography  of  General  George  Clinton, 
and  several  Essays.  Washington,  1808.  —  On  rotation. 

ANDREWS,  C.  C.  Administration  Reform  as  an  Issue  in  the  next  Presiden- 
tial Canvass.  Cambridge,  1888. 

AUSTIN,  BENJAMIN,  JR.  Constitutional  Republicanism  in  Opposition  to 
Fallacious  Federalism.  Boston,  1803. 

BERNARD,  G.  S.  Civil  Service  Reform  versus  Spoils  System.  New 
York,  1885.  —  Contains  a  bibliography. 

BONAPARTE,  C.  J.  Civil  Service  Reform  as  a  Moral  Question.  New 
York,  1889. 

BROWN,  WILLARD.  Civil  Service  Reform  in  the  New  York  Custom- 
House.  New  York,  1882. 

CALLENDER,  J.  T.     The  Prospect  before  Us.    Richmond,  1800. 

CALLENDER,  J.  T.  Sedgwick  &  Co.,  or  a  Key  to  the  Six  Per  Cent  Cabi- 
net. Philadelphia,  1798. 

CALLENDER,  "TOM."    Letters  to  Alexander  Hamilton.    New  York,  1802. 

CAMILLUS.  A  History  of  French  Influence  in  the  United  States,  to  which 
is  added  an  Exposition  of  the  Congressional  Caucus.  Philadelphia,  1812. 

CARPENTER,  G.  M.  The  Reform  of  the  Civil  Service  considered  from  the 
Party  Standpoint.  Read  before  the  Rhode  Island  Historical  Society, 
March  25,  1890.  No  title-page. 

[COLEMAN,  WILLIAM.]  An  Examination  of  the  President's  Reply  to  the 
New  Haven  Remonstrance  .  .  .  together  with  a  List  of  Removals  and  New 
Appointments  made  since  the  Fourth  of  March,  1801.  New  York,  1801. 

CURTIS,  G.  W.     The  Situation.     New  York,  1886. 

DAYTON,  JONATHAN.  Public  Speculation  Unfolded:  in  sixteen  letters 
addressed  to  F.  Childs  and  J.  H.  Lawrence  of  New  York,  by  Jonathan  Day- 
ton of  New  Jersey,  while  Speaker  of  the  House  of  Representatives  of  the 
United  States.  New  York,  1800. 


260  APPENDIX  D. 

DERBY,  J.  B.  Political  Reminiscences.  Boston,  1835.  —  Giving  an 
account  of  the  situation  in  Washington  in  1829,  with  letters  of  recommen- 
dation, etc. 

EARLE,  A.  L.  Our  Revenue  System  and  the  Civil  Service :  shall  they  be 
reformed?  Economic  Monographs,  No.  5.  New  York,  1878. 

ELLIOT,  JONATHAN.  The  Debates  in  the  Several  State  Conventions  on 
the  Adoption  of  the  Federal  Constitution.  4  vols.  Washington,  1836. 

FEDERALIST  (The).     Edited  by  P.  L.  Ford.     New  York,  1898. 

FOOTE,  EBENEZER.  Cheethanfs  View  of  the  Political  Conduct  of  Aaron 
Burr,  Esq.,  Vice-President  of  the  United  States.  New  York,  1802. 

FORD,  P.  L.,  editor.  Essays  on  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States. 
Brooklyn,  1892. 

FORD,  P.  L.,  editor.  Pamphlets  on  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States. 
Brooklyn,  1888. 

FOSTER,  W.  E.  The  Situation  of  Civil  Service  Reform  in  the  United 
States.  Boston,  1881. 

FRIEZE,  JACOB.  A  Concise  History  of  the  Efforts  to  obtain  an  Extension 
Suffrage  in  Rhode  Island  from  the  Year  1811  to  1842.  Providence,  1842. 

FULLERTON,  ALEXANDER.  How  you  may  aid  Civil  Service  Reform. 
Civil  Service  Reform  Association  of  Philadelphia,  Publications,  No.  8.  Phila- 
delphia [1882]. 

GREY,  EARL.  Reciprocity  and  Civil  Service  Reform,  with  comments  by 
M.  M.  Trumbull.  Chicago,  1893. 

ROWLAND,  C.  G.  Civil  Service  Reform.  Address  read  before  the  Michi- 
gan Conference  of  the  Unitarian  Churches  in  Detroit,  October  21,  1880. 

LAMBERT,  HENRY.  The  Progress  of  Civil  Service  Reform  in  the  United 
States.  Boston,  1885. 

[LOWELL,  JOHN.]  The  New-England  Patriot,  being  a  Candid  Compari- 
son of  the  Principles  and  Conduct  of  the  Washington  and  Jefferson  Admin- 
istrations. Boston,  1810. 

MAY,  JOSEPH.  Reform  of  the  Civil  Service  a  Moral  Duty.  Sermon 
preached  in  Philadelphia,  November  28,  1889.  Philadelphia,  1889. 

NEW  YORK  CIVIL  SERVICE  REFORM  ASSOCIATION.  Letters  addressed 
to  the  Various  Candidates  for  the  Governorship,  and  for  Congress,  the  Assem- 
bly, and  City  Offices  during  the  Campaign  of  1882.  New  York,  1882. 

OBSERVATIONS  upon  the  Duties  and  Emoluments  of  Certain  Public  Offices. 
New  York,  1822.  Criticism  of  the  New  York  courts. 

PILLSBURY,  A.  E.  Soldiers'  Exemption  Bill.  Speech  in  the  Massachu- 
setts Senate.  No  title-page. 

POLITICAL  MIRROR,  or  Review  of  Jacksonism.  New  York,  1835.  News- 
paper extracts,  etc. 

PRINCETON  REVIEW.  History  and  Literature  of  Civil  Service  Reform. 
Biblical  Repertory  and  Princeton  Review,  xlii.  1-21.  New  York,  January,  1 870. 

REPORT  of  the  Subcommittee  of  the  Committee  on  the  Judiciary,  appointed 
to  investigate  the  Administration  of  the  Civil  Service  Laws  of  the  State  of  New 
York.  Albany,  1895. 


PERIODICALS  AND  NEWSPAPERS.  261 

RICHMOND,  H.  A.  The  Workingmen's  Interest  in  Civil  Service  Reform: 
the  Spoils  System  in  the  Public  Schools.  Address  before  the  Central  Labor 
Union  of  Buffalo,  April  4,  1888.  [Buffalo,  1888.] 

RUSSELL,  C.  T.  Address  before  the  National  League  of  the  Civil  Service 
Reform  Association.  Boston,  1892. 

SCHURZ,  CARL.  The  Spoils  System.  Address  to  the  Civil  Service  Reform 
League  at  Washington,  December  12,  1895.  [Philadelphia,  1896.] 

SHEPARD,  E.  M.  The  Competitive  Test  and  the  Civil  Service  of  States  and 
Cities.  (Economic  Tracts,  No.  14.)  New  York,  1884. 

STICKNEY,  ALBERT.     Government  Machinery.     New  York,  1880. 

TACITUS  [THOMAS  EVANS].  A  Series  of  Letters  addressed  to  Thomas 
Jefferson,  Esq.,  President  of  the  United  States.  Philadelphia,  1802. 

THREE  PATRIOTS  (The)  ;  or  the  Cause  and  Cure  of  Present  Evils.  Ad- 
dressed to  the  voters  of  Maryland.  Baltimore,  1811. 

TOCQUEVILLE,  ALEXIS  BE.  Democracy  in  America.  Translated  by  Henry 
Reeve,  and  revised  by  Henry  Bowen.  2  vols.  Boston,  1863. 

VAN  BUREN,  MARTIN.  [Pamphlets  on  Van  Buren,  1832-1848,  passim. 
Harvard  College  Library,  shelf  number  7393.23.]  On  the  Post-Office  Remo- 
vals in  1820. 

WARREN,  J.  C.    An  Antidote  to  John  Wood's  Poison.     New  York,  1802. 

WATERS,  E.  F.  The  Great  Struggle  in  England  for  Honest  Government, 
.  .  .  with  a  Letter  on  Reform  in  New  York  City  by  Thomas  B.  Musgrove. 
New  York,  1881. 

WEBSTER,  PELATIAH.  Political  Essays  on  the  Nature  and  Operation  of 
Money,  Public  Finances,  etc.  Philadelphia,  1791. 

WHIG  Convention  of  Young  Men  in  New  York  City.     New  York,  1834. 

WHITRIDGE,  F.  W.  The  Four  Years'  Term,  or  Rotation  in  Office.  New 
York,  1883. 

WHITRIDGE,  F.  W.  Rotation  in  Office.  Political  Science  Quarterly,  iv. 
279-295.  New  York,  etc.,  June,  1889. 

WHO  shall  be  Governor,  Strong  or  Sullivan  ?  or  the  Sham-Patriot  Un- 
masked. 1806. 

WISE,  H.  A.  Seven  Decades  of  the  Union.  Philadelphia,  1876.  Tyler 
administration. 

WOOD,  JOHN.  The  History  of  the  Administration  of  John  Adams.  New 
York,  1802. 

PERIODICALS   AND  NEWSPAPERS. 

At  the  time  of  the  first  issue  of  Poole's  Index  the  civil  service  was  promi- 
nently before  the  public,  and  consequently  all  articles  in  the  periodicals  which 
the  index  includes  have  been  made  so  easily  accessible  that  it  is  unnecessary 
to  recapitulate  them  here.  The  two  most  useful  periodical  publications  are 
Niles^s  Register,  which  furnishes  contemporary  comment  and  episode  through- 
out the  period  of  the  establishment  of  the  spoils  system,  and  the  Nation,  the 
date  of  whose  foundation  (1865)  coincides  with  the  beginning  of  the  effective 


262  APPENDIX  D. 

reform  movement.    A  useful  list  is  found  in  the  Fifteenth  Report  of  the  U.S. 
Civil  Service  Commission,  pp.  511-517. 

NORTH,  S.  N.  D.  History  and  Present  Condition  of  the  Newspaper  and 
Periodical  Press  of  the  United  States.  (Census  Report,  1880.)  Washing- 
ton, 1 88 1. 

ALBANY  ARGUS.  Albany,  1813,  etc.  Edited  by  Jesse  Buel,  and  afterward 
by  Leake  and  Croswell.  —  Often  had  the  state  printing,  and  was  for  many 
years  the  chief  regency  organ. 

BOSTON  COURIER.  Boston,  1824,  etc.  — Chiefly  commercial;  Whig  in 
politics,  but  not  violent ;  valuable  during  the  forties. 

CINCINNATI  CHRONICLE.    Cincinnati,  1836-1850.     Whig. 

CITY  GAZETTE  OR  DAILY  ADVERTISER.  Charleston,  South  Carolina, 
1 788-1 817.  —  Jeifersonian  Republican. 

CIVIL  SERVICE  CHRONICLE.     Indianapolis,  1889-1896. 

CIVIL  SERVICE  RECORD.  Boston,  1881-1892.  —  Organ  of  the  Boston  and 
Cambridge  Civil  Service  Reform  Associations. 

CIVIL  SERVICE  REFORMER.  Baltimore,  1885-1892.  —  Organ  of  the  Balti- 
more Civil  Service  Reform  Association.  In  1892  it  was  united  with  the  Civil 
Service  Record,  under  the  title  "  Good  Government." 

CLAYPOOLE'S  AMERICAN  DAILY  ADVERTISER.    Philadelphia,  1791-1800. 

COLUMBIAN  CENTINEL.  Boston,  1790-1840.  —  Published  and  edited  by 
Benjamin  Russell  for  about  forty  years,  ending  1828.  Advocated  the  adop- 
tion of  the  constitution ;  Federalist,  anti-Jacksonian,  strongly  partisan  ;  very 
progressive,  and  the  source  of  news  for  many  New  England  papers,  until  the 
retirement  of  Mr.  Russell. 

CONNECTICUT  COURANT.  Hartford,  1764,  etc.  —  Representative  of  Con- 
necticut Federalism  in  its  successive  forms ;  generally  reliable  and  up  to  date. 

COURIER  AND  ENQUIRER.  New  York,  1829-1861.  — Edited  by  Mordecai 
M.  Noah.  Supported  Jackson  strongly  in  1828. 

DAILY  NATIONAL  JOURNAL.  Washington,  1822,  etc.  —  Published  and  ed- 
ited by  Peter  Force.  In  1825,  Clay  transferred  the  printing  under  his  control 
from  Gales  and  Seaton  to  Force,  who  continued  to  be  very  near  the  adminis- 
tration for  the  next  four  years.  The  paper  was  very  ably  conducted,  though 
of  course  partisan. 

GLOBE.  Washington,  1830-1845.  —  Published  and  edited  by  Blair  and 
Rives.  The  official  Democratic  paper  from  its  inception  to  its  end;  ex- 
tremely partisan  and  unreliable. 

GOOD  GOVERNMENT.  New  York,  1892,  etc.  —  Organ  of  the  National  Civil 
Service  Reform  League. 

JACKSON  GAZETTE.  Jackson,  Tennessee,  1824-1830.  —  Valuabfe  between 
1825  and  1830. 

LANCASTER  JOURNAL.  Lancaster,  Pennsylvania,  1794-1839.  —  Strongly 
Federalist;  used  about  1800. 

LEXINGTON  REPORTER.  Lexington,  Kentucky,  1807-1873.  — Supported 
Adams  in  1828. 


PERIODICALS  AND  NEWSPAPERS.  263 

LOUISIANA  ADVERTISER.    New  Orleans,  1825,  etc.  —  Supported  Jackson. 

MADISONIAN.  Washington,  1842,  etc.  —  Published  and  edited  by  Thomas 
Allen.  Violently  partisan,  and  supported  the  spoils  system;  official  Whig 
paper  in  1841,  but  followed  Tyler  in  his  break  with  that  party;  important 
only  during  this  administration.  Mr.  Allen  later  became  editor  of  the  Union. 

MASSACHUSETTS  CENTINEL.  Boston,  1784-1790.  —  In  1790  the  name  was 
changed  to  Columbian  Centinel. 

MASSACHUSETTS  SPY  AND  WORCESTER  COUNTY  ADVERTISER.  Worces- 
ter, 1771-1904. —  Federalist  and  anti-Jacksonian ;  contains  many  long  and 
violent  communications,  but  its  editorial  and  news  columns  are  not  unfair. 

NASHVILLE  GAZETTE.    Nashville.    Jacksonian. 

NATION.    New  York,  1865,  etc. 

NATIONAL  INTELLIGENCER.  Washington,  1800-1869.— Published  aQd 
edited  by  Samuel  H.  Smith  and  Joseph  Gales,  and  later  by  Joseph  Gales,  Jr., 
and  William  Seaton.  The  administrative  organ  until  1825,  when  Clay  took 
his  patronage  from  it ;  it  still  supported  Adams,  however,  and  had  the  print- 
ing of  the  House.  In  1843  it  became  the  mouthpiece  of  the  Whigs.  After 
this  date  its  importance  diminished. 

NATIONAL  REPUBLICAN  AND  OHIO  POLITICAL  REGISTER.  Cincinnati, 
1823,  etc.  —  From  1799  to  1823  its  name  was  Western  Spy  and  Hamilton 
Gazette. 

NEW  YORK  EVENING  POST.  New  York,  1801,  etc.  —  Established  and  edited 
by  William  Coleman  under  the  direction  of  Alexander  Hamilton.  Strongly 
Federalist,  but  not  scurrilous.  In  1828,  William  Cullen  Bryant  became 
editor.  The  paper  supported  Jackson,  and  remained  Democratic  during  the 
period  for  which  it  is  used  here. 

NEW  YORK  HERALD.  New  York,  1802,  etc.  —  Published  in  the  century  in 
the  interest  of  the  Federalists. 

NEW  YORK  HERALD.  New  York,  1835,  etc-  — Tne  Herald,  edited  by 
James  Gordon  Bennett,  and  the  Tribune  (see  below),  edited  by  Horace 
Greeley,  tended,  in  the  fifties,  to  supplant  the  official  organs  at  Washington. 
They  were  enabled  to  do  this  by  the  introduction  of  the  telegraph,  and  by  the 
energy  and  alertness  of  their  skilled  Washington  reporters. 

NEW  YORK  OBSERVER.  New  York,  1820-1850.  —  Religious.  Its  political 
notes  are  generally  fair. 

NEW  YORK  TRIBUNE.  New  York,  1841,  etc. — Invaluable  for  Washing- 
ton correspondence  during  the  fifties  and  sixties.  Independent  and  Repub- 
lican. 

NILES'S  REGISTER.  Baltimore,  1811-1849.  —  Edited  by  Hezekiah  Niles 
until  1846.  On  the  whole  non-partisan,  but  violent  on  particular  issues. 

ORACLE  OF  DAUPHIN  AND  HARRISBURGH  ADVERTISER.  Harrisburgh, 
1791,  etc.  —  Jeffersonian  Republican. 

PENNSYLVANIA  EAGLE.    Huntington,  Pennsylvania.     Republican. 

PHILADELPHIA  GAZETTE  AND  UNIVERSAL  DAILY  ADVERTISER.  Phila- 
delphia, 1794-1840.  —  Strongly  Federalist. 


264  APPENDIX  D. 

POULSON'S  AMERICAN  DAILY  ADVERTISER.  Philadelphia,  1800-1839. 
Federalist.  —  A  continuation  of  Claypoole's  American  Daily  Advertiser. 

REPUBLIC.     Washington,  1848-.     Official  Whig  journal. 

RICHMOND  ENQUIRER.  Richmond,  1804,  etc. — Published  and  edited  by 
Thomas  Ritchie.  From  early  in  the  century  until  1845,  when  Ritchie  was 
transferred  to  the  Union,  the  exponent  of  Virginian  principles.  The  best 
newspaper  in  the  South ;  well  gotten  out,  quoting  many  other  papers,  and 
fairly  reliable. 

SPRINGFIELD  GAZETTE.     Springfield,  1879,  etc. —  Whig. 

TRUTH'S  ADVOCATE  AND  MONTHLY  ANTI-JACKSON  EXPOSITOR.  Cincin- 
nati, January  to  October,  1828. 

UNION.  Washington,  1845,  etc. — Established,  with  Thomas  Ritchie  as 
editor,  to  supplant  the  Globe  as  the  official  organ  of  the  Democratic  admin- 
istration, because  of  the  attitude  of  Blair  on  Texas  and  slavery.  It  con- 
tinued to  be  the  organ  of  the  party  until  1857,  when  the  practice  of  having 
such  a  mouthpiece  practically  died  out,  although  the  Union  continued  to  the 
close  of  the  Buchanan  administration. 

UNITED  STATES  TELEGRAPH.  Washington,  1826,  etc.  —  Published  and 
edited  by  General  Duff  Green.  Strongly  partisan,  and  supporter  of  the  spoils 
system;  official  Democratic  paper  from  1828  to  1833,  when  the  Globe  was 
established  to  take  its  place  because  of  Green's  strenuous  support  of  Calhoun. 

WORCESTER  PALLADIUM.    Worcester.  —  Democratic. 


PUBLICATIONS   OF   SOCIETIES. 

So  scattered  is  the  material  on  this  subject  that  it  would  be  difficult  to  name 
a  learned  society  whose  publications  could  not  furnish  some  little  information. 
Only  those  specially  useful  will  be  mentioned  here. 

BOSTON  CIVIL  SERVICE  REFORM  ASSOCIATION.    Publications. 

CAMBRIDGE  CIVIL  SERVICE  REFORM  ASSOCIATION.  Prize  Essays  on 
Municipal  Reform.  Boston,  1884. 

CAMBRIDGE  CIVIL  SERVICE  REFORM  ASSOCIATION.  Purposes,  with  Con- 
stitution and  Officers.  Cambridge,  1881. 

CINCINNATI  CIVIL  SERVICE  REFORM  ASSOCIATION.    Publication. 

CLEVELAND  MUNICIPAL  ASSOCIATION.     Bulletins. 

MASSACHUSETTS  REFORM  CLUB.     Publications,  1888-1900.    Boston. 

MISSOURI  CIVIL  SERVICE  REFORM  ASSOCIATION.  Reports,  1883-1891. 
St.  Louis. 

NATIONAL  CIVIL  SERVICE  REFORM  LEAGUE.  Proceedings,  1882-1903. 
New  York. 

NATIONAL  CIVIL  SERVICE  REFORM  LEAGUE.  Six  Reports  of  the  Special 
Investigating  Committee.  Boston,  1891. 

NATIONAL  MUNICIPAL  LEAGUE.     Publications,  1894-1895.    Philadelphia. 

NEW  YORK  CIVIL  SERVICE  REFORM  ASSOCIATION.  Publications  and 
Annual  Reports,  1883-1901.  New  York. 


UNITED  STATES  DOCUMENTS.  265 

Of  the  societies  not  specially  devoted  to  this  subject,  the  American  Historical 
Society  has  published  the  most  valuable  material.  Several  collections  of 
sources  and  several  special  articles  are  especially  referred  to  elsewhere. 


UNITED   STATES   DOCUMENTS. 

Good  Government,  Vol.  xvi.  No.  4,  p.  48,  gives  a  list  of  public  documents 
on  the  subject.  The  most  important  is  the  Executive  Journal  of  the  Senate, 
which  contains  all  nominations  sent  by  the  president  to  the  Senate  with  the 
action  upon  them.  In  addition  it  gives  all  the  rules  proposed  and  adopted  in 
the  Senate  for  the  regulation  of  its  relations  with  the  president.  The  portion 
recently  published,  including  the  period  from  1869  to  1892,  is  particularly  rich 
in  this  latter  kind  of  material. 

The  annual  reports  of  the  United  States  Civil  Service  Commission  are  very 
satisfactory,  as  they  are  exhaustive  and  well  arranged. 

The  Blue  Book  or  Official  Register  containing  a  complete  biennial  list  of 
officials  is  indispensable. 

The  reports  to  the  Senate  on  the  patronage  in  1826  and  1835,  with  Mr. 
Jenckes^s  report  to  the  House  in  1868,  are  the  only  special  reports  of  much  defi- 
nite value,  but  there  is  hardly  a  report  on  an  administrative  question  which 
does  not  yield  some  material. 

MATERIAL  VALUABLE   FOR  THE   STUDY   OF   STATE 
CONDITIONS. 

Few  state  histories  contain  material  on  the  patronage,  and  the  works  and 
lives  of  statesmen  contain  little  on  state  conditions.  The  most  useful  sources 
are  found  in  the  newspapers,  the  laws,  and  the  following  works. 

MASSACHUSETTS. 

AMORY,  T.  C.    Life  and  Writings  of  James  Sullivan.    2  vols.    Boston,  1859. 
AUSTIN,  J.  T.     Life  of  Elbridge  Gerry.     2  vols.     Boston,  1828-1829. 
LARNED,  ELLEN  D.     History  of  Windham  County,  Connecticut.     2  vols. 
Worcester,  1874-1880. 

NEW  YORK. 

CLINTON,  GEORGE.    Military  Papers.    5  vols.    New  York,  etc.,  1899-1902. 

GONTERMAN,  J.  T.     New  York  Council  of  Appointment. 

HAMMOND,  J.  D.  The  History  of  Political  Parties  in  the  State  of  New 
York.  2  vols.  Cooperstown,  1846. 

HAMMOND,  J.  D.     The  Life  and  Times  of  Silas  Wright.     Syracuse,  1848. 

LEAKE,  I.  Q.  Memoir  of  the  Life  and  Times  of  General  John  Lamb. 
Albany,  1857. 

MYERS,  GUSTAVUS.     The  History  of  Tammany  Hall.     New  York,  1901. 


266  APPENDIX  D. 

NEW  YORK  COUNCIL  OF  APPOINTMENT.  Military  Minutes,  1783-1821. 
Edited  by  Hugh  Hastings.  4  vols.  Albany,  1901. 

SPEECHES  of  the  Different  Governors  to  the  Legislature  of  New  York, 
commencing  with  those  of  George  Clinton.  Albany,  1898. 

TOMPKINS,  D.  D.     Public  Papers.    Vol.  i,  Military.    New  York,  etc.,  1898. 

PENNSYLVANIA. 

ARMOR,  WILLIAM.  Lives  of  the  Governors  of  Pennsylvania.  Philadelphia, 
1872.  Correspondence  of  Governor  McKean. 

BIDDLE,  CHARLES.  Autobiography,  1745-1821.  [Edited  by  J.  S.  Biddle.] 
Philadelphia,  1883. 

BINNS,  JOHN.  Recollections  of  his  Life,  written  by  himself.  Philadelphia, 
1854. 

BROWN,  D.  P.     The  Forum.     Philadelphia,  1851. 

BUCHANAN,  ROBERDEAU.  Life  of  the  Hon.  Thomas  McKean.  Lancaster, 
Pennsylvania,  1890. 

GRAYDON,  ALEXANDER.  Memoirs  of  his  Own  Times,  with  Reminiscences 
of  the  Men  and  Events  of  the  Revolution.  Philadelphia,  1846. 

HARDING,  S.  B.  Party  Struggles  over  the  First  Pennsylvania  Constitution. 
American  Historical  Association,  Report,  1894,  pp.  371-402.  Washington, 
1895. 

LINCOLN,  C.  H.  The  Revolutionary  Movement  in  Pennsylvania,  1760- 
1776.  University  of  Pennsylvania,  Series  in  History,  No.  i.  Philadelphia, 
1901. 

McM ASTER,  J.  B.,  and  STONE,  F.  D.  Pennsylvania  and  the  Federal 
Constitution,  1787-1788.  [Philadelphia],  1888. 

MARSHALL,  CHRISTOPHER.  Passages  from  his  Diary,  kept  in  Philadelphia 
and  Lancaster  during  the  American  Revolution.  Edited  by  William  Duane. 
Philadelphia,  1839-1849. 

MEIGS,  W.  M.  Pennsylvania  Politics  early  in  this  Century.  Pennsylvania 
Magazine,  xvii.  462-490.  Philadelphia,  January,  1894. 

RHODE  ISLAND  AND  GEORGIA. 

[GiLMER,  G.  R.]  Sketches  of  Some  of  the  First  Settlers  of  Upper  Georgia, 
of  the  Cherokees,  and  the  author.  New  York,  etc.,  1855. 

JERNEGAN,  N.  W.  The  Tammany  Societies  of  Rhode  Island.  Brown 
University  Historical  Seminary,  Papers,  No.  8.  Providence,  1897. 

RHODE  ISLAND.  Report  [to  the  General  Assembly]  of  the  Committee  on 
the  Subject  of  the  Extension  of  Suffrage,  June,  1829.  [Providence,  1829.] 


INDEX. 


ABOLITIONISTS,  appointed  to  office,  150. 

Aborn,  J.  A.,  declines  office,  12. 

Accounts,  laxity,  68  ;  to  be  required,  141  ; 
required  promptly,  150. 

Adams,  C.  F.,  on  removal  power,  I2O. 

Adams,  John,  on  colonial  patronage,  I  ; 
on  appointing  power,  3,  4 ;  vice-presi- 
dent, 10;  and  patronage,  16-21  ;  last 
appointments,  32,  33  ;  correspondence 
with  Cunningham,  70. 

Adams,  John  Quincy,  promotion,  19  ; 
removal,  46  ;  on  Congressional  office- 
seekers,  59  ;  on  appointments  by  cab- 
inet officers,  62  ;  attacked  by  Clinton, 
64 ;  and  Crawford,  65  ;  on  four  years' 
law,  66 ;  and  patronage,  71-73  ;  and 
rotation,  86;  and  Ninian  Edwards, 
102,  105  ;  defeat,  104 ;  on  removal 
power,  1 20  ;  on  politics  of  office-hold- 
ers, 125;  on  Harrison,  143;  on  ap- 
pointments, 150;  on  Folk's  policy,  159. 

Akerman,  A.  T.,  on  reform  bill,  22O. 

Alabama,  judicial  tenure,  85. 

Albany,  post-office,  postmaster,  62-64 ; 
importance,  118;  removals,  152. 

Albany  Regency,  rise,  91  ;  ambition  for 
national  patronage,  105 ;  power  in 
1829,  114,  115;  monopoly  of  office, 
165. 

Alden,  Roger,  provision  for,  10,  247. 

Allen,  Thomas-  edits  Madisonian,  149 ; 
collector  at  Portland,  167. 

Amendment,  constitutional,  on  appoint- 
ments of  Congressmen,  57,  60. 

Annapolis,  selection  of  cadets  for,  219. 

Antifederalists,  and  patronage,  4-6  ;  pol- 
icy in  Rhode  Island,  n. 

Applications  for  office,  under  federalist 
presidents,  24 ;  under  Jefferson,  43, 
44  ;  under  Madison,  54  ;  by  Congress- 
men, 60;  under  Jackson,  117;  under 
Lincoln,  169.  See  also  Machinery, 
Petitions. 


Appointments,  royal,  I,  86;  legal  author- 
ity, 2,  3,  23,  186-208;  invalid,  31,  32. 
See  also  Machinery,  Office-holders. 

Arkansas,  limited  term  in,  85. 

Arthur,  C.  A.,  206  ;  nominations  by,  re- 
jected, 204  ;  removed,  216 ;  and  reform, 
217,  218,  222. 

Assessments  of  office-holders,  early  in- 
stance, 124  ;  Webster  condemns,  150; 
regularly  made,  180;  fight  against,  234. 

Attorneys,  prosecuting,  38  ;  term  not  lim- 
ited, 82,  83 ;  actual  term,  249. 

Auditor,  First,  actual  term,  249. 

Aurora,  attacks  federalists,  39. 

Australia,  civil  service  in,  236. 

Authorities,  252-266. 

BAILEY,  J.  W.,  on  reform  system,  240. 

Baltimore,  changes  at,  127  ;  office-holders 
in  convention  of  1836,  134  ;  collector 
and  surveyor  removed,  152;  impor- 
tance of  appointments,  167. 

Bancroft,  George,  resigns  office,  150 ; 
favors  removals,  159. 

Banks,  and  patronage,  128.  See  also 
United  States  Bank. 

Barlow,  Joel,  nomination  defended,  53. 

"Barnburners,"  influence  in  1853,  165. 

Barnes,  D.  L.,  appointment,  32. 

Barry,  W.  T.,  exchanges  with  John  Mc- 
Lean, 108 ;  Van  Buren  on,  122  ;  death, 
136. 

Bayard,  J.  A.,  attacks  republicans,  40 ; 
peace  commissioner,  53. 

Bedinger,  Daniel,  candidate  for  col- 
lectorship,  25,  26. 

Bela  Badger.     See  Ferguson. 

Bennett,  J.  G.,  offered  appointment,  178. 

Benton,  T.  H.,  advocates  reform,  73-75; 
on  removals,  125;  on  politics  of  office- 
holders, 127;  on  patronage,  141. 

Berrien,  J.  M.,  aids  Jackson,  118. 

Biddle,  Nicholas,  and  Jackson,  128. 


267 


268 


INDEX. 


Bigelow,  John,  on  French  customs  ser- 
vice, 210. 

Bishop,  Abraham,  and  Jefferson,  37,  38. 
Bishop,  Samuel,  collector  at  New  Haven, 

33-38. 

Blackstone,  William,  on  term  of  sheriff,  83. 

Blaine,  J.  G.,  and  reform,  222. 

Blair,  F.  P.,  edits  Globe,  124;  loses  gov- 
ernment printing,  160. 

Blair,  F.  P.,  Jr.,  and  Polk,  160. 

Blue  Book.    See  Official  Register. 

Boss,  incipient,  48  ;  influence  on  appoint- 
ments, 175.  See  also  Patronage. 

Boston,  removals  in  1801,  44 ;  assess- 
ments, 124,  1 80;  removals  in  1841, 
127  ;  Lincoln  collector,  148  ;  Bancroft 
resigns  collectorship,  150;  treasurer  to 
be  retained,  151  ;  collector  removed, 
152 ;  importance,  167 ;  reform  asso- 
ciation, 217  ;  custom  house,  251. 

Boston  Courier,  on  assessments,  180. 

Bourne,  Benjamin,  appointment  invalid, 
32. 

Boyd,  J.  P.,  desires  appointment,  54. 

Bradbury,  J.  W.,  on  removals,  163. 

Branch,  John,  aids  Jackson,  118. 

Brazil,  minister  to,  removed,  152. 

British  North  America,  Indian  service, 
197. 

Broderick,  D.  C,  influence,  1 68. 

Brooklyn,  removals,  161. 

Brown,  John,  on  Rhode  Island  appoint- 
ments, II. 

Brown,  J.  C.,  Tyler  on,  152. 

Bryan,  George,  influence  on  Pennsylvania 
constitution,  92. 

Bryant,  W.  C.,  advocates  reform,  215. 

Buchanan,  James,  opposes  removals,  159; 
and  patronage,  166-169;  accused  of 
buying  congressional  votes,  180. 

Bulletin,  favors  Van  Buren,  115. 

Bureaucracy,  tendency  towards,  78; 
feared,  220. 

Burr,  Aaron,  appointment,  17;  candidate 
for  appointment,  22,  23;  on  removals, 
39;  and  appointments  under  Jefferson, 
47-49;  influence  in  New  York,  87. 

Burt,  S.  W.,  appointment,  216;  removal, 
224. 

Burton,  T.  E.,  bill  for  consular  reform, 
230. 

Busteed,  Richard,  nomination,  203. 


Butler,   W.   F.,   on   civil   service  reform 

committee,  216. 
Byrd,  Otway,  appointed  collector,  25. 

CABINET,  influence  on  appointments,  14, 
62,  163,  176,  177,  232,  233;  Monroe 
on  qualifications  for,  61. 

Cabot,  George,  on  senatorial  influence, 
22. 

Calhoun,  J.  C.,  favored  by  Monroe,  63; 
on  spoils  system,  98;  and  Edwards, 
100;  urges  political  appointments,  101; 
faction  in  Massachusetts,  114,  115;  in 
Illinois,  115-117;  secures  confirmation 
of  Kendall,  119;  investigates  patron- 
age, 141,  142;  on  Tyler's  appointments, 
152;  and  Polk,  159. 

California,  Buchanan's  appointments, 
1 68;  Johnson's  changes,  190. 

Callender,  J.  T.,  on  Adams's  removals,  20. 

Calvert,  Mr.,  on  Jackson's  policy,  131. 

Carpenter,  C.  C.,  on  reform  bill,  220. 

Carr,  D.  F.,  appointment,  123. 

Carrington,  Edward,  and  Norfolk  col- 
lectorship, 25. 

Castine,  vacancy,  54. 

Caucus,  opposition  to  congressional, 
57-60. 

Census  Bureau,  not  under  reform  rules, 
224,  228. 

"  Centinel,"  on  appointing  power,  3. 

Charleston,  Freneau  at,  51;  custom 
house,  251. 

Chase,  S.  P,  claims  as  secretary,  177; 
and  pass  examinations,  183. 

Chetham,  James,  retains  government 
printing,  48. 

Cheves,  Langdon,  opposition  to   caucus, 

59- 

Chew,  Beverly,  appointment,  55. 

Chicago,  Johnson  at,  188. 

Chicago  Historical  Society,  publishes  Ed- 
wards correspondence,  99. 

China,  civil  service  example,  I,  21 1,  220. 

Chrystie,  Mr.,  nomination,  53. 

Circuit  judgeships,  appointments  in  1801, 
32,  40. 

Cities,  reform,  229. 

Civil  Service,  establishment,  1-28;  under 
Confederation,  2;  under  federalists, 
26-28;  Gallatin's  investigation,  26; 
national,  in  New  York,  64;  under 


INDEX. 


269 


J.  Q.  Adams,  75-78;  under  Jackson, 
76;  national  and  state,  79;  national, 
in  Illinois,  99;  from  1835  to  1837,  J35» 
in  1841,  145;  from  1845  to  l865»  l8o~ 
185;  reform,  209-228;  investigation  in 
1893,225;  and  in  1898,226;  at  pres- 
ent, 229-245.  See  also  Civil  Service 
Commission,  Patronage,  Qualifications, 
Reform,  Removals,  and  presidents  by 
name. 

Civil  Service  Commission,  established, 
1871,213;  reestablished  1883,  221;  in- 
vestigated in  1889,  223,  224;  new  rules, 
231,  232;  reports,  232;  opposes  rein- 
statements, 237;  attacked,  240.  See 
also  presidents  by  name. 

ivil  Service  Reform.     See  Reform. 

ivil  War,  effect  on  civil  service,  185,  1 86, 
210. 

larke  faction,  in  Georgia,  99. 

larkson,  J.  S.,  and  patronage,  224. 

lay,  Henry,  retires  from  Congress,  60 ; 
influence  in  Rhode  Island,  69;  and 
patronage,  73,  146;  Van  Buren  on, 
127;  on  land-office  frauds,  138;  on 
spoils  system,  140;  on  patronage,  142; 
and  Madisonian,  149;  and  Taylor, 
162;  and  Fillmore,  164. 

lay,  J.  R.,  long  service,  182. 

layton,  J.  M.,  and  Taylor,  162. 

lerks  of  courts,  term  in  Massachusetts, 

97- 

leveland,  Chamber  of  Commerce  on 
consular  reform,  230. 

leveland,  Grover,  nominations  rejected, 
204;  on  tenure-of-office  act,  206;  and 
reform,  222;  and  patronage,  222-223, 
225-226;  extends  reform  rules,  225, 
227;  on  post-office  reform,  230;  re- 
forms consular  service,  231. 

linton,  De  Witt,  charges  against  national 
officers,  64 ;  influence  in  New  York,  87 ; 
and  patronage,  89-90. 

linton,  George,  on  appointing  power,  3; 
and  patronage,  5,  88-89;  influence  in 
New  York,  87;  opposes  proscription, 
90. 

!obb,  Howell,  and  pass  examinations, 
183. 

bleman,  William,  attacks  Jefferson,  36, 

37- 
lolonies,  politics,  86;  reform  rules,  228. 


Columbian  Centinel,  urges  removals,  20; 
on  Jefferson,  30;  on  republican  charges, 
39;  on  Jackson,  131. 

Columbus,  land  frauds  at,  138. 

Competitive  examinations,  in  China,  I ; 
favored  by  Sumner,  210;  provision  for, 
221;  in  danger,  228;  adopted  for  Phil- 
ippines, 228;  application,  229;  value, 
232-234;  absurd  in  1850,  245. 

Comstock,  Job,  declines  office,  12. 

Confederates.     See  Veterans. 

Confederation,  civil  service  example,  2; 
officers  of,  appointed  by  Washington, 
10,  247;  machinery  under,  21;  rota- 
tion, 80. 

Confirmations,  daily  printed,  203.  See 
also  Appointments,  Senate. 

Congdon,  C.  T.,  on  political  activity  of 
office-holders,  124. 

Congress,  power  over  appointments,  3; 
rotation  of  delegates,  80;  discusses  re- 
moving power,  191 ;  delays  reform,  214; 
217;  discussion  on  reform,  218-221, 
240.  See  also  House  of  Representa- 
tives, Members  of  Congress,  Senate. 

Conkling,  Roscoe,  and  senatorial  cour- 
tesy, 205;  defeat,  206. 

Connecticut,  and  Jefferson,  33;  reform, 
229. 

Connecticut  Courant,  condemns  Jefferson, 

33- 
Constitution.     See  United  States,  and  the 

states  by  name. 

Constitutional  Convention.      See    Phila- 
delphia Convention,  and  states  by  name. 
Consular  clerks,  provision  for,  183,  184, 

230. 
Consular  service,  under  Washington,  15  ; 

Jackson  improves,   129 ;    reform,   183, 

230,  231. 

Contingent  fund,  reduced,  200,  201. 
Convention,  supersedes  caucus,  60. 
Cooper,  J.  F.,  appointment,  122. 
Copperheads,  appointment,  190. 
Cornell,  A.  B.,  205  ;   removed,  216. 
Corruption,  in  national  service,  58,  135- 

140,  180-181;  state,  79  ;  in  New  York 

and  Pennsylvania,  94-95. 
Cotton,  John,  on  property  in  office,  26. 
Council   of  appointment   of  New  York, 

example,  12  ;    powers,  87,  88-90  ;  evil 

influence,  88. 


2/0 


INDEX. 


Council  of  Censors  of  Pennsylvania,  on 
office-holders,  92. 

Courts,  special,  to  investigate  office- 
holders, 211. 

Cox,  S.  S.,  on  reform  rules,  220. 

Coxe,  Tench,  removed,  19  ;  replaced,  47  ; 
seeks  office,  67. 

Crawford,  W.  H.,  on  departmental  ap- 
pointments, 62  ;  complains  of  Monroe, 
62  ;  on  four  years'  law,  66, 86  ;  political 
character,  65-70  ;  on  civil  service,  76  ; 
attacked  by  Edwards,  101  ;  on  sena- 
torial courtesy,  100,  101. 

Crawfordville,  appointment  at,  113. 

Crittenden,  J.  J.,  and  Taylor,  162. 

Cunningham,  William,  correspondence 
with  John  Adams,  70. 

Curtis,  Edward,  and  Clay,  146 ;  character, 
149. 

Curtis,  G.  W.,  promotes  reform,  212 ; 
chairman  of  civil  service  board,  213  ; 
and  Conkling,  216. 

Gushing,  Caleb,  appointment,  153. 

Gushing,  T.  H.,  appointment,  54,  55. 

Customs  service,  transfer,  5,  247-248 ; 
establishment  of  national,  10-13  >  ^m~ 
proved  by  republicans,  46 ;  frauds, 
139-140;  reform,  221;  exemptions, 
227  ;  in  Boston  and  Charleston,  251. 

DAILY  TELEGRAPH.     See  Telegraph. 

Dallas,  A.  J.,  and  Jefferson,  48  ;  on  re- 
movals, 54. 

Dana,  C.  A.,  on  Lincoln,  171. 

Davie,  W.  R.,  on  appointing  power,  2. 

Davis,  Garret,  on  patronage,  145. 

Davis,  I.  P.,  Webster  aids,  146. 

Davis,  M.  L.,  Burr's  candidate,  48. 

Dayton,  Jonathan,  charges  against,  47. 

Dearborn,  Henry,  makes  removals,  44; 
and  Jefferson,  48;  nomination  rejected, 

52- 
Delaware,  Rodney  controls  appointments 

for,  48. 
Delegation,  influence  under  confederation, 

21 ;  in  1801,  47;   under  Monroe,  64; 

from  1845  to  J^65'  I74>  I75- 
Democracy,  and  spoils  system,  156. 
Democrats,    repeal    tenure-of-office    act, 

207;   and  reform,  215,  222,  243,  244; 

investigate  civil  service,  225;   number 

at  Washington,  236. 


Denver,  reform,  229. 

Departmental  service,  removals,  44,  126, 

127,  148;   appointments  to,  how  made, 

62,  63;   reform  rules  for,  221. 
Derby,  J.  B.,  on  machinery  in  1829,  113; 

on  assessments,  124. 
Dickerson,  Mahlon,  introduces  four  years' 

law,  66. 

Dickinson,  John,  on  appointing  powers,  2. 
Diplomatic   service,    under    Adams,    17; 

under  Jefferson,  38,  45 ;  under  Jackson, 

122. 

District  Attorneys.     See  Attorneys. 

District  of  Columbia,  221;  midnight  ap- 
pointments for,  31. 

Doolittle,  J.  R.,  on  reform,  196. 

Douglas,  S.  A.,  Buchanan  opposes,  1 68; 
monument  dedicated,  188. 

Drayton,  W.  H.,  appointment  urged, 
61. 

Duane,  William,  demands  removals,  44; 
and  Jefferson,  48. 

Du  Plessis,  P.  L.  B.,  removal  demanded, 

54- 
Dutch,  practise  rotation,  80. 

EAGLE,  on  McKean's  removals,  93. 

Eaton,  D.  B.,  studies  in  England,  215; 
in  civil  service  commission,  222;  drafts 
reform  bill,  218;  attacked,  240. 

Eaton,  J.  H.,  secretary  of  war,  108;  aids 
Jackson,  118. 

Editors,  and  postmasterships,  41 ;  appoint- 
ments, 123,  149,  178. 

Edmunds,  G.  M.,  and  tenure-of-office  bill, 
193,  196,  202,  206. 

Edwards,  Ninian,  and  patronage,  99-109; 
and  Jackson  leaders,  103;  favors  Cal- 
houn,  115. 

Efficiency,  difficulty  of  estimating,  212, 
232;  records,  224. 

Election  to  civil  offices,  175,  176. 

Ellery,  William,  why  retained,  54. 

England.     See  Great  Britain. 

Europe,  civil  service  investigated,  210. 

Ewing,  Thomas,  on  removals,  120. 

Examinations.  See  Competitive  Examina- 
tions, Pass  Examinations. 

Excise,  repealed,  45,  46. 

Executive,  given  choice  of  office-holders, 
2-3.  See  also  President. 

Executive  council,  urged  by  Mason,  2. 


INDEX. 


271 


Executive  Journal,  202. 

Exemptions  from  reform  rules,  226,  227. 

FALMOUTH,  consulship,  182. 

Favoritism,  Washington  and,  7;  Jefferson 
and,  50;  Tyler  and,  153;  Lincoln  and, 
171. 

Federalists,  use  of  patronage,  4,  5;  be- 
come a  party,  13;  and  removals,  19-21; 
and  Jefferson,  30;  and  state  patronage, 
39;  appointed  by  Madison,  53;  and 
Monroe,  61,  62;  and  J.  Q.  Adams,  70- 
72;  and  Jackson,  106. 

Ferguson,  Alexander,  naval  officer,  149. 

Fessenden,  W.  P.,  on  consular  reform, 
183;  on  duties  of  senate,  196. 

Few,  William,  and  Savannah  appoint- 
ments, 14. 

Fillmore,  Millard,  and  Taylor,  162,  163; 
and  patronage,  164. 

Fish,  Hamilton,  and  Taylor,  163. 

Fitz,  Gideon,  removed,  120. 

Florida,  governor  removed,  152. 

Force,  Peter,  edits  National  Journal,  73. 

Foster,  Theodore,  appointment,  12;  on 
factional  politics,  14. 

Foulke,  W.  D.,  on  political  activity,  236. 

Four  Years'  Law,  85;  reason  for,  66-70; 
repeal  recommended,  74,  141;  prece- 
dents, 82;  effect  on  President's  power, 
1 86;  Johnson  on,  195.  See  also  Lim- 
ited term. 

Fowler,  Isaac,  not  removed,  168. 

Fox  family,  long  service,  182. 

France,  civil  service  example,  210,  211; 
extending  of  civil  service,  233. 

Francis,  John,  on  Rhode  Island  appoint- 
ments, ii. 

Franking  privilege,  of  postmasters,  41, 
178. 

Franklin,  Benjamin,  influence  on  Penn- 
sylvania constitution,  92. 

Freedman's  Bureau,  appointments  for, 
194. 

Frenchmen,  appointment  of,  50. 

Freneau,  Philip,  loses  printing,  20 ;  com- 
missioner of  loans  and  editor,  51. 

Frontier  states,  patronage  in,  99. 

GAGE,  Lyman,  defends  McKinley's  ex- 
emption order,  227 ;  retirement  plan, 
241. 


Gales,  Joseph,  on  rotation,  159.  See  also 
Gales  and  Seaton. 

Gales  and  Seaton,  lose  printing,  73 ;  re- 
ceive printing,  149. 

Gallatin,  Albert,  investigates  civil  service, 
26 ;  on  Gardner  and  Campbell,  47 ; 
on  political  activity  of  office-holders, 
43,  44;  not  nominated  secretary  of 
state,  52. 

Gardner,  William,  removed,  19  ;  replaced, 

47- 

Garesche,  Mr.,  treasury  agent,  136-139. 

Garfield,  J.  A.,  nominations  rejected,  204  ; 
and  senatorial  courtesy,  205  ;  reform 
record,  217;  effect  of  assassination,  218. 

Geographical  considerations.  See  Quali- 
fications. 

Georgia,  appointments  in,  22 ;  spoils  sys- 
tem, 98,  99. 

Germany,  civil  service,  237. 

Gerry,  Elbridge,  charge  against,  5  ;  ap- 
pointment, 17;  and  Adams,  21;  and 
patronage,  96-98  ;  on  rotation,  81,  97. 

Gibbs,  W.  C,  demands  removals,  69. 

Giles,  W.  B.,  attacks  federalists,  40. 

Gilmer,  G.  R.,  governor  of  Georgia,  99. 

Globe,  official  organ,  1 24 ;  upholds  spoils 
system,  132  ;  on  politics  of  office-holders 
in  1841,  127;  Polk  disavows,  160. 

Good  Government,  on  exemption,  227. 

Goodrich,  Chauncy,  removed,  32. 

Governors,  control  of  national  appoint- 
ments, 103,  159,  163,  175. 

Granger,  Gideon,  on  removals,  29,  41 ; 
on  division  of  offices,  33 ;  thanks  re- 
moved officer,  44  ;  removed,  56. 

Grant,  U.  S.,  on  tenure-of-office  act,  201, 
206  ;  nominations  rejected,  204  ;  advo- 
cates reform,  212;  and  patronage,  212- 
215. 

Grayson,  W.  J.,  on  spoils  system,  98. 

Great  Britain,  civil  service  example,  83, 
185,  209,  210,  216,  218;  standing  of 
civil  service  in,  233. 

Greeley,  Horace,  on  Tyler,  147  ;  contempt 
for  patronage,  158  ;  influence,  178. 

Green,  Duff,  friend  of  Edwards,  100, 103  ; 
and  Calhoun,  100;  edits  Telegraph, 
106  ;  on  petitions,  113  ;  and  patronage, 
114-117;  service,  123. 

Greene,  Nathaniel,  in  Washington,  115  ; 
appointment,  123. 


2/2 


INDEX. 


Greene,  Ray,  appointment  invalid,  32. 
Griffin,  Cyrus,  appointment,  15. 
Grosvenor,  C.  H.,  on  pensions,  240;  plan, 

242. 
Gunn,  James,  and  Savannah  appointments, 

14. 

Gurowski,  Adam,  candidacy,  179. 
Gwin,  W.  W.,  influence,  168. 

HAMILTON,  Alexander,  1 7  ;  and  Washing- 
ton, 15  ;  and  Adams,  21  ;  influence  in 
New  York,  18,  87,  89  ;  appointment  op- 
posed, 22-24  >  and  Coleman,  36 ;  on 
appointing  power,  191. 

Hamilton,  J.  A.,  on  removals,  29 ;  on 
office  seeking,  1 10 ;  and  Van  Buren, 
114;  on  service  under  Jackson,  122, 
129,  132. 

Hanna,  M.  A.,  181. 

"  Hard  Shells,"  influence,  165  j  prin- 
ciples, 179. 

Harrisburg,  post-office,  152. 

Harrison,  Benjamin,  and  patronage,  223- 
226,  237. 

Harrison,  W.  H.,  on  removals,  142 ;  death, 
147. 

Hart,  S.  B.,  appointment,  168. 

Hartford,  post-office,  121. 

Harvard  University,  gives  pensions,  241. 

Hawley,  J.  R.,  on  Reform  Bill,  219. 

Hayes,  R.  B.,  and  tenure-of-office  act, 
200 ;  nominations  rejected,  204 ;  and 
patronage,  215-217. 

Heath,  P.  S.,  allows  political  activity, 
236. 

Heth,  William,  advice  sought,  25. 

Higginson,  Stephen,  on  Adams,  21. 

Hill,  Isaac,  rejected  by  Senate,  119. 

Hoar,  G.  F.,  on  tenure-of-office  act,  202, 
206-208. 

Hoar,  Sherman,  reform  in  postal  service, 
230. 

House  of  Representatives,  favors  power 
of  executive,  23,  201,  206;  and  reform, 
2 1 6,  219  ;  civil  service  reform  commit- 
tee, 240. 

Hone,  Philip,  at  Washington,  130. 

Hopkins,  J.  H.,  247. 

Hopkinson,  Francis,  The  New  Roof,  5. 

Horr,  R.  G.,  on  Reform  Bill,  220. 

Howe,  T.  O.,  on  tenure-of-office  act, 
196. 


Hoyt,  Jesse,  demands  removals,  107;  col- 
lector, 139. 

Humphreys,  David,  removed,  38. 
Humphreys,  D.  C.,  resigns,  203. 
Hunter,  William,  long  service,  182. 
Huntington,  Jedediah,  loses  office,  55. 
Hutchinson,  Thomas,  and  patronage,  I. 

ILLINOIS,  patronage  in,  99-193;  contest 
for  senatorship,  168,  169;  reform,  229. 

Impeachment  of  Johnson,  199,  200. 

Inauguration,  Jefferson's,  109;  J.  Q. 
Adams's,  109;  Jackson's,  109,  no;  in 
1841,  142;  Taylor's,  161  ;  Fillmore's, 
164;  Lincoln's  second,  172;  John- 
son's, 187;  McKinley's,  226. 

Indiana,  Johnson's  changes,  190;  reform, 
229. 

Indianapolis,  postmaster  removed,  152. 

Indian  service,  203;  limited  term  ap- 
plied to,  86;  under  reform  rules,  224. 

Ingalls,  J.  J.,  on  tenure-of-office  act,  207; 
on  reform  act,  220,  221. 

Ingham,  S.  D.,  on  office-seekers,  1 10. 

Iowa,  limited  term  in,  86. 

Irishmen,  appointment  of,  50. 

Irving,  Washington,  secretary  of  legation, 

122. 

Irwin,  W.  W.,  and  Tyler,  152. 
Izard,  George,  appointment,  62. 

JACKSON,  Andrew,  on  appointment  of 
congressmen,  60,  130;  correspondence 
with  Monroe,  61,  62,  70,  105;  and 
limited  term,  86;  elements  in  his 
favor,  104;  and  patronage,  105-133; 
policy  predicted,  105-107;  policy  an- 
nounced, iu-112;  and  senate,  119; 
and  reform,  128-130;  and  Tyler,  154; 
and  spoils  system,  155,  and  Blair,  160. 

Jackson  Gazette,  on   spoils  system,  132. 

Jackson  Republican,  selected  by  Clay,  73. 

Jacobins.     See  Republicans. 

James,  T.  L.,  supports  Conkling,  205. 

Jarvis,  William,  appointment,  38. 

Jay,  John,  247;  appointment,  10;  and 
patronage,  89. 

Jay,  John (2),  investigates  civil  service,  216. 

Jefferson,  Thomas,  247;  appointment, 
10;  on  North  Carolina  applicants,  13; 
and  Adams,  21,  32;  and  federalists,  26; 
and  patronage,  29-51;  tests  public 


INDEX. 


273 


sentiment,  30-38;  policy  of  equlibrium, 
35,  44;  and  reform,  45-46;  on  four 
years'  law,  67,  85;  comments  on,  96, 
102;  example,  218. 

Jenckes,  T.  A.,  and  reform,  185, 196,  210- 
212. 

Jenckes  Bill,  211. 

Johnson,  Andrew,  favors  rotation,  166; 
and  patronage,  187-201  ;  attacked  by 
Sumner,  194 ;  and  Stanton,  198-200 ; 
impeached,  199. 

Johnson,  Reverdy,  favors  removals,  159 ; 
on  filling  vacancies,  191  ;  on  tenure  of 
office  act,  193  ;  on  four  years'  law,  195  ; 
appointment,  201. 

Judicial  service,  establishment,  9. 

Judiciary  Act  of  1801,  passage,  28;  re- 
peal, 40. 

Justices  of  the  Peace,  in  District  of  Colum- 
bia, 28,  31  ;  term  made  rotative,  81  ; 
term  limited,  84,  85  ;  importance  in 
New  York,  91. 

KANSAS,  appointments  in,  168. 

Kendall,  Amos,  181 ;  on  Jackson's  in- 
auguration, no;  opposed,  118;  ap- 
pointment, 123 ;  service,  123;  depart- 
mental changes,  127;  and  reform,  128, 
129. 

King,  Rufus,  and  Van  Rensselaer,  63; 
appointment,  72. 

King,  W.  R.,  and  Clay,  149. 

"  King's  Friends,"  and  patronage,  I. 

Kinney,  William,  opposes  Edwards,  116. 

Knox,  Henry,  247  ;  urges  removals,  20. 

LABORERS,  not  under  reform  rules,  221  ; 
registration,  225. 

Ladd,  Eliphalet,  urges  removals,  20. 

Lamb,  John,  appointment,  13. 

Lamprecht,  Karl,  209. 

Land  office  frauds,  136-137. 

Langdon  family,  influence,  95. 

Lansing,  John,  appointment  urged,  64. 

Lawrence,  Abbott,  and  Taylor,  162. 

Lee,  Henry,  and  Jackson,  123. 

Lee,  R.  H.,  on  customs  service,  10. 

Legislature.  See  House  of  Representa- 
tives, Senate. 

Leib,  Michael,  appointed  and  removed, 
56. 

Lewis,  William,  opposes  spoils  system, 
T 


108;  opposed,  118;  and  Jackson,  123; 
on  political  activity  of  office-holders, 
129;  and  Biddle,  128. 

Lexington  (Ky.),  post-office,  164. 

Liberal  Republicans,  advocate  reform, 
214,  215. 

Limited  term,  for  justices  of  the  peace 
in  District  of  Columbia,  28  ;  and  rota- 
tion, 84  ;  in  various  states,  84 ;  in  na- 
tional offices,  85,  86  ;  in  Massachusetts, 
96,  97  ;  favored  in  1883,  221.  See  also 
Four  Years'  Law,  Rotation. 

Lincoln,  Abraham,  opposes  Douglas,  168; 
and  patronage,  169  ;  on  power  of  dele- 
gation, 1 74 ;  on  power  of  governors, 
175;  on  ballot  for  postmasters,  176; 
offered  position,  178;  on  political  ac- 
tivity, 1 80;  buys  votes,  1 80;  on  vet- 
eran preference,  238. 

Lincoln,  Levi,  political  activity,  50;  and 
proscription,  96. 

Lincoln,  Levi  (2),  and  Tyler,  151;  col- 
lector, 148. 

Lindsay,  William,  collector,  25,  26. 

Lisbon,  consul,  38. 

Literary  men,  appointment,  122. 

Little,  Robert,  sermon,  106. 

Livingston,  Edward,  on  novelists  as  dip- 
lomats, 122. 

Livingstons,  and  Washington,  15;  and 
Jefferson,  48;  influence  in  New  York, 
87;  alienated  by  neglect,  89. 

Loans,  Commissioner  of,  sinecure  office, 

5°»  5'- 

Local  factions,  represented  at  Washing- 
ton, 175. 

Local  organizations,  power  over  appoint- 
ments, 148. 

Local  service,  changes,  43,  44,  126,  151, 
179;  spoils  system  appointments,  148, 

I73-I75- 

Lodge,  H.  C.,  reform  in  post-offices  and 
consular  service,  230;  on  reform  sys- 
tem, 242. 

Long  service,  instances,  182. 

Louisiana,  Burr's  patronage,  48;  limited 
term  in,  85;  office-seekers  from,  178; 
and  tenure-of-office  act,  196;  reform, 
229. 

Low,  Mr.,  removed,  121. 

Lowndes,  William,  on  military  appoint- 
ments, 53  j  opposes  caucus,  59. 


274 


INDEX. 


MCANERY,  George,  on  McKinley's  ex- 
emption order,  227. 

Machinery  for  distribution  of  office,  use 
by  federalists,  21-26;  under  Jefferson, 
47-49>  under  Jackson,  113-121;  in 
1841,  147,  148;  under  spoils  system, 
173-185. 

McKean,  Thomas,  on  appointing  power, 
3;  and  patronage,  93-94. 

McKinley,  William,  235,  237;  and  pat- 
ronage, 226-228;  on  exemptions,  227; 
regulates  removals,  228;  and  consular 
service,  231;  extends  veterans'  prefer- 
ence, 239. 

McLane,  Louis,  on  conduct  of  senate,  1 19. 

McLean,  John,  131;  retained  by  Adams, 
72;  and  Edwards,  103;  and  proscrip- 
tion, 108-109;  appointments  by,  125; 
on  appointing  power,  191. 

McNeil,  W.  G.,  removed,  160. 

Macon,  Nathaniel,  and  reform,  56-60, 
73;  and  Crawford,  68. 

Madison,  James,  207;  opposes  proscrip- 
tion, 52  ;  and  patronage,  52-56  ;  on 
limited  term,  67,  82;  on  power  of  re- 
moval, 120,  1 86,  191. 

Madisonian,  on  removals,  142,  144;  and 
Whigs,  149;  on  Bancroft's  resignation, 
150. 

Mail  service,  in  1788,  4;  railroad,  219, 
223. 

Maine,  control  of  appointments,  48;  ro- 
tation, 82. 

Mar  bury  vs.  Madison,  31. 

Marchant,  Henry,  on  Rhode  Island  ap- 
pointments, 12,  49. 

Marcy,  W.  L.,  on  spoils  system,  133; 
favors  removals,  159;  influence  in  1853, 
165;  on  rotation,  166. 

Marshal,  importance,  38;  fixed  term,  82; 
actual  term,  250.  See  also  Sheriff. 

Marshall,  John,  and  Adams,  21;  on  ap- 
pointing power,  191. 

Martin,  J.  L.,  removed,  148. 

Martin,  Luther,  charges  against,  5. 

Maryland,  rotation,  80. 

Mason,  George,  on  appointing  power,  2. 

Mason,  J.  Y.,  opposes  removals,  159;  re- 
tains office,  1 60. 

Massachusetts,  and  Virginia,  8;  removals, 
39;  rotation,  81,  82;  spoils  system,  95- 
98;  example,  225;  reform,  229. 


Massachusetts  Centinel,  on  salaries,  45. 

Massachusetts  Spy,  on  spoils  system,  131, 
132. 

Maury,  Mr.,  sanctity  of  his  commission, 
125. 

Melville,  Thomas,  removed,  131. 

Members  of  Congress,  and  civil  office,  4, 
56-60;  pay,  60;  influence  under  Con- 
federation, 21 ;  control  of  appointments, 
47»  63>  64,  79,  113,  173-175.  228;  ap- 
pointed to  office,  60,  130,  178;  pro- 
posing nomination  to  be  fined,  213; 
ambitions,  240. 

Merit  system.     See  Reform. 

Merry,  Samuel,  Tyler  on,  152. 

Mexico,  appointments  during  war  with, 
161. 

Michigan,  limited  term  in,  85. 

"  Midnight  appointments,"  Jefferson  and, 
31,  32;  prevented  in  1829,  108. 

Mifflin,  Thomas,  and  patronage,  92,  93. 

Military  officers,  applicants  for  office,  7; 
appointed  to  civil  positions,  37,  54,  77, 
177.  See  also  Military  Service,  Vet- 
erans. 

Military  service,  bi-partisan,  17,  53;  in 
Mexican  War,  161;  in  Civil  War,  171; 
under  Johnson,  189;  protected  from 
removal,  192. 

Miller,  Mr.,  on  political  reform  in  1829, 
150. 

Miller,  Warner,  on  reform  bill,  218,  219. 

Milwaukee,  reform  association,  217. 

Mississippi,  168. 

Missouri,  limited  term  in,  85. 

Mobile,  collector  removed,  152. 

Monroe,  James,  on  senatorial  influence, 
22-24;  nomination  contested,  52;  and 
patronage,  60-64;  correspondence  with 
Jackson,  61,  62;  opposes  Crawford,  70. 

Morehead,  J.  T.,  on  patronage,  145. 

Morris,  Gouverneur,  recall,  22;  on  judi- 
ciary act,  28. 

Mugwumps,  and  reform,  222. 

Muhlenberg,  F.  A.  C.,  appointment,  17. 

NAPLES,  charge  at,  160. 
Nashville,  printing  of  laws  at,  73. 
Nashville    Gazette,   announces   Jackson's 

policy,  in. 
National  Civil   Service  Reform  League, 

formed,  217;  activity,  232. 


INDEX. 


275 


National  Intelligencer,  loses  printing,  73, 
1 08;  given  printing,  149;  character, 
178. 

National  Journal,  official  paper,  73;  on 
appointment  of  McLean,  109. 

National  Republican  convention  of  1831, 
140. 

Naval  service,  removals,  161;  regulated, 
191. 

Navy  yards,  registration  of  laborers,  225. 

Negroes,  representation  at  Washington, 
236. 

Nelson,  Samuel,  associate  justice,  153. 

Nepotism,  Washington  and,  7;  Adams 
and,  18;  Jefferson  and,  50;  Whigs 
and,  148;  Lincoln  and,  171. 

Nevada,  admission,  171. 

New  England,  rotation,  80. 

New  Hampshire,  removals,  19;  rotation, 
80,  8i;  no  spoils  system,  95. 

New  Haven,  collectorship  contest,  32-38. 

New  London,  removals  demanded,  54. 

New  Netherlands,  rotation,  80. 

New  Orleans,  change  in  collectorship,  55; 
land  frauds,  137;  surveyor  removed, 
152. 

New  York,  224;  council  of  appointment, 
2,  87;  discussion  of  constitution,  3; 
patronage,  5-6,  127,  186;  activity  of 
national  office-holders  in,  64-65;  poli- 
tics, 87;  election  of  office-holders,  176, 
242;  reform,  219,  229;  customs  service, 
250. 

New  York  City,  importance,  5,  140,  149; 
collectorship,  18,  54,  140, 149,  152,  179; 
naval  office,  48,  152;  appointments  in 
1801,  48;  cost  of  collection  of  customs, 
140;  investigation,  145;  surveyor,  152; 
appointments  under  Taylor,  163;  and 
under  Pierce,  165;  and  in  1857,  167; 
and  under  Lincoln,  177;  assessments 
at,  1 80;  appointments  under  Grant, 
213;  and  in  1881,  205;  under  reform 
rules,  216;  post-office,  219. 

New  York  Civil  Service  Reform  Associa- 
tion, 217. 

New  York  constitutional  convention  of 
1801,  90;  of  1821,  92. 

New  York  Evening  Post,  on  first  proscrip- 
tion in  New  York,  90. 

New  York  Herald,  on  spoils  system,  155; 
on  Pierce's  appointments,  165;  advises 


Buchanan,  167;  on  division  of  offices, 
174;  importance,  178;  on  spoils  sys- 
tem, 184. 

New  York  Senate,  control  of  appoint- 
ments, 91. 

Newport,  217;  removals  demanded  at,  54. 

Newspapers,  carriage,  4;  influence  in 
1828,  123;  to  publish  laws,  126;  in 
1841,  144;  of  New  York  supplant  those 
of  Washington,  178;  and  reform,  210. 
See  also  Editors,  Franking,  Official 
paper. 

Niles,  Hezekiah,  on  congressmen  as 
office-seekers,  59  ;  on  appointment  of 
editors,  123  ;  on  retrenchment,  129. 

Niles,  J.  M.,  postmaster,  121. 

Noah,  M.  M.,  rejected  by  senate,  119; 
naval  officer  and  editor,  123. 

Nominations,  daily  printed,  207. 

Norfolk,  contest  for  collectorship,  24-26 ; 
superfluous  officers,  77  ;  staple  of  officers 
reduced,  129;  investigation,  145. 

North,  demands  rotation,  166. 

North  Carolina,  opposes  eligibility  of 
congressmen  for  office,  4 ;  Washing- 
ton's appointments,  13. 

Northcote,  Sir  S.  H.,  consulted,  211. 

Northwestern  Ordinance,  provides  limited 
terms,  85. 

Northwest  Territory,  appointments  for,  IO. 

Norton,  Mr.,  postmaster,  121. 

OFFICE,  danger  of  hereditary,  26;  burden, 
80  ;  limited  term  for  administrative,  84 ; 
sale,  94,  95. 

Office-holders,  choice,  1-3,  175,  176;  as  a 
class,  3,  35-37,  78 ;  character  under 
Washington,  6-14;  political  opinions, 
9, 125  ;  character  under  Adams,  17, 18  ; 
sought  by  federalists,  24;  character 
under  federalists,  29  ;  political  activity, 
43,  44,  123,  124,  134,  171,  179,  180, 
1 88,  235,  236  ;  character  under  Jeffer- 
son, 49,  50;  in  1841, 150 ;  under  Tyler, 
153;  under  Polk,  161  ;  under  Pierce, 
165;  under  Buchanan,  169;  under  Lin- 
coln, 172 ;  from  1845  to  1865, 177-185  ; 
special  courts  for,  211  ;  character  under 
reform  rules,  233,  234 ;  choice  by  states, 
242  ;  of  Confederation  appointed  under 
Constitution,  247;  state,  appointed 
national,  247  ;  actual  term,  248-251. 


INDEX. 


Office-seekers,  persistency  in  1829,  no; 

in  1841,  143;  in  1861,  169. 
Official    paper,    change,    73,    149,    160; 

Green    publishes,    1 23 ;     Globe   made, 

124;  discontinued,  167,  178. 
Official  Register,  value,  126. 
Ohio,   limited    term    in,   84 ;    Johnson's 

changes,  190. 

"Old  Fogies,"  definition,  165. 
Oregon,  178,  192,  193. 
Osgood,  Samuel,  appointment,  10,  247. 

PACA,  William,  political  opinion,  13. 
Page,  Francis,  appointment,  51. 
Page,  John,  appointment,  50,  51. 
Panic  of  1837,  effect  on  civil  service,  135, 

136. 
Parker,  Josiah,  and  Norfolk  collectorship, 

25- 

Parsons,  S.  H.,  247. 

Parton,  James,  on  "  Successful  Politi- 
cians," 117. 

Party  organization  and  spoils  system,  235. 

Pass  examinations,  introduced,  183,  212  j 
for  consular  service,  231. 

Patronage,  in  colonies,  i;  use  in  1787, 
4-6;  reduced,  45,  46;  discussed,  52- 
78 ;  under  Monroe,  60-64 ;  investi- 
gated in  1826,  73-75;  abuse,  79;  ex- 
tent in  New  York,  90 ;  used  by  Fillmore, 
164  ;  by  Buchanan,  168,  169  ;  struggle 
for,  186-208  ;  controlled  by  senate,  208; 
continued  use,  234,  235.  See  also  Spoils 
system. 

Pendleton,  G.  H.,  introduces  reform  bill, 
218,  219. 

Penn,  William,  introduces  rotation,  80. 

Pennsylvania,  discussion  of  constitution, 
3 ;  removals,  40 ;  appointments  in 
1801,  48 ;  removals  demanded,  48 ; 
removals,  56;  constitution  of  1776,  80, 
92 ;  rotation,  80,  82  ;  limited  term  in, 
84 ;  spoils  system  introduced,  92-94 ; 
politicians  criticised,  149. 

Pennsylvania  Railroad,  gives  pensions, 
241. 

Pensions,  for  civil  servants,  240,  241  ; 
commissioner  of,  temporary  office,  86. 

Petitions,  weight  under  Adams,  26 ;  un- 
der Jackson,  113. 

Philadelphia,  proscription  in,  93  ;  changes, 
127  ;  Ferguson  made  naval  officer,  149  ; 


postmaster  removed,  152  ;  importance, 
167;  convention  of  1866,  189,  190; 
reform,  217,  229. 

Philadelphia  Convention,  an  appointing 
power,  1-3  ;  on  rotation,  80. 

Philippines,  merit  system  in,  228. 

Pickering,  Timothy,  appointment,  8  ;  op- 
poses Adams,  18  ;  takes  printing  from 
Freneau,  20 ;  removal,  21  ;  charges 
against,  47  ;  reports  debate,  52. 

Pierce,  Franklin,  and  patronage,  164, 
165;  and  his  Cabinet,  177;  and  mili- 
tary applicants,  177. 

Pinckney,  Charles,  appointment,  38. 

Pinckney,  Thomas,  nomination  opposed, 

53- 

Platt,  T.  C,  and  senatorial  courtesy,  205  ; 
defeat,  206. 

Plummer,  William,  why  appointed,  56. 

Poindexter,  George,  investigates  patron- 
age, 145,  179. 

Political  activity,  Lincoln  on,  171.  See 
also  Office-holders. 

Politicians,  appointed  to  office,  149,  178. 
See  also  Office-holders,  Qualifications. 

Polk,  J.  K.,  and  Tyler,  154 ;  and  patron- 
age, 159-161. 

Poolers  Index,  illustrates  reform  move- 
ment, 217. 

Porter,  P.  B.,  writes  to  Clay,  149. 

Portland  (Me.)  collector  removed,  152 ; 
collector  appointed,  167. 

Porto  Rico,  competitive  examinations,  228. 

Portsmouth,  removal  at,  19. 

Portugal,  J.  Q.  Adams  minister  to, 
19. 

Postal  service,  176;  editors  in,  40-41, 
178;  proscription  in,  40,  64-65,  125; 
importance  of  patronage,  108 ;  repub- 
licans ballot  for,  176;  reform,  221, 
230 ;  election  in,  242. 

President,  control  of  appointments,  2,  3, 
177,  186-208;  term,  199-200;  and 
senate,  203-208 ;  control  of  reform 
system,  219,  244. 

Price,  W.  H.,  district  attorney,  139. 

Prohibitionist    party,     advocate    reform, 

215,  222. 

Promotion,  77,  182;   by  seniority,  210; 

in  consular  service,  231. 
Proscription.     See  Removals. 
Providence,  174;  naval  office,  12. 


INDEX. 


277 


Prussia,  J.  Q.  Adams  minister  to,  19  ;  civil 

service  example,  211. 
Public  printing,  Clay  and,  73,  149. 

QUALIFICATIONS  of  office-holders,  left 
to  the  President,  6;.  under  Washing- 
ton, 6-14  ;  geographical,  8,  50,  87,  170- 
171;  political,  9,  17-18,  29,  64,  189; 
under  Adams,  17-18;  Jefferson,  30, 
35-36,  46-5 1  ;  military,  54 ;  under 
Madison,  55;  Jackson,  121-123;  in 
1841,  148;  under  Tyler,  153;  Lincoln, 
170-172;  from  1845  to  l865»  177-181; 
under  reform  rules,  233,  234.  See  also 
Office-holders. 

Quincy,  Josiah,  on  reform,  57,  58. 

RANDALL,  A.  W.,  and  patronage,  188. 
Randolph,  Edmund,  on  appointing  power, 

2  ;   removed,  14. 

Randolph,  John,  minister  to  Russia,  123. 
Rantoul,  Robert,  Jr.,  appointed  by  Tyler, 

*53- 

Reform,  proposed  by  Macon,  56-60;  in 
1826,  74,  75 ;  in  ^the  fifties,  182- 
185 ;  in  1867,  197 ;  origin,  209 ;  and 
the  senate,  213;  tried,  213;  discon- 
tinued, 214;  Hayes  aids,  215,  216; 
movement  for,  217;  act,  218-221;  as 
campaign  issue,  222 ;  extension  of 
rules,  223,  225,  228,  229;  exemptions 
from  rules,  226-227  ;  spread,  229 ; 
effects,  232-237  ;  dangers  to,  237-243  ; 
attacked,  239-242. 

Reformers,  disappointed  in  Grant,  214 ; 
dissatisfied  with  Hayes,  217  ;  activity, 
217  ;  influence  in  Congress,  220 ;  dissat- 
isfied with  Cleveland,  222 ;  with  Har- 
rison, 224  ;  aims,  231,  232  ;  attacked, 
240  ;  character,  243. 

Reinstatement,  of  veterans,  226  ;  McKin- 
ley  facilitates,  227  ;  danger,  237. 

Removal  power,  120,  141,  186-208. 

Removals,  Washington's,  13  ;  J.Adams's, 
19-21  ;  first  political,  19  ;  Jefferson's, 
32,  38,  41,  42,  44;  Jefferson  and  Cole- 
man  on,  35-37;  popular,  38,  51,  107, 
132;  how  to  estimate,  43  ;  Madison's, 
54,  55  ;  Madison  on,  54  ;  from  1803  to 
1829,  76,  77 ;  in  New  York,  89,  90; 
in  Pennsylvania,  93  ;  in  Massachusetts, 
97  ;  under  Jackson,  125  ;  in  1841,  142, 


150;  Tyler's,  152-154  ;  and  spoils  sys- 
tem, 155;  Polk's,  159,  160;  Taylor's, 
163,  164;  Pierce's,  166;  Buchanan's, 
1 68  ;  Lincoln's,  170;  Johnson's,  189, 
190;  tenure-of-office  act,  202-204;  for 
good  cause  only,  210,  211,  228-231; 
Cleveland's,  222  ;  Harrison's,  223,  224. 

Replacement,  181,  182;  in  1 80 1,  46,  47; 
of  suspended  officers,  202,  203. 

Reporter  of  Supreme  Court,  office  tempo- 
rary, 225. 

Republic,  on  reform,  161. 

Republican,  on  Edwards  and  Crawford, 
101. 

Republican  Party,  in  1861,  169,  171;  and 
Johnson,  188^-201;  and  tenure-of-office 
act,  201-208;  and  reform,  215, 217,  218, 
222,  243;  and  exemptions,  226-228. 

Republicans,  form  party,  13;  and  Wash- 
ington, 22, 24;  demand  recognition,  30. 

Retirement,  plan  for  compulsory,  240. 
See  also  Pensions. 

Retrenchment,  under  Jefferson,  45,  46; 
under  Jackson,  128,  129. 

Revolution,  influence  on  New  York  poli- 
tics, 87. 

Rhett,  R.  B.,  on  Tyler,  152. 

Rhode  Island,  21 1;  appointments  by 
Washington,  11-13;  Crawford's  influ- 
ence in,  69;  delegation  and  Providence 
post-office,  174. 

Rhodes,  Zachariah,  appointment,  12. 

Richmond,  commissioner  of  loans,  50. 

Richmond  Inquirer,  on  reform,  106;  on 
Jackson's  policy,  III. 

Ripley,  E.  W.,  and  military  appointments, 

54- 

Ritchie,  Thomas,  edits  Union,  160. 

Rittenhouse,  Daniel,  treasurer,  92. 

Rives,  J.  C.,  founds  Globe,  124. 

Robertson,  W.  H.,  collector,  205,  206. 

Rodney,  Caesar,  and  Jefferson,  48. 

Roosevelt,  Theodore,  checks  rotation, 
167;  in  civil  service  commission,  224, 
244;  on  consular  service,  250. 

Rotation,  Monroe  and,  67;  Adams  and, 
72;  development,  79-86;  in  New  York, 
80;  in  New  England,  80 ;  in  Pennsyl- 
vania, 80;  and  elective  office,  80,  81; 
for  education,  81;  for  protection,  8i; 
and  executive  office,  81;  in  England, 
83;  and  administrative  office,  83;  final 


278 


INDEX. 


significance,  86;   avowed  by  Polk,  159; 

Buchanan   perfects,   166;    checked   by 

Roosevelt,   167;    checked  by  Lincoln, 

172;    never  fully  adopted,    181,    182; 

effect,   233,    237.      See    also    Limited 

term. 

Rules.     See  Reform. 
Russell,  Jonathan,  nomination  contested, 

52. 

Russia,  John  Randolph  minister  to,  123. 
Rynders,  Isaiah,  appointment,  168. 

ST.  CLAIR,  Arthur,  247. 

St.  Clair,  Matthew,  investigates  patronage, 

145- 

St.  Louis,  receiver,  152. 

San  Francisco,  reform  association,  217. 

Sargent,  Winthrop,  247. 

Savannah,  appointments,  14;  collector 
removed,  152. 

Schenectady,  objects  to  appointments,  88. 

Schnell,  Augustus,  appointment,  167. 

Schofield,  J.  M.,  succeeds  Stanton,  200. 

Schurz,  Carl,  promotes  reform,  212,  213; 
appointment,  215. 

Schuyler,  Philip,  surveyor-general,  88. 

Schuyler  faction,  strengthened  by  national 
appointments,  15;  influence  in  New 
York,  87. 

Scientific  positions,  exempted  from  rules, 
227. 

Scoville,  J.  A.,  on  Tyler's  appointments, 
152. 

Seagrove,  James,  on  Georgia  politics,  14; 
on  choice  of  office-holders,  22. 

Seaton,  Mrs.  William,  on  Adams's  inau- 
guration, 109. 

Secretary  of  War,  changes  in  office,  249. 

Senate.  See  United  States  Senate  and 
the  states  by  name. 

Senatorial  courtesy,  101,  205.  See  also 
Senators,  United  States  Senate. 

Senators,  demand  rotation,  72,  86;  and 
appointments,  100,  101,  147,  174.  See 
also  United  States  Senate. 

Seward,  W.  F.,  on  office  seeking,  161; 
and  Taylor,  162,  163;  and  Fillmore, 
164;  and  Chase,  177;  on  needs  of 
state  department,  201;  orders  investi- 
gation of  European  civil  service,  210. 

Sheriff,  rotative  office,  82;  term  in  Vir- 
ginia, Pennsylvania,  and  New  Hamp- 


shire, 82;  in  Connecticut,  83;  in 
England,  83;  in  Massachusetts,  97. 
See  also  Marshal. 

Sherman,  John,  amends  tenure-of-office 
bill,  195;  on  removing  power,  220. 

Sherman,  Roger,  on  appointing  power,  4; 
on  senatorial  influence,  22. 

Sickles,  D.  E.,  influence,  168. 

Smith,  Jeremiah,  urges  removals,  19. 

Smith,  Larkin,  and  Jefferson,  49. 

Smith,  W.  S.,  seeks  office,  18. 

Smythe,  Alexander,  not  nominated,  59. 

"Soft  Shells,"  influence  in  1853,  165. 

South,  demands  few  removals,  42,  43,  132, 
140;  no  spoils  system,  98,  99,  157,  166; 
few  removals,  126,  168;  influence  of 
civil  war,  185;  Johnson's  appointments, 
190;  representation  in  Washington,  236. 

South  Carolina,  uses  limited  term,  84;  no 
spoils  system,  98. 

Southard,  S.  L.,  appointment,  63. 

Spanish  War,  effect  on  civil  service,  226 ; 
and  veterans'  preference,  239. 

Special  agents,  number  reduced,  201. 

Spencer,  Judge,  and  patronage,  90,  91. 

Spoils  system,  218;  under  Jefferson,  51  ; 
genesis,  79-104;  in  New  York,  86-91, 
94  ;  in  Pennsylvania,  92-95  ;  establish- 
ment, 105-133;  confirmed,  134-157; 
significance,  156;  triumphant,  158- 
171  ;  machinery,  173-185  ;  results,  135, 
184,  233  ;  substitute,  235. 

Springfield  (111.),  postmaster,  180. 

Stanton,  E.,  to  be  protected,  196  ;  sus- 
pended, 198;  removed,  199,  200. 

States,  and  appointing  power,  2,  3  ;  office- 
holders drawn  from,  9,  10-13  ;  require 
different  treatment,  42,  43  ;  spoils  sys- 
tem begins  in,  79  ;  nineteen  adopt  rota- 
tion, 81 ;  eleven  make  sheriff's  term 
rotative,  82;  reform,  217,  229;  reform 
did  not  begin  in,  209-210  ;  division  of 
offices  between,  174,  175,  221,  235. 

Statesman,  favors  Calhoun,  115. 

Story,  Joseph,  on  Jackson's  inauguration, 
109. 

Strong,  Caleb,  and  patronage,  98. 

Subtreasury  Act,  effect  of  repeal,  150. 

Sullivan,  James,  and  patronage,  96. 

Sumner,  Charles,  185  ;  and  tenure-of- 
office  act,  194-196;  and  Seward,  201  ; 
and  reform,  210. 


INDEX. 


279 


Suspensions,  how  acted  on,  202-204.    See 

also  Removals. 
Swartwout,  Samuel,  favors  spoils  system, 

114;  collector,  114;  on  qualifications  in 

1829,  121  ;  defaults,  139. 
Symmes,  J.  C.,  247. 

TAFT  COMMISSION,    adopts    competitive 

examinations,  228. 
Tallmadge,  James,  on  power  of  senators, 

147. 
Tammany  Hall,  in  New  York  City,  87 ; 

in  Rhode  Island,  95  ;   demands  offices, 

179. 

Taylor,  Francis,  candidate  for  collector- 
ship,  25. 
Taylor,   Zachary,  and  patronage,  161- 

164;  and  governors,  175;  and  Lincoln, 

178. 
Telegraph,  upholds   spoils   system,  132; 

demands  removals,  107. 
Tenure  of  office,  actual,  248-251. 
Tenure-of-Office  Act,   192-209 ;   call  for, 

194, 195;  operation,  188-206;  changed, 

20 1  ;    repeal,    206-208  ;     and    reform, 

207.     See  also  Removals. 
Texas,  240  ;  annexation  and  patronage, 

153. 

Thomas,  L.  B.,  and  Edwards,  100. 
Thomas,  Lorenzo,  succeeds  Stanton,  199. 
Thompson,  Ebenezer,  appointment,  12. 
Thompson,  H.  S.,  civil  service  commis- 
sion, 244. 

Thompson,  R.  R.,  on  judiciary  bill,  40. 
Thomson,   Charles,    attempt    to    provide 

for,  10. 

Tilden,  S.  J.,  and  reform,  215. 
Tocqueville,  Alexis  de,  on  office  seeking, 

132. 

Tracy,  B.  F.,  regulates  navy  yards,  225. 
Transfer  of  government  in  1789,  1 6. 
Transfers,     McKinley     facilitates,     227; 

danger,  238. 

Travel,  influence,  27,  210,  237. 
Trevelyan,  C.  E.,  consulted,  211. 
Tribune,    on  Tyler's   proscription,    153; 

reports  on  patronage,  158;  importance, 

178;  on  spoils  system,  184. 
Troup  faction  in  Georgia,  99. 
Trumbull,  Lyman,  213;  on  tenure-of-office 

act,  202. 
Tryon  County,  on  appointments,  88. 


Tyler,  John,  and  patronage,  1841,  147  ; 

and   patronage,    1843-1845,    151-154; 

and    Harrison,     151;     and  Polk,    154, 

1 60;   removals,  252. 
Tyler,  John,  Sr.,  on  Washington,  15. 
Tyler,  L.  G.,  on  John  Tyler,  151. 

UNCLASSIFIED  service,  bills  to  regulate, 
232. 

Union,  relation  to  Buchanan,  167;  char- 
acter, 178. 

United  States  Bank,  term  of  directors  of 
first,  85;  attack  on  second,  128. 

United  States  Constitution,  and  appoint- 
ing power,  2,  3,  190-192. 

United  States  Senate,  appointing  power, 
2,  3;  power  feared,  3,  4;  and  J. 
Adams,  18;  and  patronage,  22-24,  75> 
120,  141,  182,  186-208;  and  Madison, 
52;  and  J.  Q.  Adams,  108;  and  Jack- 
son, 108;  and  Tyler,  152;  and  any 
president,  186;  and  Lincoln,  187;  and 
Johnson,  198-200;  from  1869  to  1891, 
203-205.  See  also  Senatorial  courtesy, 
Senators. 

United  States  Supreme  Court,  appoint- 
ment to,  in  1844,  153;  on  removing 
power,  191. 

VACANCIES  in  recess,  power  to  fill,  3,  191, 
192;  pay  of  appointees,  187. 

Van  Buren,  John,  influence,  168. 

Van  Buren,  Martin,  and  Van  Rensselaer, 
63;  secures  removals,  65;  on  office- 
seekers,  no;  and  patronage  in  1829, 
114,  115,  117,  118,  122,  125-127;  re- 
jected by  senate,  119;  reputation,  134; 
and  patronage,  134-143. 

Van  Rensselaer,  Solomon,  appointment, 
62;  and  Jackson,  118;  removed,  153. 

Van  Rensselaers,  influence  in  New  York, 
87. 

Van  Winkle,  P.  G.,  amends  tenure-of- 
office  bill,  195. 

Varnum,  J.  M.,  why  not  appointed,  10. 

Vermont,  appointments  in,  88. 

Vest,  G.  P.,  on  reform  bill,  218. 

Veterans,  special  reinstatement  regula- 
tion, 226;  preference,  238-239.  See 
also  Military  officers. 

Vice-President,  control  of  appointments, 
163;  and  civil  service,  211,  213. 


280 


INDEX. 


Virginia,  opposes  eligibility  of  congress- 
men for  office,  4;  and  Massachusetts,  8; 
demands  no  removals,  43;  slighted  in 
1829,  126;  customs  service,  250. 

WALKER,  R.  J.,  on  Tyler,  154;  opposes 
removals,  159;  influence  in  1857,  167. 

Warfield,  H.  R.,  and  election  of  1825,  71. 

Washington,  D.C.,  221,  236;  in  1829, 
105,  no,  131;  in  1825,  109;  and  Jack- 
son, 130;  in  1801,  131;  investigation, 
145;  in  1861,  169;  under  reform  rules, 
213;  in  1897,  226« 

Washington,  George,  and  patronage,  6- 
16,  21-24,  J77;  change  of  attitude, 
13,  14;  and  Adams,  18. 

Watkins,  Tobias,  defalcation,  128. 

Watterson,  H.  M.,  upbraids  Whigs,  145. 

Webster,  Daniel,  and  election  of  1825, 
71,  72;  and  Jackson,  105,  no;  on  spoils 
system,  140,  141 ;  and  patronage,  146- 
147;  on  Polk,  161 ;  on  assessments  and 
accounts,  150;  opposes  pass  examina- 
tions, 183. 

Webster,  Fletcher,  appointment,  148. 

Webster,  Noah,  on  local  appointments, 
209. 

Webster,  Pelatiah,  on  rotation,  81. 

Weed,  Thurlow,  on  New  York  collector- 
ship,  149;  and  Taylor,  163;  and  Fill- 
more,  164;  and  Chase,  177. 

West,  demands  rotation,  166. 

West  Point,  selection  of  cadets,  219. 

Wheaton,  Henry,  why  appointed,  56;  not 
removed  in  1829,  125;  recall,  161. 


Whig  Party,  opposes  spoils  system,  140; 
plan  of  reform,  142;  reject  their  pro- 
gramme, 144, 145, 150, 151 ;  character  of 
appointees,  150;  confirm  spoils  system, 
151;  and  patronage,  161-164. 

Whipple,  Joseph,  removed,  20;   replaced, 

47- 

White,  Hugh,  investigates  patronage,  73; 
on  committee  on  patronage,  141. 

Wilkinson,  James,  seeks  office,  54. 

Wilkinson,  Ruben,  seeks  office,  14. 

Williams,  D.  R.,  opposes  caucus,  59. 

Williams,  G.  H.,  on  tenure-of-office  act, 
192,  194,  195. 

Wilson,  Henry,  213. 

Wilson,  James,  on  appointing  power,  3; 
on  abuse  of  patronage,  5. 

Wirt,  William,  on  departmental  appoint- 
ment, 62;  and  Edwards,  99;  on  "sen- 
atorial courtesy,"  101. 

Wisconsin,  tenure  of  judges,  86;  governor 
removed,  152;  Johnson's  changes,  190; 
reform,  229. 

Wise,  H.  A.,  appointment,  153. 

Wolcott,  Oliver,  transferred  to  national 
service,  9;  and  Hamilton,  18;  removes 
Coxe,  19;  seeks  advice,  25. 

Wood,  Fernando,  influence,  168. 

Woodbury,  Levi,  and  land  office  frauds, 

138. 

Wooster,  Mary,  Washington  writes  to,  7. 
Wright,  Robert,  opposes  reform,  57. 

"  YOUNG  AMERICANS,"  influence  in  1853, 
165. 


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